History and hierarchy : the foreign policy evolution of modern Japan by Funaiole, Matthew
HISTORY AND HIERARCHY
THE FOREIGN POLICY EVOLUTION OF MODERN JAPAN
Matthew P. Funaiole
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
2014




Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/5843
This item is protected by original copyright
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons Licence
History	  and	  Hierarchy
The	  Foreign	  Policy	  Evolution	  of	  Modern	  Japan
This	  thesis	  is	  submitted	  in	  partial	  fulﬁllment











This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   foreign	   policy	   evolution	   of	   Japan	   from	   the	   time	   of	   its	  
modernization	   during	   the	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century	   though	   the	   present.	   It	   is	   argued	  
that	   infringements	   upon	   Japanese	   sovereignty	   and	   geopolitical	   vulnerabilities	   have	  
conditioned	   Japanese	   leaders	   towards	   power	   seeking	   policy	   objectives.	   The	   core	  
variables	   of	   statehood,	   namely	   power	   and	   sovereignty,	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   state	  
elites	   are	   traced	   over	   this	   broad	   time	   period	   to	   provide	  a	  historical	   foundation	   for	  
framing	  contemporary	  analyses	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy.
	   To	   facilitate	   this	   research,	   a	   unique	   framework	   that	   accounts	   for	   both	   the	  
foreign	   policy	   preferences	   of	   Japanese	   leaders	   and	   the	   external	   constraints	   of	   the	  
international	  system	  is	  developed.	  Neoclassical	  realist	  understandings	  of	  self-­‐help	  and	  
relative	   power	   distributions	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   presented	   analysis,	   while	  
constructivism	  oﬀers	  crucial	  insights	  into	  ideational	  factors	  that	   inﬂuence	  state	  elites.	  
Social	   Identity	   Theory,	   a	   social	   psychology	   theory	   that	   examines	   group	  behavior,	   is	  
integrated	  to	  conceptualize	  the	  available	  policy	  options.
	   Surveying	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   through	   this	   framework	   clariﬁes	   the	  
seemingly	  irreconcilable	  shifts	   in	  Japan’s	   foreign	  policy	  history	  and	  clearly	  delineates	  
between	   political	   groups	   that	   embody	   distinct	   policy	   strategies	   and	   norms.	  
Consequently,	   the	   main	   contribution	   of	   this	   thesis	   lies	   in	   the	   development	   of	   a	  
theoretical	   framework	   that	   is	   uniquely	   positioned	   to	   identify	   historical	   trends	   in	  
foreign	  policy.	  Owing	  to	  the	  numerous	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  history,	  
this	   research	   identiﬁes	   and	   examines	   three	  distinguishable	   Japanese	   “states”:	   	   Meiji	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The	  geopolitics	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Paciﬁc	  region	  are	  at	  the	  center	  of	  global	  power	  dynamics.	  
The	   region	   is	  home	   to	   the	   three	   largest	  global	   economies.	   It	   contains	   several	   of	  the	  
most	  advanced	  militaries	  in	  the	  world,	  including	  the	  lone	  remaining	  superpower,	  and	  
four	   nuclear	   states.	   The	   waters	   of	   the	   Paciﬁc	   are	   host	   to	   a	   number	   of	   ongoing	  
territorial	   disputes.	   Controversies	   over	   ballistic	   missile	   technology,	   national	  
sovereignty,	  and	  democratic	  freedoms	  have	  at	  various	  times	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War	  left	  the	  region’s	  great	  powers	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another.
	   Such	   a	   concentration	  of	  power	  requires	  nuanced	  and	   insightful	   research	   that	  
sheds	   light	   on	   the	   prevailing	   security	   concerns	   of	   the	   region.	   Over	   the	   past	   two	  
decades,	   questions	  regarding	   the	  future	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Paciﬁc	  have	  centered	  on	  China’s	  
rapidly	   expanding	   economy	   and	   bourgeoning	   military	   strength.	   As	   an	   emerging	  
superpower,	   understanding	   the	   nature	   of	   China’s	   rise	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   study	   of	  
international	  relations.	  Nevertheless,	  regional	  studies	  are	  saturated	  with	  China-­‐centric	  
literature,	  leaving	  other	  regional	  actors	  under-­‐researched.
	   Among	  these	  less	  discussed	  actors	  is	  Japan.	  A	  state	  that	  boasts	  the	  third	  largest	  
global	  economy,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  technologically	  advanced	  militaries	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  
the	  industrial	  capacity	  to	  quickly	  transform	  into	  a	  nuclear	  power.	  Japan’s	  alliance	  with	  
America	   has	   facilitated	   its	   integration	   into	   the	   American	   nuclear	   umbrella	   and	  
provided	   Japan	   with	   crucial	   technology	   exchanges	   that	   have	   greatly	   enhanced	   its	  
access	  to	  ballistic	  missile	  systems.	  
	   Perhaps	  even	  more	  crucial	  when	  considering	  regional	   stability,	   is	   that	  China’s	  
emergence	  as	  a	  global	   power	  has	  come	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Japan’s	  position	  within	  the	  
regional	   power	  hierarchy.	  For	  over	   a	   hundred	  years,	  Japan	  held	  sway	  as	   the	  premier	  
Asian	  power.	  Even	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  Imperial	  Japan	  and	  within	  the	  bipolarity	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War,	  Japan	  remained	  the	  preeminent	  non-­‐Western	  regional	  power.	   	  By	  the	  end	  
of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   had	   grown	   to	   such	   heights,	   that	   many	  
observers	   thought	   Japan	   would	   soon	   overtake	   America	   as	   a	   global	   economic	  
superpower.
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   Crippling	   economic	   stagnation	   and	   political	   ineﬀectiveness	   truncated	   Japan’s	  
potential,	   enabling	   China	   to	   supplant	   Japan	   as	   the	   premier	  Asian	   power.	   This	   shift	  
precipitated	  a	  score	  of	  international	  relations	  literature	  that	  explores	  how	  the	  existing	  
status	  quo	  is	  serving	  China’s	  economically	  growth-­‐driven	  foreign	  policy.	  As	  is	  the	  case	  
with	   any	   emerging	   power,	   China	   may	   or	   may	   not	   rebuﬀ	   the	   status	   quo	   at	   some	  
unforeseen	   juncture	   in	   the	   future	   -­‐	   a	   point	   that	   has	   been	   thoroughly	   explored	   by	  
international	  relations	  scholars.	  
	   What	  has	  not	  been	  adequately	  accounted	  for	  is	  how	  Japan’s	  loss	  of	  power	  and	  
prestige	  impacts	  regional	  stability.	  Should	  Japanese	  leaders	  perceive	  the	  existing	  status	  
quo	   to	  be	  detrimental	   to	  Japan’s	  geopolitical	   interests,	  new	  policies	  may	  be	  instituted	  
to	   bolster	  Japan’s	  position.	  These	  eﬀorts	  could	  unintentionally	  destabilize	  the	  region.	  
Among	   these	  policy	  options	   is	   the	   potential	   revision	  of	  Article	  9	  of	   Japan’s	  postwar	  
constitution,	  which	  prohibits	  Japan	  from	  maintaining	  a	  military	  or	  using	  force	  to	  settle	  
international	  disputes.	  Given	  Japan’s	  contentious	  past	  as	  an	  aggressive	  imperial	  power,	  
any	   steps	  made	   towards	   enhancing	   Japanese	  military	   strength	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   eyed	  
with	   suspicion	   by	   its	   neighbors.	   Furthermore,	   widespread	   paciﬁst	   norms	  within	   the	  
Japanese	  public	  constrain	  the	  actions	  of	  Japan’s	  leaders.
	   In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  security	  trajectory	  of	  Japan,	  and	  its	   impact	   therein	  
upon	  the	  region,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  delve	  into	   Japan’s	  past	  and	  explore	  the	  factors	  that	  
shape	  its	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  history	  of	  modern	  Japan	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  a	  number	  of	  
systemic	   shifts	   within	   the	   international	   system	   that	   precipitated	   seemingly	  
irreconcilable	   transitions	   in	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	   Following	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	  
Western	   imperialist	   powers	   in	   East	   Asia	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   Japanese	  
leaders	   bypassed	   centuries	   of	   cultural	   traditions	   by	   embracing	   modernization	   and	  
opening	   relations	   with	   the	   powers	   of	   Europe	   and	   America.	   Japan’s	   alliances	   with	  
Western	  states	  facilitated	  its	  rise	  from	  an	  insular	  feudal	   state	  to	   a	  great	  power.	  Yet	  in	  
the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   First	   World	   War,	   Japanese	   leaders	   directed	   their	   military	  
aggressiveness	  towards	  their	  former	  Western	  allies.	  Mere	  decades	  later,	  this	  aggression	  
was	  superseded	  by	  the	  ready	  acceptance	  of	  Japan’s	  paciﬁst	  constitution.	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   Each	  transition,	  from	  isolationism	  to	  imperialism,	  from	  a	  status	  quo	  power	  to	  a	  
revisionist	  power,	  and	  from	   revisionism	  back	   to	  a	  state	  entrenched	  in	  the	  status	  quo,	  
can	  be	  explained	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  eﬀectiveness	  through	  appeals	  to	  accepted	  schools	  of	  
thought	   within	   international	   relations.	   However,	   there	   remains	   a	   fundamental	  
problem	   of	   theoretical	   and	  analytical	   consistency.	   Realism	   is	   well	   suited	   to	   explain	  
Japan’s	  rise	  to	  great	  power	  status	  and	  its	  confrontation	  with	  Western	  powers,	  but	  must	  
be	   considerably	   stretched	   to	   explain	   the	   postwar	   paciﬁsm	   of	   Japanese	   leaders.	  
Constructivism	   is	   useful	   for	   revealing	   how	   identity,	   culture,	   and	  norms	   shaped	   the	  
perspectives	  of	  Japanese	  leaders,	  but	  oﬀers	   little	  utility	   for	  determining	   the	  direction	  
of	   foreign	   policy	  outputs.	   Even	   liberalism	   has	   some	  function	   with	   regard	   to	   Japan’s	  
commitment	  to	  international	  institutions	  in	  recent	  decades.	  
	   The	   result	   is	   a	  score	  of	   limited	   scholarship	  that	   either:	   (1)	   truncates	   Japanese	  
history	   by	   assuming	   August	   6th	   and	   9th	   of	   1945	   were	   nuclear	   reset	   buttons	   on	  
Japanese	   foreign	   policy;	   (2)	   forsakes	   theoretical	   rigor	   to	   oﬀer	   a	   broad	   historical	  
examination	  of	   Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  evolution;	   or	  (3)	  makes	  wide	  scale	  assumptions	  
about	   trends,	   such	   as	   militarism	   or	   paciﬁsm,	   presumed	   to	   be	   prevalent	   within	   the	  
Japanese	   collective	   identity.	   While	   these	   studies	   contribute	   greatly	   to	   the	   overall	  
understanding	   of	   Japan’s	   position	   within	   the	   international	   system,	   they	   often	   oﬀer	  
contradictory	   conclusions	   regarding	   the	   direction	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	  
Speciﬁcally,	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   clarity	   regarding	   Japan’s	   impact	   on	   the	   triangular	  
distribution	   of	   power	   between	   China,	   America,	   and	   Japan.	   This	   conundrum	   is	  
complicated	   by	   conﬂicting	   pressures,	   such	   as	   the	   historical	   legacy	   of	   the	   Japanese	  
Empire,	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   Japanese	   constitution,	   and	   the	   US-­‐Japanese	   security	  
agreement.
	   The	   consequence	   is	   a	   rather	   fractured	   representation	   of	   Japan	   within	  
international	  relations	   literature.	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  peculiarities	  within	  the	  Japanese	  
polity	  or	  upon	  a	  particular	  chapter	   in	  Japan’s	  history	  and	  repeating	  this	  process	  over	  
hundreds	  if	  not	  thousands	  of	  studies,	  one	  could	  arrive	  at	  any	  number	  of	  conclusions.	  
Japan	  is	  a	  paciﬁst	   state;	   Japan	  is	  a	  revisionist	  state;	  Japanese	  leaders	  seek	  to	  obfuscate	  
Japan’s	   past;	   Japan	   clings	   to	   the	   US-­‐Japanese	   alliance;	   Japan	   is	   pushing	   away	   from	  
America;	  Japan	  is	  a	  regional	  leader,	  that	  Japan	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  leading	  -­‐	  and	  so	  on	  and	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so	   forth.	   At	   the	   core	   of	   these	   antithetical	   conclusions	   is	   often	   a	  presupposing	   of	   a	  
particular	   behavior	   and	   then	   determining	   whether	   or	   not	   Japan	   conforms	   to	   the	  
selected	  hypothesis.	  This	  problem	  is	  compounded	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  theoretical	  consistency	  
where	  the	  objects	  of	  analysis	  are	  not	  clearly	  deﬁned,	  and	  where	  the	  “facts”	  of	  history	  or	  
policy	  decisions	  are	  chosen	  to	  ﬁt	  the	  author's	  argument	  and	  not	  by	  the	  analysis.	  
	   Gaining	   insight	   into	   Japanese	  foreign	   policy	   trajectory	   requires	   an	  alternative	  
approach	   that	   expands	   international	   relations	   scholarship	   by	   combining	   theoretical	  
parsimony	  with	  longitudinal	  historical	  depth.	  To	   this	  end,	  this	  thesis	  has	  developed	  a	  
unique	  framework	  designed	  to	  answer	  three	  prevailing	  research	  questions:	  
1. How	   have	   concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	  
international	  system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?
2.How	  have	  these	  factors	  changed	  with	  time?
3.What	   ideological	  continuities	  exist	  between	  competing	   groups	   of	  Japanese	   political	  
elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?
	   Engaging	   with	   these	   questions	   provides	   a	   means	   for	   tracing	   the	   numerous	  
trends	  in	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  evolution.	  To	  provide	  theoretical	  consistency	  over	  this	  
expansive	   historical	   timeframe,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   explore	   two	   levels	   of	   analysis	   that	  
account	   for	  (1)	   the	  baseline	  characteristics	  of	  states	  and	  (2)	   the	  group	  dynamics	  that	  
deﬁne	  foreign	  policy	  creation.	  The	  core	  principles	  of	  statehood,	  most	  often	  associated	  
with	   the	  realist	   tradition,	   bind	  all	   states	  to	   a	  fundamental	   set	   of	   interests.	   States	  are	  
self-­‐interested	   entities	   that	   must	   acquire	   suﬃcient	   power	   to	   both	   uphold	   their	  
territorial	  integrity	  (sovereignty)	  and	  to	  pursue	  their	  perceived	  interests	  (embodied	  in	  
foreign	  policy)	  while	  operating	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  
	   Neoclassical	   realism	   provides	   a	  useful	   baseline	   for	  deﬁning	  the	   parameters	   of	  
state	  behavior,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  without	  shortcomings.	  Individual	  leaders	  are	  charged	  with	  
interpreting	   the	   pressures	   of	   the	   international	   system	   and	   crafting	   foreign	   policy	  
strategies	  based	  upon	  their	  perception,	  thereby	  adding	  a	  layer	  of	  complexity	  to	  foreign	  
policy	  analysis.	   Neoclassical	   realist	   literature	  acknowledges	   this	  dynamic,	   but	   oﬀers	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limited	  means	   for	  analysis.	  Similarly,	  constructivism	   engages	  with	   group	  norms	  and	  
identities,	   which	   is	   useful	   for	   investigations	   of	   ideational	   factors,	   but	   it	   does	   not	  
provide	  the	  necessary	  theoretical	  traction	  for	  studies	  rooted	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  
	   This	  gap	  is	  addressed	  by	  supplementing	  international	  relations	  literature	  with	  
elements	  of	  social	  psychology.	  Social	  Identity	  Theory	  (SIT)	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  theory	  
that	  examines	  the	  relationships	  between	  social	  groups	  and	  the	  preferences	  of	  in-­‐group	  
members.	   By	  utilizing	   SIT	   to	  conceptualize	  group	  dynamics	  and	  then	  applying	   these	  
insights	   to	   neoclassical	   realism	   and	   constructivism,	   a	   robust	   framework	   for	  
interpreting	  foreign	  policy	  trajectories	  is	   developed.	   	  Resultantly,	   three	  categories	  of	  
foreign	  policy	  strategies	  are	  identiﬁed:	  
1. Social	  mobility	  is	  when	  a	  group	  (state)	  seeks	  to	  elevate	  its	  position	  within	  a	  power	  
hierarchy	  (e.g.	  the	  international	  system)	  by	  mirroring	  the	  practices	  of	  a	  successful	  
referent	  group.	  
2.Social	   competition	  occurs	  when	  a	  group	  attempts	  to	   equal	  or	  eclipse	  a	  dominant	  
group	  by	  challenging	  their	  claim	  to	  superiority.
3.Social	   creativity	  is	  a	  re-­‐imagining	  of	  the	  power	  hierarchy	  by	  a	  subordinate	  group	  
with	  the	  intent	  of	  achieving	  recognition	  for	  excelling	  in	  an	  alternate	  domain	  that	  
does	  not	  directly	  challenge	  the	  dominate	  group	  or	  groups.
	   The	   body	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   divided	   into	   seven	   chapters.	   Chapter	   1	   oﬀers	   a	  
literature	  review	  of	  historical	  and	  international	  relations	  works	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  
Chapter	  2	  	  provides	  a	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  remaining	  
ﬁve	  chapters	  cover	  distinct	  historical	   periods	   in	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   evolution	  and	  
are	  discussed	  below	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  strategies.
• Chapter	  3	   serves	  as	  a	  historical	   starting	  point,	  and	  details	  the	  collapse	  of	  feudal	  
Japan	  during	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century.	  The	  chapter	  surveys	  how	  the	  arrival	  of	  
Western	  powers	  in	  East	  Asia	  undermined	  centuries	  of	  isolationist	  foreign	  policy.	  
The	   domestic	   struggle	   between	   traditionalists	   and	   reformists,	   including	   the	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eﬀorts	  of	  Japanese	  oﬃcials	  to	   placate	  Western	  demands	  for	  trade	  liberalization,	  
the	  signing	  of	  unequal	  treaties,	  and	  the	  Boshin	  War	  (1868	  -­‐	  9)	  are	  discussed.	  	  
• Chapter	   4	   explores	   Japan’s	   transition	   from	   an	   isolated	   feudal	   republic	   to	   an	  
outward	  looking	  modern	  state.	   	  The	  imperialist	  Western	  powers	  provided	  Meiji	  
leaders	  with	   a	  blueprint	   for	  modernization,	   and	  served	   as	  a	   referent	   group	   for	  
Japan’s	  evolving	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  analyzing	  
the	  consequences	  of	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1894-­‐5).
• Chapter	   5	   examines	   Japan’s	   continued	   rise	   as	   a	   great	   power	   through	   ongoing	  
social	  mobility	   from	   the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1904-­‐5)	   through	  the	   1920s.	  In	  the	  
aftermath	   of	   the	  First	  World	  War	  (1914-­‐1918),	   international	   norms	  that	   stressed	  
economic	   openness	   and	   a	   commitment	   to	   international	   peace	   rose	   to	  
prominence.	  Imperialism	  remained	  a	  deﬁning	  feature	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  
in	   subsequent	  decades,	  however,	   Japanese	  political	   leaders	  explored	  options	   for	  
incorporating	  the	  new	  norms	  of	  internationalism	  into	  Japan.
• Chapter	  6	  expands	  upon	  the	  strategy	  options	  facing	  Japanese	  leaders.	  Ultimately,	  
the	   Imperial	   Army	   compelled	   the	   Japanese	   government	   to	   abandon	   its	   eﬀorts	  
towards	  adopting	  internationalism	  and	  pushed	  Japan	  towards	  social	  competition	  
through	  war.	  Following	   the	  formal	   surrender	  of	  Japan	  in	   1945,	   Japanese	   leaders	  
utilized	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  new	  Japanese	  constitution	  to	  establish	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  
creativity	   that	   privileged	   economic	   growth	   and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   a	   low	  
diplomatic	  proﬁle.	  
• Chapter	  7	  discusses	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  from	  the	  1970s	  until	  the	  present.	  The	  
collapse	   of	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   and	   the	   backlash	   against	   Japan’s	   non-­‐
participation	   in	   the	   Gulf	   War	   (1991)	   crippled	   the	   Japanese	   strategy	   of	   social	  
creativity,	   and	  prompting	   Japanese	  leaders	  to	   explore	  new	  directions	   in	  foreign	  
policy.	   The	   11	   September	   2001	   terrorist	   attacks	   shifted	  global	   security	   agendas,	  
enabling	   Japanese	   elites	   to	   establish	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   that	   was	  
supportive	  of	  America’s	  War	  on	  Terror	  and	  that	  sidestepped	  Article	  9.	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   A	   few	   points	  must	   be	   noted	   before	   proceeding.	   First,	   individuals	   of	   Japanese	  
descent	   are	   presented	   within	   the	   Japanese	   custom	   of	   listing	   their	   surname	   ﬁrst	  
followed	   by	   their	   given	   name.	   This	   includes	   reversing	   names	   in	   some	   works	  
published	   in	   English	   where	   the	   name	   has	   been	   presented	   in	   the	  Western	   style.	  
Second,	   romanticized	   Japanese	   words	   follow	   the	   example	   set	   forth	   by	   historian	  
Marius	   B.	   Jansen,	   and	   utilizes	   Kenkyusha’s	   New	   Japanese-­‐English	   Dictionary,	  
Fourth	  Edition	  (1974).	  Third,	  the	  descriptor	  “Western”	   is	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  simplicity	  
used	   in	  a	  number	  of	   instances	  and	  should	  be	  simply	  understood	  as	  European	  and	  
American.	  For	  example,	  “Western	  powers”	  most	   commonly	   refers	  to	   the	  dominate	  
states	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  occasionally	  
Russia.	  No	  other	  implication	  should	  be	  assumed.
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Chapter	  1	  
	  	  	  Interpretations	  of	  Japan’s	  International	  Relations
Signatures	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Yoshida	  Shigeru	  (right)	  and	  cabinet	  
ministers	  on	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Japan
This	  chapter	  reviews	  the	  literature	  relevant	  to	  examining	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  modern	  
Japan.	   Studies	   of	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   within	   international	   relations	   fall	   into	   two	  
broad	  categories.	   First,	   Japan’s	   advanced	   economic	  and	   technological	   infrastructure	  
has	  forced	  questions	  regarding	  the	  legal	   restrictions	  of	  Japan’s	  paciﬁst	  constitution	  to	  
the	   forefront	   of	   international	   relations	   scholarship.	   This	   literature	   focuses	   on	   the	  
prospect	   of	   Japanese	   “normalization”.	   For	   reference,	   the	   deﬁnition	   of	   a	   “normal”	  
country	   is	   a	   state	   constitutionally	   capable	   of	   deploying	   its	  military	   in	   pursuit	   of	   its	  
national	   security	   agenda.1 	   Second,	   Japan’s	  diplomatic	  engagement	   with	  other	  states	  
(commonly	   America	   and	   China)	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   regional	   security	   constitutes	  
another	  principal	  concern	  of	  international	  relations	  authors.
	   Interpretations	   of	   Japanese	   normalization	   and	   interstate	   relations	   run	   the	  
gambit	   of	  theoretical	  conceptualizations.	  To	  facilitate	  a	  more	  targeted	  approach,	   this	  
review	  utilizes	   the	  research	  questions	  presented	   in	  the	   introduction	   to	   delineate	  the	  
sources	  most	   relevant	   to	   this	   thesis.	   	   Research	   questions	   one	   and	   two	   -­‐	  How	   have	  
concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	   international	  
system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	   	  and	  How	  have	  
these	   factors	  changed	  with	  time?	  -­‐	   	  are	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  aspects	  of	  realism.	  
These	   elements	   include	   the	   international	   power	   hierarchy	   of	   states	   and	   Japanese	  
sovereignty.	   Research	   question	   three	   -­‐	  What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	  
competing	  groups	  of	  Japanese	  political	   elite	  from	  one	   historical	  period	  to	   the	  next?	  -­‐	  is	  
bound	  to	  constructivist	  notions	  of	  norms	  and	  identity.	  Therefore,	   this	  review	  focuses	  
primarily	  upon	  four	  components:	  realist	  theory	  (Section	  1.1),	  realist	  interpretations	  of	  
Japanese	  foreign	   policy	  (Section	   1.2),	   constructivism	   (Section	   1.3),	   and	   constructivist	  
understandings	  of	  Japan	  (Section	  1.4).	  The	  reader	  should	  note	  that	  literature	  featuring	  
liberal	   interpretations	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   commonly	   surveys	   economic	  
integration	  and	  regionalism,	  and	  are	  outside	  the	  research	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.
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  Power	  in	  the	  North	  Korean	  
Nuclear	  Talks?,"	  Asian	  Survey	  49,	  no.	  5	  	  (2009);	  Hughes,	  Japan's	  Re-­‐Emergence	  as	  a	  "Normal"	  Military	  
Power	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  for	  the	  International	  Institute	  of	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  2004),	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  "Who	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  National	  Security	  Debate?	  Divergent	  Interpretations	  of	  Japan's	  Security	  
Role,"	  Asian	  Aﬀairs:	  An	  American	  Review	  35,	  no.	  3	  	  (2008):	  141-­‐2;	  Preble,	  "Two	  Normal	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Rethinking	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  Strategic	  Relationship,"	  Policy	  Analysis,	  no.	  566	  	  (18	  April	  2006):	  17;	  
Samuels,	  Securing	  Japan:	  Toyko's	  Grand	  Strategy	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  East	  Asia	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  2007),	  5-­‐7.
	   Through	   this	   review,	   two	   fundamental	   gaps	   in	   the	   existing	   literature	   are	  
identiﬁed:	  (1)	  the	  lack	  of	  historical	  detail	  in	  analyses	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  (2)	  
the	   shortcomings	   of	   international	   relations	   theory	   in	   framing	   the	   foreign	   policy	  
strategies	   of	   Japanese	   leaders.	   There	   is	   a	   myopic	   view	   of	   Japanese	   history	   within	  
international	   relations	   scholarship	   that	   overemphasizes	   recent	   events.	   The	   research	  
questions	   address	   this	   factor	   by	   emphasizing	   historical	   transitions	   within	   broader	  
understanding	  of	  modern	  Japan’s	  history.	  To	  compensate	  for	  this	  oversight,	  historical	  
sources	  (both	  primary	  and	  secondary)	  are	  also	  reviewed	  (Section	  1.5).	  While	  historical	  
sources	  greatly	  enhance	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  thesis,	  they	  generally	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  
of	   international	   relations	   literature	   and	   thus	   do	   not	   oﬀer	   adequate	   theoretical	  
engagement.	   This	   limitation	   and	   the	   noted	   shortcomings	   of	   both	   realism	   and	  
constructivism	   constitute	   a	   theoretical	   gap	   that	   is	   addressed	   by	   the	   framework	  
developed	  in	  Chapter	  2.
1.1	  Neoclassical	  Realism	  and	  Power	  Dynamics
This	  thesis	   proposes	   a	  framework	   that	   hybridizes	  several	   theoretical	   traditions,	  with	  
core	  realist	  principles	  regarding	  relative	  power	  distributions	  and	  the	  primacy	  of	  states	  
constituting	  foundational	  variables.	  These	  realist	  elements	  must	  be	  understood	  before	  
endeavoring	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  concepts	  of	  national	  security	  and	  the	  pressures	  of	  the	  
international	  system	  raised	  by	  the	  research	  questions	  one	  and	  two.	  This	  section	  reﬁnes	  
the	  realist	   leanings	  of	  this	  thesis	  by	  focusing	  on	  neoclassical	   realism,	  and	  the	  theory’s	  
emphasis	  on	  foreign	  policy	  strategies.	  
	   As	   a	  tradition	  of	  political	   thought,	   realism	   spans	  a	   space	  of	  over	  2,000	   years,	  
and	  draws	   from	   the	   classical	   works	  of	   Thucydides	   and	  Machiavelli.	   In	  more	   recent	  
years,	   the	   scholarship	   of	   E.H.	   Carr	   and	   Hans	   Morgenthau	   has	   reﬁned	   what	   is	  
collectively	  understood	  as	  classical	  realism.2	   	  Classical	  realism	  is	  not	  a	  cohesive	  theory,	  
but	   it	   aﬃrms	   that	   ‘the	  drive	  for	  power	  and	   the	  will	   to	   dominate	   [are]…fundamental	  
aspects	  of	  human	  nature’	   and	  that	  human	  nature	  drives	  political	  elites	  within	  a	  state	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  ed.	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Dunne,	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  and	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to	   value	   interests	   above	   ideology.3 	   Subsequently,	   the	   primary	   concern	   for	   classical	  
realist	  scholars	  is	  deﬁning	  how	  leaders	  can	  convert	  national	  power	  into	  foreign	  policy.4	  
	   In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  forwarded	  a	  new	  realist	  theory	  that	  attempted	  
to	  better	  understand	  why	  states	  seek	  power.	  According	  to	  Waltz,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
international	  system,	  not	  human	  nature	  as	  classical	   realists	  believe,	  conditions	  states	  
towards	   the	   pursuit	   of	   power.5 	   There	   are	   two	   distinct	   camps	   among	   the	  neorealist	  
theorists	  that	  draw	  from	  Waltz.	  Oﬀensive	   realists,	  such	  as	  John	  Mearsheimer,	  believe	  
that	  states	  should	  strive	  to	  maximize	  their	  power	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  their	  national	  
security	   agenda.	   Defensive	   realists,	   like	   Waltz	   himself,	   hold	   that	   states	   may	   be	  
punished	  by	  the	  system	  (other	  states)	  should	  they	  acquire	  too	  much	  power.6	  
	   Tracing	   where	   neoclassical	   realism	   ﬁts	   into	   this	   tradition	   is	   necessary	   for	  
understanding	   its	   utility	   in	   answering	   this	   thesis’	   research	   questions.	   Neoclassical	  
realism	  deﬁnes	  its	  theoretical	  space	  in	  response	  to	  the	  problems	  left	  unresolved	  by	  the	  
neorealist	   model	   championed	   by	   Waltz.	   Neorealist	   theory	   is	   primarily	   a	   theory	   of	  
international	   politics	   that	   attempts	   to	   explain	   the	   outcome	   of	   state-­‐to-­‐state	  
interactions.	  To	  facilitate	  this	  end,	  neorealism	  fashions	  broad	  assumptions	  about	  state	  
motivations.7 	  This	  simpliﬁcation	  is	  perfectly	  acceptable	  to	  neorealists,	  whose	  primary	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  in	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  Politics:	  An	  Introduction	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International	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  ed.	  John	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While	  political	  elites	  are	  driven	  primarily	  by	  interests,	  how	  these	  interests	  are	  determined	  is	  
dependent	  upon	  subjective	  interpretation.	  Given	  the	  impossibility	  of	  completely	  separating	  identity,	  
norms,	  and	  ideology	  from	  a	  group,	  this	  thesis	  will	  argue	  there	  is	  signiﬁcant	  interplay	  between	  these	  
elements.
4	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  and	  Foreign	  Policy,"	  in	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  E.	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  Norrin	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  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  16.
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  York:	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  in	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  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	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  2010),	  78.
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  Rose,	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  Policy,"	  World	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aim	   is	   to	   describe	   how	   the	   constraints	   of	   the	   international	   system	   condition	   state	  
behavior.8	  
	   Neoclassical	   realists	   reﬁne	   neorealism	   by	   shifting	   the	   focus	   from	   a	   theory	   of	  
international	  politics	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  In	  other	  words,	  neoclassical	  realism	  
is	   attentive	   to	   the	  domestic	   variables,	   such	  as	   state	   structure	   and	   the	   perception	   of	  
political	   elites,	   which	   propel	   foreign	   policy.9 	   Jeﬀrey	   W.	   Taliaferro	   asserts	   ‘that	   the	  
relative	  distribution	  of	  material	  power	  shapes	  the	  parameters	  of	  states’	   foreign	  policy	  
behavior	  ...	  [h]owever,	  these	  systemic	  forces	  can	  only	  inﬂuence	  foreign	  policy	  through	  
the	  medium	  of	  leaders’	   perception	  and	  calculations	  of	   relative	  power	  and	  prestige.’10	  
To	  clarify	  these	  intervening	  variables,	  neoclassical	  realists	  draw	  upon	  the	  principles	  of	  
statesmanship	  and	  theories	  of	  foreign	  policy	  espoused	  by	  classical	  realists.11	  
Gideon	   Rose	   details	   the	   nuances	   of	   the	   amalgamated	   theory	   through	   appeals	   to	  
both	  	  neorealism	  and	  classical	  realism.	  Rose	  argues	  notes	  that:
A	  country's	  foreign	  policy	  is	  driven	  ﬁrst	  and	  foremost	  by	  its	  place	  in	  the	   international	  system	  and	  
speciﬁcally	   by	   its	   relative	   material	   power	   capabilities.	   This	   is	   why	   they	   are	   realist.	   They	   argue	  
further,	   however,	   that	   the	   impact	   of	   such	   power	   capabilities	   on	   foreign	   policy	   is	   indirect	   and	  
complex,	  because	  systemic	  pressures	  must	  be	   translated	  through	  intervening	   variables	  at 	  the	  unit	  
level.	  This	  is	  why	  they	  are	  neoclassical.12
Rose	  continues	  by	  arguing	  that	  neoclassical	  realism	  lies	  in	  the	  middle	  ground	  between	  
theorists	   who	   accept	   a	   ‘direct	   link	   between	   systemic	   constraints	   and	   unit-­‐level	  
behavior’	   (neorealists)	   and	   those	   who	   reject	   ‘any	   objective	   systemic	   constraints	  
exist’	   (constructivists).13 	   Neoclassical	   realists	   accept	   a	   loose	   objective	   reality	   where	  
external	  variables	  constrain	  state	  behavior,	  and	  the	  political	  elite	  must	  interpret	  these	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constraints	   before	   rendering	   foreign	   policy.	   It	   is	   political	   leaders’	   ‘perceptions	   of	  
relative	   power	   that	   matter,	   not	   simply	   relative	   quantities	   of	   physical	   resources	   or	  
forces	  in	  being’.14	  This	  reﬁnement	  of	  realism	  does	  not	  refute	  the	  structural	  elements	  of	  
neorealism.	  It	   suggests	  rather	  that	   short	   term	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  are	  diﬃcult	   to	  
assess	   by	   solely	   analyzing	   systematic	   constraints,	   while	   maintaining	   that	   neorealist	  
assumptions	  account	  for	  long	  term	  trends	  in	  international	  politics.15
While	  neoclassical	  realism	  diﬀers	  from	  classical	  realism	  and	  neorealism,	  certain	  
theoretical	  elements	  are	  shared	  across	  the	  realist	  tradition.	  Taliaferro	  et	   al.	  recognize	  
three	   core	   elements	   within	   the	   realist	   tradition.16 	   First,	   human	   beings	   survive	   as	  
members	  of	  groups	  which	  provide	  some	  level	  of	  security	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  loyalty	  of	  
the	  individual.	  This	  sentiment	   is	  mirrored	  by	  Robert	  Gilpen,	  who	  aﬃrms	  that	  groups	  
are	  the	  ‘building	  blocks	  and	  ultimate	  units	  of	  social	  and	  political	  life.’17	  Second,	  groups	  
must	   compete	   against	   one	   another	   to	   secure	   scare	   resources,	   whether	  material	   or	  
social,	   for	  their	  members.	  As	  groups	  have	  no	  permanent	  assurance	  of	  another	  group’s	  
intention,	   interaction	   between	  groups	   is	  characterized	  by	  uncertainty.	   Third,	  groups	  
require	  power	   to	   facilitate	   their	  objectives	   and	   sustain	   their	  existence.18 	  William	   C.	  
Wohlforth	  mirrors	  these	  assertions	  by	  contesting	   that	   realism	   is	  deﬁned	  by	  groupism	  
(humans	   are	  divided	  into	   groups,	   and	  depend	  on	   these	   groups	  for	   survival),	   egoism	  
(self-­‐interested	   behavior	   drives	   political	   action),	   and	   power-­‐centrism	   (power	   is	   a	  
fundamental	   element	   of	  politics).19 	   Importantly,	  Wolhforth	   notes	   that	   anarchy	   is	   a	  
“scope	  condition”	  that	  varies	  based	  upon	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  For	  
example,	  a	  great	  power	  can	  enforce	  order	  over	  small	  states,	  as	  has	  historically	  been	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Central	  America.	  For	  these	  small	  states,	  the	  international	  
system	   is	   inherently	   less	   anarchical	   than	   if	   the	   great	   power	  was	   absent.	   Therefore,	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  2009,	  4.
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  Ibid.,	  14-­‐5.
17	  Gilpin,	  "The	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  of	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  of	  Political	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  International	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  38,	  no.	  02	  	  
(1984):	  290.
18	  Taliaferro,	  Lobell,	  and	  Ripsman	  2009,	  14-­‐5.
19	  Wohlforth,	  "Realism	  and	  Foreign	  Policy,"	  in	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Theories,	  Actors,	  Cases,	  ed.	  Steven	  Smith,	  
Amelia	  Hadﬁeld,	  and	  Tim	  Dunne	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  41.
realism	  is	   less	  about	  assuming	  anarchy	  and	  more	  a	  theoretical	  approach	  dealing	  with	  
varying	  levels	  of	  anarchy.20	  
This	   thesis’	   framework	   explores	   these	   core	   realist	   insights	   within	   the	   social	  
world,	   by	   examining	   neoclassical	   realism’s	   focus	   on	   foreign	   policy	   outcomes.	   This	  
approach	  helps	  clarify	  the	  the	  process	  through	  which	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategies	  
are	   created.	   By	   examining	   how	   group	   behavior	   is	   translated	   into	   international	  
relations,	  several	  assumptions	  can	  be	  derived:
· Humans	   are	   fundamentally	  social	   creatures	  who	   are	   compelled	   to	   participate	  
within	  social	   groups.	  Group	  aﬃliation	  is	  determined	  by	  shared	  environmental	  
variables,	   including	   community	   location	   and	   ethnicity,	   which	   enables	   the	  
systematic	  segregation	  of	  in-­‐group	  members	  and	  out-­‐group	  non-­‐members.	  This	  
groupism	   is	   habitual	   to	   human	   interaction	   and	   forms	   the	   foundation	   of	  
political	   life.	   In	  the	  context	  of	  international	   relations,	  the	  state	  constitutes	  the	  
formative	  group	  and	  is	  the	  primary	  actor	  in	  analyzing	  foreign	  policy.21
· There	  is	  an	  ongoing	  struggle	  between	  states	  for	  ‘material	  power	  and	  security	  in	  
a	  world	  of	  scarce	  resources	  and	  pervasive	  uncertainty’.22	  This	  uncertainty	  stems	  
from	   an	   anarchical	   international	   system	   that	   lacks	   a	   universal	   sovereign.	  
Within	   such	  a	   system,	   states	  must	   acquire	   enough	  power	  to	   provide	  for	  their	  
own	  security	  (self-­‐help),	   and	  relative	  power	  distributions	  set	   boundaries	  upon	  
the	  state’s	  foreign	  policy.23	  
· States	   desire	   resources	   perceived	   necessary	   by	   its	   members,	   particularly	   by	  
state	  elites.	  In-­‐group	  distribution	  of	  resources	  can	  lead	  to	   intergroup	  conﬂict.24	  
States	   competing	   over	   the	   same	   resources	   can	   cooperate	   by	   forming	   a	  
partnership	  (and	  sometimes	  a	  newly	  merged	  group)	  that	  by	  extension	  excludes	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some	  other	   state.	   Alternatively,	   a	  state	  can	  forgo	   collaboration	   and	   choose	  to	  
challenge	   a	   competing	   state.	   State	   leaders	   are	   charged	  with	   the	   decision	   to	  
cooperate	   or	   compete,	   and	   their	   decisions	   rely	   upon	   their	   subjective	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   state’s	   perceived	   need	   of	   a	   resource,	   whether	   objective	  
(e.g.	   raw	  materials)	   or	  subjective	   (e.g.	   prestige	  or	  status).	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  
behavior	  of	  a	  state	   (or	  group)	  depends	  upon	   the	  preferences	  and	  strategies	  of	  
its	  leaders.	  
Neoclassical	  realism	  supplies	  the	  necessary	  theoretical	  traction	  to	  deﬁne	  several	  of	  the	  
elements	   discussed	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   and	   any	   subsequent	   discussion	   of	   the	  
nature	   of	   the	   international	   system	   will	   have	   a	   distinct	   neoclassical	   realist	   leaning.	  
Nevertheless,	  neoclassical	  realism	  does	  have	  its	  shortcomings.	  It	  oﬀers	  little	  utility	  for	  
analyzing	  the	  intervening	  variables,	  namely	  the	  perception	  of	  political	  elites,	  that	  it	  so	  
aptly	   recognizes	   as	   signiﬁcant.	   Neoclassical	   realism	   will	   therefore	   be	   expanded	  
through	  the	  incorporation	  of	  other	  theoretical	  traditions.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  each	  
theory	  introduced	  by	   this	  thesis	  builds	  upon	  one	  another,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  reﬁnes	  
the	   analytical	   space	   in	   which	   the	   research	   questions	   are	   examined.	   Neoclassical	  
realism	  provides	  the	   foundation	  of	  this	  approach	  and	   its	  utility	  is	   strengthened	  with	  
the	  introduction	  of	  constructivism	  (Section	  1.3)	  and	  SIT	  (Section	  2.2).
1.2	  Great	  Power	  Politics:	  Realist	  Interpretations	  of	  Japan
Within	   the	  broad	   school	   of	  realist	   scholarship,	   Japan	  has	   been	  a	  popular	  case	   study.	  
The	  economic	  successes	  of	  Japan	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  led	  a	  number	  of	  realist	  authors	  
to	   conclude	   that	   Japan’s	   expanding	   capabilities	   would	   result	   in	   increased	   military	  
assertiveness.	  One	  of	  the	  earliest	  proponents	  of	  this	  position	  was	  Herman	  Kahn,	  who	  
in	  the	  early	  1970s	  argued	  that	  Japan’s	  rapid	  economic	  expansion	  would	  continue	  until	  
it	   had	   economically	   surpassed	   the	   America.25 	   Kahn	   also	   considers	   the	   military	  
implications	  of	   Japan’s	   ongoing	   development	   by	   exploring	   scenarios	   through	   which	  
Japan	  could	  translate	  its	  massive	  economy	  into	   a	  military	  infrastructure	  on	  par	  with	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  America.	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   Although	  much	  of	  Kahn’s	  analysis	  derives	  from	  realist	  understandings	  of	  power	  
acquisition,	  he	  discusses	  important	  domestic	  elements,	  such	  as	  modes	  of	  thinking	  and	  
social	   institutions,	   that	   contribute	   to	   Japan’s	   uniqueness.	   Contemporaries	   of	   Kahn,	  
although	   falling	   outside	   a	   purely	   realist	   perspective,	   support	   much	   of	   Kahn’s	  
conclusions	   regarding	   the	  uniqueness	  of	   the	   Japanese.	   Anthropologist	   Chie	  Nakane	  
examines	  the	  social	  elements	  of	  Japan	  and	  contends	  that	   Japanese	  society	  conditions	  
its	  citizens	   to	   value	   success.26 	  Seymour	  Broadbridge	  notes	  that	  Nakane’s	   ‘analysis	   of	  
social	   structure	   and	  motivation	   supports	   Kahn's	   emphasis	   on	   Japanese	   capacity	   for	  
purposive,	  dedicated	  and	  communal	  action’.27	  
	   The	  rise	  of	  neorealism	   in	  the	  late	   1970s	  reformulated	   realist	   interpretations	  of	  
Japan.	   Neorealism	   favors	   system	   level	   analyses	   of	   international	   relations	   over	   unit-­‐
based	  or	  reductionist	  approaches.	  Consequently,	  much	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  discussed	  by	  
Kahn	  was	  abandoned	   for	  positivistic	  research	  interested	   in	  the	  conditioning	   of	  Japan	  
by	   external	   forces.	   Despite	   this	   shift,	   Kenneth	   Waltz’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   necessary	  
conﬂuence	  of	  political,	  economic,	  and	  military	  capital	   to	   support	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
great	   power	  drives	  neorealist	   conclusions	  on	  a	   trajectory	  parallel	   to	   those	  of	  Kahn.28	  
Waltz	  furthered	  this	  position	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  by	  suggesting	  that	  ‘[m]uch	  in	  Japan's	  
institutions	  and	  behavior	  supports	  the	  proposition	  that	  it	  will	  once	  again	  take	  its	  place	  
among	  the	  great	  powers’.29	  
	   The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  marked	  a	  renewed	  emphasis	  of	  realist	  interpretations	  
lynchpinned	  by	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  external	  hindrances	  to	  Japanese	  militarization	  
had	  vanished.30	  Christopher	  Layne	  explores	  the	  neorealist	  hypothesis	  that	  unipolarity	  
propels	   the	   rise	   of	   great	   powers	   to	   challenge	   hegemony	   through	   the	   balance	   of	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power.31 	   Layne	  notes	   that	   in	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	  environment	   Japan	  may	  eventually	  
militarize	   to	   counter	   American	   supremacy,	   resulting	   in	   a	   highly	   competitive	   US-­‐
Japanese	   relationship.	   Richard	   Betts	   also	   considers	   the	   implications	   of	   Japan’s	  
economic	  strength	  and	  potential	  militarization	  on	  East	  Asian	  stability	  by	  noting	  that	  
‘[f]or	   a	   realist,	   a	   normally	   armed	   Japan,	   unless	   it	   is	   pinned	   down	   by	   a	   powerful	  
common	   enemy,	   is	   a	  potential	   threat.’32 	   Betts	  continues	   by	  suggesting	   a	   number	   of	  
strategies	  that	  Washington	  can	  adopt	  to	   ‘keep	  Tokyo	  a	  uni-­‐dimensional	  superpower’.33	  
The	   apprehension	   towards	   a	   fully	   militarized	   Japan	   noted	   by	   Betts	   is	   mirrored	   by	  
Aaron	  Friedberg	  who	  examines	  sources	  of	  potential	   instability	  in	  East	  Asia	  in	  the	  early	  
1990s.	   With	   regard	   to	   Japan,	   Friedberg	   suggests	   East	   Asian	   states	   ‘are	   also	   looking	  
nervously	  toward	  Japan	  and,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  hedging	  against	   the	  possibility	  that	  the	  
Japanese	  too	  will	  begin	  to	  expand	  their	  capacity	  for	  projecting	  military	  power.’34	  
	   Samuel	   Huntington	   contends	   that	   an	   economic	   superpower	   will	   utilize	   its	  
wealth	  to	  maximize	  power.	  For	  Huntington,	  Japan	  has	  adopted	  realist	   principles	  into	  
its	  economic	  strategy	  by	  seeking	  power	  through	  market	   control.35 	  Eric	  Heginbotham	  
and	  Richard	   J.	   Samuels	  develop	   a	  similar	   thesis,	   termed	   “mercantile	  realism”,	  which	  
‘recognizes	   technoeconomic	   security	   interests-­‐including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to,	   those	  
associated	   with	   military	   security-­‐as	   central	   considerations	   of	   state	   policy’.36	  
Consequently,	  the	  pair	  argue	  that	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  are	  centered	  on	  the	  
advancement	  of	   its	   technoeconomic	  position.37 	   Reinhard	  Drifte	   suggests	   there	   is	  no	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guarantee	  an	  economic	  power	  will	   transform	  into	   a	  military	  power.38	  Drifte	  examines	  
how	   the	   term	   ‘power’	   has	   been	   conceptualized	   within	   Japan,	   and	   notes	   ‘[a]lthough	  
Japan	  now	  has	  fewer	  inhibitions	  about	  action	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  economic	  power	  ...	  it	  
remains	  restrained	   in	   the	  area	  of	  security.’39 	   He	  argues	   that	   Japan	  prefers	  to	   pursue	  
national	  security	   through	  economic	  power.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   Japan’s	  expanding	  
economic	  strength	   requires	  it	   to	   assume	  greater	  responsibilities	  globally	  to	   assure	  its	  
national	  security.
	   Many	  of	   the	   assumptions	   regarding	   Japan’s	   harnessing	   of	   economic	  strength	  
were	  realigned	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  “lost	  decade”	  of	  economic	  stagnation	  and	  the	  shock	  
of	  the	  1997	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis.	  Michael	  Green	  asserts	  that	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War,	   Japan	   slowly	   transitioned	   to	   a	   strategy	   of	   “reluctant	   realism”.40 	   Having	  
recognized	  the	  limit	  the	  Japanese	  economy,	  Green	  suggests	  that	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  
has	  become	  increasingly	  sensitive	  to	  its	  power	  relations	  with	  China	  and	  expanding	  its	  
national	   security	   interests.	   The	   terrorist	   attacks	   of	   September	   11th	   2001	   shifted	   the	  
global	   security	   agenda	  of	  the	  international	  community	  as	  America	  initiated	  the	  War	  
on	   Terror,	   and	   likewise	   aﬀected	   realist	   interpretations	   of	   Japan.	   Daniel	   Kliman	  
suggests	  that	   following	  9/11	   Japan’s	   political	   elite	  have	  adopted	   a	  realpolitik	   security	  
perspective	   that	   derives	   policy	   primary	   from	   material	   consideration	   designed	   to	  
enhance	   state	   power	   rather	   than	   ideological	   factors.41 	   Kilman	   argues	   that	   ‘Japan’s	  
security	   outlook	  will	   be	  wholly	   realpolitik’	   and	   that	   ‘[n]o	   state	  guided	  by	   realpolitik	  
would	  rely	  on	  a	  single	  ally	  for	  security	  without	  at	  least	  establishing	  the	  kernel	  of	  a	  new	  
strategic	  option’.42	  By	  examining	  the	  increased	  assertiveness	  of	  the	  Japan	  Self-­‐Defense	  
Forces	   (JSDF)	   since	   9/11,	   Kilman	   identiﬁes	   several	   complimentary	   forces	   within	   the	  
Japanese	  political	  infrastructure	  that	  have	  catalyzed	  this	  transition.	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   The	  publications	  of	  Christopher	  Hughes	  support	  much	  of	  Kilman’s	  work,	  albeit	  
without	   the	   same	   overt	   appeals	   to	   realism.43 	   Hughes	   assesses	   the	   military	   and	  
economic	   security	   policies	   within	   Japan’s	   domestic	   infrastructure.	   In	   his	   2004	  
publication,	  Hughes	  scrutinizes	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  Japan’s	  security	  policy.	  Hughes	  argues	  
that	  Japan	  has	  adopted	  a	  more	  assertive	  military	  position	  through	  stronger	  integration	  
within	   the	  US-­‐Japanese	   alliance.44 	   This	   evolving	   security	   posture	   is	   re-­‐examined	  by	  
Hughes	  in	  2009	  where	  he	  analyzes	  the	  trajectory	  of	  Japan’s	  remilitarization	   following	  
the	  Koizumi	  premiership	  (2001-­‐2006).	  Despite	  numerous	  legal	  and	  cultural	  hindrances	  
to	   normalization,	   Hughes	   suggests	   that	   ‘Japan	   has	   continued	   on	   its	   path	   of	  
remilitarisation	  ...	   [t]his	  has	  been	  manifest	   in	   long-­‐term	   changes	   in	  the	  structures	  of	  
its	  military	   capacity,	   in	   civil-­‐military	  relations,	   in	   the	  military-­‐industrial	   complex,	   in	  
Japan’s	   external	  military	   commitments	   and	   in	   societal	  attitudes	  towards	   the	  military	  
and	  military	   power.’45 	   Accordingly,	   the	   long-­‐term	   security	   beneﬁts	   of	   a	   traditional	  
military	   infrastructure	   will	   compel	   Japan	   towards	   continued	   strategies	   of	   power	  
projection	  and	  enhanced	  integration	  with	  America.46	  
	   A	   defensive	   realist	   interpretation	   of	   Japan	   would	   depart	   from	   the	   oﬀensive	  
realist	  assumption	  that	  states	  react	  to	   the	  possibility	  of	  conﬂict	  (which	  assumes	  Japan	  
would	   translate	   its	   economic	   strength	   into	   military	   strength)	   by	   suggesting	  
alternatively	  that	   it	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  conﬂict	  within	  a	  security	  dilemma	  that	  drives	  
states.	   Defensive	   realists	   suggest	   that	   interstate	   relations	   are	   dependent	   upon	   how	  
state	  elites	   interpret	   other	   states,	   that	   is	  to	   say	  that	   states	  interpreted	  as	   friends	  are	  
treated	  diﬀerently	  than	  those	   interpreted	  as	  enemies.47 	  However,	  it	   has	  been	  argued	  
that	   defensive	   realism	   fails	   to	   account	   for	   the	   role	   of	   economic	   power	   within	   the	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security	   dilemma.48 	   This	   is	   a	   signiﬁcant	   oversight	   given	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	  
strategies.	  
	   More	   specialized	   varients	   of	   realism,	   such	   as	   postclassical	   realism,	   ‘construes	  
states	   as	   actors	   who,	   while	   highly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   economic	   costs	   of	   defense,	   are	  
maximizing	   their	   security	   without	   threatening	   others	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   the	   security	  
dilemma.’49 	  Tsuyoshi	  Kawasaki	  argues	  that	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  
to	  ‘reduce	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  security	  dilemma	  in	  Northeast	  Asia.’50	  To	  this	  end,	  Japan	  
maintains	   a	   refrained	   defensive	   military	   posture	   and	   supports	   its	   alliance	   with	  
America.	  Any	  alternative	  would	  destabilize	  the	  region,	  a	  fact	  the	  weighs	  heavily	  upon	  
Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   leaders.	   Furthermore,	   Kawasaki	   contends	   that	   although	  
economic	  considerations	  do	   impact	   Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  objectives,	  the	  importance	  
of	   these	   factors	   has	   been	   overemphasized	  by	  mercantile	   realists.51 	  While	  Kawaski’s	  
analysis	  is	   compelling,	  his	  overemphasis	  on	  material	   elements	  ultimately	   contradicts	  
the	  work	  of	  Kahn	  and	  other	  domestically	  focused	  researchers.	  Furthermore,	  Kawaski	  
published	   before	   the	   eﬀects	   of	   9/11	   could	   be	   considered.	   The	   empirical	   evidence	  
present	   in	   Kliman	   and	   Hughes’	   work	   demonstrates	   that	   Japan	   has	   become	   more	  
assertive,	  and	  challenges	  Kawaski’s	  security	  dilemma	  premise.
	   While	   the	   realist	   tradition	   provides	   an	   interesting	   context	   for	   Japan’s	   power	  
potential,	   it	  does	  not	   adequately	   address	   the	   restrictive	  domestic	  institutionalization	  
that	  inhibit	  the	  emergence	  of	  Japan	  as	  a	  traditional	  great	  power.	  In	  his	  criticism	  of	  this	  
realist	   shortcoming	   Andrew	  Oros	   notes	   that	   ‘[c]entral	   tenets	  of	  realist	   theory	  would	  
predict	   that	   [the]	  vestiges	  of	  Japan’s	  defeat	   over	  half	  a	  century	  ago	  would	   long	   since	  
have	  been	  discarded.	   Realists’	   standard	  response	  is	   that	  there	  is	   simply	  a	   time	   lag.’52	  
Conversely,	  Inoguchi	  Takashi	  argues	  that	  both	  political	  and	  military	  normalization	  are	  
underway	   in	   Japan.	   Inoguchi	   notes	   that	   the	   political	   structure	   of	   Japan	   is	   shifting	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towards	   a	   two-­‐party	   system	   and	   greater	   assertiveness	   internationally	   that	   calls	   for	  
eventual	   constitutional	   revision.53 	   Inoguchi’s	   emphasis	  on	   political	   pragmatism	   and	  
security	  embody	  general	  realist	  themes,	  and	  his	  emphasis	  on	  how	  changes	  to	  domestic	  
institutions	   are	   complementary	   to	   a	   normal	   security	   posture	   oﬀer	   an	   interesting	  
(although	  not	  contradictory)	  counter	  to	  Oros.
	   Although	   realist	   theorists	   have	   overall	   struggled	   to	   accurately	   gauge	   the	  
character	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  whole	  scale	  failure	  of	  realism.	  It	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  much	  of	  the	  discussed	  
realist	  scholarship	  draws	  from	  either	  classical	  or	  neorealist	  theories,	  whose	  tenets	  were	  
established	  under	  multipolar	  and	  bipolar	  international	   systems,	   respectively.	   Both	  of	  
these	  brands	   of	   realism	   are	   better	   equipped	  to	   analyze	   the	  period	  of	  modern	   Japan	  
from	  the	  Meiji	  Restoration	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War.	  Given	  the	  unipolar	  nature	  
of	   the	   international	   power	  hierarchy	   over	  the	  past	   twenty	  years,	   combined	  with	  the	  
emergence	   of	   economic	  multipolarity,	   realism	   has	   again	   adapted	   and	   oﬀered	   new	  
insights	  through	  the	  development	  of	  neoclassical	  realism.	  
	   Neoclassical	   realism,	   as	  deﬁned	   in	  the	  previous	   section,	   is	  a	  theory	  of	  foreign	  
policy	   that	   contends	   the	   external	   pressures	   of	   the	   international	   system	   must	   be	  
interpreted	   through	  intervening	  variables,	  such	   as	  the	  perceptions	  of	  political	   elites,	  
before	   policy	   can	  be	   enacted.	   This	   sensitivity	   to	   domestic	  factors	   is	  promising,	   and	  
although	   neoclassical	   realist	   interpretations	   of	   Japan	   are	   extremely	   limited,	   Oros	  
suggests	   that	   authors	   such	   as	   Green	   and	   Kliman	   in	   part	   derive	   their	   theoretical	  
frameworks	   from	   foundational	   neoclassical	   realist	   theorists	   including	   Randall	  
Schweller	   and	   Gideon	   Rose.54 	   One	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   this	   thesis’	   theoretical	  
framework	   is	   to	   further	   neoclassical	   realist	   scholarship	   by	   applying	   core	   realist	  
assumptions	  through	  a	  historically	  nuanced	  analysis	  of	  Japan.	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1.3	  Ideological	  Factors	  and	  Constructivism
In	   addition	   to	   the	  neoclassical	   realist	  underpinnings	  described	  in	   the	  preceding	   two	  
sections,	   this	   thesis	   also	   engages	   with	   ideological	   considerations.	   This	   section	  
introduces	  constructivism	  as	  a	  method	  for	  addressing	  the	  role	  of	  ideational	  factors	  on	  
foreign	  policy.	  Of	   particular	   interest	   are	   the	  variables	   of	  group	   dynamics	  and	  trans-­‐
generational	   norms	   raised	   by	   the	   research	   question	   three:	   What	   ideological	  
continuities	   exist	   between	   competing	   groups	   of	   Japanese	   political	   elite	   from	   one	  
historical	   period	   to	   the	   next?	   Constructivism	   contends	   that	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
international	   system	   is	   contingent	   upon	   historical	   and	   social	   factors,	   rather	   than	  
originating	  from	  intrinsically	  given	  characteristics	  of	  international	  politics.55 	  Although	  
not	   a	   fully	   actualized	   theory,	   research	   founded	   on	   constructivist	   methodology	   is	  
designed	   to	   elicit	   a	   thorough	   ontological	   explanation	   of	   the	   social	   elements	   that	  
collectively	  comprise	  international	  relations.	  This	  is	  to	   say,	  constructivists	  investigate	  
pivotal	   factors	   of	   international	   relations	   that	   exist	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	  neoclassical	  
realism.56	  
Much	   of	   the	   constructivist	   doctrine	   is	  a	   direct	   reaction	   to	   neorealism,	   which	  
was	   the	   dominant	   theory	   of	   international	   relations	   during	   its	   emergence.	   For	   the	  
purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  Alexander	  Wendt’s	  critique	  of	  neorealism	  will	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  
the	  constructivist	  elements	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Wendt	   contests	  that	   the	  neorealist	  premise	  
that	   anarchy	   is	   an	   inherent	   property	   of	   the	   international	   system	   by	   asserting	   that	  
anarchy,	   although	   a	   possible	   feature	   of	   the	   international	   system,	   is	   a	   socially	  
constructed.57 	   This	   contention	   provides	   Wendt	   and	   other	   constructivists	   with	   the	  
necessary	  theoretical	  space	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  a	  state	  proceeds	  from	   social	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factors,	   such	  as	  the	  shared	  identity	  of	  a	  state’s	   leaders	  and	  public,	   termed	   “collective	  
identity”	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  its	  political	  elite.58	  
Wendt	   notes	   that:	   ‘Identities	   are	   the	   basis	   of	   interests.	   Actors	  do	   not	   have	  a	  
“portfolio”	   of	   interests	   that	   they	  carry	  around	   independent	  of	  social	   context;	   instead	  
they	  deﬁne	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  process	  of	  deﬁning	  situations.’59 	  Similarly,	  Alice	  Ba	  
and	  Matthew	  Hoﬀman	  state	  ‘the	  interests	  and	  identities	  of	  actors	  in	  world	  politics	  are	  
malleable	   ...	   their	   interests	  and	   identities	  depend	  on	   the	  context	   in	  which	   they	  ﬁnd	  
themselves.’60 	   Identities	   are	   therefore	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   constructivist	   theorizing.	  
Unlike	  classical	   realist	   reasoning	  which	   is	  underpinned	  by	   interpretations	  of	  human	  
nature,	   constructivists	   assert	   that	   identities	   emerge	   from	   the	   social	   construction	   of	  
ideas,	  beliefs,	   and	  associations	   that	   are	   themselves	   perpetually	   linked	  in	  a	   recursive	  
feedback	   loop	   with	   the	   social	   world.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   Ian	   S.	   Lustick	   and	   Dan	  
Miodownik:
The	   fundamental	   insight	   [of	   constructivism]	   is	   that	   the	   social	  world	   is	   not	   given	   to	   us	   as	   pre-­‐
organized	  in	  some	  immutable	  fashion,	  but	  that	  the	  categories	  of	  action	  and	  interpretation	  that	  help	  
us	  produce	  and	  reproduce	  a	  familiar	  world	  are	  themselves	  constructed	  out	  of	  processes	  in	  which	  we	  
participate,	  but	  which	  we	  may	  or	  may	  not	  understand.61
	   This	  conclusion	   is	   echoed	   in	   a	  wealth	  of	   literature	   that	   endeavors	   to	   explain	  
international	   relations	   though	   the	   lens	   of	   constructivism.62 	   Despite	   the	   sometime	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divergent	   arguments	   of	   constructivist	   authors,	   Lustick	   and	   Miodownik	   distilled	  
several	   key	   attributes	   of	   identity	   that	   are	   consistent	   across	   most	   constructivist	  
writings.	  What	   follows	  below	  is	  a	  summation	  of	  David	  Rousseau’s	  elaboration	  on	  the	  
research	  of	  Lustick	  and	  Miodownik.	  63	  According	  to	  Rousseau:
· Identities	   are	   ﬂuid	   and	   subject	   to	   change	   over	   time.64 	   Linda	  Bishai	   expands	  
upon	  this	  point	  by	  claiming	   that	   ‘identities…are	  constructed	  constantly	  by	  our	  
own	  accounts	  of	  all	  the	  circumstances	  through	  which	  we	  exist.’	  65
· Groups	  and	  individuals	  have	  multiple	  identities,	  and	  they	  shift	  between	   these	  
identities	  depending	  upon	  the	  situation	  and	  environment.
· These	   contextual	   (situation	   and	   environment)	   variables	   derive	   from	   the	  
political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   structures	   within	   which	   the	   group	   and	  
individual	   operate.	   Ba	   and	  Hoﬀman	   note	   that	   ‘the	   identity	   and	   interests	   of	  
states	  change	  across	  contexts	  and	  over	  time.’66
· Social	   interaction	   inﬂuences	   the	   saliency	   of	   one	   identity	   over	  other	   possible	  
identities	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  identities.
· Certain	   actors	   (e.g.	   politicians	   and	   intellectuals)	   have	   greater	   access	   to	   the	  
resources	   and	  modes	  of	  communication	  necessary	  for	   disseminating	   identity.	  
These	   actors	   have	   a	   greater	   inﬂuence	   on	   the	   identities	   (including	   collective	  
identities)	  prevalent	  within	  society.	  
While	  Rousseau	  explores	  the	  interplay	  between	  identity	  and	  the	  individual,	  it	  remains	  
unclear	   how	   the	   individual	   forms	   a	   notion	   of	   self,	   or	   how	   the	   self	   operates	   as	   a	  
member	  of	  a	  group.	  Understanding	   this	  process	   is	  essential	   to	   examining	   this	   thesis’	  
focus	   on	   how	   group	   dynamics	   help	   shape	   foreign	   policy	  outcomes.	   Subjective	   self-­‐
identiﬁcation	   shapes	   identity	   formation,	   and	   consequently	   how	   collective	   identity	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functions	   within	   the	   international	   system.	   Conceptualizing	   the	   self	   can	   only	   be	  
accomplished	  through	   the	  self’s	   dichotomous	   relationship	  with	   the	  other.	   That	   is	   to	  
say,	   the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  self	  are	  constrained	  by	  that	  which	  lies	  outside	  the	  self	  (the	  
other).	  This	  paradoxical	  deﬁnition	  is	  posited	  by	  Franke	  Wilmer,	  who	  states	  the	  self	  ‘is	  
constituted	  by	  referring	  the	  bounded	  self	  to	  something	  else,	  something	  with	  which	  the	  
self	  is	  either	  identiﬁed	  (as	  the	  same)	  or	  from	  which	  it	  is	  diﬀerent’.67
The	  division	  between	  the	  self	  and	  the	  other	  is	  signiﬁcant	  when	  examining	  the	  
socialization	   inherent	   to	   human	   interaction.	   Humans	   are	   fundamentally	   social	  
creatures	   who	   are	   compelled	   to	   participate	  within	   social	   groups.	   Group	   association	  
supplies	   its	  members	   with	   material	   (acquisition	   of	   resources,	   distribution	   of	   labor,	  
protection	   from	   threats)	   and	   emotional	   (comfort,	   sense	   of	   belonging,	   purpose)	  
beneﬁts.	  The	  self-­‐other	  delineation	  that	  enables	  an	  individual	   to	  deﬁne	  themselves	  as	  
separate	   from	   another	   translates	   directly	   to	   these	   social	   groups.	   For	   example,	   two	  
individuals	  borne	  of	  the	  same	  parents	  will	  view	  each	  other	  with	  less	  otherness	  than	  an	  
individual	  with	  diﬀerent	  parents.	  Likewise,	  an	  individual	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  a	  speciﬁc	  
village	  would	  likely	  view	  a	  foreign	   traveler	  as	  being	  more	   other	  than	  a	   fellow	  village	  
dweller.	   Although	   these	   examples	   may	   oversimplify	   a	   rather	   complex	   feature	   of	  
human	   behavior,	   they	   reﬂect	   an	   underlying	   aspect	   of	   the	   self-­‐other	   complex:	   that	  
otherness	   is	   both	   inclusive	   and	   exclusive.	   The	   siblings	   from	   the	   ﬁrst	   example	   are	  
unique	  individuals	  with	  their	  own	  (self)	  identity	  that	  is	  exclusively	  distinguished	  from	  
all	   others.	  They	  are	  also	  part	  of	  a	  family	   (a	  group),	  whose	  membership	   is	  inclusively	  
deﬁned	  by	  excluding	  others	  from	  diﬀerent	  families.
	  Membership	  within	   a	   group	  is	  not	   always	   voluntary	   (siblings	  do	   not	   choose	  
their	   family),	   but	   groups	   nonetheless	   form	   their	   own	   identities	   through	   the	  
communication	   of	   shared	   thoughts	   and	   perceptions	   between	   its	   members.68 	   The	  
collective	  identity	  of	  the	  group,	  which	  is	  continually	  constructed	  through	  the	  dialogue	  
of	   members,	   informs	   the	   individual	   identity	   of	   each	  member.69 	  Additionally,	   some	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actors	  within	  the	  group	  will	  exert	  a	  greater	  inﬂuence	  on	  the	  group’s	  collective	  identity	  
(and	   by	   extension	   upon	   each	   group	   member)	   than	   members	   with	   less	   leverage.	  
Collective	   identity	   is	   thereby	   dynamically	   recreated	   by	   in-­‐group	   members,	   and	  
constantly	   conﬁned	   by	   out-­‐group	   others.	   When	   considering	   the	   shifts	   in	   Japan’s	  
foreign	   policy	   strategies,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   understand	   how	   identity	   is	   deﬁned	   and	  
constrained	  by	  group	  leaders	  (namely	  state	  elites).
Within	   the	   group,	   particular	   ideas	   and	   beliefs	   are	   transmitted	   between	  
members.	   These	  factors	  help	  deﬁne	   the	  “norms”,	  or	  the	  rules	  which	  govern	  behavior	  
and	  ideology,	  of	   the	  group.	  Robert	  Axelrod	  discusses	  norms	  as	  standards	  of	  behavior	  
governing	   cooperation	   and	   reciprocity	   between	   actors.70 	  Hugo	   Dobson	   notes	   that	  
other	  constructivist	   literature,	   especially	  the	  work	   of	  Friedrich	  Kratochwil,	   expanded	  
Axelrod’s	   deﬁnition	   of	   norms	   to	   ‘not	   only	   as	   constraining	   but	   also	   encouraging,	   or	  
constituting,	   behavior.’71 	   Peter	   J.	   Katzenstein	   divides	   norms	   into	   two	   categories:	  
regulatory	   and	   constitutive.	   Regulatory	   norms	   ‘deﬁne	   standards	   of	   appropriate	  
behavior	   that	   shape	   interests	   and	   help	   coordinate	   the	   behavior	   of	   political	   actors’	  
while	  ‘[c]onstitutive	  norms	  express	  actor	  identities	  that	  also	  deﬁne	  interests	  and	  thus	  
shape	   behavior’.72 	   These	   complementary	   sets	   of	   norms	   are	   transmitted	   from	   one	  
generation	   to	   the	   next,	  and	   in	   the	  process	   simultaneously	   reforge	  and	   reinforce	  the	  
collective	   identity	   of	   the	   group.73 	   Toni	   Erskine	   clariﬁes	   this	   dynamic,	   noting	   that	  
norms	   ‘embody	  established	  codes	  of	  what	   actors	  should	  do,	  or	  refrain	  from	  doing,	  in	  
certain	   circumstances.’74 	   From	   this	   scholarship	  we	  can	  derive	  a	  deﬁnition	   of	  norms.	  
Norms	  within	  this	  thesis	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  system	  of	  established	  rules	  that	  
inform	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors.	  
The	  in-­‐group/out-­‐group	  division	  correlates	  directly	  to	  the	  international	  system,	  
where	  the	  principle	  actor	   is	  the	  state	  (the	  primacy	  of	  the	  state	  is	  explored	  in	  Section	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1.1).	  Each	  state	  possesses	  a	  unique	  collective	   identity	  and	  contains	  several	   competing	  
identities.	   For	   example,	   the	   collective	   identity	   of	   America	   is	   deﬁned	   by	   norms	   of	  
democracy	  and	  personal	   liberty	  while	  the	  competing	   identities	   of	   the	  general	  public	  
are	   roughly	   divided	   by	   conservative	   (Republican)	   and	   liberal	   (Democrat)	   factions.	  
Within	   the	   state,	   political	   elites	   not	   only	  control	   foreign	   policy	   outcomes,	   but	   they	  
exert	   greater	   inﬂuence	   on	   the	   collective	   identity	   of	   the	   state.	   Additionally,	   social	  
factors	   aﬀect	   the	   collective	   identity	   of	   a	   group.75 	   For	   example,	   state	   leaders	   can	  
cultivate	  nationalism	  (a	  facet	  of	  collective	  identity)	  to	  bolster	  their	  political	  position.
The	   social	   environment	   of	   international	   relations	   is	   the	   international	   system,	  
and	   the	   recursive	   socialization	   of	   states	   comprises	   the	   external	   pressures	   that	  
constrain	   state	   leaders.	   As	   a	  result,	   the	  objective	   reality	   of	  neoclassical	   realists	   is	   in	  
part	   created	   through	   the	   subjective	   reality	   of	   state	   elites.76 	   The	   neoclassical	   realist	  
interpretation	  of	  foreign	  policy	  follows	  a	  pattern	  similar	  to	  the	  previous	  discussion	  of	  
collective	   identity	   formation,	   whereby	   in-­‐group	   leaders	   are	   constantly	   engaged	   in	  
interpreting	   and	   redeﬁning	   the	   collective	   identity	   of	   the	   group.	   In	   terms	   of	  
neoclassical	   realism,	   the	  subjective	  reality	  of	  state	  elites	  are	  in	  constant	  dialogue	  with	  
the	  objective	  reality	  of	  the	  international	   system	  that	  in	  turn	  deﬁnes	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
the	   subjective	   world.	   Integrating	   constructivism	   with	   neoclassical	   realism	   is	   an	  
essential	  component	   in	  conceptualizing	   identities	  as	  intervening	  variables	  within	  the	  
framework	   of	   this	   thesis.	   In	   this	  manner,	   the	  proposed	   combination	   of	   approaches	  
enhances	   this	   thesis’	   conclusions	   by	   expanding	   the	   oﬀered	   analysis	   beyond	   the	  
traditional	  scopes	  of	  neoclassical	  realist	  or	  constructivist	  research.	  
1.4	  Ideational	  Considerations:	  Constructivist	  Interpretations	  of	  Japan
Japan’s	   unique	   position	   within	   the	   international	   system	   and	   its	   unconventional	  
approach	   to	   foreign	   policy	   has	   prompted	   a	   number	   of	   studies	   that	   focus	   on	   the	  
domestic	   dynamics	   of	   Japan.	   These	   works	   diﬀerentiate	   themselves	   from	   the	   more	  
traditional	   international	   relations	  understandings	   of	   a	  state’s	   foreign	  policy	  goals	  by	  
adopting	  a	  constructivist	  methodology.	  Constructivism	  examines	  how	  the	  interaction	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between	  actors	  (state	  and	  non-­‐state)	  in	  the	  social	  world	  establishes	  norms,	  transforms	  
identity,	  and	  aﬀects	  the	  development	  of	  policy.	  With	  regard	  to	   Japan,	  constructivists	  
most	   commonly	   employ	   socially	   rooted	   variables,	   such	   as	   norms	   and	   identity,	   to	  
explain	  Japan’s	  reluctance	  to	  remilitarize.	  Unlike	  classical	  realism	  or	  neorealism	  which	  
privileges	   power	   dynamics,	   constructivists	   contend	   that	   Japan’s	   resistance	   to	  
normalization	   is	   a	   result	   of	   inherent	   Japanese	   antimilitarism.	   In	   particular,	   Thomas	  
Berger	  and	  Peter	  Katzenstein	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  social	  elements	  on	  Japanese	  
national	  security.	  
	   Thomas	   Berger	   asserts	   that	   Japan’s	   security	   agenda	   has	   been	   profoundly	  
inﬂuenced	  by	  cultural	  factors.	  For	  Berger,	  Japan’s	  position	  as	  an	  economic	  superpower	  
that	  has	  forgone	  military	  normalization	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  “culture	  of	  anti-­‐militarism”	  that	  
deﬁnes	   the	  goals	  of	  its	   political	   actors.77 	   Through	  a	  comparative	   analysis	  of	  postwar	  
Japan	   and	  Germany,	   Berger	   argues	   that	   Japan’s	   rejection	   of	   traditional	   great	   power	  
policies	  must	   be	  understood	   as	   a	   result	   of	   Japan’s	  cultural	   aversion	   to	   its	  disastrous	  
militaristic	  past.	   	  In	  his	  review	  of	  East	  Asian	  security,	  Berger	  notes	  that	  constructivism	  
‘oﬀers	   a	   convincing	   explanation	   for	   the	   historical	   shift	   of	   actor	   preferences	   from	  
security	   to	   economic	   concerns.’78 	   While	   his	   historical	   analysis	   of	   Japan’s	   security	  
policies	  does	  provide	  an	   intriguing	   discussion	  of	  norms	   and	   values,	  Berger’s	  analysis	  
could	  beneﬁt	   from	   expanding	  upon	   the	   complex	  external	   factors	   that	   also	   inﬂuence	  
foreign	  policy
	   Katzenstein	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  norms	  and	  how	  their	  institutionalization	  into	  
societal	  and	  legal	  practices	  inﬂuences	  security	  practice.79 	  Norms	  serve	  as	  a	  behavioral	  
mitigator	  to	  Katzenstein	  who	  argues	  that	  policy	  decisions	  are	  constrained	  by	  expected	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standards	   of	   behavior.	   In	   particular,	   Katzenstein	   discusses	   the	   reluctance	   of	   the	  
Japanese	  police	  and	  military	  to	  use	  violence.	  Katzenstein	  develops	  a	  useful	  theoretical	  
approach	  through	  his	  engagement	  of	  norms.	  He	  contends	  that	  norms,	  which	  are	  often	  
overlooked	  by	   realist	   or	  liberal	   approaches,	   are	  a	   necessary	  component	  of	   Japanese-­‐
centric	   studies.80 	   Despite	   these	   insights,	   Katzenstein	   has	   been	   criticized	   for	  
misinterpreting	   some	  of	  the	  domestic	  historical	  developments	  essential	   to	   his	  norm-­‐
based	   framework.81 	  Glenn	  Hook	   develops	  a	  similar	   thesis	  by	  exploring	   the	  eﬀects	   of	  
Imperial	   Japan’s	   legacy	   on	   Japanese	   policy.	   By	   discussing	   Japanese	   security	   policy	  
through	   a	   survey	   of	   both	   internal	   and	   external	   pressures,	   and	   with	   signiﬁcant	  
consideration	   of	   the	   Japanese	   identity,	   Hook	   provides	   an	   excellent	   context	   to	  
understand	   Japan’s	   paciﬁst	   foreign	   policy.	   By	   emphasizing	   the	   role	   of	   language	   on	  
security	   policy,	   Hook	   introduces	   several	   insights	   from	   discourse	   analysis	   to	   the	  
aforementioned	  constructivist	  frameworks.82	  
	   While	  these	  sources	  provide	  an	  excellent	  starting	  point	  for	  analyses	  of	  Japanese	  
foreign	   policy,	   the	   complex	   interaction	   of	   norms	   and	  identity	  on	   foreign	  policy	   can	  
lead	   to	   an	   oversimpliﬁed	  understanding	   of	   Japanese	   society.	  Paciﬁst	   norms	   are	   core	  
components	  of	  postwar	  Japan’s	  collective	  identity,	  but	  Kenneth	  Pyle	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  
a	   historically	   entrenched	   disconnect	   between	   the	   Japanese	   ruling	   elite	   and	   the	  
Japanese	  masses.83 	  While	   Japan’s	   leaders	   cannot	   ﬂagrantly	   violate	   domestic	  paciﬁst	  
norms,	  this	  divide	  has	  provided	  the	  necessary	  traction	  for	  Japan’s	  evolution	  towards	  a	  
more	  traditionally	  conservative	  foreign	  policy,	  witnessed	  by	  its	  increased	  assertiveness	  
over	  the	  past	  decade	  and	  a	  half.	  Norms	  still	  operate	  heavily	  within	  this	  equation,	  but	  it	  
is	  worth	  noting	   these	  norms	  are	   constantly	  evolving.	  Hugo	  Dobson	   investigates	   this	  
transformation	   by	   discussing	   Japan’s	   participation	   in	   United	   Nations	   (UN)	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Peacekeeping	   operations.	   Dobson	   emphasizes	   the	   role	   of	   norms	   on	   behavior	   as	   a	  
contributing	  factor	  to	  Japan’s	  peacekeeping	  involvement.84
	   Andrew	  Oros	  builds	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Berger	  and	  Katzenstein	  and	  argues	  that	  a	  
culture	  of	  domestic	  anti-­‐militarism	  still	  dominates	  Japan’s	  security	  agenda.	  According	  
to	  Oros,	  a	  systemic	  shock	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  override	  the	  salience	  of	  antimilitarism	  
within	   the	   Japanese	   identity.	   Oros	   notes	   that	   existing	   constructivist	   literature	   has	  
devoted	  limited	  attention	  to	  ‘the	  question	  of	  how	  contending	  views	  of	  security	  identity	  
in	   Japan	   have	   structured	   speciﬁc	   security	   practices	   in	   postwar	   Japan’.85 	   For	   Oros,	  
antimilitarism	   norms	   emerged	   from	   competing	   security	   perspectives	   of	   postwar	  
Japanese	  leaders	  who	  negotiated	  a	  security	  identity	  contingent	  upon	  the	  “three	  Rs”	  of	  
“reach,	  reconcile,	  reassure”.86 	  With	  regard	  to	  Japan’s	  apparent	  shift	  away	  from	  its	  Cold	  
War	  agenda,	  Oros	  argues	  that	  the	  “three	  Rs”	  still	  constrain	  its	  new	  objectives.	  
	   The	   general	   acceptance	   of	   paciﬁst	   norms	   by	   constructivist	   methodologies	   is	  
challenged	  by	   Jennifer	  Lind	  who	   suggests	   that	   if	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   embodied	  
paciﬁst	   norms,	   Japan	   would	   adopt	   a	   truly	  military	   defensive	   doctrine	   that	   was	   less	  
integrated	  with	  America.87	  More	  historically	  geared	  analyses,	  such	  as	  that	   oﬀered	  by	  
Pyle	  and	  Samuels,	  provide	  an	  excellent	  counterpoint	   to	  constructivist	   studies.	  Rather	  
than	  focusing	  only	  on	  Japanese	  culture	  and	  foreign	  policy	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  forward,	  
these	  authors	  begin	  their	  analysis	  with	   the	  transformation	  of	  Japanese	  society	  under	  
the	  Meiji	  Restoration	  and	  progress	  to	   the	  present.	   	  This	  approach	  is	  replicated	  in	  this	  
thesis.
	   Constructivist	   insights	  into	   identity	  and	  norms	  are	  essential	   in	  understanding	  
the	   domestic	   aspects	   that	   inﬂuence	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy.	   Nevertheless,	  
constructivism	  struggles	  to	  deﬁne	  the	  role	  of	  paciﬁst	  principles	  in	  Japan’s	  increasingly	  
assertive	   stance.	  As	  referenced	   in	   Section	   1.2	  and	   fully	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  7,	   since	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9/11	   Japan	   has	   become	   a	   more	   active	   participant	   in	   regional	   and	   global	   security	  
measures.	  Of	  particular	  note	  is	  the	  sidestepping	  of	  constitutional	  restraints,	  which	  are	  
the	  legal	  institutionalization	  of	  norms,	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	  supplemental	   laws	  that	  
expand	  Japan’s	  security	  options.	  Neoclassical	   realism	  provides	  some	  insight	   into	   how	  
changing	  external	   constraints	  have	  conditioned	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	  alter	  their	  foreign	  
policy	  approach.	  However,	   without	   a	  ﬁrm	   basis	   in	   Japanese	  history	   the	   relationship	  
between	   a	   more	   assertive	   foreign	   policy	   and	   the	   existing	   paciﬁst	   norms	   remains	  
opaque.	  This	  thesis	  addresses	  this	  need	  by	  drawing	  heavily	  upon	  historical	  evidence.	  
1.5	  Historical	  Context
This	  thesis	  develops	  a	  broad	  historical	  discussion	  that	  oﬀers	  a	  cohesive	  understanding	  
of	   Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  evolution.	  The	  research	  questions	  speciﬁcally	  reference	  both	  
external	   and	   internal	   transitions	   aﬀecting	   Japan	   across	   historical	   periods.	   	   Both	  
neoclassical	   realist	   and	   constructivist	   factors	   must	   therefore	   be	   framed	   within	   the	  
context	   of	   modern	   Japanese	   history.	  Within	   this	   thesis,	   “modern”	   Japanese	   history	  
refers	  to	  the	  period	  following	  the	  Meiji	  Restoration	  in	  1868.	  Prior	  to	  this	  period,	  Japan	  
was	  isolated	  from	   the	  international	  community	  and	  practiced	  minimal	  foreign	  policy.	  
When	  considering	  the	  foreign	  policy	  evolution	  of	  Japan,	  the	  policy	  strategy	  crafted	  by	  
early	  Meiji	   leaders	  provides	  a	  clear	  historical	   starting	  point.	  This	  point	  is	  expanded	  in	  
Chapter	  3.
	   Current	   international	   relations	   literature	   provides	   a	   wealth	   of	   information	  
regarding	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	  over	  the	   last	   ﬁfty	   to	   sixty	   years.	   However,	   such	   a	  
limited	  historical	  scope	  leaves	  crucial	  elements	  of	  the	  research	  questions	  unanswered.	  
Each	  research	  question	  contains	  a	  historical	  element,	  which	  have	  been	  placed	  in	  bold	  
text	  for	  clarity:	  How	  have	   concerns	  over	  national	  security	  and	  other	  external	  pressures	  
from	   the	   international	   system	   inﬂuenced	   the	   dramatic	   shifts	   in	   modern	   Japan’s	  
foreign	   policy?88 	  How	   have	   these	   factors	   changed	  with	   time?	  What	   ideological	  
continuities	   exist	   between	   competing	   groups	   of	   Japanese	   political	   elite	   from	   one	  
historical	  period	  to	   the	  next?	   As	  detailed	   in	  the	  introduction,	   this	  thesis	  provides	  a	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framework	  that	  accounts	  for	  both	  theoretical	  and	  historical	  factors.	  This	  framework	  is	  
developed	   in	  Chapter	  2,	  but	  ﬁrst	  it	   is	  necessary	   to	   review	  the	  historical	   sources	  used	  
throughout	  each	  chapter.	  
	   Three	   types	   of	   historical	   resources	   are	   used	   within	   this	   thesis.	   First,	   a	   wide	  
range	  of	  anthologies	  are	  utilized.	  These	  works	  cover	  large	  periods	  of	  Japanese	  history	  
with	  speciﬁc	  chapters	  dedicated	  to	  a	  particular	  era	  or	  approach	  (e.g.	  political	  economy	  
or	   Japanese	   imperialism).	   Notably,	   the	   Cambridge	   History	   of	   Japan	   series	   is	   used	  
extensively,	   as	   are	   the	  works	  of	  renowned	  Japanese	  scholars,	   such	  as	  Marius	   Jansen	  
and	   W.G.	   Beasley.89 	   Second,	   this	   thesis	   draws	   from	   detailed	   accounts	   of	   speciﬁc	  
historical	   events	   found	   in	   stand	   alone	   publications.	   These	   resources	   are	   generally	  
more	   focused	   than	   historical	   anthologies,	   and	   are	   extremely	   useful	   for	   analyzing	   a	  
particular	  event	  or	  person,	  such	  as	  Ian	  Hill	  Nish’s	  work	  on	  the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Alliance	  
or	   Seki	   Hiroharu’s	   examination	   of	   the	   Mukden	   Incident.90 	   Third,	   primary	   source	  
material	  in	  the	  form	  of	  autobiographies,	  memoirs,	  and	  translated	  accounts	  of	  political	  
correspondences	   are	   deployed	   to	   provide	   an	   account	   of	   how	   Japan’s	   political	   elite	  
reacted	   to	   key	   historical	   events.	   Examples	   include	   Kajima	   Morinosuke’s	   masterful	  
detailing	   of	   correspondences	   between	   Meiji	   leaders,	   Kume	  Kunitake’s	   collection	   of	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  Modern	  Japan	  
(HarperCollins,	  2009);	  Paine,	  The	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1894-­‐1895:	  Perceptions,	  Power,	  and	  Primacy	  
(New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003);	  Winkler,	  The	  Quest	  for	  Japan's	  New	  Constitution:	  An	  
Analysis	  of	  Visions	  and	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Proposals	  1980-­‐2009	  (Abingdon,	  Oxon:	  Routledge,	  
2012).
translated	   documents	   from	   the	   Iwakura	   Mission,	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   Yoshida’s	  
memoirs.91	  
	   There	  are	  a	  handful	  of	  sources	  that	  provide	  both	  the	  historical	  depth	  necessary	  
to	   develop	  a	   nuanced	  understanding	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   that	   forward	  a	  
central	  argument	  geared	  towards	  international	  relations.	  Kenneth	  Pyle’s	  Japan	  Rising:	  
The	   Resurgence	   of	   Japanese	   Power	   and	   Purpose	   merges	   historical	   evidence	   from	   a	  
wealth	   of	   primary	   and	   secondary	   sources	  with	   insights	   from	   international	   relations	  
theory.92 	   Pyle	   addresses	   the	   aforementioned	   shifts	   in	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   by	  
detailing	  the	  external	  factors	  upon	  which	  Japanese	  leaders	  have	  acted.	  By	  tracing	  these	  
factors	   from	   the	  Meiji	   Restoration	  until	   the	  present	   day,	   Pyle	   eﬀectively	   challenges	  
existing	   assumptions	   that	   these	   sudden	  shifts	   in	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   direction	   are	  
either	   unpredictable	   or	   a	   radical	   departure	   from	   the	   norm.	   It	   is	   an	   extremely	  
informative	  text	   that	  has	  been	  fundamental	   to	   this	   thesis,	  but	   it	   nonetheless	  has	   its	  
shortcomings.	   Pyle’s	   engagement	  with	   international	   relations	   theory	  could	  be	  more	  
substantial.	  He	  makes	  extensive	  use	  of	   realist	   tenets,	  but	  deploys	   the	  English	  school,	  
constructivism	   and	   liberalism	   without	   providing	   an	   overall	   framework	   that	   justiﬁes	  
this	  diverse	  use	  of	  theory.93	  This	  approach	  does	  not	  detract	   from	   the	  eﬀectiveness	  of	  
Pyle’s	   excellent	   work,	   but	   it	   does	   highlight	   the	   need	   for	   a	   more	   comprehensive	  
theoretical	  framework	  for	  analyzing	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy.
	   Richard	   J.	   Samuels	   approaches	   Japanese	   security	   policy	   through	   a	   detailed	  
historical	   analysis	   in	   Securing	   Japan:	   Tokyo's	   Grand	   Strategy	   and	   the	   Future	   of	   East	  
Asia.94 	   Samuels	   traces	   the	   historical	   context	   of	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	  evolution	  and	  
utilizes	  these	  factors	  to	  frame	  the	  current	  security	  discourse	  in	  Japan.	  Similar	  to	  Pyle,	  
Chapter	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91	  Kajima	  and	  Kajima	  Heiwa,	  The	  Diplomacy	  of	  Japan,	  1894-­‐1922,	  vol.	  I	  (Tokyo:	  Kajima	  Institute	  of	  
International	  Peace	  :	  Distributed	  by	  Kajima	  Pub.	  Co.,	  1976);	  ibid.,	  III;	  Kume,	  Japan	  Rising:	  The	  Iwakura	  
Embassy	  to	  the	  USA	  and	  Europe	  1871-­‐1873,	  ed.	  Chūshichi	  Tsuzuki	  and	  R.	  Jules	  Young	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009);	  Yoshida,	  The	  Yoshida	  Memoirs:	  The	  Story	  of	  Japan	  in	  Crisis,	  trans.	  
Yoshida	  Ken'ichi	  (London:	  Heinemann,	  1961).
92	  Pyle	  2007
93	  Realism	  is	  used	  throughout,	  but	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  pages	  45-­‐65.	  Hedley	  Bull	  of	  the	  English	  
School	  is	  discussed	  on	  page	  72.	  Alexander	  Wendt	  is	  referenced	  on	  page	  100	  and	  liberalism	  surfaces	  on	  
page	  147	  .	  
94	  Samuels	  2007
Samuels	  challenges	  assumptions	  prevalent	  in	  Japan-­‐centric	  literature	  that	  oversimplify	  
and	  misinterpret	   the	   security	   strategies	   of	   Japanese	   leaders.	   Samuels	   contends	   that	  
domestic	  political	   debates	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  external	   factors	  must	  be	  considered	  
when	   examining	   Japanese	  policy.	   To	   this	  end,	   Samuels	  traces	  a	  wealth	  of	  ideological	  
perspectives	  from	  the	  Meiji	  era	  to	  the	  present,	  and	  demonstrates	  how	  security	  policies	  
arose	   out	   of	   the	   contestation	   of	   divergent	   ideas	   and	   interpretations	   of	   the	  
international	  system.	  While	  Samuels’	  work	  draws	  from	  a	  vague	  historical	  timeframe,	  it	  
is	   heavily	   slanted	   towards	   Cold	   War	   and	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   Japan.	   This	   focus	   is	  
understandable	   given	  Samuels’	   aim	   to	   provide	  a	  historical	  basis	   for	  current	   strategic	  
debates	   facing	   Japanese	   leaders.	   Additionally,	   Samuels	   draws	   from	   both	   realist	   and	  
constructivist	   theory,	   without	   fully	   engaging	   with	   either	   theory	   or	   forwarding	   a	  
comprehensive	  theoretical	   framework.	  Much	  like	  Pyle,	  such	  a	  strong	  theoretical	  focus	  
falls	  outside	  of	  the	  desired	  scopes	  of	  their	  desired	  projects,	  and	  does	  not	  distract	  from	  
the	  potency	  of	  their	  research.	  
	   Ian	   Neary	   also	   provides	   a	   strong	   historical	   basis	   for	   his	   analysis	   of	   Japanese	  
foreign	  policy,	  tracing	  liberal	  and	  authoritarian	  trends	  in	  the	  Japanese	  polity	  from	  the	  
Meiji	   Restoration	   to	   the	  present.	   In	   this	  manner,	   Pyle,	   Samuels	  and	  Neary	  utilize	  a	  
similar	   methodology.	   Neary’s	   incorporation	   of	   historical	   factors	   provides	   a	   unique	  
examination	   of	   domestic	   factors	   (particularly	   the	   evolution	   of	  party	  politics)	   over	  a	  
broad	   historical	   timeframe,	   but	   ultimately	   suﬀers	   from	   limited	   details	   within	   a	  
relatively	  short	  publication.95	  
	   Pyle	   and	  Samuels’	   nuanced	   and	   historically	   rigorous	   approach	  does	  much	   to	  
address	  the	  lack	  of	  historical	  detail	   in	  international	  relations	  literature,	  but	  their	  work	  
suﬀers	   from	   a	  broad	  theoretical	   approach	  that	   does	   not	   clearly	   identify	   its	   frame	   of	  
analysis.	  This	  thesis	  is	  heavily	  indebted	  to	   the	  research	  of	  both	  authors.	  Nevertheless,	  
it	   will	   diverge	   considerably	   from	   their	   methodology	   by	   deriving	   theoretical	  
assumptions	  from	   a	  neoclassical	   realist	   perspective	   that	   incorporates	   constructivism	  
and	   SIT.	   In	   more	   general	   terms,	   historical	   analyses	   of	   Japan	  would	   beneﬁt	   from	   a	  
robust	  yet	  consistent	  theoretical	   framework	   that	  clearly	  deﬁnes	  its	  objects	  of	  analysis.	  
Such	  a	  framework	  is	  proposed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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95	  Neary,	  The	  State	  and	  Politics	  in	  Japan	  (Wiley,	  2002).
1.6	  Summarizing	  Existing	  Theories	  and	  Research	  Gaps
This	  chapter	  constitutes	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  analytical	  approach	  developed	  by	  this	  thesis,	  
and	   overlaps	   considerably	   with	   the	   framework	   fashioned	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   The	   research	  
questions	  driving	  this	  thesis	  build	  upon	  existing	  realist	  and	  constructivist	  scholarship,	  but	  
pulls	   its	   analytical	   tools	   from	   specific	   nuanced	   strands	   within	   each	   theory.	   It	   was	  
therefore	   necessary	   to	   contextualize	   the	   theoretical	   underpinnings	   of	   this	   research	  
project.	  First,	  neoclassical	  realism	  was	  introduced.	  Neoclassical	  realism	  focuses	  primarily	  
upon	  foreign	  policy	  but	  also	  considers	  domestic	  variables,	  such	  as	  state	  structure	  and	  the	  
perception	  of	  political	  elites,	  which	  propel	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  theory	  offers	  considerable	  
insight	  into	  the	  concepts	  of	  national	   security	  and	  international	  power	  hierarchies	  raised	  
by	  the	  research	  questions	  one	  and	  two,	  but	  its	  emphasis	  on	  foreign	  policy	  output	  leaves	  
questions	   regarding	   domestic	   variables	   unanswered.	   This	   discussion	   of	   the	   realist	  
tradition	   was	   supplemented	  with	   a	   review	   of	   current	   international	   relations	   literature	  
that	  forwards	  realist	  interpretations	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy.	  
	   Constructivism	   was	   introduced	   as	   a	  method	   for	   remedying	   the	   problems	   left	  
unresolved	  by	  neoclassical	   realism.	  Constructivism	   is	  a	  loose	  theoretical	   tradition	  that	  
examines	   the	  role	   of	   the	   social	   world	  within	   international	   relations.	   It	   also	   examines	  
elements	  crucial	  to	  surveying	  interstate	  relations,	  such	  as	  identity	  and	  norms,	  that	  exist	  
beyond	  established	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	   realism.	  This	   thesis	  utilizes	   constructivism	  to	  
supplement	   neoclassical	   realism,	  and	  as	  a	  method	  for	  examining	  social	   considerations	  
relevant	   to	   the	  research	  questions.	  A	  review	  of	   constructivist	  understandings	  of	   Japan	  
was	  also	  discussed.
	   Through	   this	   review,	   two	   complementary	   research	   gaps	   were	   identified.	   First,	  
international	   relations	   literature	   often	   presents	   short-­‐sighted	   analyses	   of	   Japan	   that	  
neglects	  historical	   factors.	  This	  thesis	  draws	  heavily	  upon	  historical	  detail,	  and	  a	  review	  
of	  relevant	  sources	  was	  provided.	  While	  significant	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  by	  a	  handful	  
of	   authors	  to	   incorporate	  history	  within	  international	   relations,	   existing	  resources	  are	  
wanting	   for	   a	   comprehensive	   theoretical	   framework.	   Second,	   current	   theoretical	  
interpretations	   of	   Japan	   do	   not	   provide	   adequate	   means	   for	   addressing	   both	   these	  
historical	  and	  the	  aforementioned	  theoretical	  factors.	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  a	  unique	  framework	  
derived	  from	  neoclassical	  realism,	   constructivism,	  and	  SIT	   is	  developed	  to	  address	  this	  
second	  gap.
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Chapter	  2	  




This	   chapter	   expands	   upon	   the	   sources	   reviewed	   in	   Chapter	   1	   and	   synthesizes	   a	  
theoretical	  framework	  through	  which	  the	  objectives	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  analyzed.	  Given	  
the	  diversity	  of	  concepts	  raised	  by	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis,	   it	   is	  necessary	  
to	   draw	   from	   multiple	   schools	   of	   thought.	   Therefore,	   this	   framework	   supplements	  
neoclassical	   realism	   and	   constructivism	   with	   Social	   Identity	   Theory	   (SIT).	   It	   is	   an	  
amalgamation	   tailored	   speciﬁcally	   to	   understand	   the	   evolution	   of	   Japan’s	   foreign	  
policy,	   but	   that	   is	   nevertheless	   robust	   enough	   to	   accommodate	   other	   research	  
interests.	   In	   broad	   terms,	   this	   framework	   is	   founded	   on	   neoclassical	   realist	  
assumptions	  that	  regard	  the	  state	  as	  the	  primary	  actor	  (statism)	  amidst	  the	  intergroup	  
interaction	   of	   other	   self-­‐interested	   states	   within	   an	   anarchical	   international	   system	  
(survivalism),	   that	   states	  must	   act	   to	   secure	  their	  own	   interests	   (self-­‐help),	   and	  that	  
these	  interests	  are	  dependent	  upon	  the	  perception	  of	  political	  elites.	  Examining	  these	  
elements	  of	  neoclassical	  realism	  is	  essential	  for	  understanding	  national	  security,	  power	  
dynamics,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  international	   system,	  which	  underscore	  the	  research	  
questions	  one	  and	  two.	  
	   Constructivist	   insights	   on	   identity	   formation	   and	  norms	   are	   then	   utilized	   to	  
complement	  neoclassical	  realist	  assumptions,	  with	  a	  speciﬁc	  interest	  in	  clarifying	  how	  
the	   perspective	   of	   state	   elites	   is	   formed.	   The	   central	   elements	   of	   constructivism	  
distilled	  in	  Chapter	  1	  provide	   the	  necessary	  means	   for	  engaging	  with	   the	  concepts	  of	  
group	  dynamics	  and	  trans-­‐generational	  norms	  also	  raised	  by	  research	  questions	  three.	  
The	  collective	   identity	  of	  a	  state	  both	  conditions	   the	  actions	   of	  political	   leaders	  and	  
forms	   a	   channel	   through	   which	   leaders	   communicate	   with	   domestic	   populations.	  
Additionally,	   the	   norms	   of	   the	   international	   system	   similarly	   constrain	   the	   foreign	  
policy	  options	  available	  to	  state	  leaders.	  Combining	  the	  constructivist	  and	  neoclassical	  
realist	  traditions	  is	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  how	  this	  thesis	  analyzes	  the	  strategies	  of	  
political	  leaders	  (Section	  2.1).	  
	   SIT,	   a	   social	   psychology	   theory	   that	   explores	   status-­‐seeking	   group	   behavior,	  
further	  enhances	  this	  framework	  by	  delineating	  the	  foreign	  policy	  strategies	  available	  
to	   Japanese	   leaders	   (Section	   2.2).	   Despite	   drastic	   shifts	   in	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy,	  
Japanese	   leaders	   have	   consistently	   acted	   upon	   neoclassical	   realist	   notions	   of	  
survivalism	   and	   self-­‐help	   as	   understood	   through	   their	   subjective	   perception	   of	   the	  
international	  system.	  This	  perception	  is	  dependent	  upon	  identities	  and	  norms,	  but	  the	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pragmatic	  privileging	  of	  certain	   identities	  and	  norms	  is	  best	   interpreted	  through	  SIT.	  
When	  applied	  to	   international	  relations,	  SIT	  contends	  that	  all	  foreign	  policy	  strategies	  
are	   designed	   to	   bolster	   the	   relative	   position	   of	   states	   (Section	   2.3).	   For	   example,	  
Japan’s	  transition	  to	  an	  aggressive	  revisionist	  state	  during	   the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  
and	  its	   low	  diplomatic	  stance	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  are	  critical	  moments	  that	   require	  
thorough	   academic	   engagement.	   By	   analyzing	   these	   seemingly	   divergent	   policies	  
through	   SIT,	   a	   consistent	   drive	   within	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   infrastructure	   to	  
strengthen	  state	  power	  while	  solidifying	  its	  sovereignty	  is	  identiﬁed.	  Having	  addressed	  
these	   factors,	   an	   example	   is	   oﬀered	  to	   demonstrate	  the	   eﬃcaciousness	   of	   this	   three	  
pronged	  approach	  	  in	  conceptualizing	  foreign	  policy	  outputs	  (Section	  2.4).	  
2.1	  Neoclassical	  Realism	  and	  Identity
Neoclassical	   realism’s	   sensitivity	   to	   intervening	   variables	   oﬀers	   an	   avenue	   for	  
incorporating	  constructivism	  within	  a	  hybridized	  framework.	  However,	   it	  is	  necessary	  
to	   consider	   areas	   of	   possible	   contradiction.	   Exploring	   these	   concerns	   ensures	   that	  
methodological	   conclusions	   drawn	   from	   either	   theoretical	   approach	   are	   consistent,	  
thus	  enhancing	  the	  theoretical	  viability	  of	  the	  framework.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  both	  
theories	  have	  been	  considerably	  reﬁned	  through	  the	  review	  of	  Chapter	  1,	   and	  geared	  
speciﬁcally	   to	   answer	   the	   research	   questions	   of	   this	   thesis.	   References	   to	   either	  
approach	   must	   be	   understood	   within	   the	   speciﬁc	   context	   that	   they	   have	   been	  
developed.	   Nevertheless,	   two	   potential	   sources	   of	   contention	   must	   be	   resolved	   if	  
neoclassical	   realism	   and	   constructivism	   are	   to	   be	   successfully	   integrated:	   (1)	   Is	   the	  
international	  system	  characterized	  by	  prevalent	  anarchy?	  (2)	  Does	  constructivism	  share	  
neoclassical	   realism’s	   emphasis	   on	   self-­‐preservation	   through	   relative	   power	  
distributions?	  
	   In	  lieu	  of	  a	  hierarchically	  superior	  coercive	  force	  within	  global	  aﬀairs,	  it	  can	  be	  
said	  that	  some	  degree	  of	  anarchy	  exists	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  Consequently,	  
resolution	  of	   international	   disputes	   depends	  upon	   the	  relative	  power	  distribution	   of	  
states.	   Anarchy	   is	   therefore	   also	   relative,	   as	   is	   deﬁned	   in	   Section	   1.1.	   Within	  
constructivism	  the	  “facts”	  of	  the	  international	  system	  (namely	  anarchy)	  do	  not	  derive	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from	   a	  material	   reality,	   but	   rather	  from	   an	   intersubjective	   social	   reality.96 	  Ergo,	   the	  
structure	  of	  the	   international	   system	   depends	  upon	  the	   ideas	  and	  perceptions	   of	   its	  
actors,	  rather	  than	  concrete	  objective	  factors.97	  
Within	   the	   constructivist	   camp	   there	   are	   two	   discrete	   epistemologies,	  
described	  by	  Wendt	  as	  “thin”	  and	  “thick”	  (and	  by	  John	  G.	  Ruggie	  as	  “neoclassical"	  and	  
"postmodernist")	  constructivism.98	  Thin	  constructivists	  maintain	  that	  reality	  is	  socially	  
constructed,	  but	  it	  exists	  externally	  from	  actors	  and	  can	  be	  engaged	  through	  empirical	  
research.	  99 	   Thick	   constructivists	   counter	   this	   assumption	  by	   insisting	   that	   no	   true	  
reality	   exists,	   because	  what	   is	   observed	  cannot	   be	   shown	   to	   exist	   independently	   of	  
observation.100
The	   thick	   constructivism	   has	   limited	   application	   within	   international	   relations,	  
and	  is	  better	  suited	  for	  philosophy.	  For	  thin	  constructivists,	  however,	  anarchy	  and	  its	  
corollary	   eﬀects	   (e.g.	   self-­‐help)	   are	   mutually	   constructed	   institutions.	   In	   Wendt’s	  
words:
An	  institution	  is	  a	  relatively	  stable	  set	  or	  "structure"	  of	  identities	  and	  interests.	  Such	  structures	  are	  
often	  codiﬁed	  in	  formal	  rules	  and	  norms,	  but	  these	  have	  motivational	  force	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  actors'	  
socialization	  to	  and	  participation	  in	  collective	  knowledge.	  Institutions	  are	  fundamentally	  cognitive	  
entities	  that	  do	  not	  exist	  apart	  from	  actors'	  ideas	  about	  how	  the	  world	  works.101
Actors	   thus	   participate	   in	   constant	   dialogue	   with	   an	   international	   system	   that	   is	  
created	   by	   their	   beliefs	   and	   concurrently	   constrained	   by	   these	   same	   beliefs.	   This	  
sentiment	   is	  mirrored	  by	  Rose’s	  understanding	  of	  neoclassical	  realism,	  where	  political	  
actors	  operate	  as	  an	  intervening	  variable	  between	  an	  objective	  reality	  that	  has	  already	  
been	   created,	   and	  a	   subjectively	  derived	  reality	   they	   seek	   to	   shape	   through	   foreign	  
policy.	  Conceptions	  of	  anarchy	  within	  thin	  constructivism	  and	  neoclassical	  realism	  are	  
therefore	  complementary	  to	  a	  nuanced	  interpretation	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  and	  
do	   not	   exclude	   the	  deployment	   of	  both	  theories	  within	  this	  framework.	  Resultantly,	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when	   deriving	   analysis	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   international	   system,	   which	  
underpins	   the	   security	   emphasis	   of	   research	   questions	   one	   and	   two,	   it	   should	   be	  
understood	   that	   relative	   anarchy	   is	   a	   persistent	   feature	  of	   interstate	   relations.	   This	  
assertion	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  previous	  discussion	  of	  scope	  conditions	  in	  Section	  1.1.
Regarding	   the	   primacy	   of	   power,	   there	   is	   signiﬁcant	   overlap	   between	  
constructivism	  and	  core	  tenets	  of	  realism	  covered	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  Both	  approaches	  argue	  
that	   under	  anarchy	  an	   actor’s	  ﬁrst	   concern	  must	   be	  preservation	   (self-­‐help/egoism).	  
The	   distribution	   of	   power	   is	   thereby	   delimitated	   between	   actors	   (states)	   who	  
cognitively	   distinguish	   themselves	   from	   other	   actors.102 	   What	   diﬀers	   between	  
constructivists	   and	  neoclassical	   realists	   is	   the	   perceived	   utility	  of	  material	   power.	   J.	  
Samuel	  Barkin	  considers	  the	   role	  of	  material	   power	  and	   reasons	  that	   constructivism	  
and	   realism	   can	   be	   merged	   into	   a	   hybrid	   theory	   of	   international	   relations.	   Barkin	  
holds	  that	  the	  realist	  emphasis	  on	  material	  power	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  an	  
adversary’s	  military	  can	   ‘threaten	   the	  very	   existence	  of	  a	  state’.103 	   Since	  much	  of	  the	  
foundational	   realist	   work	   (namely	   neorealism)	   was	   crafted	   during	   the	   Cold	   War,	  
Barkin	   suggests	   that	   military	   threats	   were	   commonly	   the	   focus	   of	   seminal	   realist	  
literature.	   Barkin	   concludes	   that	   in	   an	   international	   system	   where	   ‘no	   imminent	  
military	  threat[s]	  exist’,	  such	  as	  the	  current	   hegemonic	  world-­‐order,	   that	   no	   ‘a	  priori	  
reason	   exists	   within	   realist	   theory	   to	   privilege	   military	   power	   over	   other	   forms	   of	  
power.’104 	  Barkin	  examines	  the	  broad	  realist	  tradition,	  of	  which	  neoclassical	  realism	  is	  
but	   one	   of	   many	   subsets,	   and	   his	   conclusions	   provide	   a	   useful	   starting	   point	   for	  
conceptualizing	  “power”	  from	  a	  neoclassical	  realist	  perspective.
Soft	   power,	   economic	   strength,	   prestige,	   and	   other	   alternate	   forms	   of	   power	  
can	  be	  combined	  with	  military	  strength	  to	  supply	  states	  with	  the	  necessary	  leverage	  to	  
assure	   their	   security.105 	   This	   assumption	   is	   by	   no	   means	   revolutionary	   to	   realist	  
thinking,	   even	  Waltz	  noted	   that	   ‘[a]	   state	  becomes	  a	   great	  power	  not	  by	  military	  or	  
economic	  capability	  alone	  but	  by	  combining	  political,	   social,	  economic,	  military,	   and	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international	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  and	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  foreign	  policy	  outcome.	  
geographic	   assets	   in	   more	   eﬀective	   ways	   than	   other	   states	   can’.106 	   Furthermore,	  
neoclassical	  realist	  conceptions	  of	  power	  are	  immersed	  in	  relative	  power	  distributions.	  
Since	   there	   is	   no	   deﬁnitive	   empirical	   method	   to	   quantify	   state	   power,	   power	  
calculations	   are	   accomplished	  through	   a	   partially	   subjective	  analysis	   of	   the	   political	  
elite.107 	   These	  elite	  must	   also	   navigate	   the	   status	   quo	   vs	   revisionist	   state	   dichotomy	  
stressed	  by	  Schweller	  to	   evaluate	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  foreign	  state’s	  ambition.108	  As	  Kang	  
notes,	  ‘more	  important	  than	  power	  itself	  is	  what	  states	  want	  to	  do	  with	  that	  power’.109	  
The	  resulting	  interpretations	  of	  political	  leaders	  are	  deeply	  entwined	  with	  their	  state’s	  
collective	   identity,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  argued	  in	   subsequent	  sections,	   the	  strategy	  chosen	  
by	  the	  political	   elite	  can	  be	  best	  understood	   through	   the	  terminology	  of	  SIT.	  When	  
determining	   the	  external	   factors	  conditioning	  state	  elite	  (research	  questions	  one	  and	  
two)	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   those	   elite	   (research	   question	   three)	   is	   necessary	   to	  
consider	  this	  conceptualization	  of	  power.
Having	  established	  that	  neoclassical	  realism	   is	  compatible	  with	  constructivism,	  
it	   is	  posited	  that	  identities	  are	  a	  central	   variable	  among	  the	  intervening	  factors	  noted	  
within	   neoclassical	   realism.	   The	   synthesis	   of	   both	   neoclassical	   realism	   and	  
constructivism	  provides	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  states	  and	  
the	   international	   system.	  The	   core	   goals	  of	   state	  elites	   are	   realist,	   i.e.	  motivated	  by	  
self-­‐interest,	  and	  are	  constrained	  by	  the	  external	  pressures	  of	  an	  international	  system	  
in	  which	  realist-­‐orient	  states	  interact	  with	  one	  another.	  
	   The	   interaction	   between	   a	   state	   and	   the	   international	   system	   is,	   however,	  
dependent	   upon	   the	   intervening	   variables	   noted	   within	   neoclassical	   realism.	   The	  
perception	  of	  the	  political	  elite	  within	  a	  state	  ﬁlters	  and	  interprets	  the	  pressures	  of	  the	  
international	   system	   before	   determining	   foreign	   policy.	   Furthermore,	   the	   collective	  
identity	   and	   competing	   domestic	   identities	   of	   that	   state	   inﬂuence	   state	   behavior.	  
Constructivism	   is	   essential	   to	   understanding	   intervening	   variables,	   which	   exist	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between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state	  elite,	  and	  “ﬁltering	  variables”,	  which	  act	  between	  the	  
state	  elite	  and	  the	  international	  system.	  Figure	  2.1	  provides	  a	  visual	  reference	  for	  these	  
interrelated	  factors.	  
Figure	  2.1	  :	  Relationship	  between	  State	  and	  International	  System
	   Analysis	  of	  these	  ﬁltering	  and	  intervening	  variables	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  inherently	  
nebulous	   conceptualization	   of	   identities	   and	  norms.	   It	   is	   impossible	   to	   deﬁne	   clear	  
boundaries	  for	  identities	  or	  the	  exact	  degree	  to	  which	  identities	  inﬂuence	  the	  foreign	  
policy	  apparatus	  of	  a	  particular	  state.	  Norms	  may	  restrain	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors	  and	  
transmit	   ideational	   factors	   between	   the	   international	   system	   and	   state	   elites,	   and	  
between	   state	   elites	   and	   their	   public,	   but	   remain	   similarly	   vague.	   Owing	   to	   this	  
intrinsically	  opaqueness,	  intervening	  and	  ﬁltering	  variables	  are	  referred	  to	  collectively	  
as	   “gray	   variables”.	   Acknowledging	   the	   analytical	   limitations	   of	   gray	   variables	   is	  
essential	   if	   faulty	   conclusions	   are	   to	   be	   avoided.	   Nevertheless,	   gray	   variables	   are	  
crucial	   for	   conceptualizing	   the	   relationship	   between	   neoclassical	   realist	   actors	   and	  
determining	   the	   relevant	   objects	   to	   analyze,	   as	   presented	   in	   Figure	   2.2.	   The	   two	  
categories	  of	  gray	  variables	  are	  represented:	   intervening	  variables	   (domestic	  political	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and	  external	  pressures).	  Also	  note	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  distribution	  of	  norms	  mirrors	  










Figure	  2.2	  :	  Relationship	  Between	  Foreign	  Policy	  Actors	  and	  	  Gray	  Variables
	   The	   presented	   research	  questions	   also	   correspond	   to	   this	  dynamic.	   Consider	  
research	  question	  one	  and	   two:	  How	   have	   concerns	  over	   national	   security	  and	   other	  
external	   pressures	   from	   the	   international	   system	   inﬂuenced	   the	   dramatic	   shifts	   in	  
modern	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy?	   How	   have	   these	   factors	   changed	   with	   time?	   These	  
questions	   are	  primarily	   concerned	   with	   the	   interaction	   between	   state	   elite	   and	   the	  
international	  system.	  This	  relationship	  includes	  the	  two	  neoclassical	   realist	   elements	  
highlighted	   by	   Figure	   2.1:	   the	   goals	   of	   state	   elite	   and	   the	   international	   system.	  
Research	  question	  three:	  What	  ideological	  continuities	  exist	  between	  competing	  groups	  
of	   Japanese	   political	   elite	   from	   one	   historical	   period	   to	   the	   next?	   -­‐	   focuses	   on	   the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  state	  elite.	  The	  gray	  variables	  described	  above,	  
i.e.	   the	  ﬁltering	   and	  intervening	  factors,	  deﬁne	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  relationship	  by	  
engaging	   with	   intergroup	   relations	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   group	   leaders.	   Research	  
question	  three	  thereby	  highlights	  the	  signiﬁcance	  of	  constructivism	  to	  the	  subsequent	  
analysis.	  
2.2	  Social	  Identity	  Theory	  (SIT)
To	  supplement	  the	  lack	  of	  preciseness	  present	  in	  gray	  variables,	  this	  thesis	  	  utilizes	  SIT	  
to	   analyze	  the	  the	  ﬁltering	  level	   between	  a	  state’s	  political	  elite	  and	  the	  international	  
system	   with	  SIT.	  This	   section	  will	   include	   a	  brief	  overview	   of	   SIT	   that	   serves	  builds	  
upon	   the	   review	   of	   Chapter	   1.	   SIT	   is	   a	   well	   established	   social	   psychology	   theory	  
developed	  by	  Henri	  Tajfel	  and	  John	  C.	  Turner	  that	  examines	  the	  relationship	  between	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social	  groups	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  its	  members.110	  All	  individuals	  are	  members	  of	  various	  
social	  groups,	  ranging	  from	  those	  they	  are	  born	  into,	  a	  nation	  or	  an	  ethnicity,	  to	  those	  
they	   choose,	   a	   political	   party	   or	  an	   occupation.	   SIT	   posits	   that	   membership	   within	  
these	   groups	   helps	   deﬁne	   oneself	   and	   shapes	   an	   individual’s	   perception	   of	   self-­‐
esteem.111	  According	  to	  the	  theory,	  people	  derive	  a	  positive	  self-­‐identity	  from	  a	  positive	  
group-­‐identity.112	  To	  gauge	  this	  positivity,	  members	  compare	  their	  in-­‐group’s	  qualities	  
or	  accomplishments	  with	  those	  of	  an	  out-­‐group	  referent	  group.	  This	  desire	  for	  positive	  
self-­‐esteem	   can	   be	   derived	   through	   positive	   evaluation	   of	   an	   in-­‐group	   (in-­‐group	  
favoritism)	  and/or	  by	  discrediting	  an	  out-­‐group	  (out-­‐group	  discrimination).113
Tajfel	   and	   Turner	   advanced	   the	   theory	   to	   explain	   the	   preference	   for	   relative	  
over	  absolute	  gains	   observed	  during	  minimum	   group	  experiments.	   Minimum	   group	  
experiments	   have	   two	   parts.	   First,	   participants	   are	   divided	   into	   groups	   through	   an	  
arbitrary	  distinction.	   Second,	   participants	   are	   asked	   to	   distribute	  a	   reward	   to	   these	  
arbitrary	  groups.114	  In	  one	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  estimate	  the	  amount	  
of	  dots	  on	  a	  page.	  Researchers	  then	  ostensibly	  divide	  the	  participants	  into	   two	  groups	  
based	  upon	  overestimation	  or	  underestimation,	  although	  in	  reality	  all	  participants	  are	  
placed	  in	  the	  same	  group.	  Participants	  are	  privately	  told	  to	  which	  group	  they	  belong.	  
Participants	  do	  not	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  and	  remain	  unaware	  as	  to	  the	  members	  
of	   their	   in-­‐group	   or	   the	   members	   of	   the	   opposing	   out-­‐group.	   After	   establishing	   a	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group	   division,	   each	   participant	   is	   asked	   to	   distribute	   a	   reward	   or	   points	   to	   other	  
individuals.	  Participants	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  allocate	  points	  to	  themselves,	  and	  they	  are	  
informed	  that	  regardless	  of	  how	  the	  points	  are	  allocated,	  their	  decisions	  will	  not	  eﬀect	  
their	  personal	   gain	  or	  loss.115 	   Jonathan	  Mercer	  speciﬁes	  that	  participants	  ‘understand	  
that	  how	  they	  allocate	  rewards	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  their	  own	  gain	  or	  loss,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  
rational	   link	   between	   economic	  self-­‐interest	   and	   in-­‐group	   favoritism’.116 	  Participants	  
must	  next	  elect	  one	  of	  several	  presented	  distribution	  strategies,	   such	  as	  mutual	   gain,	  
relative	  gain,	  and	  absolute	  gain.117	  
	   Despite	   the	   wealth	   of	   options,	   participants	   consistently	   favor	   outcomes	   that	  
maximize	  the	  diﬀerence	  between	  in-­‐group	  and	  out-­‐group	  members,	  even	  when	  given	  
the	  option	  to	   pursue	  mutual	  gain	  strategies	  that	  would	  net	  a	  greater	  overall	   in-­‐group	  
gain.	  It	   is	  a	  result	  that	  has	  been	  replicated	  across	  various	  ethnic,	  cultural,	  and	  gender	  
groups	   indicating	   an	   innate	   aspect	   of	   intergroup	   dynamics	   that	   privileges	   in-­‐group	  
members	  even	  if	  the	  basis	  of	  said	  group	  is	  entirely	  arbitrary.118	  The	  group	  distinctions	  
of	  the	  minimum	  group	  experiments	  are	  meaningless,	  and	  each	  group	  is	  equal	  in	  status	  
and	   power.	   However,	   SIT	   researchers	   have	   noted	   similar	   in-­‐group	   favoritism	   in	  
everyday	  distinctions,	  be	  it	  based	  upon	  gender,	  occupation,	  or	  region.119	  	  	  
	   SIT	   explores	   the	   relationship	   between	   in-­‐group	   favoritism	   and	   social	  
interaction.	   Turner	   argues	   that	   “‘group-­‐deﬁned	   self-­‐perception	   produces	  
psychologically	  distinctive	  eﬀects	  in	  social	  behavior’”.120	  It	  is	  a	  group-­‐centric	  approach	  
that	  focuses	  upon	  the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  group	  behavior,	  rather	  than	  assuming	  a	  
group	   is	  merely	   the	  sum	  of	   its	  member	  parts.	   SIT	   is	   composed	  of	  three	   interrelated	  
components:	   social	   categorization,	   social	   comparison,	   and	   social	   identity.	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  Henri	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  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	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  Press,	  1982),	  20-­‐6;	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  Turner	  
1986,	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  no.	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  (2010):	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  (London:	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  Publications,	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Categorization	  is	  the	  necessary	  phenomena	  of	  simplifying	  the	  social	  world	  by	  divided	  
it	   into	   categories.	   This	  categorization	   not	   only	  assists	   in	  making	  sense	  of	   a	  complex	  
environment,	  but	  also	   deﬁnes	  the	  environment’s	  associated	  components	  and	  thereby	  
fulﬁlls	   a	   similar	   function	   to	   our	   previous	   discussion	   of	   the	   self-­‐other	   distinction.	  
Moreover,	   categorization	   requires	   comparison.	   According	   to	   SIT,	   individuals	   derive	  
part	   of	  their	  positive	   self-­‐image	  from	   the	  social	   identity	  of	  the	  groups	  to	  which	  they	  
belong.	  Individuals	  therefore	  prefer	  to	  view	  their	  group	  positively	  in	  comparison	  to	  an	  
out-­‐group	  through	  some	  evaluative	  dimension.121	  
	   The	  prevalence	  of	  in-­‐group	  favoritism	  and	  intergroup	  comparison	  is	  essential	  to	  
understanding	   how	   state	   elites	   formulate	   foreign	   policy	   strategies.	   States	   are	  
themselves	   a	   type	   of	   group,	   and	   the	   leaders	   of	   state-­‐groups	   are	   the	   policy	   elites	  
charged	   with	   fortifying	   state	   security.	   However,	   the	   perception	   of	   those	   leaders	  
determines	  how	   security	   is	   conceptualized	   and	   the	   foreign	   policy	   strategy	  pursued.	  
These	  factors	  are	  built	  upon	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  but	  a	  clear	  connection	  between	  
SIT	   and	  international	   relations	   theory	   is	   evident.	  Neoclassical	   realist	  notions	  of	  self-­‐
help	  correlate	  with	   in-­‐group	  favoritism.	  Constructivist	   appeals	   to	   group	   identity	  and	  
norms	  roughly	  equates	  to	  the	  process	  of	  categorization.	  	  
	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   is	   considerable	   disagreement	   between	   SIT	  
researchers	   regarding	   the	   relationship	   between	   identiﬁcation	   within	   a	   social	   group	  
and	   in-­‐group	   favoritism.	  While	   some	   contest	   that	   discrimination	   is	   inherent	   to	   in-­‐
group	  behavior,122	  others	  hold	  that	  this	  discrimination	  occurs	  only	  under	  circumstances	  
that	  stress	  intergroup	  comparison.123	  Given	  that	  the	  domain	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  limited	  to	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  2003),	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the	  interaction	  of	  states	  within	  an	  anarchical	  system,	  it	  can	  be	  safely	  assumed	  that	  the	  
preconditions	  for	  intergroup	  comparison	  exist.
	   Since	   groups	   seek	   a	   distinct	   social	   identity	   that	   is	   viewed	   favorably	   in	  
comparison	  with	   a	   referent	   group,	   status	   supplies	   a	   vehicle	   for	   this	   desired	  positive	  
distinction.124 	  Deborah	  Welch	  Larson	  and	  Alexei	  Shevchenko,	  who	  employ	  SIT	  within	  
international	  relations	  studies,	  maintain:
Status	  is	  based	  on	  a	  group’s	  standing	  on	  some	  trait	  valued	  by	  society.	  Status	  is	  a	  positional	  good,	  
meaning	   that	   one	   group’s	   status	   can	   improve	   only	   if	   another’s	   declines.	   SIT	   introduces	   an	  
important	  modiﬁcation	  to	   [the]	   prevailing	  zero-­‐sum	  conception	   of	   status	   by	  pointing	  out	  that	  
groups	  have	  multiple	  traits	  on	  which	  to	  be	  evaluated,	  so	  that	  comparisons	  among	  them	  need	  not	  
be	  competitive.125
The	  outcome	  of	   this	  ongoing	   comparison	   is	  the	   establishment	  of	  a	  status	  hierarchy,	  
that	  confers	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  identity	  upon	  a	  group.126 	  If	  a	  group	  perceives	  itself	  
to	   possess	   a	   negative	   identity,	   it	   may	   pursue	   one	   of	   three	   strategies	   to	   enhance	   its	  
status:	  
• Social	   mobility	   is	   the	  belief	   a	   group	  can	   increase	   its	  position	  by	  mirroring	   the	  
practices	  of	  a	  dominant	  group,	  and	  thereby	  attain	  status	  comparable	  to	  a	  chosen	  
referent	  group.	  127	  
• Social	  competition	  occurs	  when	  a	  group	  attempts	  to	  equal	  or	  eclipse	  a	  dominant	  
group	  by	  challenging	  their	  claim	  to	  superiority.	  128
• Social	  creativity	  is	  a	  re-­‐imagining	  of	  the	  status	  hierarchy	  by	  a	  subordinate	  group	  
with	   the	   intent	   of	   achieving	   recognition	   for	   excelling	   in	   an	   alternate	   domain	  
that	  does	  not	  directly	  challenge	  the	  dominate	  group.129	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The	   strategy	  chosen	   by	  a	   particular	   group	  depends	  on	   internal	   factors,	   such	   as	   the	  
group’s	   core	   beliefs	   or	  norms,	   and	   the	   group’s	   perception	   of	   external	   pressures,	   in	  
particular	   the	   permeability	   of	   the	   established	   status	   hierarchy.130 	   These	   three	  
dimensions	   constitute	   the	   primary	   terminology	   and	   conceptualization	   of	   strategies	  
used	  within	  this	  thesis	  to	  analysis	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy.
2.3	  Integrating	  SIT	  within	  International	  Relations
Although	   rooted	   in	   social	   psychology,	   SIT	   can	  be	   applied	  to	   international	   relations.	  
Notable	   constructivist	   scholars	   Alexander	   Wendt,	   Jeﬀery	   T.	   Checkel,	   and	   Peter	   J.	  
Katzenstein	   have	   proposed	   complementing	   international	   relations	   scholarship	   with	  
social	   psychology	  theory.131 	  Taliaferro	   et	   al.	   suggest	  that	  neoclassical	   realist	   literature	  
would	   also	  beneﬁt	   from	   incorporating	   social	  psychology	  research.132	   SIT	   is	  geared	  to	  
this	  purpose.	  It	  is	  a	  group-­‐centric	  theory	  that	   is	  sensitive	  to	  external	   forces	  and	  yields	  
considerable	   insight	   on	   the	   gray	   variables	   that	   aﬀect	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   has	   been	  
successfully	  utilized	  within	  some	  international	  relations	  publications.133	  
	   If	  states	  are	  considered	  groups	  within	   the	  status	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  international	  
system,	   the	   three	  modes	  of	   social	   behavior	   (social	   mobility,	   social	   competition,	   and	  
social	  creativity)	  can	  be	  refashioned	  to	  suggest	  ‘that	  states	  may	  improve	  their	  status	  by	  
joining	  elite	  clubs,	  trying	  to	  best	  the	  dominant	  states,	  or	  achieve	  preeminence	  outside	  
the	   area	   of	   geopolitical	   competition’.134 	   Examples	   of	   social	   mobility	   include	   states	  
seeking	  entry	  into	  the	  EU	  or	  Japan	  and	  Germany’s	  bid	  for	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  UN	  
Security	   Council.	   Japanese	   eﬀorts	   to	   mirror	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   imperial	   Western	  
powers	  during	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  (covered	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4)	  also	  conforms	  to	  the	  
tenets	  of	  social	   mobility.	  The	  bilateral	   competition	   between	  America	   and	   the	  Soviet	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Union	   during	   the	   Cold	   War	   constitutes	   a	   classic	   example	   of	   social	   competition.	  
Concurrently,	   Japanese	   foreign	  policy	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	   (discussed	   in	  chapters	  6	  
and	  7),	  which	   was	  contingent	   upon	  privileging	   economic	   factors	   and	  maintaining	   a	  
low	  diplomatic	  stance,	  is	  representative	  of	  social	   creativity.	  Social	  mobility	  and	  social	  
competition	  have	   a	  clear	  connection	  with	   realism	   and	  can	  be	  easily	   reframed	  within	  
the	   more	   conventional	   status	   quo	   vs.	   revisionist	   state	   paradigm.	   Likewise,	   social	  
creativity	  mirrors	  the	  constructivist	   emphasis	  on	  deﬁning	   identity	  though	   social	   and	  
historical	  parameters	  rather	  than	  simply	  privileging	  material	  variables.	  The	  vocabulary	  
of	  SIT	   is	  deployed	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  as	  it	  provides	  the	  most	  consistent	  means	  of	  
grouping	  foreign	  policy	  strategies.	  This	  vocabulary	  has	  been	  reﬁned	  to	  suit	  the	  speciﬁc	  
purposes	  of	  this	  thesis.
	   Despite	   the	   overlap	  between	   SIT	   and	   international	   relations	   literature,	   some	  
theoretical	  obstacles	  must	  be	  noted	  before	  expanding	  upon	  these	  empirical	  examples.	  
A	  signiﬁcant	   challenge	  arises	  from	  the	   the	  realist	   assumption	  that	   anarchy	  generates	  
self-­‐interested	  behavior.	  Conversely,	  Wendt	   argues	   that	   self-­‐help	   is	   not	   an	   inherent	  
feature	  of	  international	   politics	  but	   rather	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  socially	  constructed	  
environment.135 	   These	   realist	   and	   constructivist	   assumptions	   can	   be	   harmonized	  
through	   appeals	  to	  Wendt’s	  notions	  of	  anarchy	  as	  a	   socially	   constructed	  institution.	  
However,	  SIT	  demonstrates	  that	   in-­‐group	  biases	  may	  generate	  behavioral	  preferences	  
prior	  to	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  identity	  and	  interests.	  Such	  factors	  help	  explain	  the	  
ready	  acceptance	  of	  modernization	   in	  Meiji	   Japan.	  Although	  modernization	   required	  
Japanese	  leaders	  to	  abandon	  much	  of	  what	  was	  considered	  part	  of	  traditional	  Japanese	  
society,	  they	  were	  motivated	  primarily	  to	  enhance	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Japanese	  state	  (an	  
in-­‐group	   bias)	   rather	   than	   perpetuating	   historical	   factors	   (collective	   identity	   and	  
cultural	  norms).	  This	  nuance	  is	  thoroughly	  explored	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4.
	   It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  critical	  insight	  of	  SIT	  undermines	  the	  constructivist	  
notion	   that	   a	   socially	   interaction	   need	   not	   be	   competitive.136 	   Nevertheless,	   two	  
conditions	   must	   be	   considered.	   First,	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   minimum	   group	  
experiments	   have	   been	   replicated	   across	   several	   cultural	   divides,	   indicating	   that	  
simply	  belonging	  to	  a	  group	  fundamentally	  changes	  an	  individual’s	  social	  actions.	  SIT	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researches	  have,	  however,	  found	  variations	  in	  the	  levels	  to	  which	  participants	  practice	  
in-­‐group	  bias.	  Although	   in-­‐group	  favoritism	   is	  ever	  present,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	   is	  
exercised	  varies	  in	  relation	  to	  factors	  such	  as	  socio-­‐historic	  factors	  and	  group	  norms.137	  
As	   noted	   above,	   competitive	   behavior	   between	   groups	   may	   be	   dependent	   upon	  
environments	   that	   stress	   intergroup	   comparison.	   This	   thesis	   adopts	   a	   neoclassical	  
realist	  perspective	  that	  the	  international	  system	   is	  both	  anarchic	  and	  conﬂictual,	   and	  
thus	   suﬃcient	   cause	   for	   intergroup	   competition.	   This	   is	   particularly	   evident	   when	  
considering	  how	  external	   factors	  have	  shaped	   Japanese	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  arrival	   of	  
the	  Western	  imperialist	  powers	  conditioned	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	  modernize	  (Chapters	  
3-­‐4),	  the	  isolation	  of	  Japan	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War	  shifted	  policy	  objectives	   to	  
those	   of	   a	   revisionist	   power	   (Chapters	   5-­‐6),	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	  
coerced	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	  accept	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  the	  American-­‐led	  regional	   order	  
(Chapters	  6-­‐7).
	   Second,	  although	  minimum	   group	  experiments	  strive	  to	   reduce	  the	   impact	   of	  
social	   variables,	   such	   as	   identity	   and	   interests,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   truly	   remove	   all	  
social	   inﬂuences	  from	  an	   inherently	  social	   environment.	  Thus,	   arguing	  whether	  self-­‐
interested	  behavior	  follows	  from	  a	  socially	  created	  anarchical	  environment	  or	  whether	  
biases	   towards	   in-­‐members	   of	   a	   socially	   created	   group	   generates	   the	   anarchical	  
environment	   is	   the	   theoretical	   equivalent	   of	   the	   chicken-­‐egg	   paradox.	   It	   is	   an	  
intriguing	   conundrum,	   but	   it	   oﬀers	   little	   utility	   outside	   of	   a	   purely	   theoretical	  
application.	   SIT	   demonstrates	   that	   in-­‐group	   favoritism	   does	  not	   require	  antagonism	  
by	  in-­‐group	  members	  towards	  out-­‐groups.138	  
	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   throughout	   this	   framework	   that	   intergroup	   conﬂict	   is	  
dependent	   upon	   the	   preferences	   of	   state	   elite	   (neoclassical	   realism)	   and	   upon	  
ideational	  factors	  (constructivism).	  This	  premise	  is	  supported	  by	  SIT,	  which	  does	  not	  
equate	  out-­‐group	  distinction	  and	  discrimination	   to	  intergroup	  conﬂict.	  This	  dynamic	  
oﬀers	  tremendous	  analytical	  advantages	  to	   this	  thesis.	  For	  example,	  Meiji	  leaders	  held	  
a	   considerably	  high	   opinion	   of	   the	  Western	   imperialist	   states,	  which	   in	   addition	   to	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forming	  the	  dominant	  out-­‐group	  for	  Meiji	  leaders	  also	  constituted	  their	  referent	  group	  
for	   a	  strategy	  of	  social	   mobility	  whereby	  Western	   norms	  were	   imported	   into	   Japan.	  
Lastly,	  only	  the	  most	  salient	  out-­‐groups	  are	  relevant	  to	  in-­‐group	  favoritism,	  with	  many	  
other	   out-­‐groups	   being	   largely	   ignored.139 	   This	   holds	   with	   historical	   evidence,	   as	  
Western	  imperialist	  states	  were	  the	  most	  prominent	  out-­‐group	  to	  Meiji	  leaders.	  
	   External	   constraints	  of	   the	   international	   system	   must	   also	   be	   discussed.	   The	  
existence	   of	   an	   established	   power	   hierarchy	   and	   the	   permeability	   of	   that	   power	  
hierarchy	  will	   inﬂuence	  how	  states	  navigate	   in-­‐group/out-­‐group	  distinctions.	  Donald	  
Horowitz	   notes	   that	   “unranked	   groups”	   outside	   of	   a	   clear	   power	   hierarchy	   more	  
negatively	   discriminate	   against	   out-­‐groups	   and	   have	   an	   increased	   tendency	   for	  
intergroup	  conﬂict.140	  When	  applied	  to	  international	   relations,	  this	  factor	  is	  predicted	  
by	  realist	  theory,	  whereby	  a	  state’s	  relative	  power	  (its	  position	  within	  the	  international	  
status	  hierarchy)	   constrains	  its	   foreign	  policy	  options.	  The	  permeability	  of	  the	  status	  
hierarchy,	  i.e.	  how	  easily	  a	  state	  can	  join	  the	  ranks	  of	  elite	  states,	  therefore	  constitutes	  
a	  primary	  norm	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  The	  interaction	  between	  the	  established	  
power	   hierarchy	   and	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   is	   explored	   throughout	   this	   thesis.	   It	  
should	  be	  noted	   that	  structure	  of	  the	  power	  hierarchy	  must	   also	   be	  considered.	  For	  
example,	  greater	  permeability	  existed	  for	  a	  relatively	  small	  state	  like	  Japan	  during	  the	  
multipolar	  international	  system	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  than	  during	  bipolarity	  
of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Additionally,	   the	   prevalence	   of	   imperialist	   norms	   during	   the	  
ninetieth	  century	  enabled	  Japan	  to	  overcome	  its	  geographical	   limitations	   to	  enhance	  
state	   power	   through	   the	   exploitation	   of	   peripheral	   regions.	   No	   such	   means	   existed	  
during	   the	  Cold	  War,	   forcing	   Japan	   into	   a	  ﬁxed	  position	   as	   a	   secondary	   power	   that	  
could	  not	  challenge	  either	  superpower	  (a	  period	  of	  extremely	  low	  permeability).	  
Finally,	  the	  process	  of	  identity	  formation	  must	  be	  reviewed.	  Identity	  is	  a	  central	  
element	  of	  both	  SIT	   and	  constructivism,	  but	   the	  role	  of	  agency	  in	   identity	  formation	  
diﬀers	   signiﬁcantly	   between	   the	   theories.	   Constructivists	   assert	   that	   identity	   results	  
from	  the	  interaction	  of	  multiple	  parties,	  who	  through	  their	  interaction	  create	  a	  shared	  
view	   each	   party’s	   identity.	   SIT	   rejects	   the	  necessity	   of	   an	   outside	   party	   accepting	   a	  
group’s	   identity,	   and	   thus	   ‘allows	   for	   the	  possibility	   of	  misperception	  of	   the	  other’s	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identity	  claims’.141 	   This	   is	  an	   important	   distinction	  because	  states,	  whose	   identity	   is	  
derived	   from	  history,	   geography,	   culture,	   and	  political	   leaders,	   may	   not	   accept	   how	  
their	   identity	  is	   perceived	  by	  others	  and	  may	  pursue	  internally	  motivated	  policies	   to	  
change	  their	  social	   identity	  or	  challenge	  the	  perception	  of	  other	  states.	   For	  example,	  
there	   was	   considerable	   diﬀerence	   between	   internal	   (domestic)	   and	   international	  
perceptions	   of	   Imperial	   Japan	   during	   the	   late	   1930s	   and	   early	   1940s.	   Although	  
signiﬁcant,	   the	  necessity	  of	  a	  referent	   group	  within	  SIT	   does	  in	   part	   fulﬁll	   the	  social	  
interaction	  inherent	  to	  constructivist	  notions	  of	  identity	  formation	  by	  providing	  both	  
a	   distinct	   out-­‐group	   and	   by	   forming	   part	   of	   the	   external	   pressures	   of	   the	   status	  
hierarchy.	   Since	  both	   theories	  require	  an	   external	   referent	   group	  to	   deﬁne	   in-­‐group	  
boundaries	   and	  rely	  upon	   the	   subjective	   interpretation	  of	   in-­‐group	   leaders,	   SIT	   and	  
constructivism	  will	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  compatible.
Notwithstanding	   these	   theoretical	   obstacles,	   this	   amalgamated	   framework	   is	  
advantageous	  when	  answering	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis.	  That	  said,	  it	  must	  
be	   noted	   that	   other	   approaches	   could	   provide	   complementary	   insights	   to	   those	  
oﬀered	  by	   the	  above	  framework.	   	  In	  their	  survey	  of	  foreign	  policy	  analysis	   literature,	  
Mark	  Webber	  and	  Michael	  Smith	  contest	  that	  three	  “images”	  of	  foreign	  policy	  making	  
exist.142 	   They	  are:	   (1)	   ‘rational	   actor’	   images,	  which	  utilize	   a	  means-­‐end	  analysis	   and	  
views	   the	   state	  as	   a	   unitary	   actor;	   (2)	   ‘political’	   images	   that	   hold	   the	  state	   is	  not	   a	  
unitary	  actor	   and	   that	   foreign	  policy	   is	   the	  outcome	   of	   political	   bargaining;	   (3)	   and	  
‘psychological’	  images	  that	  suggest	  the	  perceptions	  of	  policy	  makers	  can	  distort	  or	  bias	  
policy	  outcomes.143
Strong	  similarities	  exist	  between	  the	  categories	  identiﬁed	  by	  Webber	  and	  Smith	  
and	  the	   oﬀered	   framework.	  Neoclassical	   realism	   parallels	   the	  means-­‐end	  analysis	   of	  
the	  rational	   actor	  image,	  but	  the	  theory’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  perceptions	  of	  state	  elites	  
deviates	   from	   the	   view	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   unitary	   actor.	   Although	   the	   bureaucratic	  
aspects	   of	   political	   images	   of	   foreign	   policy	   analysis	   do	   not	   directly	   match	   the	  
variables	   of	   the	   thesis’	   framework,	   there	   is	   overlap	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   contestation	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between	  domestic	  political	  groups	  found	  within	  neoclassical	   realism	  and	  SIT.	  Aspects	  
of	  the	  psychological	  model	  are	  evident	  in	  all	  three	  theories	  foundational	  to	  this	  thesis,	  
speciﬁcally	  constructivism’s	  insights	  into	  norms	  and	  identity.
These	   parallels	   demonstrate	   the	   comprehensiveness	   of	   the	   framework	  
developed	  within	  this	  chapter.	  Yet	  despite	  these	  overlaps,	  it	  proved	  most	  effective	  to	  
employ	   international	   relations	   and	   social	   psychology	   theories.	   This	   decision	   was	  
driven	  by	  identifying	  the	  theories	  best	  suited	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  posed	  
in	  the	   introduction.	   For	   instance,	   the	  rational	   image	  could	  be	  useful	   in	   identifying	  
the	   ‘concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures’	   impacting	  
Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   (Question	   1),	   but	   examining	   the	   ‘ideological	   continuities’	  
between	  generations	  of	   Japanese	   elites	   (Question	   3)	   necessitates	  an	   approach	   that	  
deviates	   from	   the	  unitary	  state	  model	  present	  within	  the	  rational	   image.	  While	  this	  
ideological	  component	  could	  be	  addressed	  by	  utilizing	  the	  psychological	   image,	  this	  
aspect	   of	   foreign	   policy	   analysis	   does	   not	   offer	   the	   necessary	   insights	   into	   the	  
‘competing	   groups’	  within	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  (Question	   3),	  which	  would	   be	  best	  
answered	   by	   political	   images	   noted	   by	   Webber	   and	   Smith.	   Furthermore,	   when	  
delving	   into	   the	   historical	   nuance	   behind	   the	   shifts	   in	   Japan’s	   policy	   direction	  
(Question	   2),	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   balance	   the	   structural	   components	   of	   the	   rational	  
image	  with	  the	  agent-­‐driven,	  subjective	  insights	  of	  the	  psychological	  image.	  
It	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  develop	  a	  complementary	  approach	  that	  draws	  from	  all	  
three	   images.	   However,	   appeals	   to	   the	   underlying	   concept	   of	   groupism	   found	   in	  
neoclassical	   realism,	   constructivism,	   and	   SIT	   provided	   a	   unifying	   variable	   that	  
bridged	   all	   three	   theoretical	   traditions,	   enabling	   a	   thorough	   evaluation	   of	   each	  
research	   question.	   	   This	   synthesis	   proved	   less	   feasible	   when	   considering	   often	  
divergent	  images	  of	  foreign	  policy	  analysis.	  	  
2.4	  Theory	  in	  Use
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A	  brieﬂy	  overview	  of	   empirical	   evidence	  will	   clarify	   the	  beneﬁts	  of	  drawing	   analysis	  
from	   neoclassical	   realism,	   constructivism,	   and	   SIT.	   As	   covered	   in	   Chapter	   3,	  
premodern	  Japan	  was	  thrust	  onto	  the	  international	  stage	  by	  external	   factors.	  For	  over	  
two	   hundred	   years	   Japan	   remained	   isolated	   from	   the	   outside	   world.	   The	   arrival	   of	  
Western	   powers	   in	   the	   mid-­‐nineteenth	   century	   ushered	   in	   an	   era	   of	   gunboat	  
diplomacy	   that	   forever	   changed	   Japanese	   society.	   Early	   Meiji	   leaders	   soon	  
acknowledged	  that	  modernization	  would	   enhance	  state	  power	  and	  aﬀord	  the	  means	  
to	   reverse	   the	   unequal	   treaties	   that	   were	   thrust	   upon	   them.	   Japan’s	   leaders	   thus	  
became	   obsessed	   with	   enhancing	   national	   strength	   through	   rapid	   industrialization	  
and	  militarization,	  opting	  at	  times	  to	  abandon	  traditional	  Japanese	  customs	  in	  favor	  of	  
Western	  norms	  that	  facilitated	  progress.
	   The	   decision	   by	   Meiji	   leaders	   to	   cultivate	   national	   power	   through	  
modernization	   can	   be	   explained	   through	   the	   oﬀered	   framework.	   The	   international	  
system	   of	   the	   period	  was	   governed	   by	   a	  balance	   of	  power	   dictated	   by	   the	  Western	  
industrialized	   states.	   Japanese	   leaders	  aspired	   to	   join	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   elite	  nations,	  
and	  thus	  initiated	  policies	  that	  imitated	  the	  practices	  of	  these	  states.	   	  This	  transitional	  
period	  in	  Japan	  is	  an	  example	  of	  social	  mobility,	  whereby	  a	  group	  seeks	  to	  enhance	  its	  
status	   by	  mirroring	   the	   practices	   of	   a	   referent	   group,	   and	   is	   discussed	   at	   length	   in	  
Chapters	  3	  -­‐	  5.	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  referent	  group	  may	  constitute	  one	  dominant	  group	  
within	   a	   multipolar	   status	   hierarchy.	   In	   bipolar	   or	   unipolar	   hierarchies,	   a	   referent	  
group	  could	  constitute	  one	  of	  many	  secondary	  powers	  subordinate	  to	   the	  hegemonic	  
dominant	  group.	  This	  latter	  structural	   constraint	   is	  prevalent	  in	   the	  period	   following	  
the	  Paciﬁc	  War,	  where	  America	  has	  remained	  the	  dominant	  power	  within	  the	  region.	  
A	   strategy	   of	  social	   mobility	   within	   this	   context	   requires	   a	  delineation	   between	   the	  
dominant	  power	  and	  referent	  secondary	  powers.	  For	  geopolitical	  reasons,	   it	  would	  be	  
impossible	  for	  Japan	  (a	  small	   island	  state)	  to	  pursue	  social	  mobility	  with	  the	  hopes	  of	  
mirroring	   the	  behavior	   of	  a	   superpower.	   The	  resources	  within	   Japan	   simply	   do	   not	  
exist.	   Consequently,	   a	   secondary	   referent	   power	   with	   which	   Japan	   could	   compare	  
itself,	  such	  as	  Britain,	  would	  be	  required.	  This	  factor	  is	  detailed	  in	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7.	  
	   Social	   mobility	   is	   therefore	   founded	   upon	   a	   perceived	   permeability	   of	   the	  
existing	   status	   hierarchy	   by	   the	   Japan’s	   political	   elite.	   During	   the	   late	   nineteenth	  
century,	  this	  permeability	  was	  in	  part	  constituted	  by	  a	  multipolar	  international	  system	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though	  which	   elite	   states	   balanced	   one	   another.	   By	   fortifying	   its	   national	   strength	  
through	   a	  Western	  metric	  and	  embracing	  Western	   cultural	   norms,	   Japanese	  leaders	  
assumed	  that	  Japan	  would	  eventually	  achieve	  parity	  with	  the	  modernized	  nations.	  
	   The	   intersection	   of	   the	   existing	   power	   hierarchy	   within	   the	   international	  
system	  and	  the	  direction	  of	  foreign	  policy	  warrants	  further	  consideration.	  Had	  Japan’s	  
isolation	  ended	  within	  a	  bipolar	  or	  unipolar	  international	  system,	  Meiji	   leaders	  would	  
have	  confronted	  a	  less	  permeable	  power	  hierarchy,	  resulting	  in	  a	  potentially	  diﬀerent	  
direction	   in	   foreign	   policy.	   Table	   2.1	   examines	   possible	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	  
outcomes	  within	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  multipolar	  environment	  as	  perceived	  by	  
Meiji	  leaders.
Strategy Foreign	  Policy	  Direction Outcome
Social	  Mobility Attempt	  to	  join	  the	  great	  powers	  by	  
adopting	  an	  imperialist	  foreign	  policy.
Provides	  Meiji	  leaders	  an	  avenue	  for	  
strengthening	  Japan	  and	  reversing	  
the	  unequal	  treaties.	  
Social	  Competition Resist	  encroachment	  of	  the	  
industrialized	  great	  powers.
Japanese	  sovereignty	  was	  already	  
compromised	  by	  gunboat	  diplomacy.	  
Continued	  antagonism	  would	  further	  
erode	  Japanese	  sovereignty.
Social	  Creativity
Develop	  alternative	  strategy	  that	  
does	  not	  compromise	  the	  imperialist	  
world	  order.
Might	  preserve	  traditional	  Japanese	  
culture,	  but	  oﬀered	  little	  option	  for	  
reversing	  the	  unequal	  treaties.
Table	  2.1	  :	  Possible	  Foreign	  Policy	  Directions	  in	  Meiji	  Japan	  	  (1860s	  -­‐	  1870s)
	   By	  combining	  the	  strategies	  of	  SIT	  with	  an	  attentiveness	  to	  neoclassical	  realist	  
and	   constructivist	   principles,	   possible	  directions	   in	   foreign	   policy	  can	   be	   simpliﬁed	  
and	  analyzed.	  While	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  multipolar	  system	  to	  maintain	  an	  impermeable	  
power	   hierarchy,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   reality	   that	   confronted	   Meiji	   leaders.	   The	   existing	  
international	  order	  privileged	  imperialist	  norms,	  oﬀering	  Meiji	  leaders	  an	  opportunity	  
to	   address	   Japan’s	   power	   imbalance	   by	   adopting	   an	   imperialist	   foreign	   policy.	  
Furthermore,	   Japan’s	   unique	   geopolitical	   factors	  must	   also	   be	   understood.	   The	   core	  
Japanese	   islands	   are	   not	   particularly	   rich	   in	   natural	   resources	   and	   must	   support	   a	  
relatively	  large	  population.	  Competition	  over	  material	  resources	  is	  a	  prototypical	  cause	  
of	   intergroup	   conﬂict.	   Within	   a	   multipolar	   imperialist	   system,	   however,	   there	   is	  
considerable	   leverage	   for	  Japanese	   leaders	   to	   confront	   these	   inadequacies	   while	  not	  
challenging	  the	  existing	  power	  hierarchy.	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   From	   this	   example,	   the	   following	   external	   pressures	   can	   be	   identiﬁed:	   the	  
structure	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  the	  dominant	  norms	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  
and	   the	  permeability	  of	   the	   existing	   power	  hierarchy	   with	   regard	   to	   relative	   power	  
distributions.	  These	  interrelated	  variables	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  each	  of	  the	   following	  
chapters.	  Domestic	  gray	  variables,	  i.e.	  Japanese	  cultural	  norms	  and	  collective	  identity,	  
intersect	   with	   these	   external	   forces	   in	   the	   ﬁltering	   level	   between	   Japan	   and	   the	  
international	  system	  and	  must	  be	  interpreted	  by	  Japanese	  leaders.	  SIT	  is	  then	  utilized	  
to	   determine	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   interaction	   and	   the	   resulting	   direction	   in	   foreign	  
policy.	   By	   considering	   these	   variables	   through	   the	   language	   of	   SIT,	   shifts	   in	   the	  
direction	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  can	  be	  identiﬁed	  and	  analyzed	  with	  consistency.	  
	   To	   clarify,	  the	  inherent	  comparative	  aspect	  of	  SIT	  is	  witnessed	  on	  two	  distinct,	  
yet	  interrelated	  levels.	  Firstly,	  SIT	  provides	   insight	  into	  the	  domestic	  contestation	  for	  
authority	  within	   states.	   Competition	   between	   political	   groups	   often	   determines	   the	  
trajectory	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   thesis,	   this	   domestic	   aspect	   is	  
discussed	   insofar	   as	   it	   concerns	   overarching	   trends	   in	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	   One	  
such	   example	  occurs	  within	  Chapter	  3,	  where	  domestic	  groups	  were	  galvanized	  into	  
conﬂict	  over	  incompatible	  views	  of	  how	  Japan	  should	  react	  to	  Western	  encroachment.	  
In	  the	  language	  of	  SIT,	  these	  conﬂicts	  are	  evidence	  of	  domestic	  social	  creativity.
	   Secondly,	  SIT	  clariﬁes	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  dominant	  domestic	  group,	  
i.e.	   the	   state	   elites,	   and	   the	   international	   system.	   State	   elites	   are	   charged	   with	  
interpreting	   the	   pressures	   of	   the	   international	   system,	   and	   crafting	   policies	   suited	  
towards	  their	  perceived	  goals.	  	  These	  policies	  may	  fall	  into	  strategies	  of	  social	  mobility,	  
social	  competition,	  or	  social	  creativity.	  As	  this	  thesis	  is	  focused	  on	  trends	  in	  Japanese	  
foreign	  policy,	  this	  second	  level	  often	  forms	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  oﬀered	  analysis.	  
	   It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  state	  elites	  must	  mediate	  the	  relationship	  between	  
levels.	  How	  this	  balance	  is	  accomplished	  depends	  heavily	  upon	  historical	  context,	  as	  
the	  prevailing	   international	  norms	  and	   structure	  of	   the	  international	   system	  narrow	  
policy	   options	   both	   within	   and	   outside	   of	   the	   state.	   Continuing	   with	   the	   example	  
from	   Chapter	  3,	  Western	   encroachment	   during	   the	  Nineteenth	   century	   catalyzed	   a	  
domestic	   struggle	   for	   power.	   Pro-­‐modernization	   groups	   proved	   victorious,	   and	   the	  
leaders	  of	  these	  groups	  built	  Japan’s	   foreign	  policy	  apparatus	  by	  instituting	  a	  strategy	  
of	   social	   mobility.	   Group	   elites	   thus	   became	   state	   elites	   charged	  with	   determining	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Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy,	  and	  group	  norms	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  said	  strategy.	  
Similar	   turning	  points	  can	  be	  noted	  by	  the	   Imperial	   Army	  seizing	   power	  during	   the	  
1930s	  (Chapter	  5),	  Prime	  Minister	  Yoshida’s	  emergence	  following	  the	  political	  purges	  
instituted	   by	   the	   Allied	   Occupation	   of	   Japan	   (Chapter	   6),	   and	   Prime	   Minister	  
Koizumi’s	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Japanese	  constitution	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  9/11	  (Chapter	  7).	  
This	  dynamic	  is	  highlighted	  by	  the	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy	  discussed	  below.	  Figure	  
2.3	  presents	  a	   reﬁnement	  to	   the	  one	  oﬀered	  Figure	  2.2,	   and	  features	   the	  relationship	  




















Figure	  2.3	  :	  Relationship	  Between	  Foreign	  Policy	  Actors	  ,	  Gray	  Variables,	  and	  Framework
By	   examining	   how	  SIT	   interacts	  with	   international	   relations	   the	   following	   variables	  
can	  be	  deﬁned.
· The	  international	  system	  is	  constrained	  by	  a	  power	  hierarchy	  that	  distinguishes	  
between	  elite	  states,	  secondary	  states,	  and	  periphery	  states.	  The	  number	  of	  elite	  
states	   changes	   with	   time.	   Within	   a	   multipolar	   system	   there	   could	   be	   any	  
number	  of	  elite	  states,	  a	  bipolar	  system	  results	  when	  there	  are	  two	  elite	  states,	  
and	  a	  unipolar	  system	  occurs	  when	  there	  is	  only	  one	  elite	  state.	  The	  elite	  states	  
of	  bipolar	  and	  unipolar	  systems	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  superpowers.	  
· The	  structure	  of	  the	  international	   power	  hierarchy	  determines	  permeability,	  or	  
the	  ability	  of	  a	  state	  to	  ascend	  to	  the	  elite	  stratum	  of	  states.	  Within	  a	  multipolar	  
system	   there	  exists	  greater	  opportunity	  for	  a	  state	  to	  become	  elite,	  as	  power	  is	  
diluted	   across	  several	   poles.	  Within	  bipolar	  or	  unipolar	  systems,	  a	   state	  must	  
possess	   a	   tremendous	   concentration	   of	   resources	   to	   be	   elite.	   As	   a	   relatively	  
small	   state	  with	   limited	   access	   to	   resources,	  modern	   Japan	  has	   only	  been	   an	  
elite	   state	   during	   the	  multipolar	   imperialist	   period	   of	   the	   late	  ninetieth	   and	  
early	  twentieth	  century.	  It	  has	  been	  a	  secondary	  power	  from	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  
century	  to	  the	  present.	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· Within	  each	   state	  there	  is	  a	  domestic	   identity	  hierarchy.	  Competition	  between	  
groups	  representing	  diﬀerent	   sets	  of	  norms	  deﬁnes	  the	  order	  of	  this	  hierarchy,	  
with	  one	  group	  most	  often	  emerging	  (for	  a	  limited	  period	  of	  time)	  as	  dominant.	  
Consequently,	   the	   foreign	   policy	   strategy	   of	   a	   state	   results	   from	   the	   policy	  
preferences	   of	   the	   dominant	   domestic	   group.	   Periods	   where	   there	   is	   no	  
dominant	   group	   are	   marked	   by	   political	   ambiguity.	   Over	   time	   a	   funneling	  
eﬀect	  occurs,	  whereby	  the	  norms	  of	  dominant	  groups	  are	  repeatedly	  reinforced	  
and	  thus	  become	  part	  of	  a	  state’s	  collective	  identity.
· How	   power	   is	   conceptualized	   by	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   states	   depends	   upon	  
international	   norms.	   During	   the	   imperialist	   period,	   international	   norms	  
centered	  on	  aggressive	   expansionism	  and	  military	  prowess.	   	  Following	  WWI,	  
the	  Versailles-­‐Washington	   System	   emerged,	   and	   stressed	   economic	  openness	  
and	   a	   commitment	   to	   international	   peace.	   Ascension	   to	   elite	   status	   and	  
maintenance	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  must	  be	  understood	  within	  the	  changing	  nature	  
of	   international	   norms.	   In	   general	   terms,	   power	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	  
ability	  of	  states	  acquire	  the	  resources	  they	  desire.	  What	   this	  acquisition	  entails	  
and	  what	  resources	  are	  desired	  hinges	  upon	  	  the	  perspective	  of	  state	  elites	  and	  
international	   norms.	   Prestige	   is	   a	   corollary	   of	   power.	   Prestige	   is	   a	   state’s	  
reputation	  for	  power,144	  or	  how	  a	  state’s	  power	  is	  perceived	  by	  other	  states.
· When	  operationalizing	  SIT	   to	   categorize	  foreign	  policy	  options,	   three	  possible	  
strategies	  can	  be	  identiﬁed:	   (1)	  social	  mobility,	  where	  a	  state	  seeks	  to	   emulate	  
the	  practices	  of	  a	  status	  quo	  power	  with	  the	  existing	  power	  hierarchy;	  (2)	  social	  
competition,	  where	  a	  state	  seeks	  to	  challenge	  the	  existing	  power	  hierarchy;	  and	  
(3)	   social	   creativity,	   where	   a	   state	   deﬁnes	   original	   parameters	   for	   success	  
(through	   adopting	   new	   norms)	   that	   does	   not	   challenge	   the	   existing	   power	  
hierarchy.	   Each	  of	   these	   strategies	  necessitates	  the	   identiﬁcation	   of	   a	  referent	  
group.	  Under	  social	  mobility,	  a	  state	  imitates	  the	  policies	  of	  a	  chosen	   referent	  
group.	  Under	  social	   competition,	   a	  state	  challenges	  the	   referent	  group.	  Under	  
social	   creativity,	   the	  referent	  group	  refers	  back	   to	   the	  state	  in	  question	  and	  is	  
therefore	   self-­‐referential.	   Within	   bipolar	   and	   unipolar	   international	   systems,	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144	  This	  understanding	  of	  prestige	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  prestige	  oﬀered	  by:	  Morgenthau,	  
Politics	  among	  Nations	  (McGraw-­‐Hill	  Education,	  2005).
there	   is	   often	   a	   diﬀerence	   between	   a	   state’s	   chosen	   referent	   group	   and	   the	  
dominant	  group	  or	  superpower	  that	  is	  the	  regional	  hegemon.
Using	  both	  Figure	  2.3	   and	   the	  outline	  above,	   the	  primary	  objects	   of	  analysis	   for	  this	  
thesis	  have	  been	  identiﬁed.	  Table	  2.2	  provides	  a	  visual	  reference	  for	  these	  variables	  as	  
determined	   by	   the	   proceeding	   example,	   i.e.	   Meiji	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy.	   Note:	   the	  
group	  denoted	  with	  a	  bold	  font	  weight	  under	  the	  “domestic	  identity	  hierarchy”	  is	  the	  

















Social	  Mobility.	  Westernization	  generally	  
accepted	  for	  short	  period	  before	  giving	  
way	  to	  more	  nuanced	  modernization	  
modeled	  after	  Europe	  and	  America.
Table	  2.3	  :	  Objects	  of	  Analysis
Variants	  of	  this	   table	  are	  deployed	   in	  each	   chapter	  to	   clarify	  how	  these	  factors	   have	  
changed	   through	  modern	   Japanese	   history,	   and	   to	   assure	  each	  object	   of	   analysis	   is	  
adequately	  discussed	  within	  this	  thesis.	  A	  composite	  chart	  that	  spans	  from	  1868	  to	  the	  
present	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  conclusion.
	   The	   order	  of	   the	   columns	   in	   Table	   2.3	   correlate	   to	   research	   interests	   of	   this	  
thesis.	  The	  columns	  titled	  “Structure	  of	  the	  International	  System”	  and	  “Permeability	  of	  
the	  Power	  Hierarchy”	  are	  crucial	   in	  answering	   research	  one:	  How	  have	   concerns	  over	  
national	  security	  and	  other	  external	  pressures	  from	  the	  international	  system	  inﬂuenced	  
the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	  By	  limiting	  the	  timeframe	  of	  these	  
factors,	   transitions	   within	   the	   international	   system	   are	   identiﬁed,	   assisting	   in	   the	  
answering	   of	   research	   question	   two:	  How	   have	   these	   factors	   changed	  with	  time?	  The	  
“Domestic	   Identity	  Hierarchy”	   elucidates	   the	  key	  groups	  of	  research	   question	   three:	  
What	  ideological	  continuities	  exist	  between	  competing	  groups	  of	  Japanese	  political	  elite	  
from	  one	  historical	   period	   to	   the	   next?	  Having	   looked	  at	   these	  variables,	   SIT	   clariﬁes	  
the	  “Referent	  Group”	  and	  “Policy	  Outcome”	  of	  a	  particular	  historical	  period.	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2.5	  Framework	  in	  Review
This	  chapter	  developed	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  through	  which	  this	  thesis	  addresses	  
its	   research	   questions.	   The	   framework	   draws	   from	   neoclassical	   realism,	  
constructivism,	   and	  SIT.	   Salient	   elements	   from	  each	   theoretical	   tradition	   have	   been	  
identiﬁed,	   and	   potential	   obstacles	   to	   this	   approach	  have	  been	  examined.	  The	  realist	  
assumptions	  of	  statism,	   survivalism,	  and	  self-­‐help	  constitute	  the	  core	  assumptions	  of	  
this	   framework.	   However,	   the	   strategies	   chosen	   to	   pursue	   these	   goals	   must	   be	  
determined	   by	   the	   subjective	   interpretation	   of	   political	   elites	   charged	   with	  
establishing	  foreign	  policy.	  Neoclassical	  realism	   identiﬁes	  these	  intervening	  variables,	  
namely	   the	  perception	  of	  political	   leaders,	   as	  a	   crucial	   element	   in	  analyzing	   foreign	  
policy.	  Despite	  this,	  but	  the	  theory	  itself	  is	  limited	  in	  analyzing	  these	  variables.	  
	   Constructivism	   is	   useful	   in	   resolving	   this	   gap.	   Constructivist	   insights	   into	  
identities	   and	  norms	  have	   thus	   been	   deployed	   to	   supplement	   neoclassical	   realism’s	  
discussion	   of	   political	   elites.	   The	   relationship	   between	   neoclassical	   realism	   and	  
constructivism	  within	   this	  thesis	   is	   complementary.	  Neoclassical	   realist	   assumptions	  
regarding	   the	   state	  and	   the	   international	   system	   provide	   a	   foundation	   upon	   which	  
ideational	   factors	   can	  be	   engaged.	   It	   is	   argued	  that	   the	  norms	  of	   a	   state’s	   collective	  
identity	  condition	  behavior	  and	  restrain	  political	  leaders,	  while	  providing	  elites	  with	  a	  
method	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  domestic	  population.	  International	  norms	  similarly	  
restrict	  the	  foreign	  policy	  strategies	  of	  state	  elite.	  
	   Finally,	   SIT	   is	   explored	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   expanding	   upon	   neoclassical	   realist	   and	  
constructivist	  understandings	  of	  group	  behavior.	   	  SIT	  reﬁnes	  assumptions	  derived	  out	  
of	  international	  relations	  theory	  and	  illuminates	  how	  identity	  and	  norms	  translate	  into	  
policy.	   SIT	   contends	  that	   an	   individual’s	  understanding	   of	   self	  and	  his	   sense	  of	  self-­‐
worth	   are	   determined	   by	   the	   status	   of	   the	   groups	   to	   which	   (s)he	   belongs.	   When	  
applied	   to	   international	   relations,	   SIT	   provides	   a	   useful	   mechanism	   for	  
conceptualizing	   potential	   foreign	   policy	   strategies	   and	   the	   constraints	   acting	   upon	  
state	   elites.	   Similar	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   neoclassical	   realism	   and	  
constructivism,	  SIT	  is	  an	  additional	  ﬁlter	  that	  focuses	  the	  oﬀered	  analysis.	  
	   These	  stacking	  theoretical	   layers	  act	  as	  a	  methodological	  funnel	   that	  enables	  a	  
concise	   reading	   of	   history	   geared	   speciﬁcally	   to	   answer	   the	   proposed	   research	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questions.	   Each	   of	   the	   following	   chapters	  will	   utilize	   this	   framework	   over	   a	  speciﬁc	  
time	  period.	   In	   this	  manner,	  a	   consistent	   theoretical	   approach	   is	   employed	   to	   trace	  
Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  evolution	  and	  reveal	  how	  the	  aforementioned	  objects	  of	  analysis	  
inﬂuence	  policy	  output.
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Any	  attempt	  on	  our	  part	  to	  cling	  to	  tradition,	  making	  diﬃculties	  over	  the	  
merest	   triﬂes	   and	  so	   eventually	  provoking	   the	   foreigners	   to	  anger	  would	  
be	  impolitic	  in	  the	  extreme.
-­‐	  Hotta	  Masayoshi,	  1857
Under	   the	   excuse	   of	  keeping	   the	   peace,	   too	  much	  compromise	   has	   been	  
made	   at	   the	   sacriﬁce	   of	  national	   honour;	  too	  much	  fear	  has	   been	  shown	  
for	  the	  foreigners’	  threats.
-­‐	  Excerpt	  from	  manifesto	  carried	  by	  assassins	  of	  Ii	  Naosuke,	  1860
‘[I]f	  there	  be	  any	  sign	  of	  the	  Bakufu	  pursuing	  a	  policy	  of	  peace,	  moral	  will	  
never	  rise...and	   the	   gunbatteries	  and	  other	  preparations	  will	   accordingly	  
be	  so	  much	  ornament,	  never	  put	  to	  eﬀective	  use.’
-­‐	  Tokugawa	  Nariaki,	  1863-­‐4
Japan	   is	   a	  rather	  unique	   case	  study.	  Unlike	  other	   states,	   there	  is	   a	  clear	  delineation	  
between	  the	  premodern	  and	  modern	  periods	  in	  Japanese	  history.	  This	  chapter	  details	  
the	   internal	   and	   external	   factors	   which	   brought	   about	   the	   collapse	   of	   premodern	  
feudal	   Japan,	  thereby	  engaging	  with	   the	  ﬁrst	   research	  question	   -­‐	  How	  have	   concerns	  
over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	   international	   system	  
inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	  Such	  historical	  depth	  is	  
necessary.	   The	   strategic	   preferences	   outlined	   in	   this	   chapter	   reappear	   in	   varying	  
degrees	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   providing	   a	   basis	   for	   answering	   -­‐	   How	   have	   these	  
factors	   changed	   with	   time?	   Furthermore,	   the	   struggle	   to	   preserve	   sovereignty	   and	  
fortify	  national	   strength	  deﬁned	   the	  domestic	  struggle	   for	  power	  during	   the	  closing	  
days	   of	   feudal	   Japan,	   and	   prioritized	   pro-­‐modernization	   norms	   among	   Japanese	  
leaders.	  Tracing	  the	  ascendancy	  and	  persistence	  of	  these	  norms	  is	  crucial	  to	  answering	  
the	   third	   research	   question	   -­‐	  What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	  competing	  
groups	  of	  Japanese	  political	  elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?
	   This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  Tokugawa	  rule	   in	  Japan	  and	  the	  
policies	   of	   isolation	   enacted	   by	   Japanese	   leaders	   (Section	   3.1).	   Numerous	   attempts	  
were	  made	  by	  foreign	  nationals	  to	  subvert	  Japanese	  isolation,	  but	   it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  
emergence	   of	   industrialization	   that	   Japan’s	   isolation	   was	   truly	   threatened.	   The	  
domestic	  struggle	  between	  traditionalists	  that	  supported	  isolation	  and	  reformists	  that	  
favored	  varying	  degrees	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  Western	  powers	  is	   then	  considered	  
(Section	   3.2).	   Japan’s	   ongoing	   attempts	   to	   placate	   Western	   demands,	   namely	  
American	   insistence	   on	   opening	   Japan	   to	   trade	   is	   then	   detailed	   (Section	   3.3).	   The	  
domestic	   unrest	   resulting	   from	   eﬀorts	   to	   compromise	   with	   the	  West	   aﬀorded	   the	  
dissent	  Satsuma	  and	  Chōshū	  clans	  an	  opportunity	  to	  challenge	  the	  bakufu,	  the	  central	  
government	   of	   Japan	   (Section	   3.4).	   The	   chapter	  concludes	  by	  examining	   the	  Boshin	  
War,	  the	  civil	   conﬂict	   that	  displaced	  the	   shōgun	  and	  restored	  the	  emperor	  to	  power.	  
This	  transition	  is	  known	  as	  the	  “Meiji	  Restoration”	  (Section	  3.5).	  
	   By	   examining	   these	   empirical	   factors,	   this	   chapter	   provides	   both	   a	  historical	  
and	   theoretical	   starting	   point	   for	   this	   thesis.	   The	   encroachment	   of	   foreign	   powers	  
catalyzed	  domestic	  unrest,	  out	  of	  which	  modern	  Japan	  emerged.	  Surveying	  this	  period	  
also	  highlights	  the	  signiﬁcance	  of	  the	  theoretical	   framework	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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Gunboat	  diplomacy	  brought	  the	  core	  variables	  of	  statehood	  (neoclassical	  realism),	  the	  
norms	  and	  identities	  surrounding	  modernization	  (constructivism),	  and	  status	  seeking	  
behavior	  within	   group	  dynamics	   (SIT)	   to	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   political	   discourse	   in	  
Japan.	  
	   A	   few	   caveats	   must	   be	   noted.	   First,	   this	   chapter	   deals	   predominantly	   with	  
domestic	  factors.	   Japanese	  isolation	  crippled	  its	  foreign	  policy,	   resulting	   in	  a	  plethora	  
of	   political	   competition	   once	  the	  Western	   powers	   arrived.	   In	   short,	   Japan	   lacked	  an	  
eﬀective	  foreign	  policy	  apparatus.	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  is	  deployed	  to	  determine	  
the	   identities	   and	   norms	   that	   eventually	   formed	   the	   foundation	   of	   Meiji	   Japan’s	  
foreign	   policy.	   The	  conclusions	   of	   this	   chapter	   are	   built	   upon	   in	  Chapters	  4	   and	   5,	  
where	  the	  research	  questions	  are	  further	  explored.	  Second,	  some	  historical	  ﬁgures	  are	  
out	  of	  necessity	  referred	  to	  by	  their	  given	  names.	  For	  example,	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
members	  of	  the	  Tokugawa	  clan,	   such	  as	  Tokugawa	  Iemitsu	  and	  Tokugawa	  Nariaki,	   it	  
is	  necessary	  to	  use	  their	  given	  names	  (Iemitsu	  and	  Nariaki	   respectively).	  This	  is	  done	  
in	  accordance	  with	  the	  standards	  of	  historical	  sources.	  
3.1	  Tokugawa	  Peace	  and	  Isolation	  (1633	  -­‐	  1804)
The	   ﬁnal	   years	   of	   feudal	   Japan,	   or	   the	   bakumatsu,	   were	   politically	   and	   socially	  
turbulent,	   a	   marked	   departure	   from	   the	   preceding	   two	   centuries	   of	   peace	   under	  
Tokugawa	  rule.	  The	  Tokugawa	  bakufu	  was	  established	  by	  Tokugawa	  Ieyasu	  following	  
the	  Battle	  of	  Sekigahara	  in	  1600.	  The	  battle	  pitted	  Ieyasu	  against	  Ishida	  Mitsunari	  and	  
represented	   the	   ﬁnal	   stage	   in	   the	   military	   uniﬁcation	   of	   Japan	   begun	   by	   Oda	  
Nobunaga	  and	  Toyotomi	  Hideyoshi.145 	  As	  shōgun,	  the	  hereditary	  military	  dictator	  of	  
Japan,	   Ieyasu	   fathered	   a	  dynasty	   that	   brought	   250	   years	   of	   peace	  and	   prosperity	   to	  
Japan.	   Under	   the	  Tokugawa	   bakufu,	   Japan	  was	   organized	   under	  a	   structured	   social	  
hierarchy.	   The	   bakuhan	   taisei	   system	   divided	   Japan	   into	   a	   centralized	   feudal	  
community	  ruled	  by	  members	  of	  the	  samurai	  class.146
Chapter	  3:	  The	  Unraveling	  of	  Sakoku,	  1804	  -­‐	  1868	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66
145	  Bryant,	  Sekigahara	  1600:	  The	  Final	  Struggle	  for	  Power,	  ed.	  David	  G.	  Chandler,	  Osprey	  Military	  
Campaign	  Series	  	  (Oxford:	  Osprey	  Publishing,	  1995),	  7-­‐13,34-­‐41.	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  
Nobunaga-­‐Hideyoshi	  uniﬁcation	  of	  Japan	  see:	  Naohiro,	  "The	  Sixteenth-­‐Century	  Uniﬁcation,"	  in	  The	  
Cambridge	  History	  of	  Japan,	  ed.	  John	  Whitney	  Hall	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991).
146	  Jansen	  1986,	  71-­‐6.	  
	   In	   the	  early	  years	  of	  uniﬁcation	  under	  Nobunaga,	   Japan	  openly	  engaged	  with	  
foreigners,	   including	   Europeans.	   Nobunaga	   was	   especially	   interested	   in	   spreading	  
Western	  inﬂuence	  through	  Christianity,	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  undermining	  the	  eﬀorts	  of	  his	  
Buddhist	   rivals.	   Anti-­‐European	   sentiment	   began	   under	  Hideyoshi,	   who	   viewed	   the	  
superior	  ﬁrepower	  of	  the	  Europeans	  and	  the	   Spanish	   conquest	   of	   the	  Philippines	  as	  
harbingers	  of	  doom	   for	  Japan.147 	  Tokugawa	   Iemitsu,	   the	  grandson	  to	   Ieyasu	  and	  the	  
third	  Tokugawa	  shōgun,	   instituted	   sakoku,	   or	  the	  oﬃcial	   closing	  of	   Japan	   through	  a	  
series	   of	   edicts	   enacted	   from	   1633	   -­‐	   1639.	   Under	   sakoku,	   Japanese	   nationals	   were	  
prohibited	  from	  leaving	  Japan	  and	  European	  entry	  into	  Japan	  was	  extremely	  limited.148	  
Dutch	  merchants	  were	  restricted	  to	   the	  Deshima	  Island	  in	  Nagasaki	  Bay.	  Proxy	  trade	  
with	   China	   was	   conducted	   through	   the	   Ryūkyū	   Kingdom,	   and	   Christianity	   was	  
actively	   persecuted.	   The	   policies	   of	   national	   isolation	   initiated	   by	   Iemitsu	   would	  
prevail	  until	  the	  arrival	  of	  Europeans	  some	  two	  hundred	  years	  later.	  As	  demonstrated	  
below,	  centuries	  of	  seclusion	  left	  Japan	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  foreign	  powers	  and	  ultimately	  
spelled	  disaster	  for	  the	  Tokugawa	  bakufu.	  
	   Tokugawa	  Japan’s	  isolation	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  period	  of	  social	  creativity	  
where	  Tokugawa	   leaders	   forwent	   interstate	  relations	  and	  distanced	   themselves	   from	  
the	   Sin0-­‐centric	   regional	   power	   hierarchy.	   Japan,	   therefore,	   formed	   its	   own	   referent	  
group,	   and	   the	   permeability	   of	   the	   external	   power	   hierarchy	   does	   not	   need	   to	   be	  
considered.	   Table	   3.1	   summarizes	   these	   factors	   within	   the	   previously	   established	  
framework.	   Although	   not	   the	   principal	   time	   period	   examined	   by	   this	   research,	  
conceptualizing	  premodern	   Japan	  in	   this	  consistent	  manner	  enhances	   the	  validity	  of	  
the	   framework.	  It	   also	  demonstrates	  that	   future	   research	  projects,	  dealing	  with	  both	  
historical	  and	  contemporary	  periods,	  could	  draw	  from	  this	  approach.
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1633-­‐1804 Unipolar N/A • Traditionalist Self
Social	  Creativity.	  Policies	  of	  sakoku	  
isolate	  Japan.	  Chinese	  hegemony	  results	  
in	  regional	  unipolarity.	  
Table	  3.1	  :	  Policies	  of	  the	  Sakoku	  Period	  (1633	  -­‐	  1804)
3.2	  Seas	  of	  Change	  (1804	  -­‐	  1854)
The	   formalization	   of	   sakoku	   through	   the	   edicts	   of	   Tokugawa	   Iemitsu	   set	   the	  
parameters	   for	   Japan’s	   national	   isolation.	   The	   centralized	   power	   of	   feudal	   Japan	  
granted	   the	  bakufu	   the	  necessary	  means	   to	   uphold	   the	   strict	   restrictions	   upon	   the	  
Japanese	   pubic.	   However,	   bakufu	   authority	   did	   not	   extend	   to	   seaboard	   foreigners.	  
Prior	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Japan’s	  interactions	  with	  the	  West	  
were	  limited	  to	  Deshima	  Island	  in	  Nagasaki	  Bay.	  Deshima	  was	  an	  artiﬁcial	  island	  built	  
in	   1634	  that	  served	  as	  the	  location	  of	  trade	  between	  Japan	  and	  foreign	  nations	  during	  
the	   Edo	   period.	   The	   trading	   port	   was	   designed	   to	   limit	   foreign	   access	   into	   Japan	  
proper,	  as	  outlined	  by	  sakoku.	  Deshima	  was	  originally	  built	  for	  Portuguese	  traders,	  but	  
from	  1641	  to	  1853	  it	  was	  used	  by	  Chinese	  and	  Dutch	  traders.149	  
	   Growing	  trade	  with	  China	  and	  expanding	  whaling	  practices	  in	   the	  nineteenth	  
century	   increased	   the	   presence	   of	  Western	   shipping	   in	   the	   seas	   surrounding	   Japan.	  
Given	   Japan’s	  proximity	  to	   these	  sites,	  several	   foreign	  ships	  sought	   resupply	  and	  safe	  
harbor	   in	   Japan’s	   ports.	   While	   these	   requests	   were	   often	   out	   of	   necessity,	   not	   all	  
foreign	  incursions	  were	  innocuous.	  Tensions	  arose	  between	  Japan	  and	  Russia	  in	  1804	  
over	   the	   actions	   of	   two	   rogue	   lieutenants	   serving	   under	   Captain	   Nikolai	   Rezanov.	  
Rezanov	  was	  sent	  to	  Nagasaki	  harbor	  to	  formally	  request	  trade	  on	  behalf	  of	  Alexander	  
I,	   but	   his	  request	   was	  ultimately	  denied.150 	   In	  retaliation,	   the	   lieutenants	   raided	  the	  
Japanese	  coast.	  Japan	  did	  mobilize	  troops	  in	  its	  Northern	  provinces,	  but	  the	  actions	  of	  
Rezanov	   did	   not	   reﬂect	   oﬃcial	   Russian	   policy	   and	   the	   issue	   was	   resolved	   with	   a	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hostage	   exchange.151 	   The	   Rezanov	   aﬀair	   neatly	   encapsulates	   Japan’s	   sakoku	   policy.	  
Other	  foreign	   incursions	  did	  occur,	  but	   isolated	  incidents	   such	  as	  the	  Rezanov	  aﬀair	  
did	  not	  pose	  a	  signiﬁcant	  external	  threat	  to	  the	  bakufu.
	   What	   did	   threaten	   the	   bakufu	   were	   the	   peripheral	   consequences	   of	   the	  
Napoleonic	  Wars	  (1803–1815).	  News	  of	  the	  French	  revolution	  and	  the	  French	  invasion	  
of	   Holland	  were	   conveniently	   underplayed	  by	   the	   administrative	   head	   of	  Deshima.	  
Seeking	   to	   maintain	   the	  bakufu’s	   favor	   and	   Japanese	   trade,	   the	   Dutch	   presented	   a	  
minimized	   account	   of	   the	   rampant	   disorder	   in	   Europe.	   Meanwhile,	   war	   attrition	  
required	  the	  Dutch	   to	   lease	  American	  ships	  to	   service	  their	  trade.	  From	   1797	  to	   1807	  
American	  ships	  sailing	  under	  the	  Dutch	  ﬂag	  visited	  Deshima	  nine	  times.	  Upon	  being	  
questioned	   by	   Japanese	   oﬃcials	   who	   noted	   the	   curious	   tongue	   of	   these	   “Dutch”	  
sailors,	  Dutch	  representatives	  were	  compelled	  to	  admit	  to	  their	  deception.152
	   A	   similar	   tactic	  was	  deployed	  by	   the	  British	   to	   exploit	   Japanese	   ignorance	   of	  
external	  aﬀairs.	  Raiding	  Dutch	  shipping	  was	  a	  mainstay	  of	  the	  British	  strategy	  against	  
Napoleon.	   In	   1808,	   the	  HMS	  Phaeton	  entered	  Nagasaki	   harbor	   to	   prey	  upon	  Dutch	  
trading	  ships	  set	  to	  arrive	  in	  the	  coming	  days.	  To	  evade	  suspicion,	  the	  Phaeton	  hoisted	  
the	   Dutch	   colors	   upon	   its	   mast.	   The	   subterfuge	   surprised	   the	   Dutch.	   As	   was	  
customary	  at	  Deshima,	  representatives	   from	   the	  enclave	  rowed	  out	  to	  welcome	  their	  
assumed	  compatriots.153 	  The	  Phaeton’s	  captain,	  Fleetwood	  Pellew,	  ordered	  the	  Dutch	  
to	  be	  taken	  prisoner	  and	  demanded	  resupply	  in	  exchange	  for	  their	  release.	  To	  press	  his	  
demands,	   Pellew	   oﬀered	   a	   display	   of	   the	   ﬁrepower	   under	   his	   command	   and	  
threatened	  to	   direct	   the	  Phaeton’s	   cannons	  at	   Japanese	  and	  Chinese	  trading	   junks	  if	  
his	  demands	  were	  not	  met.	  The	  Japanese	  were	  unable	  to	  mobilize	  a	  suﬃcient	  defense,	  
and	  the	  Nagasaki	  magistrate	  (who	   in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  crisis	  committed	  seppuku)	  
caved	  to	   Pellew’s	  requests.154 	  Upon	   learning	  the	  Dutch	   trading	   vessels	  would	  not	  be	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arriving,	  the	  Phaeton	  withdrew	   from	   the	  harbor,	   but	   left	   in	   its	  wake	   the	  impetus	  for	  
anti-­‐sakoku	  sentiment.	  155
	   The	   violent	   stratagem	   of	   Pellew	   shocked	   the	   bakufu,	   and	   prompted	   a	  
strengthening	   of	   Japan’s	   coastal	   defenses	   and	   a	   special	   report	   on	   world	   aﬀairs.	  
Japanese	  oﬃcials	  questioned	  Hendrik	  Doeﬀ,	  who	  had	  served	  as	  the	  Dutch	  director	  at	  
Deshima	  since	  1803.	  Doeﬀ	  explained	  the	  Napoleonic	  Wars	  to	  provide	  a	  context	  to	  the	  
earlier	  leasing	  of	  American	  vessels	  and	  the	  British	  aggression	  in	  Nagasaki	  harbor.	  More	  
surprisingly,	  Doeﬀ	  was	  obliged	  to	  correct	  Japanese	  oﬃcials	  who	  believed	  America	  was	  
still	  a	  British	  colony,	  thereby	  allaying	  their	  fears	  that	  the	  formidable	  British	  Navy	  had	  
been	   calling	   at	   Deshima.156 	   This	   ignorance	   on	   behalf	   of	   Japanese	   leaders	   has	  
tremendous	   theoretical	   implications.	   This	   episode	   demonstrates	   the	   limitations	   of	  
theoretical	   approaches	   that	   underplay	   the	   signiﬁcance	   of	   ideational	   or	   domestic	  
factors.	  Japanese	  elites	  were	  restricted	  by	  sakoku,	  a	  domestic	  policy,	  which	  resulted	  in	  
a	   lack	   of	   awareness	   regarding	   regional	   power	   dynamics.	   Such	   a	   minimal	  
understanding	  of	  the	  external	  environment	   limited	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  Japanese	  elite	  
to	   correctly	   interpret	  external	   pressures.	  While	   this	   thesis	   focuses	   primarily	  on	   later	  
historical	   events,	   it	   is	  evident	   at	   this	   early	   stage	   that	   ideational	   constraints	   also	   act	  
upon	  state	  elites	  and	  must	  be	  appropriately	  considered.
	   Doeﬀ’s	   report	   also	   fueled	   suspicions	  that	   Tokugawa	  policies	  had	  undermined	  
Japan’s	  warrior	  heritage.	   In	   1807,	  scholar	  Sugita	  Gempaku	  expressed	  his	  concern	  that	  
Japan	  had	  departed	  from	   the	  traditions	  of	  its	  past.	  Sugita	  had	  previously	  argued	  that	  
Western	   principles	   (mainly	  medical	   science)	   were	   compatible	  with	  Japanese	  culture,	  
but	   his	   tone	   changed	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   Captain	   Nikolai	   Rezanov’s	   ambitious	  
lieutenants.157 	  He	   argued	   that	   the	   long	   peace	  of	   the	  Tokugawa	   Era	  had	   eroded	   the	  
ﬁghting	  capacity	  of	  Japan,	  complaining	   that	   ‘“seven	  or	  eight	   out	   of	  every	   ten	  Bakufu	  
retainers	   look	   like	   women	   and	   think	   like	   merchants”’.158 	   Pushing	   aside	   Sugita’s	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misogyny,	  this	  statement	  is	  an	   early	  indicator	  of	  the	  coming	   ideological	   tension	  that	  
challenged	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  Tokugawa	  period.	  
	   To	  Sugita,	  Russia	  posed	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  Japan	  and	  he	  called	  for	  a	  restoration	  
of	   pre-­‐Tokugawa	   political	   and	   social	   norms.	   Sugita’s	   concern	   derived	   from	   fear	   of	  
Russian	   reciprocation	   should	   Japan	   reject	   the	   Russian	   trade	   demands.	   ‘“Our	   ﬁrst	  
priority	  is	  to	  save	  our	  world”’,	  he	  argued,	  ‘“if	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  permit	  trade	  for	  now,	  we	  
must,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   a	   disgrace;	   at	   a	   later	   time	   we	  will	   be	   able	   to	   redeem	   our	  
honor”’.159 	   Although	   these	   fears	   never	   materialized,	   Sugita’s	   calls	   for	   restoration	  
through	  revitalizing	  the	  institutional	  principles	  of	  Japan’s	  past	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  debate	  that	  would	  eventually	  see	  the	  bakufu	  stripped	  of	  power.160	  
	   The	   bakufu	   chose	   to	   combat	   the	   growing	  Western	   encroachment	   in	   1825	  by	  
issuing	   the	   Edict	   to	   Repel	   Foreign	   Vessels,	   which	   stated	   that	   any	   foreign	   ship	  
approaching	  Japan’s	  shore	  should	  be	  driven	  oﬀ	  by	  force.161	  Earlier	  edicts	  had	  permitted	  
provisions	   to	   be	   given	   to	   peaceful	   foreigners,	   but	   such	   leniency	   was	   deemed	  
impossible.	   The	   “no	   second	  thoughts”	   edict	   prohibited,	   under	  penalty	  of	  death,	   any	  
non-­‐sanctioned	   contact	   with	   foreigners.162 	   The	   edict	   proved	   ineﬀectual	   and	   was	   a	  
source	   of	   criticism	   from	   both	   within	   and	   beyond	   Japan.	   In	   1837,	   the	   American	  
merchant	   ship	  Morrison	   sailed	   to	   Japan	  with	   seven	  shipwrecked	   Japanese	  and	   three	  
Christian	   missionaries	   onboard.	   It	   was	   hoped	   the	   repatriation	   of	   the	   Japanese	  
nationals	  would	  curry	  favor	  with	  the	  bakufu	  and	  provide	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  fruitful	  trading	  
relationship.	  When	   the	  Morrison	  arrived,	   the	   shore	   batteries	   at	   Edo	   and	  Kagoshima	  
opened	   ﬁre,	   driving	   the	   Morrison	   out	   of	   Japanese	   waters.	   A	   year	   afterward,	   the	  
Morrison’s	  mission	  was	  revealed	  to	  the	  bakufu	  by	  the	  Dutch	  at	  Deshima.163	  In	  response	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159	  Jansen	  1989,	  100-­‐1.
160	  	  Ibid.,	  101.
161	  Several	  minor	  incursions	  occurred	  during	  the	  interim,	  but	  nothing	  close	  in	  scale	  to	  the	  Phaeton	  aﬀair.
162	  Ravina,	  The	  Last	  Samurai:	  The	   Life	  and	  Battles	  of	  Saigo	  Takamori	  (Hoboken,	  New	  Jersey:	  John	  Wiley	  
&	  Sons,	  Inc.,	  2004),	  50-­‐4.
163	  Jansen	  1989,	  107-­‐8.
to	  this	  information,	  Takano	  Chōei,	  a	  prominent	  scholar	  of	  Western	  learning,	  circulated	  
a	  pamphlet	  lambasting	  the	  bakufu	  for	  its	  doctrinarian	  mindset.164	  He	  wrote:
[I]f	   the	   bakufu	   resorts	   to	   expelling	   them	   by	   force,	   Japan	   will	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   brutal	   country	  
incapable	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  right	  and	  wrong.	  The	  word	  will	   spread	  that	  we	  are	  an	  unjust	  
country,	  and	   Japan	   will	   lose	   its	   good	  name	   as	   a	   country	  which	   respects	  propriety	   and	  courtesy.	  
What	  disasters	  might	  befall	  us	  as	  a	  result	  are	  diﬃcult	  to	  predict.165
	   Strategic	   considerations	   further	   eroded	   the	   edict’s	   practicality.	   China’s	  
disastrous	  showing	  during	  the	  First	  Opium	  War	  (1839-­‐1842)conﬁrmed	  to	  many	  within	  
Japan	  that	  traditional	  methods	  of	  war	  could	  not	  match	  Western	  technology.	  The	  edict	  
was	  repealed	  in	  1841.	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  respected	  military	  engineer	  Takashima	  Shūhan	  
demonstrated	   Western	   ﬁrearms	   to	   the	   bakufu.166 	   The	   controversy	   surrounding	  
Western	   technology	   dominated	   the	   political	   discourse.	   Egawa	   Hidetatsu,	   who	   had	  
been	  charged	  with	  the	  defense	  of	  Tokyo	  Bay	  following	  the	  Morrison	  incident,	  thought	  
it	   necessary	   to	   incorporate	   Western	   technology	   into	   Japan’s	   military.	   Egawa	   and	  
likeminded	  oﬃcials	  believed	  that	  Western	  knowledge	  represented	  yet	  another	  foreign	  
element,	   like	   Confucianism	   and	   Buddhism	   before,	   that	   could	   be	   successfully	  
integrated	  into	  Japanese	  society.167	  Other	  pragmatic	  politicians	  advanced	  a	  position	  of	  
‘“controlling	  the	  barbarians	  with	  their	  own	  methods”’.168	  However,	  traditionalists	  who	  
favored	  established	  Japanese	  norms	  of	  warfare	  and	  isolation	  prevailed,	  and	  accusations	  
of	   treason	  were	   levied	   against	   several	   prominent	   progressives,	   including	   Takashima	  
and	  Takano.169	  
	   Tension	  between	  these	  groups	  constitutes	  the	  primary	  competition	  within	  the	  
domestic	  identity	  hierarchy.	   As	  per	  the	   theoretical	   framework,	   competition	  between	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164	   	  Although	  circulated	  after	  the	  Morrison	  incident,	  Takano	  was	  under	  the	  impression	  the	  ship	  would	  
be	   returning,	   thereby	   explaining	   the	   use	   of	   present	   tense.	   Furthermore,	   Takano	   had	   been	  
misinformed	   as	   to	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   crewmen,	   thinking	   them	   British	   and	   commanded	   by	  
missionary	  Robert	  Morrison.	  
165	  Quoted	  in	  Ibid.,	  108.
166	  Jansen	  2002,	  287;	  Totman	  1995,	  534.
167	  Harootunian,	  "Late	  Tokugawa	  Culture	  and	  Thought,"	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  University	  of	  Japan:	  The	  
Nineteenth	  Century,	  ed.	  Marius	  B.	  Jansen	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  239-­‐43.
168	  Ibid.,	  241.
169	  Ibid.,	  242.
groups	  (which	   represent	  diﬀerent	   sets	   of	  norms)	  deﬁnes	  the	  order	  of	  this	  hierarchy.	  
The	  direction	  of	  the	  state	  results	  from	  the	  policy	  preference	  of	  the	  dominant	  domestic	  
group,	   which	   during	   this	   period	   was	   the	   traditionalists.	   Table	   3.2	   presents	   these	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Table	  3.2	  :	  Competing	  Domestic	  Identities	  (1800s	  -­‐	  1830s)
	   Competition	   between	   domestic	   identities	   is	   a	   consistent	   factor	   throughout	  
modern	  Japanese	  history,	  but	   it	  holds	  additional	   signiﬁcance	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  
ongoing	  ideological	  struggle	  was	  at	  its	  core	  a	  confrontation	  between	  old	  and	  new	  ways	  
of	   understanding	   Japan’s	   position	   within	   the	   international	   system.	   Traditionalists	  
favored	   status-­‐quo	   isolationism	   derived	   out	   of	   premodern	   Japanese	   norms,	   which	  
preserved	   Japanese	   sovereignty.	   The	   reformists	   were	   primarily	   concerned	   with	  
enhancing	  the	  material	  power	  of	  Japan	  within	  their	  new,	  outward	  looking	  perspective.	  
Competing	   approaches	   to	   Japanese	   security	   (the	   competition	   between	   groups	  
privileging	  sovereignty	   vs.	   groups	  privileging	  power)	   remains	  a	   consistent	   feature	   of	  
modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  evolution.	  
	   Despite	   the	  traditionalist	   victory,	   pro-­‐modernization	  norms	  within	   Japan	  had	  
already	  begun	  to	   take	  root.	  Britain's	  handling	  of	  China	  during	   the	  First	  Opium	  War	  
cannot	  be	  understated.	  For	  centuries	  China	  sat	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  regional	  
order,	  and	  served	  as	  a	  beacon	  of	  culture,	  civility,	  and	  technology	  for	  its	  neighbors.	  The	  
very	  foundations	  of	  Japanese	  society,	  its	  philosophy	  and	  language,	  were	  derived	  out	  of	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the	   corresponding	   Chinese	   tradition.170 	   Yet	   centuries	   of	   success	   had	   blinded	   the	  
Chinese	   when	   confronted	   by	   the	   West.	   Assuming	   the	   superiority	   of	   its	   cultural	  
heritage	  would	  prevail	  over	  those	  of	  the	  European	  barbarians,	  China	  retreated	  into	   its	  
institutionalized	  traditions.	  For	  a	  time	  Japan	  followed	  suit,	  inheriting	  one	  last	  cultural	  
feature	  from	  China.
	   With	   the	  edict	   repealed	   and	   the	  Opium	  War	  opening	  more	  Chinese	   ports	   to	  
trade,	   some	   Americans	   assumed	   Japan	   was	   primed	   for	   trade.	   In	   1845,	   American	  
representatives	   in	   China	   organized	  an	   expedition	   to	   test	   this	   prospect.	   Commodore	  
James	   Biddle	   sailed	   into	   Edo	   Bay	   in	   1846,	   only	   to	   ﬁnd	   the	   Japanese	   still	   fervently	  
opposed	  to	  engagement.	  Biddle	  was	  under	  orders	  to	   avoid	  any	  resort	  to	   violence,	  and	  
his	   subsequent	   withdrawal	   from	   Edo	   Bay	   reaﬃrmed	   Japan’s	   policy	  of	   seclusion	  and	  
strengthened	  the	  traditionalist	  cause.171	  
	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Americans	   remained	   open	   to	   another	   expedition.	  
Opportunity	   surfaced	   when	   news	   reached	   the	   American	   East	   India	   Squadron	   that	  
eighteen	  shipwrecked	  American	  sailors	  were	  imprisoned	  in	  Japan.	  Commander	  James	  
Glynn	   of	   the	   USS	   Preble	   was	   sent	   to	   Nagasaki	   in	   1849	   to	   secure	   the	   release	   of	   the	  
shipwrecked	   Americans.	   The	   Japanese	   attempted	   to	   block	   the	   Preble’s	   entry,	   but	  
Glynn	  navigated	  his	  way	   into	   the	  bay.	  From	  his	  anchored	  position,	  Glynn	   requested	  
the	   release	   of	   the	   prisoners,	   and	   with	   Dutch	   assistance,	   his	   demand	   was	   met.172	  
Although	  the	  repatriation	  of	  foreign	  nations	  is	  expected	  of	  interstate	  relations,	  Glynn’s	  
expedition	  marked	  the	  ﬁrst	  successful	  negotiation	  by	  an	  American	  with	  sakoku	  Japan.	  
Upon	  returning	  to	   America	  in	   1851,	  Glynn	  proposed	  additional	  measures	  be	  taken	  to	  
open	  Japan.	  Backed	  by	  shipping	   interests,	  Glynn	  argued	   that	   Japan’s	   supplies	  of	  coal	  
could	   fuel	   trans-­‐Paciﬁc	   steamers	   en	   route	  to	   Shanghai.	   Furthermore,	  news	   that	   the	  
shipwrecked	   sailors	   had	   been	   systematically	   mistreated	   by	   their	   captors	   became	   a	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170	  Pyle	  2007,	  34-­‐9.
171	  Beasley	  1989,	  268.
172	  Hoyt,	  Japan's	  War:	  The	  Great	  Paciﬁc	  Conﬂict	  (Rowman	  &	  Littleﬁeld,	  2001),	  6.
highly	  politicized	  national	  sensation.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Daniel	  Webster	  found	  Glynn’s	  
proposal	  agreeable,	  and	  approved	  another	  expedition.173
	   On	  8	   July	   1853,	  Commodore	  Matthew	  Perry	  arrived	   in	  Edo	  Bay	  with	  orders	   to	  
negotiate	  with	   the	   Japanese	   through	   threat	   of	  force	   if	   necessary.	   Perry	  was	   charged	  
with	   securing	   access	   to	   coal	   for	   American	   steamers,	   negotiating	   a	   guarantee	   of	  
protection	  for	  shipwrecked	  American	  sailors,	  and	  enabling	  American	  ships	  to	  dispose	  
cargo	   at	   Japanese	  ports.	   To	   this	   end,	   Perry	   devised	   a	   strategy	   whereby	   he	  was	   ‘“to	  
demand	  as	  a	  right,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  favor,	   those	  acts	  of	  courtesy	  which	  are	  due	  from	  one	  
civilized	   nation	   to	   another”’.174 	   Perry	   insisted	   on	   handing	   over	   a	   formal	   letter	   from	  
President	  Millard	  Fillmore	  to	  the	  emperor	  at	  Kurihama	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  his	  gunboats.	  
He	   likewise	  refused	  to	   travel	   to	   Nagasaki	   to	   receive	  a	   reply	  as	  was	   customary.	   In	   his	  
own	   letter	   he	   informed	   the	   Japanese	   he	   had	   brought	   only	   a	   small	   squadron	   to	  
demonstrate	   his	   ‘friendly	   intentions	   [and]	   should	   it	   become	   necessary	   [he	   would]	  
return	  to	  Yedo	  in	  the	  ensuing	  spring	  with	  a	  much	  larger	  force’.175
	   Rather	  than	  aﬀord	  the	  Japanese	  the	  occasion	   to	  keep	  him	  waiting	   for	  a	  reply,	  
Perry	  withdrew	   to	  China	  and	   returned	   in	  February	  1854	  with	  the	  additional	  ships	  he	  
promised.	  Perry’s	  tactics	  reignited	  the	  debate	  within	  Japan	  over	  sakoku.	  Abe	  Masahiro,	  
a	   senior	  member	   of	   the	   Tokugawa	   council,	   lead	   the	   team	   of	   Japanese	   negotiators.	  
With	   Perry’s	   arrival	   in	   1853,	   Abe	   devised	   a	   strategy	   that	   would	   aﬀord	   Japan	   the	  
necessary	   time	   to	   bolster	   its	   coastal	   defenses.	  Abe	   circulated	   translations	   of	   Perry’s	  
letters	   to	   the	   daimyō,	   feudal	   Japan’s	   regional	   samurai	   rulers,	   asking	   for	  
recommendations	   on	   how	   Perry	   should	   be	   addressed.176 	   Abe	   aimed	   to	   form	   a	  
consensus	   among	   prominent	   Japanese	   leaders,	   but	   alternatively	   uncovered	  
irreconcilable	  norms	  between	  the	  reformists	  and	  traditionalists	  of	  the	  Japanese	  elite.	  
Chapter	  3:	  The	  Unraveling	  of	  Sakoku,	  1804	  -­‐	  1868	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75
173	  Beasley	  1989,	  269.
174	  Hawks,	  Narrative	  of	  the	  Expedition	  of	  an	  American	  Squadron	  to	  the	  China	  Seas	  and	  Japan,	  Performed	  
in	  the	  Years	  1852,	  1853	  and	  1854,	  vol.	  1	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Beverley	  Tucker,	  Senate	  Printer,	  1856).	  
175	  Ibid.,	  256-­‐9.	  
176	  Bolitho,	  "Abe	  Masahiro	  and	  the	  New	  Japan,"	  in	  The	  Bakufu	  in	  Japanese	  History,	  ed.	  Jeﬀery	  P.	  Mass	  
and	  Willian	  B.	  Hauser	  (Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  179-­‐83.
	   The	  majority	  of	  the	  daimyō	   supported	  sakoku,	  but	  recognized	  it	  was	  in	  Japan’s	  
best	   interest	  to	  avoid	  hostilities	  until	  it	  could	  strengthen	  its	  position	  (placing	  them	  in	  
the	  pragmatist	  group).	  However,	   this	  perspective	  oﬀered	  little	   in	  the	  way	  of	  political	  
maneuverability,	   as	   avoiding	   hostilities	   required	   a	  degree	  of	   compromise	   regarding	  
sakoku	   with	   the	   Western	   powers.	   Others	   led	   by	   Hotta	  Masayoshi	   and	   Ii	   Naosuke	  
forwarded	   a	   pro-­‐modernization	   and	   fairly	   pro-­‐Western	   (by	   Tokugawa	   standards)	  
position.	   Hotta	   and	   Ii	   believed	   Japan’s	   sovereignty	   could	   only	   be	   defended	   by	  
modernizing	  its	  military	  through	  Western	  technology.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  pair	  supported	  
fostering	   relationships	   with	   Western	   states	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   their	   knowledge	   of	  
advanced	   warfare.177 	   According	   to	   Ii,	   ‘“it	   is	   impossible	   in	   the	   crisis	   we	   now	   face	   to	  
ensure	   the	   safety	   and	   tranquility	   of	   our	   country	   merely	   by	   an	   insistence	   on	   the	  
national	  isolation	  laws	  as	  we	  did	  in	  former	  times”’.178	  In	  the	  interim,	  they	  believed	  the	  
Americans	   had	   to	   be	   granted	   access	   to	   Japan’s	   ports	   for	   fuel	   and	   supplies.	   They	  
fervently	  opposed	  opening	  Japan	  to	  foreign	  traders,	  suggesting	  alternatively	  that	  Japan	  
construct	   a	   merchant	   ﬂeet	   to	   conduct	   trade	   oversees	   and	  away	   from	   Japan	   proper.	  
This	  ﬂeet,	  they	  argued,	  could	   form	   the	  basis	  of	  an	   eventual	  navy.179 	  This	  progressive	  
perspective	   is	   representative	   of	   the	   struggle	   by	   bakufu	   leaders	   to	   balance	   between	  
attempts	  to	   protect	   Japanese	  sovereignty	  and	  fortify	  national	  strength.	  For	  Hotta	  and	  
Ii,	   temporarily	   compromising	   Japanese	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   hopes	   of	   gaining	   the	  
necessary	   strength	   to	   resist	   future	   encroachment	   was	   an	   acceptable	   avenue	   for	  
addressing	  foreign	  demands.	  
	   Opposition	   to	   Hotta	   and	   Ii	   was	   led	   by	   Tokugawa	   Nariaki.	   Nariaki	  
acknowledged	  that	  Western	  technology	  must	  be	  part	  of	  Japan’s	  defense,	  but	  he	  ﬁrmly	  
rejected	   any	   calls	   for	   acquiescence	   to	   foreign	   demands.	   Nariaki	   believed	   that	  
maintaining	  morale	  was	  more	  valuable	  than	  pragmatic	  considerations.	  He	  argued	  ‘“if	  
there	  be	  any	  sign	  of	  the	  Bakufu	  pursuing	  a	  policy	  of	  peace,	  morale	  will	  never	  rise...and	  
the	  gunbatteries	  and	  other	  preparations	  will	  accordingly	  be	  so	  much	  ornament,	  never	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put	   to	   eﬀective	   use”’.180 	   Japan’s	   defense,	   Nariaki	   believed,	   lay	   in	   directly	   and	  
immediately	   confronting	   the	  West	   before	   they	   could	   establish	   a	   foothold	   in	   Japan.	  
Sovereignty,	   therefore,	   must	   be	   maintained	   at	   all	   cost,	   even	   if	   it	   forced	   Japanese	  
leaders	   to	   fend	   oﬀ	   foreigners	   with	   the	   limited	   means	   (power)	   available	   to	   them.	  
Competing	   views	   on	   sovereignty	   and	  power	   constitute	   the	   two	   primary	   ideological	  
variables	  considered.	  Table	  3.3	   visualizes	  the	  contending	   views	  of	  these	  three	  groups	  
with	  regard	  to	  trade,	  modernization,	   their	  view	  of	  Western	  states,	  and	  seclusion.	  The	  
table	  expands	  the	  information	  oﬀered	  by	  Table	  3.2	  and	  oﬀers	  a	   further	  reﬁnement	  to	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  Western	  
Nations




Necessary Optimistic Mainly	  Opposed
Conservative Optimistic Hostile
Partial	   Opposed Absolute
Abe	  Masahiro
Hotta	  Masayoshi/	  Ii	  
Naosuke	  
Tokugawa	  Nariaki
Table	  3.3	  :	  Competing	  Identities	  and	  Salient	  Variables	  (1840s	  -­‐	  1850s)
	   The	  signiﬁcance	  of	  the	  domestic	  competition	  between	  identities,	  as	  understood	  
through	  SIT,	   cannot	   be	  understated.	  A	   strict	   realist	   interpretation	  may	  misrepresent	  
the	  variables	  at	   play,	   focusing	  primarily	  on	  external	  pressures.	  The	  external	  pressures	  
challenging	   the	  status-­‐quo	   isolationism	   of	   Japan	  were	   tremendous.	  Many	  within	  the	  
traditionalist	   group	   rather	   dogmatically	   rejected	   the	   reality	   of	   this	   threat.	   A	  
constructivist	   interpretation	   could	   account	   for	   the	   continuity	   of	   the	   established	  
isolationist	   norms.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   falls	  short	   in	  explaining	  the	   swiftness	  with	  which	  
the	  old	  established	  norms	  were	  sidelined,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  Sections	  3.5	  and	  3.6.
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   It	   fell	   to	   Abe	   to	   balance	   these	   competing	   groups	   and	   the	   external	   pressures	  
embodied	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  Perry.	  Under	  orders	  from	  the	  bakufu	  to	  avoid	  hostilities	  
with	   the	   Americans,	   but	   likewise	   prohibit	   opening	   Japan	   to	   trade,	   he	   opted	   for	  
compromise	  with	  Perry	  while	  making	  military	   preparations	  at	   home.	  An	   agreement	  
with	   the	   Americans	   was	  reached	  on	  31	  March	   1864.	   The	   Treaty	  of	  Peace	   and	   Amity	  
opened	  Shimoda	  and	  Hakodate	  as	  ports	  of	  call	   for	  American	  ships	  needing	   supplies,	  
granted	  America	  a	  permanent	  consul	  at	  Shimoda,	  and	  required	  Japan	  to	  provide	  aid	  to	  
shipwrecked	   American	   sailors.	   The	   treaty	   also	   included	   a	   most-­‐favored	   nation	  
clause.181	  
	   While	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  treaty	  was	  more	  political	   than	   commercial,	  Perry’s	  
arrival	   presented	   an	   unprecedented	   threat	   to	   Japanese	   sovereignty.	   Abe	   had	   been	  
charged	   with	   not	   only	   preserving	   Japan’s	   autonomy,	   but	   also	   balancing	   the	   anti-­‐
Western	   emperor	  and	  the	  war	  seeking	   daimyō.	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Peace	  and	  Amity	  may	  
have	  facilitated	  only	  marginal	  interaction	  between	  the	  West	  and	  Japan,	  but	  this	  slight	  
opening	   undermined	   the	   spirit	   of	   sakoku	   and	   provided	   the	   foundation	   for	   similar	  
treaties	   with	   Britain	   and	   Russia.	   Abe	   himself	   noted	   the	   tempestuous	   domestic	  
environment	   in	   1955:	   ‘“there	   is	   now	  a	   greater	  danger	  of	   internal	   rebellion	   than	   of	  a	  
foreign	  attack”’.182	  The	  need	  for	  modernization	  became	  evident	  to	  several	  within	  Japan,	  
revitalizing	   the	  earlier	  debate,	   and	   numbering	   the	  days	   that	   Japanese	   leaders	   could	  
reasonably	  expect	  to	  utilize	  sakoku	  as	  its	  dominant	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.
	   The	   ideological	   struggle	  must	   also	  be	  theoretically	   conceptualized.	   The	  divide	  
between	  reformists	  and	  traditionalists	  corresponds	  to	   strategies	  of	  social	  mobility	  and	  
social	  competition.	  Reformists	  valued	  state	  power	  over	  unassailable	  sovereignty.	  It	  was	  
a	   long-­‐term	   strategy	  designed	   to	   facilitate	   the	   adoption	  of	  Western	   norms	   (namely	  
modernization)	   in	  order	   to	   bolster	   Japan’s	   national	   strength	  and	  ultimately	   reassert	  
Japanese	   sovereignty.	   By	   mirroring	   the	   successful	   practices	   of	   Western	   states,	  
reformists	  hoped	  to	   prevent	  a	  disaster	  comparable	  to	   the	  Opium	  War	  from	  erupting	  
within	  Japan.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   traditionalists	  privileged	   sovereignty	   above	  power,	  
even	   if	   such	   a	   position	   undermined	   attempts	   to	   increase	   Japan’s	   national	   strength	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through	  the	  adoption	  of	  Western	  technology.	  It	  was	  a	  short-­‐term	  strategy	  designed	  to	  
prevent	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  from	  being	  compromised.	  While	  not	  the	  ﬁnest	   example	  
of	   social	   competition,	   traditionalists	   did	   seek	   to	   challenge	   the	   dominant	   Western	  
states	  and	  diminish	  their	  claims	  on	  Japan.	  Although	  there	  was	  little	  hope	  of	  equaling	  
or	  eclipsing	  Western	  powers,	  traditionalists	  wished	  only	  to	  subvert	   foreign	  incursions	  
into	  Japan	  and	  thus	  challenge	  Western	  superiority	  within	  Japan.	  Table	  3.4	  speciﬁes	  the	  
competition	  within	  the	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  group	  
strategies	  for	  status	  seeking	  behavior.	  

















Embrace	  Western	  contact	  as	  












Outright	  reject	  compromise	  
with	  West,	  defend	  sovereignty	  
at	  all	  costs.
Table	  3.4	  :	  Theoretical	  Representation	  of	  Reformists	  and	  Traditionalists	  (1840s	  -­‐	  1850s)
Table	  3.5	  provides	  a	  reference	  point	  for	  this	  period	  within	  the	  larger	  framework.	  Note	  
that	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   remains	   non-­‐existent	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   second	  
















Social	  Creativity.	  Isolation	  maintained,	  
but	  tenets	  of	  sakoku	  challenged	  by	  arrival	  
of	  Western	  powers.
Table	  3.5	  :	  Policies	  and	  Groups	  of	  the	  Bakumatsu	  	  (1840s	  -­‐	  1850s)
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3.3	  Domestic	  Reaction	  and	  the	  Harris	  Treaty	  (1854	  -­‐	  1858)
Abe’s	  compromise	  assured	  that	  Japan	  remained	  (in	  letter	  at	  least)	  closed	  to	   trade,	  but	  
his	   eﬀorts	   also	   revealed	   Japan’s	   impotence.	   Japan’s	   deference	   to	   foreign	   coercion	  
compromised	  the	  authority	  of	   the	  bakufu,	  as	  did	  Abe’s	  strategy	  of	  consulting	  daimyō	  
outside	   of	   the	   bakufu.183 	   Furthermore,	   Shōgun	   Tokugawa	   Iesada	   proved	   politically	  
ineﬀectual	  amidst	  the	  domestic	  unrest.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  bakufu’s	  weakness	  and	  the	  
mounting	   criticism	   of	   the	  treaty,	  Abe	   enhanced	  his	   fortiﬁcation	   eﬀorts.	   He	  ordered	  
warships	  and	  arms	  from	  the	  Dutch,	  and	  constructed	  new	  port	  defenses.	  Western-­‐style	  
military	   schools	   were	   founded	   at	   Nagasaki	   and	   Edo,	   and	   the	   government	   began	  
translating	  Western	  books	  in	  earnest.184 	  Despite	  his	  eﬀorts	  to	   strengthen	   Japan’s	  war	  
capabilities,	  Abe	  could	  not	  fortify	  his	  own	  position	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  Hotta	  in	  1855.	  
	   Hotta’s	   tenure	   as	   senior	  minister	  was	   marked	   by	   his	   acute	  awareness	   of	   the	  
Second	  Opium	  War	  (1856-­‐60),	   and	  his	  hesitancy	  towards	  the	  West.	  His	  caution	  was	  
not	   lost	   on	   the	   Dutch.	   Dutch	   representatives	   at	   Nagasaki	   advanced	   a	   letter	   to	   the	  
bakufu	   in	   which	   they	   stated	   the	   British	   would	   soon	   arrive	   and	   demand	   a	   full	  
commercial	   treaty	   with	   Japan.	   In	   lieu	   of	   being	   caught	   unprepared,	   the	   Dutch	  
suggested	   Japan	   sign	   a	   trade	   agreement	   with	   Holland	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   model	   for	   the	  
impending	  warships	  upon	  the	  horizon.	  Hotta	  and	  his	  advisors	  concluded	  that	   it	  was	  
impossible	   to	   hold	   the	   West	   at	   bay	   indeﬁnitely,	   and	   that	   a	   strategy	   for	   treaty	  
negotiation	  must	  be	  developed.185
	   Debate	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  concessions	  continued	  into	  the	  fall	  of	  1857.	  The	  
expected	  pragmatist	  (those	  who	  wished	  Japan	  to	  advance	  slowly	  in	  any	  negotiations),	  
progressive	   (those	   more	   realistic	   about	   Western	   demands),	   and	   traditionalist	  
(draconian	  isolationists)	  elements	  emerged	  within	  the	  debate.	  Nariaki	  led	  the	  group	  of	  
traditionalist	   dissenters	   and	   opposed	   caving	   to	   Western	   demands.	   The	   gravity	   of	  
Nariaki’s	  position	  was,	  however,	  lessened	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  conﬂict.	  As	  Hotta	  stated:	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‘“Any	   attempt	   on	   our	  part	   to	   cling	   to	   tradition,	   making	   diﬃculties	   over	   the	  merest	  
triﬂes	  and	  so	   eventually	  provoking	   the	  foreigners	   to	  anger	  would	  be	   impolitic	  in	  the	  
extreme.”’186	  
	   Inaccurately	   reported	   news	   of	   the	   impeding	   British	   arrival	   forced	   the	   issue.	  
While	  debate	  continued	  within	  the	  bakufu,	  the	  Dutch	  compelled	  the	  Japanese	  oﬃcials	  
at	  Nagasaki.	  In	  September	  1857,	  the	  oﬃcials	  at	  Nagasaki	   took	   the	  unprecedented	  step	  
of	   signing	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   Dutch	   without	   the	   approval	   of	   the	   bakufu.187	  
Although	  the	  agreement	  was	  only	  a	  marginal	  modiﬁcation	  of	  Japan’s	  two	   century	  old	  
agreement	  with	  the	  Dutch,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  accord	  stirred	  the	  ire	  of	  many	  within	  the	  
bakufu.	  Yet	  the	  response	  it	  prompted	  from	  America	  was	  more	  distressing	  for	  Japan.
	  
	   From	  his	  oﬃce	  at	   the	  American	  consul	   in	  Shimoda,	  consul	  general	   Townsend	  
Harris	  carefully	  observed	  the	  Dutch	  advancements.	  Since	  Harris’	  arrival	  in	  1856	  he	  had	  
been	  charged	  with	  establishing	  a	  commercial	  treaty	  with	  Japan.	  While	  the	  Dutch	  were	  
pushing	  their	  position	  at	  Nagasaki,	  he	  renewed	  his	  request	  for	  an	  audience	  with	  the	  
shōgun.	   His	   request	   was	   ﬁnally	   approved	   in	   late	   September.	   Harris’	   visit	   to	   Edo	   in	  
November	  was	  a	  watershed	  event.	   In	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  shōgun,	  Harris	  submitted	  to	  
Hotta	  an	  oﬃcial	  letter	  from	  the	  president.188
	   Hotta	  and	  Harris	  engaged	  in	  a	  series	  of	  negotiations	  in	  the	  subsequent	  weeks.	  
Harris	   declared	   that	   Japan	   would	   be	   brought	   into	   the	   international	   ﬁnancial	  
community,	   either	   through	   peaceful	   negotiations	   or	   by	   force.	   Remaining	   a	   closed	  
country	  was	  no	   longer	  a	  viable	  option.	  It	  was	  a	  position	  well	  known	  by	  Hotta.	  Several	  
of	   his	   trusted	  subordinates	  called	  for	   the	  negotiation	  of	  commercial	   treaties.	  Others	  
within	  Hotta’s	  camp	  called	  for	  only	  a	  minimal	  and	  temporary	  opening	  until	   Japan	  had	  
the	  strength	  to	  defend	  itself.	  The	  division	  among	  Hotta’s	  advisors	  reﬁned	  debate	  over	  
sovereignty	   and	  power,	   as	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   absolute	   sovereignty	   comparable	   to	  
that	  exercised	  during	  sakoku	  was	  now	  impossible.189	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   In	   the	   following	  months,	   a	   consensus	   was	   reached	   and	   by	   late	   February	   an	  
agreement	   was	  penned.	   Six	  ports	   (Yokohama,	  Nagasaki,	  Niigata,	   Kobe,	   Edo,	   Osaka)	  
were	  opened	  to	  American	   trade.	  Additionally,	   the	  existing	  ports	  of	  call	   for	  American	  
ships	   at	   Shimoda	   and	   Hakodate	   were	   formally	   opened.	   These	   openings	   were	  
accompanied	   by	   lax	   tariﬀs	   and	   extraterritorial	   privileges	   for	   Americans.	   The	  
concessions	   granted	   to	   Americans	   went	   far	   beyond	   the	   early	   agreement	   with	   the	  
Dutch,	   but	   the	   Japanese	   oﬃcials	   were	   unfamiliar	   with	   expectations	   of	   diplomatic	  
relations	  with	  the	  West.190
	   Domestically,	   Hotta	   faced	   another	   challenge.	   He	  needed	   formal	   approval	   for	  
the	   treaty.	   Although	   the	  debate	  continued	  between	   daimyō,	   Japan	   had	  no	   practical	  
option	   other	  than	   to	   concede,	  and	  even	  Nariaki	   acknowledged	   that	   resisting	   foreign	  
trade	   was	   no	   longer	   an	   option.191 	   While	   several	   of	   Japan’s	   most	   powerful	   leaders	  
accepted	   that	   trade	  was	   inevitable,	   gaining	   formal	   approval	   for	   the	   treaty	   remained	  
elusive.	  Shōgun	   Iesada	  was	  both	   childless	   and	  perceived	  as	   ill-­‐equipped	  to	   quell	   the	  
unrest	  that	  was	  likely	  follow	  the	  treaty’s	  ratiﬁcation,	  bringing	  questions	  of	  succession	  
to	   the	  forefront.	  There	  were	  two	  viable	  candidates,	  Tokugawa	  Iemochi	  and	  Tokugawa	  
Yoshinobu.	  Iemochi	  was	  young	  but	  closest	   in	  blood	  to	  the	  sitting	  shōgun.	  He	  was	  the	  
favorite	  of	  traditionalists	  in	  Edo.	  Yoshinobu	  was	  older	  and	  more	  accomplished.	  As	  son	  
to	  Nariaki,	  he	  was	  supported	  by	  those	  seeking	  reform.192
	   Hotta	   avoided	  the	  succession	   issue	  by	  devising	   a	  radical	   plan.	  He	   traveled	  to	  
Kyoto	   and	   put	   the	   treaty	   before	   the	   imperial	   court.	   With	   imperial	   approval,	   Hotta	  
hoped	   to	   coerce	   the	   bakufu	  while	  silencing	   his	  opposition.	   It	  was	   a	  bold	  move	   that	  
rebuﬀed	  centuries	  of	  tradition.	  In	  Tokugawa	  Japan,	  the	  emperor	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  
political	   ﬁgurehead.	  While	  the	  emperor	  was	  legally	  powerless,	   an	  imperial	   decree	   in	  
favor	   of	   the	   treaty	   would	   have	   subverted	   the	   traditionalists	   who	   clung	   to	   national	  
isolation.	  Unfortunately	  for	  Hotta,	  the	  court	  refused.	  Any	  decree,	  Hotta	  was	  informed,	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could	  only	  be	  issued	  after	  he	  had	  secured	  a	  consensus	  among	  the	  daimyō.193 	  Hotta’s	  
failed	   gambit	   proved	   too	  much	   for	  the	   traditionalist	   within	   the	  bakufu,	   and	   he	  was	  
replaced	  in	  June	  1858	  by	  Ii	  Naosuke.194
	   Serving	   as	   regent,	   Ii	   was	   charged	   with	   quickly	   resolving	   the	   succession	  
problem,	   as	   to	   focus	   his	   attention	   to	   the	   more	   salient	   issue	   of	   Harris’	   growing	  
impatience.	  Ii	  named	  Iemochi	  as	  successor,	  providing	  the	  traditionalists	  an	  important	  
victory.	  Attention	  soon	  returned	  to	   the	   issue	  of	  trade.	  News	  that	  Britain	  had	  reached	  
an	  accord	  with	  China	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  more	  sinister	  rumor	  that	  the	  British	  ﬂeet	  
was	  preparing	  to	  steam	  to	  Japan.	  195 	  Harris	  played	  up	  the	  rumor,	  forcing	  Ii	  to	  sign	  the	  
treaty	   even	   though	   opinion	   among	   the	   daimyō	   remained	   divided.	   One	   of	   Harris’	  
informants	  described	  the	  situation,	   ‘“taking	  10	  persons	  in	  authority,	  three	  would	  be	  in	  
favour	  of	  opening	   the	  country	  at	  once,	   two	  would	  be	   in	  favour	  but	  with	  delay,	   three	  
would	   refuse,	   so	   long	   as	   force	   is	  not	   used...and	   two	   would	  ﬁght	   to	   the	   last”’.196 	   The	  
British	  heralded	  their	  arrival	  in	  Edo	  Bay	  with	  a	  single	  ship.	  In	  the	  following	  weeks	  the	  
Dutch,	  Russians,	  the	  British,	  and	  the	  French	  all	  signed	  treaties	  of	  similar	  content	  and	  
with	  respective	  most-­‐favored-­‐nation	  clauses.197
	   The	   political	   fallout	   was	   vast.	   Ii	   had	   isolated	   the	   traditionalists	   by	   not	   only	  
kneeling	   to	   the	   West,	   but	   by	   doing	   so	   without	   imperial	   approval.	   His	   choice	   of	  
Iemochi	   over	   Yoshinobu	   severed	   the	   support	   of	   the	   reformist	   daimyō.	   Ii	   sought	  
compromise	   between	   the	   factions,	   but	   his	   eﬀorts	   undermined	   his	   position.	   To	  
strengthen	  the	  bakufu’s	  position,	  Ii	  purged	  the	  opposition.	  Nariaki	  and	  his	  supporters	  
were	   placed	   under	  house	   arrest.	   Senior	  members	   of	   the	   imperial	   court	   were	   either	  
replaced	   or	   bribed	   into	   compliance.198 	   Other	   detractors	   of	   lesser	   standing	   were	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executed.199 	  The	  purge	  bought	  Ii	  only	  temporary	  relief.	  Ii	  was	  assassinated	  at	  the	  gate	  
of	  Edo	   Castle	  on	  a	  snowy	  March	  day	  in	   1860.	  The	  assailants	  were	  led	  by	  by	  Arimura	  
Jisaemon,	   a	   samurai	   from	   Satsuma.200 	   The	   conspirators	   carried	   with	   them	   their	  
manifesto.	  A	  quote	  from	   the	  manifesto	  opened	  this	  chapter.	  An	  expanded	  excerpt	   is	  
provided	  below.
While	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  necessity	  for	  some	  change	  in	  policy	  since	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  Americans	  at	  
Uraga,	  it 	  is	  entirely	  against	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  country	  and	  a	  stain	  on	  the	  national	  honour	  to	  open	  
up	  commercial	   relations	  with	  foreigners,	  to	   admit	  foreigners	  into	   the	  Castle,	  to	   conclude	   treaties	  
with	  them,	  (...)	  to	  allow	  foreigners	  to	  build	  places	  of	  worship	  for	  the	  evil	  religion,	  and	  to	  allow	   the	  
three	  Foreign	  Ministers	   to	   reside	  in	   the	   land.	  Under	   the	  excuse	   of	   keeping	   the	  peace,	   too	  much	  
compromise	  has	  been	  made	  at	  the	  sacriﬁce	  of	  national	  honour;	  too	  much	  fear	  has	  been	  shown	  for	  
the	  foreigners’	  threats.	  Therefore,	  we	  have	  consecrated	  ourselves	   to	   be	  the	  instruments	  of	  Heaven	  
to	  punish	  this	  wicked	  man,	  and	  we	  have	  taken	  on	  ourselves	   the	  duty	  of	   ending	  a	   serious	   evil,	  by	  
killing	  this	  atrocious	  autocrat.201
3.4	  Sonnō	  Jōi	  (1858	  -­‐	  1864)
The	  assassination	  of	  Ii	   transformed	  the	  nature	  of	  bakumatsu	  political	  dissent.	  Before	  
Ii’s	  death,	  the	  contestation	  within	   the	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy	  occurred	  between	  
traditionalists	  concerned	  with	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  and	  reformists	  seeking	  to	  enhance	  
the	   state	   power	   through	   cooperation	   with	   the	   West.	   Bloody	   years	   followed	   the	  
assassination,	   with	   regular	   attacks	   on	   foreigners.	   Amid	   the	   turmoil,	   two	   groups	  
emerged	   to	   challenge	   the	   bakufu.	   The	   ascendency	   of	   these	   two	   groups	   shifted	   the	  
competition	  between	  domestic	  identities	  from	  that	  of	  foreign	  policy	  (isolationism	  vs.	  
engagement)	  to	  that	  of	  political	  legitimacy.	  
	   The	  ﬁrst	  group	  was	  comprised	  of	  reactionary	  loyalists,	  who	  were	  often	  loosely	  
organized	   and	   lacked	   structured	   goals	   beyond	   their	   guiding	   slogan	   “honor	   the	  
emperor,	   expel	   the	   barbarian	   (sonnō	   jōi)”.	   From	   the	   loyalist	   perspective,	   Ii	   had	  
betrayed	  the	  emperor	  by	  signing	   commercial	  treaties	  without	  imperial	   approval.	  The	  
treaties,	   they	   reasoned,	   had	   ﬂooded	   the	   country	   with	   barbarians	   and	   compromised	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Japan’s	   collective	  identity	  as	  a	  closed	  state.202	  While	  these	  treaties	  did	  open	  Japan	  to	  
foreigners,	   the	   loyalists	   had	  a	  limited	  appreciation	   of	   the	  external	   constraints	  acting	  
upon	   to	   Ii.	   The	   loyalists	   were	   mostly	   composed	   of	   lower	   ranking	   samurai	   and	  
politicized	   commoners	   who	   lacked	   a	   political	   voice	   in	   Japan’s	   highly	   structured	  
society.	  With	   no	   means	   to	   aﬀect	   change,	   they	   turned	   to	   terror	   tactics.203 	   Although	  
their	  xenophobic	  reaction	  reﬂected	  a	  minimal	   understanding	  of	  international	  aﬀairs,	  
their	  actions	  were	  not	  solely	  bullheaded.	  In	  July	  1861,	  a	  group	  of	  loyalists	  attacked	  the	  
British	  legation	  at	  Tōzenji.	  The	  target	  was	  political	  as	  was	  the	  objective:	  to	  destroy	  the	  
bakufu’s	  nascent	  relationship	  with	  the	  British.204
	   The	  loyalists	  were	  mainly	  a	  fringe	  political	  group.	  The	  second	  group,	  however,	  
possessed	  considerable	  political	  resources.	  The	  turmoil	  following	  Japan’s	  opening	  had	  
weakened	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  bakufu,	   providing	  an	  opportunity	   for	  some	  daimyō	   to	  
position	  themselves	  for	  greater	  power	  within	  Japan.	  The	  movement	  was	  led	  by	  Shimazu	  
Hisamitsu	  of	   the	  Satsuma	  clan,	   who	   supported	   fostering	   relations	   with	   the	  West.205	  
Satsuma	   leaders	  were	  some	  of	   the	  earliest	   adopters	   of	  Western	  technology	  in	  Japan,	  
and	  the	  weakened	  bakufu	  was	  a	  golden	  opportunity	  to	  exercise	  this	  new	  ﬁrepower.
	   Satsuma	  deﬁance	  came	  to	   a	  head	   in	  September	   1862.	  While	  Shimazu	   was	  en	  
route	   to	   Kyoto,	   a	   quarrel	   broke	   out	   between	   his	   escort	   and	   a	   group	   of	   foreigners,	  
leaving	   a	   British	   merchant	   named	   Richardson	   dead.	   The	   aﬀair	   quickly	   became	   an	  
international	  crisis.	  The	  British	  demanded	  indemnities	  from	  the	  bakufu	  and	  Satsuma,	  
as	   well	   as	   those	   responsible	   being	   turned	   over	   to	   British	   authorities.	   The	   bakufu	  
oﬀered	   the	   British	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   indemnity,	   but	   Satsuma	   leaders	   rejected	   the	  
demands.	   In	  response,	  the	  British	  squadron	  steamed	  into	  the	  Satsuma	  waters	  outside	  
Kagoshima,	   and	   attempted	   to	   seize	   anchored	   Satsuma	   vessels	   as	   random	   until	   the	  
indemnity	  was	  paid.	  In	  the	  battle	  that	  followed,	  much	  of	  Kagoshima	  was	  shelled	  and	  
several	  British	  vessels	  were	  damaged.	  The	  outcome	  was	  indecisive,	   but	   the	  two	  sides	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came	  to	  terms	  in	  December	  1863.206	  Through	  the	  negotiations	  the	  Satsuma	  and	  British	  
established	  a	  working	  relationship,	  which	  provided	  Satsuma	  leaders	  access	  to	  Western	  
military	  technology.	  Technology	  that	  would	  prove	  pivotal	  in	   the	  eventual	   toppling	  of	  
the	  bakufu.	  
	   The	   Richardson	  Aﬀair	  was	   but	   the	  beginning	  of	  deﬁance	   in	   Japan’s	  southern	  
provinces.	  Controversy	  also	   arose	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  Chōshū,	  a	  neighbor	  and	  longtime	  
rival	   to	   Satsuma.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   Ii’s	   assassination,	   Satsuma	   and	   Chōshū	   vied	   for	  
political	   control	   in	   the	  bakufu	   and	   the	  imperial	   court.207 	   	  During	  a	  shōgunal	  visit	   to	  
Kyoto	   in	  April	  1863,	  bakufu	  oﬃcials	  came	  under	  pressure	  from	  a	  violent	  loyalist	  group	  
demanding	  a	   return	   to	   isolation.208 	  In	  breaking	  with	  centuries	   of	  tradition,	  Emperor	  
Komei	   issued	  a	  public	  “order	  to	   expel	   the	  barbarians”	  (jōi).	   Seizing	  the	  moment,	  the	  
Chōshū	   began	   publicly	   defying	   the	   bakufu.	   Clan	   leader	   Mori	   Takachika	   ordered	  
foreign	  ships	  traveling	  through	  the	  Shimonoseki	  Strait	  to	  be	  ﬁred	  upon.209	  On	  25	  June	  
1863,	   Chōshū	   shore	   batteries	   opened	  ﬁre	   upon	   the	   USS	   Pembroke.	   In	   the	   following	  
months	  American,	   French,	   and	  Dutch	  warships	  all	   tried	   in	   vain	   to	   bring	  Chōshū	  to	  
heel,	   the	   Shimonoseki	   Straits	   remained	   closed	   to	   trade.210 	   Figure	   3.6	   visualizes	   the	  
distinction	  between	  the	  Satsuma	  and	  Chōshū	  clans,	  and	  the	  loyalist	  faction.
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   The	   Chōshū	   situation	   continued	   to	   deteriorate.	   On	   20	   August	   1864	   Chōshū	  
forces	  moved	  on	  the	  imperial	  palace	  in	  Kyoto	   in	  an	  attempted	  coup	  that	  would	  have	  
seen	  power	  restored	  to	   the	  emperor.	   In	  response,	  a	  multinational	   ﬂeet	  under	  British	  
command	  steamed	   to	   the	   Shimonoseki	   Strait.	  The	  ﬂeet	   destroyed	   the	   Chōshū	  navy	  
and	  its	  shore	   artillery,	   forcing	  Chōshū	  leaders	   to	   surrender.	  The	  bakufu	  organized	  a	  
complementary	   land	   response.	   Seeking	   to	   weaken	   their	   traditional	   enemy,	   Satsuma	  
initially	  backed	  the	  bakufu	  initiative,	  but	  soon	  became	  convinced	  the	  bakufu	  was	  using	  
Chōshū	   as	   a	   staging	   ground	   to	   move	   against	   Satsuma.	   Consequently,	   Satsuma	  
brokered	  a	  deal	  that	  saw	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  coup	  turned	  over	  to	  the	  bakufu	  in	  exchange	  
for	  bakufu	  withdrawal.	   In	   the	  end,	  the	  First	  Chōshū	  Expedition	  ended	  without	  a	  shot	  
ﬁred.212
	   The	  failed	  Chōshū	  coup	  was	  accompanied	  by	  domestic	  uprisings,	  including	  the	  
Mito	  Rebellion	  led	  by	  pro-­‐imperial,	  anti-­‐Western	  samurai.	  Rebel	  leaders	  were	  brutally	  
punished	  for	  their	  actions	  with	  hundreds	  being	  executed.213	  With	  the	  containment	  of	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Satsuma	   and	   Chōshū	   to	   the	   South	   and	   the	   paciﬁcation	   of	   domestic	   uprisings	  
elsewhere,	  the	  bakufu	  position	  was	  for	  a	  time	  secure.	  However,	   the	  show	  of	   force	  by	  
Western	   warships	   and	   the	   Western	   enthusiasm	   in	   participating	   in	   the	   domestic	  
struggle	   eﬀectively	   eliminated	   the	   sonnō	   jōi	   movement	   and	   any	   illusion	   that	   Japan	  
could	   return	   to	   isolation.	   Sovereignty	   and	   national	   power	   remained	   key	   variables	  
during	   this	   transition,	   but	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   reformist	   and	   loyalist	   became	   more	  
politicized.	   Loyalist	   support	   for	  the	   restoration	   of	   imperial	   rule	  was	   co-­‐oped	   by	   the	  
reformist	   Satsuma	   and	   rebellious	   Chōshū	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   garnering	   popular	  
support	  and	  delegitimizing	  Tokugawa	  supremacy.	  
	  
	   Satsuma	   and	   Chōshū	   deﬁance	   signaled	   yet	   another	   transformation	   of	  
bakumatsu	  political	  dissent.	  Domestic	  groups	  in	   Japan	  had	  previously	  formed	  around	  
ideological	  principles.	  The	  ﬁrst	  divide	  emerged	  in	  response	  to	  Western	  encroachment,	  
with	   political	   groups	   arguing	   over	   isolationism.	   Then	   opposition	   to	   the	   bakufu	  
brought	   concepts	   of	   legitimacy	   to	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   political	   debate.	   While	   the	  
loyalists	  remained	  ideologically	  driven,	  the	  high-­‐level	   of	  political	  organization	  within	  
the	  Satsuma	  and	  Chōshū	  domains	  posed	  a	  more	  serious	  threat.	  The	  domestic	  struggle	  
for	   power	   then	   moved	   towards	   greater	   political	   factionalism,	   as	   the	   Satsuma	   and	  
Chōshū	  challenged	  Tokugawa	  rule.
	   The	  oﬀered	  theoretical	  framework	  is	  designed	  for	  analysis	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  but	  
the	   insights	  of	  SIT	   remain	  valid	   for	  conceptualizing	   this	   struggle	   between	  domestic	  
groups.	   The	   Satsuma,	   Chōshū,	   and	   loyalists	   rebuﬀed	   Tokugawa	   hegemony	   and	  
through	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  competition	  rejected	  the	  existing	  hierarchical	  distribution	  
of	   power.	   Given	   this	   interpretation,	   the	   bakufu	   constituted	   the	   referent	   group	   was	  
outwardly	  challenged	  by	  each	  group.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Satsuma	  and	  Chōshū	  domains	  
represented	   semi-­‐autonomous	   political	   units.	   Premodern	   Japan	   was	   largely	  
decentralized,	  aﬀording	  clan	  leaders	  a	  high	  level	  of	  authority	  within	  their	  domains.	  As	  
bakufu	  legitimacy	  deteriorated,	   this	  autonomy	  enabled	  Satsuma	  and	  Chōshū	  leaders	  
to	  act	  as	  proto-­‐states,	  each	  engaging	  in	  military	  confrontations	  and	  foreign	  policy	  with	  
Western	   powers.	   Although	   not	   the	   research	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis,	   conceptualizing	  
groups	  through	  SIT	  provides	  an	  avenue	  for	  analyzing	  both	  international	  and	  domestic	  
intergroup	  conﬂicts.	  Future	  research	  could	  build	  upon	  this	  approach,	  as	  it	  is	  clear	  that	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ideological	  groups	  (the	  loyalists),	  political	   separatists	  (the	  Satsuma	  and	  Chōshū),	   and	  
states	   (bakumatsu	   Japan)	   act	   upon	   similar	   desires	   to	   improve	   their	   group’s	   relative	  
position.	   Such	   theoretical	   robustness	   may	   be	   diﬃcult	   from	   a	   strict	   realist	   or	  
constructivist	   perspective,	   which	   does	   not	   draw	   from	   SIT’s	   insights	   into	   group	  
dynamics.
3.5	  From	  Bakufu	  to	  Boshin	  (1865	  -­‐	  1868)
The	  bakufu	   remained	  handicapped	  by	   internal	   conﬂicts	   and	   external	   constraints.	   As	  
the	  bakufu	  renewed	  its	  modernization	  eﬀorts,	  tensions	  with	  the	  anti-­‐Western	  imperial	  
court	  remained	  high.	  Bakufu-­‐imperial	  tensions	  grew	  more	  strained	  when	  the	  insolvent	  
bakufu	  was	  unable	  to	  pay	  the	  indemnities	  demanded	  after	  Shimonoseki,	  and	  Western	  
nations	  again	  turned	  to	  gunboat	  diplomacy.	  In	  exchange	  for	  reducing	  the	   indemnity,	  
the	  Western	  nations	  demanded	  the	  emperor	  ratify	  the	  Harris	   Treaty.	   A	  squadron	   of	  
warships	   moved	   into	   Hyōgo	   harbor,	   and	   remained	   there	   until	   the	   emperor	  
relinquished	  negotiation	  authority	  to	  the	  shōgun.214
	   The	   First	   Chōshū	   Expedition	   also	   provided	   hardliners	   an	   opportunity	   to	  
reassert	   themselves	   in	   the	  bakufu.	   Hawkish	   sentiments	   varied	   from	   those	  seeking	   a	  
complete	   severing	   from	   Japan’s	   former	   seclusion	   and	   traditionalists	   who	   felt	  
threatened	   by	   the	   growing	   inﬂuence	   of	   the	   Satsuma	   and	   Chōshū.	   A	   consensus	   to	  
aﬃrm	   bakufu	   authority	   through	   a	   second	   punitive	   campaign	   against	   the	   Chōshū	  
formed	  in	  late	  1865.215	  The	  emperor	  himself	  had	  grown	  tired	  of	  the	  Chōshū	  and	  issued	  
a	   command	   to	   ‘“begin	   a	   punitive	   expedition	   at	   once”’.216 	   Hostilities	   broke	   out	   the	  
following	  summer.	  Although	  the	  bakufu	  had	  utilized	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  West	   to	  
supply	  new	  arms,	  the	  bakufu	  army	  remained	  an	  amalgam	   of	  poorly	  organized	  feudal	  
and	  modern	   units.	   Conversely,	   the	  Chōshū	  military	  beneﬁted	   from	  half	  a	   decade	   of	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training	   with	   Western	   arms,	   and	   its	   newly	   formed	   alliance	   with	   Satsuma.217 	   The	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Reject	  compromise	  with	  West,	  
overthrow	  bakufu	  in	  response	  to	  
its	  acquiescence	  to	  Western	  
demands.	  
Figure	  3.7	  :	  Groups	  during	  Boshin	  Conﬂict	  (1868	  -­‐	  1869)
	   The	  campaign	  was	  a	  disaster	  for	  the	  bakufu.	  Its	  army	  was	  roundly	  defeated.	  Its	  
prestige	  was	   shattered.	   The	  Chōshū	   even	   seized	   several	   of	   bakufu’s	   traditional	   land	  
holdings.218 	   The	   bakufu	   responded	   with	   enhanced	   modernization	   eﬀorts.	   Japanese	  
students	   were	   sent	   abroad.	   Ships	   and	   armaments	   were	   purchased	   en	   masse	   from	  
Western	  powers.	  Anti-­‐Western	  sentiment	   fell	  silent,	  as	  the	  feudal	  system	  was	  dead	  in	  
all	   but	   name.	   The	   bakufu’s	   weakness	   also	   compromised	   its	   position	   with	   Western	  
powers,	  who	   had	  until	   then	  recognized	   the	  bakufu	  as	   Japan’s	  legitimate	  ruling	  body.	  
The	  coming	  showdown	  soon	  became	  less	  a	  battle	  to	  preserve	  the	  bakufu,	  and	  more	  an	  
initiative	  to	  preserve	  Tokugawa	  dominance	  amidst	  the	  bakufu’s	  inevitable	  collapse.219
	   Tokugawa	  authority	  also	   faced	  friction	  from	  within.	  Shōgun	  Iemochi	  had	  died	  
in	   the	   waning	   stages	   of	   the	   Second	   Chōshū	   Expedition.	   Tokugawa	   Yoshinobu	  
succeeded	   Iemochi,	   but	   he	   lacked	   the	   support	   of	   his	   predecessor.	   Several	   daimyō	  
demanded	  the	  bakufu	  return	  political	  power	  to	   the	  emperor.	  Seeking	  to	  avoid	  conﬂict	  
Yoshinobu	   conceded	   some	   authority	   to	   the	   emperor,220 	   but	   the	   death	   of	   Emperor	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Kōmei	   in	   1867	   left	   Yoshinobu	  with	   few	   allies	   in	   the	   imperial	   court.221 	   Satsuma	  and	  
Chōshū	   armies	   advanced	   on	   Kyoto,	   demanding	   the	   emperor	   revoke	   the	   shōgun’s	  
remaining	   power.	   Meanwhile,	   anti-­‐bakufu	   rebels	   (backed	   by	   Satsuma	   and	   Chōshū)	  
terrorized	  Edo.	  Seeking	   to	   consolidate	  his	  power	  base,	  Yoshinobu	   resigned	  his	   oﬃce	  
and	  titles.	  Once	  his	  resignation	  was	  formally	  accepted	  by	  the	  imperial	  court,	  the	  267	  
years	  of	  Tokugawa	  rule	  came	  to	  its	  oﬃcial	  end.222	  
	   Following	  Yoshinobu’s	  resignation,	  the	  Satsuma,	  Chōshū	  and	  their	  allies	  seized	  
control	  of	  the	  imperial	  palace	  and	  purged	  the	  lingering	  Tokugawa	  elements	  of	  the	  old	  
government.	   On	   3	   January	   1868	   they	   announced	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   emperor.	  
Although	  Yoshinobu	  had	  nominally	  accepted	  the	   restoration	  through	  his	  abdication,	  
his	  compliance	  threatened	  his	  position	  within	  the	  Tokugawa	  house.	  He	  soon	  called	  for	  
the	   imperial	   court	   to	   rescind	   its	   endorsement	   of	   the	   restoration,	   and	   returned	   to	  
Kyoto	  to	  remonstrate	  with	  a	  contingent	  of	  Tokugawa	  and	  allied	  troops.223
	   The	   confrontation	   between	   Tokugawa	   and	   Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	   forces	   over	   the	  
next	   several	   months	   constituted	   the	  majority	   of	   hostilities	   in	   the	   Boshin	   civil	   war	  
(1868-­‐9).	  Both	  sides	  boasted	  victories,	  but	  the	  highly	  structured	  and	  modernized	  pro-­‐
imperial	   armies	   of	   the	   Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	   alliance	   prevailed.224 	   Foreign	   powers	   also	  
played	  their	  part.	  The	  British	  remained	  close	  to	  Satsuma	  leaders	  following	  the	  shelling	  
of	   Kagoshima	   in	   1862,	   suppling	   the	   Satsuma	   army	   with	   British	   arms.	   In	   its	  
modernization	  eﬀorts	  the	  bakufu	  developed	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  the	  French,	  so	  
strong	   that	   French	   representatives	   personally	   urged	   Yoshinobu	   to	   maintain	   his	  
resistance	  in	  Edo.225	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   With	   the	   fall	   of	   Edo	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1868,	   Tokugawa	   authority	   was	  
supplanted	   by	   Satsuma	   and	   Chōshū,	   and	   the	   imperial	   restoration	   was	   aﬃrmed.226	  
Figure	  3.8	  summarizes	  the	  key	  variables	  at	  play.	  Considering	  the	  period	  was	  marked	  by	  
considerable	   domestic	   unrest,	   no	   referent	   group	   is	   identiﬁed.	   Similarly,	   the	   policy	  
outcome	  of	  the	  period	  centered	  around	  political	   legitimacy	  rather	  than	  foreign	  policy.	  
It	   should	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   although	   the	   reformist	   group	   is	   bolded	   to	   indicate	   its	  


















Ambiguous.	  Western	  encroachment	  
undermines	  sakoku,	  domestic	  conﬂict	  
over	  direction	  of	  Japan	  results	  in	  the	  	  Meiji	  
Restoration.	  
Table	  3.8	  :	  Pre-­‐Restoration	  Foreign	  Policy	  Groups	  (1853	  -­‐	  1868)
3.6	  The	  End	  of	  Tokugawa	  Japan
Japan’s	  transition	  from	  feudalism	  to	   imperialism	  is	  often	  given	  only	  cursory	  treatment	  
in	  international	  relations	  literature.	  The	  above	  chapter	  expounds	  the	  leading	  historical	  
events	  during	  these	  tumultuous	  years	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  identifying	  the	  norms	  that	  would	  
deﬁne	  Japan	  in	  the	  coming	  era.	  Returning	  to	  the	  research	  questions	  driving	  this	  thesis,	  
the	  following	  conclusions	  can	  be	  derived.	  Since	  this	  chapter	  represents	   the	  historical	  
starting	   point	   for	   this	   thesis,	   research	   questions	   one	   and	   two	   are	   be	   answered	  
together.
1. How	  have	  concerns	  over	  national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	  
international	   system	   inﬂuenced	   the	   dramatic	   shifts	   in	   modern	   Japan’s	   foreign	  
policy?	  	  How	  have	  these	  factors	  changed	  with	  time?	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226	  Following	  Yoshinobu’s	  surrender,	  hostilities	  continue	  into	  1869	  as	  a	  league	  of	  northern	  daimyō	  rose	  
to	  gainsay	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  South.	  The	  North	  was	  soon	  subdued	  by	  Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	  forces.	  
• It	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   Western	   encroachment	   prioritized	  
neoclassical	   realist	   variables	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   power	   in	   the	   minds	   of	  
Japanese	   leaders.	   Through	   the	   subsequent	   political	   struggles	   -­‐	   the	  
contestation	   between	   reformists	   and	   traditionalists,	   the	   violent	   sonnō	   jōi	  
movement,	   and	   the	   Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	   victory	   in	   the	   Boshin	   War	   -­‐	   pro-­‐
modernist,	   pro-­‐Western,	   and	   pro-­‐restoration	   norms	   emerged	   dominant	  
within	  Japan.	  These	  norms	  provided	  the	  basis	   for	   the	  Meiji	   Restoration	  and	  
Japan’s	   industrialization,	   the	   latter	   of	   which	   are	   discussed	   in	   the	   following	  
chapter.	  
• The	  emergence	  of	  Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	  dominance	  narrowed	  Japan’s	  choice	  for	  a	  
referent	   group.	   Satsuma	   leaders	   cultivated	   a	   working	   relationship	  with	   the	  
British	  following	  their	  confrontation	  in	  the	  Shimonoseki	  Straits.	  The	  modern	  
arms	  provided	  by	  the	  British	  were	   essential	   to	   the	  Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	  victory.	  
Meiji	   leaders	   inherited	  an	  appreciation	   for	  Western	   technology	  and	  formed	  
strong	   relations	   with	   the	   British.	   As	   Meiji	   leaders	   solidiﬁed	   their	   foreign	  
policy	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility,	   they	  settled	  upon	   the	  British	   as	   a	  referent	  
group.	  The	  modernization	  eﬀorts	  of	  the	  Satsuma	  and	  Chōshū	  must	  therefore	  
be	  understood	  as	  the	  roots	  of	  Meiji’s	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.
2.What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	   competing	   groups	   of	   Japanese	   political	  
elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?
• It	   is	   not	   suﬃcient	   to	   attribute	   Japan’s	   adoption	   of	   Western	   industrial	   and	  
imperial	  practices	  (a	  process	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5)	  as	  simply	  a	  
response	   to	   the	  gunboat	   diplomacy.	  The	  domestic	  conﬂict	  of	  competing	  norms	  
and	   identities	  must	   also	   be	  contextualized	   to	   trace	   the	  ascendency	  of	   the	   pro-­‐
modernization	  norms.	  These	  norms	  are	  rooted	  in	  the	  political	  struggles	  outlined	  
in	   this	   chapter,	   and	   in	   the	   coming	   decades	  were	   institutionalized	   by	   the	  new	  
Meiji	  government.	  Furthermore,	  the	  balance	  between	  protecting	  sovereignty	  and	  
enhancing	   state	   power	   deﬁned	   much	   of	   the	   political	   discourse	   during	   the	  
bakumatsu,	   and	   instilled	   within	   Japanese	   leaders	   a	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   core	  
concepts	   of	   statehood	   that	   likewise	   resurfaces	   throughout	   this	   thesis.	   These	  
factors	   narrowed	   the	   foreign	   policy	  discourse,	   leading	   to	   less	  division	   between	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groups.	  Marginalized	  groups	  were	  either	  co-­‐opted	   into	  other	  groups	  or	  became	  
politically	  insigniﬁcant.	  Therefore,	   this	  chapter	  provides	  an	   ideological	   starting	  
point	  for	  the	  political	  divisions	  discussed	  in	  following	  chapters.	  
	   These	   conclusions	   form	   the	   foundation	   of	   Chapter	   4,	   where	   the	   foreign	   and	  
domestic	   policies	   of	   the	   new	   Meiji	   government	   are	   examined.	   Although	   roughly	  
conterminous	  to	  one	  another,	  premodern	  and	  modern	  Japan	  are	  two	  distinct	  political	  
entities	   with	   diﬀerent	   governments,	   state	   elites,	   and	   norms.	   Understanding	   the	  
historical	   context	   of	   Japan’s	   transition	   from	   isolation	   to	   an	   outward	   looking	   state	  
preoccupied	  with	  sovereignty	  and	  power	  is	  essential;	  without	  it	  later	  analysis	  would	  be	  
prone	  to	  shortsighted	  conjecture.
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Depiction	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Nothing	  has	  more	   urgency	  for	  us	  than	  schools	   ...	   unless	  we	   establish	  an	  
unshakable	   national	   foundation	   we	   will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   elevate	   our	  
country’s	  prestige	  in	  a	  thousand	  years	  ...	  Our	  people	  are	  no	  diﬀerent	  from	  
the	   Americans	   or	   Europeans	  of	   today;	   it	   is	   all	   a	   matter	   of	  education	  or	  
lack	  of	  education.
-­‐	  Kido	  Takayoshi,	  1872
If	  it	  is	  decided	  to	  send	  an	  envoy	  oﬃcially,	  I	  feel	  sure	  he	  will	  be	  murdered.	  I	  
therefore	   beseech	   you	   to	   send	   me.	   I	   cannot	   claim	   to	   make	   a	   splendid	  
envoy	  ...	  but	  if	  it	  is	  a	  question	  of	  dying,	  that,	  I	  assure	  you,	  I	  am	  prepared	  to	  
do.
-­‐	  Saigō	  Takamori,	  1873
The	  English	  export	  opium,	   a	  poisonous	  drug,	   to	  China.	  The	   Chinese	   lose	  
money,	   injure	   their	   health,	   and	   year	   by	   year	   their	   national	   strength	   is	  
sapped.…This	  depends	  solely	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  country	  is	   stronger	  and	  
one	  weaker.
-­‐	  Fukuzawa	  Yukichi,	  early	  1880s
A	   terrible	   lesson	   has	   been	   administered	   to	   China	   ...	   she	   has	   lost	   her	  
prestige	  which	  was	  nothing	  but	   the	  shadow	  of	  a	  great	  name;	  that	  she	   lies	  
exposed	   as	  a	   carcass	  in	  the	   neighbourhood	   of	  which	  a	  cloud	  of	  eagles	   is	  
hovering.
-­‐	  The	  North	  China	  Herald,	  1895
Japan	   did	   not	   enter	   the	   international	   arena	   as	   a	   willing	   and	   equal	   partner.	   For	  
centuries,	   Japan	   practiced	   an	   isolationist	   foreign	   policy.	   The	   technological	  
advancements	  of	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  in	  Western	  countries	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  
new	  imperialist	  norms	  that	  privileged	  global	  military	  and	  economic	  objectives	  negated	  
the	  geopolitical	  factors	  that	  enabled	  Japan’s	  isolation	  and	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  era	  in	  East	  
Asia.	  This	  chapter	  discusses	  Japan’s	   transition	   into	   an	  outward	   looking	  modern	  state	  
between	  1868	  -­‐	  1895.	  
	   The	  origins	  of	  the	  Western	   imperialist	  international	   system,	  which	  constituted	  
the	  primary	  external	   constraints	   that	   triggered	  Japan’s	  domestic	  unrest,	   are	  explored	  
with	  particular	  reference	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  industrialization	  on	  government	  and	  foreign	  
policy	   (Section	   4.1).	   These	   elements	   are	   essential	   to	   understanding	   Japan’s	   evolving	  
foreign	   policy	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility,	   as	   the	   Western	   powers	   provided	   Meiji	  
leaders	  with	  a	  blueprint	   for	  modernization.	  The	  adoption	  of	  modernization	   norms	   -­‐	  
such	   as	  the	   centralization	   of	   state	  power,	   the	   industrialization	   of	   the	  economy,	  and	  
delimitation	   of	   national	   boundaries	   -­‐	   within	   Japan	   occurred	   ﬁrst	   though	   observing	  
Western	   institutions	   and	   determining	   which	   practices	   were	   most	   beneﬁcial	   to	  
enhancing	   state	   power	   (Section	   4.2).	   These	   norms	   were	   soon	   assimilated	   into	   the	  
Japanese	   collective	   identity,	   and	   in	   the	   process	   they	   developed	   distinctly	   Japanese	  
features	  (Section	  4.3).	  This	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  Meiji	  foreign	  policy;	  
including	   Japan’s	   increasingly	   antagonistic	   relationship	   with	   Russia,	   Japanese	  
exploitation	  of	  Korea,	  and	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  (Section	  4.4).	  It	   is	  argued	  that	  
the	  defeat	  of	  China	  between	  1894-­‐5	  propelled	  Japan	  to	   unprecedented	  heights	  as	  the	  
primer	  Asian	  power,	  but	  the	  conﬂict	  also	  put	  Japan	  on	  a	  collision	  course	  with	  Russia.
	   The	  considerable	   focus	  on	  domestic	  factors	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  3	  continues	   to	  a	  
limited	  extent	  in	  this	  chapter,	  before	  shifting	  to	  examine	  Meiji	   Japan’s	  foreign	  policy.	  
Conceptually,	  Chapters	   3	   and	  4	   outline	   the	   internal	   constraints	   and	   external	   factors	  
upon	  which	  modern	  Japan	  was	   founded.	   	  When	   considering	   research	  questions	   one	  
and	  two	   -­‐	  How	  have	  concerns	  over	  national	   security	  and	  other	  external	  pressures	  from	  
the	  international	  system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	  
How	   have	   these	   factors	   changed	   with	   time?	   -­‐	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   consider	   the	   links	  
between	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4.	  Chapter	  3	  detailed	  the	  end	  of	  premodern	  Japan.	  Chapter	  4	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examines	  the	  Meiji	  Japan	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  This	  tight	  
linkage	  also	  extends	  to	  the	  third	  research	  question:	  What	  ideological	  continuities	  exist	  
between	  competing	  groups	   of	  Japanese	   political	   elite	   from	   one	   historical	  period	   to	   the	  
next?	  Chapter	  3	  highlighted	  the	  struggle	  between	  groups	  seeking	  to	   reinforce	  Japan’s	  
sovereignty	  vs.	  groups	  concerned	  with	  enhancing	   state	  power,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  
modernization	  norms.	  Chapter	  4	  builds	  upon	  these	  factors,	  speciﬁcally	  discussing	  how	  
modernization	  norms	  permeated	  throughout	   Japanese	  society	   and	  how	  they	  evolved	  
into	  foreign	  policy.
	   Considerable	  theoretical	   overlap	   exists	  between	   these	   elements.	   The	   external	  
pressures	   acting	   upon	  Meiji	   leaders,	   namely	   concerns	   over	   power	   and	   sovereignty,	  
harken	   to	   neoclassical	   realist	  understandings	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	   states	  and	  
the	   international	   system.	  The	   surge	  of	  modernization	  norms	  within	  Japan	  reinforces	  
the	   constructivist	   emphasis	   on	   domestic	   variables.	   SIT	   uniﬁes	   these	   elements	   by	  
identifying	  their	  recursive	  relationship.	  Meiji	  leaders	  adopted	  modernization	  norms	  to	  
enhance	   the	   power	   and	   prestige	   of	   the	   state,	   thereby	   establishing	   a	   foreign	   policy	  
strategy	   of	   social	   mobility.	   Social	   mobility	   enables	   states	   to	   increase	   their	   position	  
within	  the	  established	  power	  hierarchy	  by	  mirroring	  the	  practices	  of	  successful	   states	  
(in	   this	   context	   the	  Western	   powers).	   As	   is	   made	   evident	   throughout	   this	   chapter,	  
social	   mobility	   greatly	   enhanced	   Japanese	   power	   and	   prestige	   thus	   reinforcing	   the	  
modernization	  norms.	  
4.1	  The	  World	  Japan	  Entered
The	   external	   pressures	   that	   catalyzed	   Japan’s	   domestic	   restructuring	   resulted	   from	  
new	   tensions	   within	   the	   international	   system.	   Under	  gunboat	   diplomacy,	   the	   Sino-­‐
centric	  hierarchical	  order	  atrophied.	  As	  the	  Western	  powers	  established	  their	  regional	  
dominance,	   Japanese	   leaders	   looked	   to	  Western	   institutions	   as	   a	  model	   for	   	   a	  new	  
Japanese	  state.	   This	  section	   therefore	   reviews	   the	  dominant	   norms	  driving	  Western	  
expansionism	   into	  Asia,	   as	   it	   was	  these	  factors	   that	  Meiji	   leaders	   sought	   to	   emulate	  
through	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	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   The	   wave	   of	   rapid	   expansionism	   by	   the	   Western	   powers	   during	   the	   late	  
nineteenth	   century	   diverged	   sharply	   from	   the	   colonialism	   of	   the	   previous	   three	  
centuries.	   “Colonialism”	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   process	   of	   resettlement	   which	  
transplanted	  European	  peoples	   from	   their	  mother	  country	  to	   the	  overseas	  territories	  
of	  their	  home	  government.	  This	  gradual	  process	  supported	  the	  expanding	  mercantilist	  
interests	   of	   the	  maritime	   powers:	   Spain	   and	   Portugal	   in	   the	   sixteenth	   century,	   and	  
Holland,	   Britain,	   and	   France	   in	   the	   seventieth	   and	   eighteenth	   centuries.	   The	  
piecemeal	  evolution	  of	  colonialism	  and	  the	  diversity	  of	  peoples	  engaged	  in	  the	  process	  
resulted	  in	  variances	  in	  the	  structure	  and	  character	  of	  colonial	  holdings.227	  
	   Although	   colonialism	   necessitated	   an	   imperialist	   agenda,	   the	   imperialism	   of	  
the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   to	   early	   twentieth	   century	   (approximately	   1860s	   -­‐	   1918)	  
lacked	  both	  longevity	  and	  diversity.	  This	  distinction	  is	  noted	  by	  Mark	  R.	  Peattie	  who	  
deﬁnes	   “new	   imperialism”	   as	   the	   ‘surge	   of	   aggrandizement	   by	   the	   older	   European	  
powers	   [that	   was]	   remarkable	   for	   its	   global	   dimensions	   and	   its	   brief	   duration’.228	  
Peattie	   contests	   that	   ‘the	   industrial	  West...created	  modern	   colonial	   systems	  notable	  
for	  the	   rapidity	  with	  which	  they	  were	  assembled	  and	  the	  degree	  to	   which	  they	  were	  
similar	   in	  arrangement,	   structure,	   and	  evolution’.229 	   In	  practice,	   the	  colonies	   of	   this	  
new	  imperialism	  often	  operated	  on	  the	   ‘fringe	  of	  national	   interests,’	   but	  with	  the	  full	  
support	   of	   their	   home	   governments	   that	   justiﬁed	   imperialism	   through	   appeals	   to	  
prestige,	  economic	  and	  strategic	  considerations,	  and	  ‘comparative	  advantage	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
some	  other	  colonial	  power’.230	  
	   Throughout	   the	   next	   two	   chapters,	   discussions	   of	   imperialism	   are	   consistent	  
with	  the	  deﬁnition	  of	  new	  imperialism	  oﬀered	  by	  Peattie.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	  that	  use	  
of	  “new	  imperialism”	  to	  describe	  this	  epoch	  in	  imperialism	  is	  not	  exclusive	  to	  Peattie.	  
W.G.	   Beasley	   makes	   a	  complementary	   case,	   arguing	   that	   new	   imperialism	   diverged	  
from	   “co-­‐operative	   imperialism”	   where	   ‘treaty	   signatories	   shared	   their	   privileges	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227	  Peattie,	  "Introduction,"	  in	  The	  Japanese	  Colonial	  Empire,	  1895-­‐1945,	  ed.	  Ramon	  Hawley	  Myers;	  Mark	  




through	   the	   most-­‐favoured-­‐nation	   clause’,	   and	   was	   alternatively	   marked	   by	   ‘ﬁerce	  
imperialist	  rivalries’	  driven	  onward	  by	  conﬂicting	  territorial	  and	  economic	  pursuits.231	  
The	  distinction	  between	  colonialism	  and	  imperialism	  is	  represented	  by	  Table	  4.1.
Colonialism
Imperialism
The	   establishment	   and	   maintenance	   of	   colonial	   holdings	   outside	   of	   state	   borders	   with	   unequal	  
relationships	  between	   colonial	   power	   and	  colony.	  Permanent	   resettlement	   of	  nationals	   into	   colonies.	  
Varied	  methods	  of	  control	  (occupation	  vs	  indirect)
Aggressive	  expansion	  whereby	   indigenous	  populations	  are	  subjugated	  for	   purposes	  of	  establishing	  an	  
empire	   and	   expanding	   state	   power	   and	   prestige.	   Motivated	   by	   notions	   of	   cultural	   superiority	   and	  
marked	  by	  technological	  inequality	  between	  empire	  and	  targeted	  population.	  
Table	  4.1	  :	  Colonialism	  vs	  Imperialism
Understanding	  this	  diﬀerence	  is	  key	  to	  determining	  the	  external	  pressures	  acting	  upon	  
Japan	  during	   its	  emergence	  into	   the	   international	   community.	  Modernization	  norms	  
had	   already	   taken	   root	   in	   Japan.	   This	   evolution	   translated	   into	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	  
mobility,	   which	   required	   Meiji	   leaders	   to	   observe	   the	   successful	   practices	   of	   the	  
imperialist	  Western	   powers.	   It	   is	   these	  practices	  (norms)	   that	   once	   incorporated	  by	  
Meiji	  leaders	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  Meiji	  foreign	  policy.	  
	   This	  global	   foreign	  policy	  agenda	  resulted	  from	   the	  modernization	  of	  Western	  
powers	  following	  the	  industrial	   revolution.	  Modernization	  evolved	  diﬀerently	  in	  each	  
of	   the	   imperialist	   states,	   but	   generalized	   features	   (i.e.	   domestic	   norms)	   can	   be	  
identiﬁed.	   During	   this	   period,	   the	   Western	   powers	   made	   signiﬁcant	   eﬀorts	   to	  
centralize	  state	  authority	  and	  to	  incorporate	  the	  masses	  into	  the	  economy	  and	  polity.	  
Combined	  with	  the	  formal	  development	  of	  national	  boundaries,	  these	  factors	  initiated	  
the	  emergence	  of	  what	  Akira	  Iriye	  describes	  as	  “modern	  states”.232	  
	   As	  with	  any	  development	  in	  international	  politics,	  the	  modern	  state	  placed	  new	  
tensions	  upon	  the	  international	   system.	  The	  norms	  embodied	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  
these	   states	   represent	   the	   core	   norms	   that	   incentivized	   state	   imperialism.	   Akira	  
identiﬁes	  four	  variables	  therein:	  (1)	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  state’s	  military	  apparatus,	  (2)	  an	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231	  Beasley	  1987,	  70-­‐1.	  Beasley	  also	  oﬀers	  an	  excellent	  survey	  (pages	  2-­‐13)	  of	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  
theories	  related	  to	  new	  imperialism.
232	  Akira,	  "Japan's	  Drive	  to	  Great-­‐Power	  Status,"	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  Japan,	  ed.	  Marius	  B.	  Jansen	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  721-­‐3.
emphasis	   on	   military	   alliances,	   (3)	   rapid	   economic	   development,	   and	   (4)	   the	  
establishment	  of	  overseas	  spheres	  of	  inﬂuence.233	  These	  measures	  were	  undertaken	  by	  
state	  elites	  who	  perceived	  that	   these	  norms	  improved	  national	  security,	  however,	  this	  
practice	   was	   reciprocated	   concurrently	   by	   several	   states	   within	   the	   anarchical	  
international	  system.	  Resultantly,	  a	  security	  dilemma	  surfaced	  with	  each	  modern	  state	  
seeking	   to	   outpace	  their	   rivals’	   economic	  expansion	   and	  development	  of	   technology	  
and	  arms.	  
	   A	   global	   security	   perspective	   materialized,	   with	   states	   seeking	   to	   not	   only	  
balance	   the	   armed	   forces	   of	   perceived	   adversaries,	   but	   with	   securing	   the	   logistical	  
networks	   necessary	   for	   supporting	   a	   global	   security	   and	   economic	   strategy.234 	   The	  
evolving	   relationship	   between	   armaments	   and	   economics	   provides	   the	   basis	   for	  
Akira’s	   understanding	   of	   imperialism,	   which	   he	   deﬁnes	   as	   ‘the	   incorporation	   of	  
overseas	   possessions	   and	   spheres	   of	   inﬂuence	   into	   the	   domestic	   economic	   and	  
strategic	   system’.235 	   It	   was	   within	   this	   globalized	   system	   that	   Japan’s	   self-­‐imposed	  
isolation	  became	   impossible.236 	  Through	  the	  strategy	  of	   social	  mobility	   instituted	  by	  
Meiji	   leaders,	  Japan	  quickly	  adopted	  the	  norms	  of	  a	  modern	  state.	  For	  example,	  Meiji	  
leaders	   expanded	   Japan’s	   strategic	   interests.	   They	   did	   so	   with	   a	   stated	   purpose	   of	  
demonstrating	  to	  Western	  powers	  that	   Japan	  was	  itself	  a	  modern	  state	  and	  should	  no	  
longer	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  unequal	  treaties	  levied	  against	  it	  (See	  Section	  4.2).	  	  




236	  	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  economic	  growth	  on	  the	  manifestation	  of	  new	  imperialism	  is	  open	  to	  theoretical	  
interpretations.	  Classical	  political	  and	  economic	  interpretations	  of	  imperialism	  center	  on	  the	  
motivations	  of	  the	  imperialist	  states,	  arguing	  that	  imperialism	  was	  driven	  either	  by	  illusions	  of	  
prestige	  and	  grandeur	  or	  by	  industrial	  overproduction.	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  interpretations	  of	  industrial	  
overproduction	  are	  somewhat	  convincing	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  West,	  but	  are	  wholly	  inadequate	  at	  
explaining	  Japanese	  imperialism.	  Japan’s	  imperial	  thrust	  began	  prior	  to	  the	  maturation	  of	  its	  
capitalist	  economy,	  negating	  claims	  that	  imperialism	  resulted	  primarily	  from	  a	  capitalist	  need	  for	  
market	  expansion.	  Other	  theoretical	  approaches	  highlight	  the	  ideological	  and	  nationalist	  roots	  of	  
new	  imperialism,	  oﬀering	  some	  additional	  insight	  to	  the	  interplay	  of	  modernization	  and	  the	  foreign	  
policy	  of	  modern	  industrial	  states.	  Further	  reading:	  Duus,	  "Economic	  Dimensions	  of	  Meiji	  
Imperialism:	  The	  Case	  of	  Korea,	  1895-­‐1910,"	  in	  The	  Japanese	  Colonial	  Empire,	  1895-­‐1945,	  ed.	  Ramon	  
Hawley	  Myers;	  Mark	  R.	  Peattie	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1984),	  128-­‐9;	  Fieldhouse,	  The	  
Theory	  of	  Capitalist	  Imperialism	  (London:	  Longmans,	  1967),	  174-­‐85;	  Mommsen,	  Theories	  of	  
Imperialism	  (Longon:	  Weidenfeld	  and	  Nicolson,	  1980),	  3-­‐28.
	   The	   inclusion	  of	  a	  global	  perspective	   into	   national	   security	  required	  states	   to	  
reconsider	   the	   role	   of	   interstate	   relations.	   Since	   these	   developments	   occurred	   in	  
several	  states	  at	  roughly	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  modern	  states	  maintained	  a	  level	  of	  power	  
equivalency.237	  The	  power	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  international	   system	  was	  therefore	  divided	  
between	  modern	   states	  with	   industrialized	  militaries	   and	  global	   economies	   and	  pre-­‐
industrial,	   non-­‐modern	   states.	   Comparable	  military	   capacity	  between	  modern	  states	  
resulted	  in	  a	  multipolar	  international	  system.	  As	  states	  sought	  to	  maintain	  parity	  with	  
perceived	   threats	  and	   oﬀset	   the	  burden	   of	   global	   military	  and	   economic	  objectives,	  
alliances	   became	   a	  hallmark	   of	   the	   modern	   state.238 	   Through	  alliances	   states	   could	  
pool	   their	  national	   resources	  and	   simultaneously	  augment	   state	  security	   and	   reduce	  
some	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  present	  within	  the	  anarchical	  international	  system.	  
	   The	   status	   hierarchy	   remained	   permeable.	   The	   division	   in	   power	   was	  
dependent	  upon	  industrialization,	  enabling	  other	  states	  to	  join	  the	  ranks	  of	  elite	  states	  
should	  they	  embrace	  industrialization.	  Alliances	  were	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  imperial	  power	  
politics,	  as	  they	  provided	  states	  with	  less	  power	  capabilities	  a	  means	  of	  elevating	  their	  
status.	  When	  considering	  the	  foreign	  policy	  options	  available	  to	  Japan	  in	  the	  following	  
sections,	   it	   will	   be	   shown	   that	   Japanese	   leaders	   utilized	   both	   of	   these	  dynamics	   to	  
enhance	  state	  power	  via	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	  	  
	   The	  advancements	  of	  the	  imperialist	  powers	  provided	  a	  means	  to	  systematically	  
dominate	  the	  less	  developed	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  hierarchical	   division	  between	  
the	   proverbial	   haves	   and	  have-­‐nots	  was	   not	   unique	   to	   interstate	  relations	   (whether	  
those	   “states”	   be	   city-­‐states,	   empires,	   or	   nation-­‐states).	   Competition	   over	   scarce	  
resources	   is	   a	   pronounced	   feature	   of	   of	   intergroup	   relations.	   However,	   the	   state	  
adopted	  two	  new	  roles	  within	  this	  division.	  	  First,	  states	  more	  aggressively	  supported	  
opportunities	  to	  maximize	  proﬁts	  through	  the	  consumption	  of	  overseas	  raw	  materials	  
by	   the	   industrialized	   markets	   of	   their	   home	   territories.	   During	   this	   period	   of	  
imperialism,	   economic	   and	   military	   expansionism	   became	   synonymous	   with	   state	  
power	   and	   prestige.	   Expansionism	   surfaced	   as	   a	   dominate	   norm	   within	   the	  
international	   system,	   with	   the	  modern	   states	   assuming	   ongoing	   expansion	   was	   the	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hallmark	   of	   a	   successful	   state.239 	   Second,	   modern	   states	   expended	   tremendous	  
resources	  to	  push	  their	  economic	  and	  military	  expansionism	  to	  the	  farthest	  reaches	  of	  
the	  globe.	  Akira	  argues	  that	  these	  areas	  represented	  the	  ‘fringes	  of	  the	  modern	  states’	  
and	  where	  never	  ‘fully	   integrated	   into	   the	  polity’.	  Nevertheless,	   spheres	  of	   inﬂuence	  
provided	  both	  dependable	  markets	  and	  compelling	  symbols	  of	  power	  and	  prestige	  for	  
the	  imperialist	  powers.240	  
	   When	   applied	   to	   the	   framework	   of	   this	   research,	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
international	   system	   must	   be	   considered.	   This	   period	   featured	   a	   number	   of	   great	  
powers	   vying	   for	   dominance	   within	   a	   multipolar	   international	   power	   hierarchy.	  
Within	  this	  context,	  the	  great	  powers	  were	  engaged	  in	  strategies	  of	  social	  competition	  
against	  each	  other.	  The	  norms	  of	  new	  imperialism	  provided	  an	  evaluative	  metric.	  For	  
example,	  the	  expansion	  into	  Central	   Asia	   (a	  peripheral	   region)	  by	  Britain	  and	  Russia	  
provided	   a	   means	   of	   countering	   the	   inﬂuence	   of	   one	   another.	   These	   same	   norms	  
oﬀered	   for	   an	   avenue	   for	   status	   seeking	   behavior,	   whereby	   Meiji	   leaders	   enhanced	  
state	  power	  through	   social	  mobility,	  with	  the	   long-­‐term	   goal	  of	   joining	  the	   ranks	   of	  
the	  elite	  states.	  
4.2	  Japan’s	  Turn	  to	  the	  West	  (1861	  -­‐	  1890)
In	   less	   than	   forty	   years,	   Japan	   was	   transformed	   from	   a	   technologically	   backward	  
isolationist	  island	  state	  into	  a	  world	  power.	  Despite	  the	  rapidity	  and	  breadth	  of	  Japan’s	  
transformation,	  early	  Meiji	   leaders	  maintained	  a	  high	  level	  of	  internal	  stability.	  Japan’s	  
modernization	  was	  conditioned	  by	  a	  changing	   international	   environment	  dominated	  
by	   modern	   states	   seeking	   to	   impinge	   upon	   Japanese	   sovereignty.	   These	   external	  
pressures	  were	   facilitated	   by	   industrialization	  within	  modern	   states,	   and	   it	   was	   this	  
element	  that	  Japanese	  leaders	  ﬁrst	  sought	  to	  emulate	  through	  social	  mobility.	  	  
	   Japan’s	   “turn	   to	   the	   West”	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   process	   of	   supplanting	   of	  
traditional	  Japanese	  norms	  (e.g.	  isolationism,	  strict	  class	  hierarchy,	  and	  decentralized	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power)	   with	   those	   of	   modern	   states,	   but	   a	   deliberate	   process	   orchestrated	   by	   the	  
skilled	   statesmen	   of	  Meiji	   Japan.241 	   Japan’s	   modernization	   had	   two	   distinct	   phases.	  
First,	   Japanese	   leaders	   observed	   the	   practices,	   technologies,	   and	   institutions	   of	   the	  
Western	   powers,	   and	   subsequently	   imported	   those	   elements	   perceived	   as	   the	  most	  
beneﬁcial	  into	  Japan.	  Second,	  Meiji	  leaders	  refashioned	  the	  Japanese	  collective	  identity	  
by	  adapting	  Japan’s	  traditional	  culture	  to	  serve	  the	  necessities	  of	  modern	  statehood.242
	   The	  systematic	  observation	  and	  assimilation	  of	  foreign	  norms	  in	  Japan	  was	  not	  
novel.	   During	   the	   Edo	   period	   (1603	   -­‐	   1867),	   there	   were	   three	   accepted	   schools	   of	  
learning	   within	   Japan:	   Confucianism,	   Japanese	   learning,	   and	  Dutch	   studies.	   Japan’s	  
cultural	   borrowing	   from	   China	  was	   a	   recognized	  element	   of	   the	   Japanese	   collective	  
identity.	   During	   the	   sixth	   and	   seventh	   centuries,	   Japanese	   embassies	   established	  
political	  and	  cultural	   links	  with	  the	  Chinese	  court	   that	  would	  persist	  thereafter.	  This	  
relationship	   introduced	   Chinese	   philosophy	   (namely	   Confucianism),	   political	  
institutions,	   and	  art	   into	   Japanese	   society	   and	   Chinese	  characters	   into	   the	   Japanese	  
language	  (kanji).243	  
	   The	   link	   between	   Chinese	   thought	   and	   Japanese	   culture	   was	   exceedingly	  
verbose.	   	  During	   Japan’s	   isolation,	  Confucian	  scholarship	  maintained	  a	  high	   level	   of	  
prestige.	   Japanese	  learning	  emerged	  mainly	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	   the	  Sino-­‐centric	  focus	  of	  
knowledge	   within	   Japan	   during	   the	   mid-­‐Tokugawa	   period.	   Lastly,	   Dutch	   studies	  
surfaced	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  Dutch	  nationals	  concentrated	  around	  Deshima	  Island	  
and	   curious	   Japanese	   scholars	  who	   sought	   to	   translate	   Dutch	   books	   (namely	   those	  
addressing	  science	  and	  anatomy)	   into	  Japanese.	  Although	  Dutch	  studies	  did	  not	  hold	  
the	  same	  prestige	  as	  Confucianism,	  these	  two	  schools	  constitute	  an	  underlying	  norm	  
that	   predates	   the	   Meiji	   Restoration.	  244 	   That	   is,	   foreign	   learning	   was	   already	   an	  
accepted	  norm	  of	  Japanese	  society.	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   The	   initial	   stage	   of	   Japan’s	   learning	   from	   the	   West	   occurred	   during	   the	  
bakumatsu,	   and	   was	   led	   by	   scholars	   of	   Dutch	   learning	   who	   desired	   to	   directly	  
experience	   the	  Western	   culture.	  The	   arrival	   of	   Commodore	  Perry	   revealed	   to	   these	  
scholars	  that	  Japan’s	  isolation	  had	  crippled	  its	  political	  and	  intellectual	  capacity.245 	  To	  
a	  limited	  degree	   late	  bakufu	  leaders	  acknowledged	  a	  similar	  disadvantage,	   as	  evident	  
from	   their	  numerous	  diplomatic	  missions	   to	  America	   from	   1861	  until	   1868,	   but	   their	  
lack	   of	  knowledge	   regarding	   international	   aﬀairs	   undermined	   their	   fruitfulness.	   For	  
example,	  Japanese	  students	  were	  sent	  to	  Holland	  during	   the	  1860s,	  only	  to	   learn	  that	  
Holland	   had	   fallen	   behind	   the	   ranks	   of	   great	   powers.	   Terashima	   Munenori,	   a	  
prominent	   Meiji	   diplomat,	   noted	   in	   a	   letter	   sent	   in	   1862	   that	   ‘“Many	   scholars	   in	  
England	   and	   France	   raised	   their	   eyebrows	   when	   they	   heard	   that	   we	   read	   Dutch	  
books	  ...	  even	  the	  Hollanders	  themselves	  all	  read	  their	  books	  in	  French	  or	  German	  ...	  
[b]eyond	  the	  borders	  no	  one	  knows	  Dutch.	  I	  must	  honestly	  say	  that	  the	  country	  is	  so	  
small	  and	  mean	  as	  to	  startle	  one.”’246
	   The	  most	  notable	  mission	  was	  the	  voyage	  of	  the	  Kanrin	  maru	  in	  1861	  from	  the	  
Uraga	  channel	   at	   the	  southern	  end	  of	  Edo	  Bay	   to	  San	  Francisco,	  which	  marked	  only	  
the	  second	  oﬃcial	  trans-­‐Paciﬁc	  crossing	  of	  Japanese	  oﬃcers.247	  Writing	  in	  response	  to	  
these	  evolving	  conditions,	  famed	  author	  and	  philosopher	  Miyake	  Setsurei	  noted	  that	  
‘“there	  is	  no	  more	  pressing	  need	  in	  our	  defense	  against	  the	  barbarians	  at	  present	  than	  
knowing	   the	   enemy”’.248 	   Nevertheless,	   these	   missions	   reﬂected	   more	   the	   political	  
necessities	   of	   state	   following	   the	   treaties	   imposed	   by	   the	   Americans	   rather	   than	   a	  
fundamental	   shift	   in	   ideology,	   as	   Japanese	   nationals	   remained	   prohibited	   from	  
traveling	  to	  the	  West	  without	  bakufu	  approval.	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   The	   additional	   freedoms	   aﬀorded	   to	   Japanese	   academics	   and	   diplomats	  
following	   the	   Meiji	   Restoration	   sparked	   a	   new	   wave	   of	   Western	   learning	   that	  
coincided	   with	   the	   modernization	   strategies	   adopted	   by	   Meiji	   leaders.249 	   In	   1871,	  
Iwakura	   Tomomi	   was	  dispatched	   to	   America	  and	  Europe	  as	   the	   leader	  of	   a	  massive	  
delegation	  of	  statesmen	  and	  scholars	  by	  the	  Japanese	  government.	  The	  stated	  purpose	  
of	  the	  Iwakura	  Mission	  was	  threefold.	  Firstly,	  to	   formally	  present	  the	  post-­‐Restoration	  
government	  of	  Japan	  and	  secure	  Western	  recognition	  of	  Meiji	  legitimacy.	  Secondly,	  to	  
observe	   Western	   military,	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   institutions.	   Lastly,	   to	  
renegotiate	   the	   unequal	   treaties	   that	   had	   been	   ratiﬁed	   by	   the	   bakufu	   during	   the	  
previous	  decades.250	  See	  Map	  4.1	  for	  the	  route	  followed	  by	  the	  Iwakura	  Mission.
Map	  4.1	  :	  Route	  of	  Iwakura	  Embassy	  (1871	  -­‐	  1873)	  251
Chapter	  4:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Modern	  Japan,	  1868	  -­‐	  1895	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106
249	  Mehl	  2003,	  16-­‐24;	  Sukehiro	  1989,	  462.
250	  Swale,	  "America,"	  in	  The	  Iwakura	  Mission	  in	  America	  and	  Europe:	  A	  New	  Assessment,	  ed.	  Ian	  Hill	  
Nish,	  Meiji	  Japan	  Series	  	  (Richmond,	  Surrey:	  Japan	  Library,	  1998),	  11-­‐2.
251	  Jansen	  2002,	  357.
	   The	   Iwakura	  Mission	   failed	   in	   its	  endeavor	  to	   revise	   the	  unequal	   treaties,	  but	  
through	   their	   observation	   of	  Western	   practices,	   Meiji	   leaders	   realized	   that	   Japan’s	  
future	   lay	   in	   modernizing	   its	   domestic	   infrastructure.	   A	   level	   of	   parity	   with	   the	  
Western	  powers	  would	  need	  to	  be	  achieved	  in	  order	  for	  Japan	   to	  reverse	  the	  treaties	  
imposed	  upon	  them	  and	  reaﬃrm	  Japanese	  sovereignty.	  Speciﬁcally,	   they	  determined	  
that	   Japan	  needed	   to	   align	   its	   legal	   and	  political	   systems	  with	  what	   from	   a	  Western	  
perspective	  was	  expected	  of	  a	  modern	  state.	  Successful	  incorporation	  of	  these	  Western	  
norms	   within	   Japan	   provided	   the	   Meiji	   leaders	   with	   the	   necessary	   footing	   to	  
renegotiate	  their	  diplomatic	  standing	  with	  the	  West.252	  
	   Kume	  Kunitake,	  who	   served	   as	  the	   private	   secretary	   to	   Iwakura	   and	   de	   facto	  
historian	   of	   the	   mission,	   suggested	   the	   tremendous	   wealth	   and	   knowledge	   which	  
enabled	   Europe’s	   international	   success	   was	   a	   relatively	   new	   phenomenon	   brought	  
upon	  by	   the	   industrial	   revolution.	   Kume	  reasoned	  that	   ‘“the	  remarkable	  wealth	  and	  
prosperity	   to	   be	  seen	   in	  Europe	   today	  dates	  to	   a	   large	  extent	   from	   1800,	   and	  took	   a	  
mere	   forty	   years	   to	   create.”’253 	   	   Renowned	  Meiji	   statesman	   Kido	   Takayoshi	   was	   so	  
impressed	   by	   the	   school	   system	   in	   America	   that	   he	   believed	   ‘“[n]othing	   has	   more	  
urgency	  for	  us	  than	  schools	  ...	  unless	  we	  establish	  an	  unshakable	  national	   foundation	  
we	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  elevate	  our	  country’s	  prestige	  in	  a	  thousand	  years	  ...	  Our	  people	  
are	   no	   diﬀerent	   from	   the	   Americans	   or	   Europeans	   of	   today;	   it	   is	   all	   a	   matter	   of	  
education	   or	   lack	   of	   education”’.254 	   Likeminded	   sentiments	   echoed	   throughout	   the	  
delegation.	   Even	   the	   more	   pessimistic	  members	   (who	   for	   example	   argued	   Britain’s	  
success	  was	   the	  result	   of	   accumulated	   knowledge	  over	  the	  centuries)	   agreed	  that	  by	  
harnessing	   industrialization	   Japan	   could	   not	   only	   equal,	   but	   overtake	   the	   Western	  
powers.255	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   Accordingly,	   Japanese	   scholars	   deliberated	   upon	   the	   relative	   success	   of	   the	  
modern	  states,	  and	  ranked	  each	  state	  according	  to	  their	  superiority	  or	  inferiority	  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis	  other	  modern	   states.	  This	  hierarchical	  ordering	  provided	  the	  Meiji	   leaders	  with	  a	  
framework	   from	   which	   they	   could	   determine	   the	   best	   attributes	   of	   each	   state	   to	  
assimilate	   into	   Japan.	  Meiji	   leaders	  ultimately	  modeled	   Japan’s	   industrial	   and	   naval	  
development	  after	  England	  and	  their	  military	  organization	  after	  Prussia.	  From	  France,	  
Japan	  incorporated	  a	  system	  of	  centralized	  educational,	   legal,	  and	  police	  systems,	  and	  
from	  America	  they	  integrated	  advanced	  agricultural	  technologies.256	  	  
	   Even	  at	   this	   early	   stage,	  Meiji	   leaders’	   emphasis	  on	  enhancing	  state	   power	   in	  
order	  to	   reassert	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  is	  identiﬁable.	  The	  arrival	  of	  the	  modern	  states	  
in	  East	  Asia	  fundamentally	  challenged	  Japanese	  statehood,	  as	  the	  treaties	  imposed	  by	  
the	   Western	   powers	   undermined	   the	   internal	   and	   external	   sovereignty	   of	   Japan.	  
Japan’s	   compromised	   internal	   sovereignty	  provided	  the	  Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	  alliance	  the	  
necessary	  political	  traction	  to	  eﬀect	  a	  regime	  change.	  The	  new	  Meiji	  government	  faced	  
the	  immediate	  challenge	  of	  securing	   their	  internal	  sovereignty	  by	  establishing	  formal	  
relations	  with	  foreign	  powers	  (the	  Iwakura	  Mission’s	  ﬁrst	  objective)	  and	  reestablishing	  
Japan’s	   external	   sovereignty	  by	   reversing	  the	   existing	  unequal	   treaties	   (the	  mission’s	  
third	  objective).	  
	  
	   By	   determining	   that	   modernization	   was	   the	   most	   eﬀective	   method	   for	  
increasing	  power	  and	  protecting	  sovereignty	  (fulﬁlling	  the	  mission’s	  second	  objective),	  
Japanese	  leaders	  began	  developing	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	  Social	  mobility	  holds	  
that	  a	  group	  seeks	  to	  enhance	  its	  status	  by	  mirroring	  the	  practices	  of	  a	  referent	  group.	  
Japanese	   leaders	   had	   yet	   to	   solidify	   their	   foreign	   policy	   agenda,	   but	   the	   Western	  
powers	  formed	  a	  rough	  referent	  group	  for	  their	  emerging	  strategy.	  Although	  a	  speciﬁc	  
referent	  group	  remained	  temporarily	  undecided,	   the	  preeminence	  of	  the	  British	  navy	  
and	   relationship	   forged	   during	   the	   bakumatsu	   between	   the	   British	   and	   Japanese	  
leaders	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	   the	  selection	  of	  Britain	  as	  a	  referent	  group.	  Table	  4.2	  
distinguishes	  between	  the	  political	  norms	  embodied	  by	  premodern	  Japan	  and	  those	  of	  
Meiji	  Japan.
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Bakufu	  Japan	  (1600	  -­‐	  1868) Meiji	  Japan	  (1868	  onward)
Government
Semi-­‐independent	  feudal	  lords	  balanced	  by	  
military	  dictatorship	  of	  the	  shōgun.	  
Constitutional	  Monarchy	  with	  emperor	  as	  
head	  of	  state.	  
Domestic	  Power Decentralized	  and	  Patriarchal Centralized	  and	  Bureaucratic	  (elected	  
oﬃcials)
Foreign	  Policy Isolationism Actively	  engaged	  regional	  power
Economy Agricultural Industrial
Society Highly	  structured	  class	  system Highly	  educated	  population	  removed	  from	  
feudal	  class	  restrictions
Military Traditional Modern
Table	  4.2	  :	  Political	  Norms	  of	  Premodern	  and	  Modern	  Japan
	   It	  must	   also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  process	  of	  modernization	  that	  began	  in	  earnest	  
following	   the	   Iwakura	  Mission	   occurred	   through	   cultural	   borrowing,	   an	   established	  
practice	   within	   Japan.	   Although	   this	   undertaking	   required	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	  
privilege	  modernization	  norms,	  the	  process	  of	  assimilation	  was	  not	  itself	  indicative	  of	  
a	  fundamental	  shift	   in	  the	  Japanese	  identity.	  Dutch	  learning	  had	  fostered	  an	  ongoing	  
interest	  in	  Western	  medicine	  and	  technology	  in	  Japan	  during	  the	  Tokugawa	  era,	   and	  
this	  norm	  was	  reﬁtted	  by	  the	  Meiji	  government	   to	  suit	  the	  imperialist	   regional	  order.	  
Of	  particular	   concern	   to	   Meiji	   leaders	  was	  China’s	  ongoing	  exploitation	  by	  Western	  
powers.	   Fukuzawa	   Yukichi	   noted	   in	   the	   early	   1880s:	   ‘“The	   English	   export	   opium,	   a	  
poisonous	   drug,	   to	   China.	  The	  Chinese	   lose	  money,	   injure	   their	  health,	   and	  year	  by	  
year	   their	   national	   strength	   is	   sapped.…This	   depends	   solely	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   one	  
country	  is	  stronger	  and	  one	  weaker.”’257	  
	   Consequently,	  much	  of	  this	  Western	  learning	  was	  directed	  at	  the	  enhancing	  the	  
military	   capacity	   of	   Japan.	   Nuances	   within	   Japanese	   society	   provided	   additional	  
traction	   for	  the	  privileging	  of	  the	  military	   strength	  by	  Meiji	   leaders.258 	  For	  centuries	  
the	   samurai,	   Japan’s	   warrior	   class,	   held	   an	   esteemed	   position	   with	   Japan.	   Japanese	  
society	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  hierarchically	  structured	  around	  the	  military	  dictatorship	  of	  the	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bakufu.	   Those	  who	  had	   lead	  the	  charge	   for	  the	  restoration	  and	  those	  now	  importing	  
modernization	  norms	  into	  Japan	  were	  often	  members	  of	  the	  samurai	  class.	  
4.3	  Japaniﬁcation	  (1890	  -­‐	  1904)
Modern	  states	  owed	  their	  success	  not	  only	  to	  industrialization,	  but	  to	  centralized	  state	  
authority	   and	   the	   successful	   incorporation	   of	   the	   masses	   into	   the	   economy	   and	  
polity.259	  The	  latter	  objective	  required	  a	  signiﬁcant	  reorientation	  of	  state	  rhetoric.	  The	  
legitimacy	  of	  Meiji	   leaders	   was	  contingent	   upon	   reversing	   the	  unequal	   treaties	   that	  
undermined	   Japanese	   sovereignty.	   Meiji	   leaders	   believed	   the	  most	   eﬀective	  method	  
for	  reversing	  the	   treaties	  was	  by	  demonstrating	   to	   the	   international	   community	  that	  
Japan	  was	   itself	  a	  modern	  state.	  Modernization	   through	  social	   mobility	   undermined	  
the	  Western	  justiﬁcation	  for	  the	  treaties,	  that	   Japan	  was	  a	  backwards	  state	  in	  need	  of	  
civilizing.260	  
	   Meiji	   leaders	  were	  determined	  to	  adopt	  Western	  legal,	  political	   and	  economic	  
institutions,	  but	  these	  perceived	  necessities	  were	  at	   odds	  with	  the	  nationalistic	  spirit	  
of	   the	  sonnō	   jōi	   movement,	   which	   had	   united	   the	   domestic	   opposition	   against	   the	  
bakufu.	  To	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  ideology	  of	  sonnō	  jōi	  and	  the	  emerging	  strategy	  
of	   social	   mobility,	   Meiji	   leaders	   disseminated	   new	   pro-­‐modernization	   slogans.	   The	  
language	   of	   ‘expel	   the	   barbarian’	   was	   replaced	   with	   statements	   such	   as	   ‘open	   the	  
country,	   establish	   friendly	  relations’.	   Similarly,	   nationalism	   was	   channeled	   into	   new	  
endeavors	   to	   bring	   ‘civilization’	   and	   ‘enlightenment’	   to	   Japan	   (bunmei	   kaika),	   to	  
‘enrich	  the	  country,	  strengthen	  the	  army’	  (fukoku	  kyōhei),	  and	  to	  ‘revise	  the	  (unequal)	  
treaties’	  (jōyaku	  kaisei).261	  
	   A	  consensus	  quickly	  formed	  around	   ‘enrich	  the	  country,	  strengthen	  the	  army,’	  
diminished	   competition	   between	   the	   domestic	   identity	   hierarchy.262 	   This	   “Meiji	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Consensus”	  was	  partially	  the	  result	  of	  the	  pro-­‐modernist	  victory	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  
However,	  the	  ready	  acceptance	  of	  this	  ideological	  reorientation	  reveals	  two	  underlying	  
considerations.	   First,	   the	   motivations	   behind	   pro-­‐imperial	   forces	   during	   the	  
restoration	   transcended	   the	   convenient	   slogan	   of	   ‘revere	   the	   emperor,	   expel	   the	  
barbarians’	   utilized	  by	  revolutionary	  leaders	  to	  mobilize	  support.263 	  Second,	  Japanese	  
leaders	  and	  the	  general	  public	  were	  primarily	  interested	  in	  fortifying	  state	  sovereignty	  
and	  less	  concerned	  with	  the	  means	  to	  this	  end.	  
	   This	   latter	   element	   is	   demonstrated	   from	   the	   evolution	   of	   one	   particular	  
slogan.	   During	   the	   mid-­‐seventh	   century	   Japan’s	   extensive	   cultural	   borrowing	   from	  
China	  was	   justiﬁed	  under	  the	   slogan	   ‘Japanese	  spirit	   and	  Chinese	   learning’.	  Chinese	  
culture	  maintained	  a	  vaunted	  position	  within	  Japan	  for	  centuries,	  but	  when	  the	  Sino-­‐
centric	  regional	  order	  collapsed,	  Japanese	  leaders	  turned	  to	  Western	   ideology.	  A	  new	  
slogan	   emerged	   advocating	   ‘Eastern	   virtue,	   Western	   technology’,	   but	   as	   Japan	  
continued	  its	  modernization	  the	  slogan	  ‘Japanese	  spirit	  and	  Western	  learning’	  became	  
dominate.264	  
	   This	  ideological	  ﬂexibility	  is	  diﬃcult	  to	  account	  for	  from	  a	  strictly	  constructivist	  
perspective.	   Although	   constructivism	   addresses	   competition	   between	   identities,	   and	  
ﬂuidity	  among	  identities	  given	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  circumstances,	  it	  does	  not	  oﬀer	  the	  
insights	  of	  SIT.	  Meiji	   leaders	  determined	  that	  social	  mobility	  through	  modernization	  
was	   the	   most	   eﬀective	   method	   for	   improving	   Japan’s	   position	   within	   the	   existing	  
status	   hierarchy.	   Social	   mobility	   therefore	   improved	   the	   position	   of	   the	   “Japanese”	  
group	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   people	   groups,	   but	   this	   strategy	   required	   a	   reorientation	   of	  
domestic	  norms.	  	  
	   The	   substitution	   of	   ‘Chinese	   learning’	   with	   ‘Western	   learning’	   also	  
demonstrates	   a	  sensitivity	   to	   concepts	   of	   sovereignty	  present	   during	   the	  early	  Meiji	  
period.	  All	   states	  desire	  the	  necessary	  power	  to	  assure	  their	  sovereignty	  (neoclassical	  
realist	  core	  variables),	  but	  contestation	  between	  groups	  as	  to	  how	  to	   achieve	  this	  end	  
is	   expected	   (the	   domestic	   identity	   hierarchy).	   During	   the	   bakumatsu,	   there	   was	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considerable	  division	  between	  groups	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  sovereignty	  and	  other	  
groups	   seeking	   to	   enhance	   state	   power	   with	   Western	   technology.	   The	   Meiji	  
Restoration	  ﬁltered	  much	  of	  the	  expected	  domestic	  plurality	  into	  a	  generally	  uniﬁed	  
group	   (the	   Meiji	   Consensus)	   that	   supported	   modernization.	   These	   objectives	   are	  
consistent	   with	   the	   emerging	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility,	   whereby	   Japanese	   leaders	  
sought	   to	   elevate	  Japan’s	  position	  within	   the	  international	  status	  hierarchy	  and	  thus	  
reverse	   the	   unequal	   treaties.	   Table	   4.3	   visualizes	   these	   nuances	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
framework	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Note	   that	   Japan’s	   choice	   of	   referent	   group	   remained	  

















Social	  Mobility.	  Westernization	  generally	  
accepted	  for	  short	  period	  before	  giving	  
way	  to	  more	  nuanced	  modernization	  
modeled	  after	  Europe	  and	  America.
Table	  4.3	  :	  	  Meiji	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1868	  -­‐	  1894)
	   Meiji	   leaders	   relied	   heavily	   upon	   foreign	   advisors	   to	   promote	   Japan’s	  
transformation	   into	   a	   modern	   state.	   The	   employment	   of	   foreign	   nationals	   was	   not	  
exclusive	   to	   the	  Meiji	   period.	   French	   advisors	   had	   a	   signiﬁcant	   role	   in	   crafting	   late	  
Tokugawa	   policy,	   and	   the	   working	   relationship	   between	   Satsuma	   and	   the	   British	  
provided	  the	   very	  means	   for	   the	  Restoration.	  During	   the	   early	  Meiji	   period,	   foreign	  
advisors	   did	   rise	   to	   new	   positions	   of	  prominence.265 	   Foreign	   advisors	   provided	   the	  
nascent	   state	  with	   the	  bureaucrats,	   engineers,	  and	  educators	  to	   drive	  modernization	  
forward,	  but	  their	  role	  was	  temporary.
	  
	   State	   elites,	   such	   as	   Minister	   of	   Industry	   Itō	   Hirobumi,	   recognized	   that	  
transforming	   Japan	   into	   a	   ‘great	   civilization’	   required	   the	   government	   to	   educate	  
‘“high	  and	  low	  alike	  [so	   that]	  Japan	  could	  take	  its	  rightful	  place	  among	  the	  nations	  of	  
the	   world”’.266 	   Educational	   development	   required	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   rely	   upon	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foreigners	   	  only	  until	   a	  generation	  of	  Japanese	  had	  been	  trained	  within	  a	  modernized	  
educational	  system.	  Resultantly,	  the	  employment	  of	  foreign	  nationals	  coincided	  with	  
eﬀorts	   to	  absorb	  foreign	  knowledge.	  Japanese	  nationals	  were	  sent	   to	   apprenticeships	  
in	  Europe	  and	  America.	   Japanese	  students	  were	  sent	   to	  study	  abroad.	  At	  the	  opening	  
of	   what	   would	   later	   become	   the	   Department	   of	   Engineering	   of	   Tokyo	   Imperial	  
University,	  Itō	  proclaimed:	  
I	   urge	   all	  ambitious	   youths	   ... 	  to	   study	   assiduously,	   to	   perfect	  their	   talents,	   and	  to	   serve	   in	   their	  
various	   posts	   with	   dedication.	   If	   this	   is	   done	   ... 	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   do	   without	   foreigners.	   We	  
ourselves	  will	  ﬁll	  the	  realm	  with	  railroads	   and	  other	  technological	  wonders	   that	  will	  form	  the	  basis	  
for	  further	  developments	  to	  continue	  for	  a	  myriad	  generations.	  The	  glory	  of	  our	  Imperial	  Land	  will	  
shine	  forth	  to	  radiate	  upon	  foreign	  shores,	  while	  at	  home,	  high	  and	  low	  will	  share	  in	  the	  beneﬁts	  of	  a	  
great	  civilization.267
	   The	  provisional	  status	  of	  foreign	  employees	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  use	  of	  language	  
within	  the	  education	  system.	  Owing	  much	  to	  the	  preeminence	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  
English	   became	   the	   language	   of	   higher	   learning.	   After	   all,	   there	   were	   no	   modern	  
textbooks	  written	   in	   Japanese.	  Natsume	  Sōseki,	   the	  ﬁrst	  Japanese	  lecturer	  of	  English	  
literature	  in	   Japan,	  notes	  that	   his	  generation	   ‘“had	   so	  much	  English	   training	  outside	  
regular	   English	   classes,	   [that]	   our	   ability	   to	   read,	   write	   and	   speak	   [in	   English]	  
developed	  naturally.”’268	  
	   The	  preference	  for	  the	  English	  language	  and	  the	  high	  esteem	  Meiji	  leaders	  held	  
for	  the	  British	  Empire	  was	   in	  no	   small	   part	  a	   result	   of	  geopolitical	   similarities	  (both	  
states	  are	  island	  nations)	  and	  the	  working	  relationship	  cultivated	  by	  the	  Satsuma	  clan	  
over	  the	  preceding	  decades.	  As	  modernization	  continued	  in	  Japan,	  its	  leaders	  became	  
better	  suited	  to	   reﬁne	  their	   foreign	   policy	   strategy.	  The	  utilization	  of	  predominately	  
English	  resources	  signals	  the	  adoption	  of	  Britain	  as	  Japan’s	  primary	  referent	  group	  for	  
its	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility,	   a	   distinction	   that	   was	   reinforced	   through	   a	   political	  
alliance	  in	  the	  coming	  decades.	  
	   While	   the	  use	  of	  English	   was	  undoubtably	  necessary	   from	   both	  an	   academic	  
and	   civil	   standpoint	   (to	   communicate	   with	   foreign	   nationals),	   the	   dominance	   of	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English	  over	  Japanese	  was	  ‘“in	  a	  sense,	  a	  disgrace”’	   to	  Natsume	  who	  felt	   it	   challenged	  
Japan’s	   ‘“independence	   as	  a	  nation”’.269 	  Natsume’s	  observation	   is	   particularly	   salient	  
when	   considering	   the	   goal	   of	   Meiji	   leaders	   was	   to	   use	   modernization	   to	   fortify	  
Japanese	   sovereignty.	   A	   realist	   interpretation	   may	   suggest	   that	   sovereignty	   is	  
contingent	  upon	  purely	  material	   factors,	  but	  to	  Natsume,	  sovereignty	  (‘independence	  
as	   a	   nation’)	   was	   inextricable	   linked	   to	   language.	   Blind	   acceptance	   of	   Western	  
practices,	   language	  included,	  would	   therefore	  undermine	   sovereignty	  by	   eroding	  the	  
Japanese	  collective	  identity.	  It	   is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	   explore	   this	  formative	  period	  
in	   modern	   Japanese	   history	   with	   a	   framework	   that	   accounts	   for	   both	  material	   and	  
ideological	  considerations.
	   Although	   English	   persisted	   within	   certain	   aspects	   of	   Japanese	   academia	   for	  
decades,	   the	   rise	  of	   native	   Japanese	   teachers	   and	   availability	   of	   Japanese	   textbooks	  
eventually	   supplanted	   the	   English.	   According	   to	   Natsume,	   ‘“[t]he	   declining	   use	   of	  
English	   [was]	   natural	   and	   to	   be	   expected.”’270 	   This	   process	   was	   accelerated	   by	   the	  
Japanese	   Minister	   of	   Education,	   Inoue	   Kowashi,	   sought	   to	   revive	   interest	   in	   non-­‐
Western	  pursuits	  such	  as	  Japanese	  literature	  and	  classical	  Chinese	  studies.271	  The	  move	  
from	   English	   to	   Japanese	   within	   Meiji	   education	   reveals	   the	   dynamism	   of	   Japan’s	  
modernization.	  	  
	   This	  period	  where	  Japanese	  culture	  was	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  suppressed	  
can	  be	  classiﬁed	  under	  the	  heading	  of	   “Westernization”.	  Given	  the	  isolated	  nature	  of	  
Japanese	   society	   prior	   to	   Perry’s	   arrival,	   the	   recent	   political	   revolution,	   and	   the	  
technological	  marvels	  of	  the	  industrial	  era,	  the	  exuberance	  with	  which	  some	  Japanese	  
embraced	  Westernization	  is	  unsurprising.	  Japan’s	  cultural	  borrowing	  extended	  beyond	  
the	   pragmatic	   pursuits	   of	   state	   and	   surfaced	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	   Western	  
aesthetics	   and	  manners.272 	  Nevertheless,	   the	  Western	  elements	   imported	   into	   Japan	  
were	  limited.	  Meiji	  society	  strongly	  resisted	  Christianity,	   frustrating	  European	  leaders	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who	   believed	   Christianity	   was	   fundamental	   for	   modern	   states.	   Bullheaded	   French	  
oﬃcials,	   who	   repeatedly	   failed	   to	   force	   their	   Catholic	   heritage	   onto	   Japanese	  
diplomats,	   suggested	   that	   the	  adoption	   of	   a	  Christian	   belief	   system	   by	  the	   Japanese	  
would	  evoke	  ‘“behavior	  more	  beﬁtting	  to	  a	  nation	  which	  wished	  to	  have	  itself	  counted	  
among	  civilized	  nations”’.273
	   State	   power	   expanded	   through	   modernization,	   causing	   patriotism	   to	   surge.	  
Characteristics	  of	  the	  Japanese	  collective	  identity	  reemerged,	  and	  supplanted	  cultural	  
elements	   that	   borrowed	   from	   the	   West,	   such	   as	   the	   language	   of	   higher	   learning.	  
Westernization	   thus	   gave	   way	   to	   a	   more	   generalized	   “modernization”	   through	   a	  
process	  of	  “Japaniﬁcation”	  whereby	  Western	  norms	  (political,	  economic,	  military,	  and	  
cultural)	   were	   assimilated	   into	   the	   Japanese	   society.	   Domestic	   institutions	   adopted	  
from	   their	   Western	   counterparts	   became	   Japanese	   institutions,	   a	   distinction	  
reinforced	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   of	   technocratic	   leaders	   educated	   in	   a	  
Western-­‐style-­‐but-­‐still-­‐Japanese	  educational	   system.	  This	  shift	  was	  recognized	  in	  ﬁrst	  
issue	  of	   the	  newspaper	  Nihon:	   ‘“We	  recognize	   the	  excellence	  of	  Western	  civilization.	  
We	  value	  the	  Western	  theories	  of	  rights,	  liberty,	  and	  equality;	  and	  we	  respect	  Western	  
philosophy	   and	   morals....These,	   however,	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   adopted	   simply	   because	  
they	   are	   Western;	   they	   ought	   to	   be	   adopted	   only	   if	   they	   contribute	   to	   Japan’s	  
welfare”’.274
	   Although	  Japanese	  leaders	  were	  primarily	  interested	  in	  emulating	  the	  Western	  
norms	   that	   bolstered	   state	   power,	   some	   Western	   cultural	   elements	   persisted	   and	  
merged	  with	   Japanese	   cultural	   norms.	   For	   example,	   geisha	   remained	   an	   important	  
element	  of	  Japanese	  society	  throughout	   the	  Meiji	  period,	  often	  entertaining	  Japanese	  
men	  donning	  Western	  suits	  and	  hairstyles.275 	  Another	  common	  marriage	  of	  Japanese	  
and	  Western	  cultural	   norms	   is	  witnessed	  by	   photographs	  of	  Meiji	   men	  with	  bowler	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hats,	   kimonos,	   and	   wooden	   clogs.276 	   This	   hybridization	   of	   Western	   and	   Japanese	  
norms	   is	  consistent	   with	   the	   theoretical	   underpinnings	   of	   this	   research.	   Individuals	  
and	  groups	   switch	  between	   multiple	   identities	   based	  upon	  context,	   i.e.	   the	   identity	  
and	  norms	  best	   suited	   to	   status	   seeking	  behavior.	  Although	  this	  research	  focuses	  on	  
foreign	   policy,	   future	   research	   could	   examine	   the	   domestic	   competition	   between	  
Western	  and	  Japanese	  cultural	  norms.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  widespread	  but	  temporary	  
exuberance	  regarding	  Western	  cultural	  norms	  was	  borne	  out	  of	  a	  political	  crisis,	  with	  
individuals	  and	  groups	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  norms	  of	  Tokugawa	  society	  until	  
modern	  Japanese	  cultural	  norms	  emerged.	  
	   Japaniﬁcation	  occurred	  through	  two	  methods.	  Some	  argued	  that	  the	  features	  of	  
modernization	  embodied	  an	  innate	  Japanese	  quality.	  Through	  appeals	  to	  the	  spiritual	  
characteristics	   of	   Japan,	   it	  was	   believed	   that	   Meiji	   reforms,	   although	   heavily	   reliant	  
upon	  the	  West,	  were	  decidedly	  Japanese.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   some	  thinkers	  asserted	  
that	  the	  norms	  of	  modernization	  where	  not	  simply	  Western	  or	  Japanese	  but	  indicative	  
of	  the	  universality	  of	  civilization.	  Saionji	  Kinmochi,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Iwakura	  Mission	  
and	  twice	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Japan,	  was	  dismissive	  of	  interpretations	  derived	  from	  the	  
particularities	  of	  certain	  nations.	  Saionji’s	  criticisms	  extend	  not	  only	  to	   the	  West	  but	  
to	  Japan,	  arguing	  that	  ‘“[m]ost	  traits	  that	  present-­‐day	  educators	  in	  Japan	  babble	  about	  
as	  being	  distinctively	  Japanese	  would	  distress	  men	  of	  learning”’.277 	  Both	  sides	  of	  this	  
debate	   reﬂect	   the	   self-­‐other	   complex	   highlighted	   in	   Chapters	   1	   and	   2.	   Despite	   the	  
inﬂux	   of	  Western	   political	   and	   cultural	   norms,	   Japanese	   leaders	   still	   distinguished	  
themselves	   (the	   self)	   from	   the	   Western	   nations	   (the	   others).	   Furthermore,	   SIT	  
indicates	   that	   the	   process	   of	   othering	   clariﬁes	   potential	   referent	   groups.	   In	   other	  
words,	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  referent	  group	  necessitates	  a	  self-­‐other	  divide.	  Through	  social	  
mobility,	  Meiji	  leaders	  identiﬁed	  a	  successful	  out-­‐group	  they	  wished	  to	  emulate.	  
	   The	  transition	  from	  Westernization	  to	  modernization	  can	  be	  substantiated	  by	  
examining	   two	   seminal	   proclamations	   of	   the	   Meiji	   government.278 	   Promulgated	   in	  
1868	   at	   the	   enthronement	   of	   Emperor	   Meiji,	   the	   Charter	   Oath	   outlined	   the	   main	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objectives	   of	   the	  Meiji	   leaders.279 	   Clauses	   four	  and	   ﬁve	   of	   the	   oath	   are	   remarkably	  
revealing,	  and	  state:
IV. Evil	  customs	  of	  the	  past	  shall	  be	  broken	  oﬀ	  and	  everything	  based	  upon	  the	  just	  laws	  of	  Nature.
V. Knowledge	   shall	   be	   sought	   throughout	   the	   world	   so	   as	   to	   strengthen	   the	   foundation	   of	  
imperial	  rule.280
These	  two	  clauses	  indicate	  that	  early	  Meiji	  leaders	  believed	  that	  if	  Japan	  was	  to	  survive	  
it	  must	  acknowledge	  the	  superiority	  position	  of	  Western	  powers	   in	  the	  international	  
power	   hierarchy,	   and	   adopt	   norms	   (namely	   those	   concerning	   modernization)	   to	  
match	  Western	  prowess.	  
	   Some	   twenty	  years	   later,	   the	  cultural	   acquiescence	   that	   occurred	  throughout	  
this	  process	  had	  begun	  to	  disappear.	   In	  1890,	   the	  Imperial	  Rescript	  on	  Education	  was	  
issued.	  The	  rescript	   forwarded	  the	  Meiji	   government’s	  guiding	  policies	   on	   eduction,	  
but	  it	   also	  embodied	  a	  more	  reﬁned	  understanding	  of	  modernization	  derived	  from	  a	  
Japanese	  historical	  perspective.	  The	  rescript	  proscribes	  morality	   though	  an	  emphasis	  
on	   family	  and	  house	  by	   encouraging	   Japanese	   peoples	   to	   ‘[b]e	  ﬁlial	   to	   your	  parents,	  
aﬀectionate	   to	   your	  brothers	  and	   sisters;	   as	   husbands	  and	  wives	  be	  harmonious,	   as	  
friends	   be	   true...extend	  your	  benevolence	   to	   all’.	  281 	   The	   rescript	   then	  continues	  by	  
linking	  this	  morality	  directly	  to	  the	  state:	  
[P]ursue	   learning	   and	  cultivate	   arts,	   and	   thereby	   develop	  intellectual	   faculties	   and	  perfect	  moral	  
powers;	   furthermore	   advance	   public	   good	   and	   promote	   common	   interests;	   always	   respect	   the	  
Constitution	   and	  observe	  the	   laws;	  should	  emergency	   arise,	  oﬀer	   yourselves	   courageously	   to	   the	  
State,	  and	  thus	  guard	  and	  maintain	  the	  prosperity	  of	  Our	  Imperial	  Throne	  coeval	  with	  heaven	  and	  
earth.282
	   The	   impact	   of	   the	   rescript	   on	   Japanese	   society	   was	   outstanding.	   While	   the	  
Charter	  Oath	  had	  represented	  the	  best	  intentions	  of	  the	  new	  government,	  the	  rescript	  
embodied	   a	   synthesis	   of	   both	   the	   practical	   (modernization)	   and	   the	   ideological	  
(Japanese	  cultural	  norms).	  When	  the	  Rescript	  on	  Eduction	  was	  presented	  to	   teachers	  
and	   students	   throughout	   the	   Japanese	   educational	   system,	   they	   were	   instructed	  by	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state	   oﬃcials	   to	   bow	   before	   the	   imperial	   signature	   aﬃxed	   to	   the	   rescript	   ‘“in	   the	  
manner	   we	   used	   to	   bow	   before	   our	   ancestral	   relics	   as	   prescribed	   in	   Buddhist	   and	  
Shintō	   ceremonies”’.283 	   This	   merging	   of	   traditional	   Japanese	   practices,	   nationalism,	  
and	  the	  norms	  of	  modernization	  demonstrates	  that	  Japaniﬁcation	  was	  a	  political	   tool	  
for	   promoting	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility.	   Both	   material	   and	   ideological	   factors	  
played	  a	  signiﬁcant	  role.	  Focusing	  entirely	  upon	  realist	  material	  calculations	  neglects	  
the	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   Japanese	   collective	   identity	   witnessed	   by	   the	   actions	   of	   Meiji	  
leaders.	  Solely	  emphasizing	   identity	  and	  norms	  likewise	  inhibits	  analysis	  by	  failing	  to	  
account	   for	   state	   elites	   seeking	   to	   bolster	   sovereignty.	   It	   is	   therefore	   necessary	   to	  
approach	  this	  formative	  period	  in	  Japanese	  history	  with	  a	  framework	  robust	  enough	  to	  
consider	  both	  angles.	  
4.4	  Meiji	  Foreign	  Policy	  (1868	  -­‐	  1895)
The	   foreign	   policy	  of	  early	  Meiji	   Japan	  was	  deﬁned	  by	  several	   international	   conﬂicts	  
which	  propelled	  Japan	   into	   the	   ranks	  of	  the	   imperialist	   powers.	  Given	  the	  notorious	  
warmongering	  of	  the	  Empire	  of	  Japan	  in	   the	  twentieth	   century,	   it	   could	  be	  assumed	  
that	   the	   modern	   Japanese	   state	  was	   at	   its	   core	   jingoistic.	   However,	   such	   simpliﬁed	  
reasoning	  does	  not	   provide	  adequate	   coverage	  of	   the	  external	  pressures	   acting	   upon	  
Japan	  nor	  examine	   the	  character	  of	   late	  nineteenth	   century	  international	   system.	   In	  
this	   section,	   the	   oﬀered	   framework	   is	   deployed	   to	   conceptualize	   Japan’s	   ascension	  
within	  the	  imperialist	  power	  hierarchy.	  Two	  foundational	   characteristics	  of	  a	  modern	  
state	   are	   clearly	   demarcated	   national	   boundaries	   and	   expanded	   national	   security	  
interests.	   Japan’s	   foray	   into	   the	   imperialist	   world	   order	   was	   deﬁned	   by	   these	  
considerations	  and	  its	  noted	  concerns	  over	  sovereignty	  and	  power.	  The	  permeability	  
of	   the	   multipolar	   power	   hierarchy	   and	   the	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   adopted	   by	  
Japanese	  leaders	  must	  also	  be	  considered.
	   During	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   the	   borders	   of	   several	   Western	   states,	  
including	   America,	   Italy,	   and	  Germany	  were	  more	  clearly	  deﬁned.	  As	  the	  process	   of	  
territorial	  delimitation	  progressed,	  geographical	  ambiguities	  -­‐	  such	  as	  those	  existing	  in	  
Alsace	   and	   Lorraine	   and	   in	   the	   Balkans	   -­‐	   became	  political	   land	   mines.	   The	   ethnic	  
homogeneity	  and	  geographically	  deﬁned	  character	  of	  Japan’s	  core	  islands	  reduced	  this	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factor,	  but	  ambiguities	  still	  existed.	  Sakhalin	  island	  and	  the	  smaller	  islands	  of	  the	  Kuril	  
chain	   are	   situated	   north	   of	   Hokkaidō.	   During	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century,	   these	  
islands	  were	  sparsely	  populated	  by	  Japanese	  and	  Russian	  nationals.284	  
	   Meiji	   leaders	   found	   the	  ambiguity	   regarding	   these	  islands	   unacceptable	   for	  a	  
modern	   state	   (a	   belief	   inherited	   from	   adoption	   of	   Western	   political	   norms),	   and	  
reasoned	  it	  was	  the	  government’s	  responsibility	  to	  oﬀer	  legal	   and	  physical	  protection	  
to	   all	   its	   citizens.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Japan’s	   leaders	   did	   not	   wish	   to	   damage	   its	  
international	  prestige	  by	  demanding	   its	  nationals	  return	   to	  Hokkaidō,	  as	  they	  feared	  
the	   move	   would	   be	   interpreted	   as	   acquiesce	   to	   Russian	   pressure.285 	   Ultimately,	   a	  
compromise	   was	   negotiated	   in	   1875	   that	   granted	   the	   Russians	   jurisdiction	   over	  
Sakhalin	  and	  the	  Japanese	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  Kurils.286	  
	   The	  Ryūkyū	  Kingdom	   centered	  on	  Okinawa	  was	   another	   territorial	   challenge	  
facing	   Meiji	   leaders.	   Traditionally,	   the	   islands	   held	   by	   the	   Ryūkyū	   were	   ostensibly	  
governed	   as	   part	   of	   Satsuma,	   but	   Ryūkyū	   rulers	   enjoyed	   relative	   autonomy	   and	  
conducted	  formal	   relations	  with	  China.	  Seeking	  to	  buttress	  its	  political	  centralization,	  
Meiji	  leaders	  placed	  the	  kingdom	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  Kagoshima	  Prefecture.	  The	  
move	  was	  designed	  to	  established	  direct	  legal	  authority	  over	  the	  Ryūkyū,	  but	   it	  soon	  
prompted	  a	  national	   crisis.	   In	  1871,	  over	  ﬁfty	  Ryūkyū	  ﬁsherman	  were	  shipwrecked	  on	  
Taiwan	  (a	  Chinese	  province)	  and	  massacred	  by	  the	  indigenous	  population.287	  
	   The	  incident	  brought	  Meiji	  legitimacy	  into	  question.	   If	  Japan	  was	  to	   transform	  
into	   a	   modern	   state,	   it	   needed	   to	   respond	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   slaughtered	  ﬁshermen,	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These	  negotiations	  are	  but	  one	  example	  of	  the	  Meiji	  consensus.	  Meiji	  leaders	  turned	  to	  Enomoto	  
Takeaki	  to	  lead	  the	  negotiations.	  Enomoto	  had	  been	  one	  of	  most	  fervent	  bakufu	  supporters.	  	  In	  the	  
closing	  stages	  of	  the	  Boshin	  War	  he	  abscond	  to	  Hokkaidō	  with	  other	  Tokugawa	  loyalists.	  It	  was	  only	  a	  
couple	  years	  prior	  to	  these	  negotiations	  that	  Enomoto	  was	  released	  from	  prison.
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  741-­‐2.
whose	   protection	  was	  guaranteed	  by	   the	   Japanese	   government.288 	  Furthermore,	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   Japanese	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   Ryūkyū	   islands	   would	   be	   undermined	  
should	   Japanese	   leaders	   not	   obtain	   compensation	   from	   China.	   Negotiations	   with	  
China	   proved	   ineﬀectual.	   From	   the	   Chinese	   perspective,	   Taiwan	   was	   a	   peripheral	  
territory	  beyond	  Chinese	  cultural	  enlightenment.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  contended	  
it	  was	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  incident	  and	  oﬀered	  no	  concessions.	  Chinese	  adherence	  
to	   its	   traditional	   philosophy	   left	   the	   Japanese	   with	   few	   options.	   For	   two	   years	   the	  
incident	  tested	  the	  resolve	  of	  the	  Meiji	   leaders.	  The	  discourse	  from	  both	  government	  
leaders	   and	   the	   population	   at	   large	   mirrored	   that	   of	   Westerners	   who	   just	   decades	  
before	  called	  for	  swift	  action	  in	  retaliation	  for	  attacks	  on	  their	  nationals	  by	  xenophobic	  
Japanese	  (e.g.	  the	  Richardson	  aﬀair	  of	  1862).	  A	  consensus	  that	  Japan	  must	  ‘punish’	  the	  
‘uncivilized’	  people	  of	  Taiwan	  materialized,	  and	  in	  1873	  Japan	  sent	  a	  unilateral	  punitive	  
expedition	  to	  Taiwan.289	  
	   In	   less	   than	   four	  months,	   the	   Japanese	  military	   established	   complete	  control	  
over	  the	  aboriginal	  territories	  of	  Taiwan.	  Japan’s	  show	  of	  force	  sent	  a	  clear	  signal	  to	  the	  
international	  community	  that	  its	  eﬀorts	  to	  modernize	  domestically	  was	  to	  be	  matched	  
by	   an	   imperialist	   agenda	   abroad.	   Following	   the	   expedition,	   Japan	   re-­‐engaged	   with	  
China,	  whose	   leaders	   had	  no	   means	   to	   counter	   Japanese	  assertiveness.	   The	  Chinese	  
court	   was	   forced	   to	   validate	   the	   expedition	   and	   accept	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   Japan’s	  
tenuous	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   Ryūkyū	   Kingdom.	   The	   post-­‐expedition	   negotiations	  
between	   Japan	   and	  China	  had	   a	   tremendous	   impact	   on	   their	   respective	   prestige.290	  
The	  crisis	  elevated	  the	  Japanese	  position	  within	  the	  regional	   hierarchy,	  aﬀording	  the	  
new	  Japanese	  state	  a	  tremendous	  boost	  in	  prestige	  that	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  waning	  
Chinese	  power.	  Any	  assumption	  of	  equality	  between	  the	  two	  states	  began	  to	  vanish,	  as	  
Japan	   had	   for	   the	   ﬁrst	   time	   in	   its	   history	   successfully	   supplanted	  Chinese	   regional	  
authority.	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   Sino-­‐Japanese	   tensions	   continue	   to	   mount	   throughout	   the	   1870s.	   Japanese	  
eﬀorts	   to	   tighten	   its	   control	   over	   the	   Ryūkyū	   islands	   alarmed	   a	   number	   of	   vocal	  
Chinese	  oﬃcials,	  prompting	  the	  Japanese	  elite	  to	  redeﬁne	  their	  strategic	  interests	  vis-­‐
à-­‐vis	  China.	  This	  interplay	  between	  broader	  security	  interests	  and	  the	  demarcation	  of	  
national	   boundaries	   was	   characteristic	   of	   modern	   states.	   As	   Akira	   concludes,	   the	  
‘transformation	   of	   China	   [in	   the]	   Japanese	   perception	   ...	   from	   friendly	   neighbor	   of	  
equal	   status	   to	   a	   potential	   adversary	   [illustrates]	   the	  way	   in	   which	   a	  modern	   state	  
stressed	  power	  considerations	  in	  its	  external	  aﬀairs’.291	  
	   Meiji	   leaders	   were	   generally	   uniﬁed	   in	   believing	   that	   modernization	   would	  
enable	  Japan	   to	   recapture	   the	  elements	  of	   its	   sovereignty	  compromised	  by	  Western	  
encroachment.	  However,	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  this	  modernization	  and	  the	  structure	  
of	   modern	   Japan’s	   domestic	   leadership	   was	   subject	   to	   debate.	   In	   no	   area	   was	   this	  
tension	  more	  salient	   than	   in	   Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  Korea.	  Historically,	  Korea	  
had	  privileged	  its	  relations	  with	  China	  over	  Japan.	  Meiji	  leaders	  were	  cognizant	  of	  the	  
Korean	   perspective,	   and	   asserted	   the	   Korean	   preference	   for	   China	   undermined	  
Japanese	  aspirations	  to	  elevate	  its	  regional	  standing	  through	  social	  mobility.292
	   Redeﬁning	   the	   parameters	   of	   Japanese-­‐Korean	   relations	   also	   provided	   Meiji	  
leaders	  with	  a	  means	  to	  solidify	  the	  centralization	  of	  its	  authority.	  Kido	  Takayoshi,	  an	  
esteemed	   statesmen	  of	  both	   the	  Tokugawa	  and	  Meiji	  periods,	   noted	   that	   a	  vigorous	  
stance	   towards	   Korea	   would	   ‘“instantly	   change	   Japan’s	   outmoded	   customs,	   set	   its	  
objectives	   abroad,	   [and]	   promote	   industry	   and	   technology”’.293 	   Kido’s	   stance	   was	  
consistent	  with	   the	   imperialist	   philosophy	  of	  a	  modern	   state,	   and	   thus	  indicative	   of	  
social	  mobility.	  As	  the	  Western	  powers	  continued	  to	  expand	  their	  interests	  in	  Asia	  and	  
Africa,	  Meiji	  leaders	  feared	  the	  weak	  peninsular	  kingdom	  may	  soon	  fall	  under	  the	  sway	  
of	  another	  power.294
Chapter	  4:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Modern	  Japan,	  1868	  -­‐	  1895	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121
291	  Akira	  1989,	  744.
292	  Paine	  2003,	  89.
293	  Akira	  1989,	  744.
294	  Beasley	  1987,	  71.	  
	   Divergent	  opinions	  arose	  between	  political	  groups	  as	  to	  what	  policies	  should	  be	  
adopted	  towards	  Korea,	  with	  some	  leaders	  favoring	  diplomatic	  solutions	  others	  opting	  
for	  a	  militaristic	  path.	  These	  disagreements	   intensiﬁed	  as	  Korean	  leaders	  continually	  
refused	   diplomatic	   appeals	   to	   realign	   the	   Japanese-­‐Korean	   relationship.295 	   Saigō	  
Takamori,	   a	   samurai	   and	   military	   leader	   from	   Satsuma,	   was	   disturbed	   by	   the	  
marginalization	  of	  the	  old	  warrior	  class	  by	  modernization	  eﬀorts.	  Saigō	  cautioned	  that	  
excess	  modernization	  would	  undermine	   traditional	   values,	   and	  he	  wished	  to	   elevate	  
the	  position	   of	   samurai	  within	  Meiji	   society	   by	   improving	   Japan’s	  military	   situation.	  
Convinced	  that	  control	  over	  Korea	  and	  China	  would	  bulwark	  against	   further	  Western	  
encroachment,	  Saigō	  suggested	  an	  ambassador	  be	  sent	  to	  Korea.	  The	  outward	  hostility	  
of	   the	   Korean	   government	   meant	   almost	   certain	   death	   for	   the	   said	   ambassador,	  
providing	  suﬃcient	  pretext	  for	  war.296	  In	  a	  motion	  ﬁtting	  a	  samurai,	  Saigō	  wrote:	  ‘If	  it	  
is	   decided	   to	   send	   an	   envoy	   oﬃcially,	   I	   feel	   sure	   he	  will	   be	  murdered.	   I	   therefore	  
beseech	   you	   to	   send	  me.	   I	   cannot	   claim	   to	   make	   a	   splendid	   envoy	   ...	   but	   if	   it	   is	   a	  
question	  of	  dying,	  that,	  I	  assure	  you,	  I	  am	  prepared	  to	  do’.297	  
	   Upon	   returning	   to	   Japan,	   members	   of	   the	   Iwakura	   Mission	   learned	   of	   the	  
growing	   support	   for	   Saigō’s	   plan.	   Noting	   the	   vulnerable	   position	   of	   Japan	   in	   the	  
international	  system,	  members	  of	  the	  mission	  halted	  the	   invasion,	  and	  refocused	  the	  
government	   towards	   domestic	   reforms.298 	   Ōkubo	   Toshimichi	   led	   those	   opposing	  
Saigō.	  He	  argued	   that	   Japan	  should	  adhere	  to	   a	  policy	  of	  peace	  and	  domestic	  reform	  
while	  the	  ‘government’s	  present	   undertakings	  intended	   to	  enrich	  and	  strengthen	  the	  
country	  must	  await	  many	  years	  for	  their	  fulﬁllment’.299	  Ōkubo	  shared	  Kido’s	  vision	  for	  
expanding	   Japanese	   interests,	   but	   favored	   a	   tempered	   approach	   that	   did	   not	  
antagonize	  the	  Western	  powers.300	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   The	  domestic	  debate	  devolved	  into	   the	  unsuccessful	  Satsuma	  Rebellion	  of	  1877	  
that	  was	   led	  somewhat	  begrudgingly	  by	  Saigō,	  who	  had	  been	  content	   to	   retire	  from	  
political	  life,	  but	  was	  forced	  into	  action	  by	  his	  bellicose	  allies.	  The	  uprising	  marks	  the	  
largest	   of	   a	   half	   dozen	   fruitless	   samurai	   uprisings	   between	   1874	   -­‐	   1877,	   which	  
challenged	  the	  	  Meiji	   legitimacy.301 	  Conceptually,	  Saigō	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  dissonant	  
group	  that	  embodied	  the	  last	  vestiges	  of	  Tokugawa	  Japan.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  his	  
enthusiasm	   for	   subjugating	   Korea	   was	   in-­‐line	  with	   the	   norms	   of	   new	   imperialism,	  
speciﬁcally	  state	  expansionism.	  Furthermore,	  Meiji	  leaders	  would	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  
adopt	  an	  aggressive	  stance	  towards	  Korea	  that	  was	  reminiscent	  of	   the	  position	  Saigō	  
forwarded.	   The	   challenge	   Saigō	   posed	   to	   the	  Meiji	   consensus	   was	   therefore	   not	   a	  
challenge	  to	  modernization,	  but	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  domestic	  reorientation	  of	  the	  former	  
samurai	  class.
	   Under	  the	  auspices	  of	  surveying	  the	  Korean	  coastline,	  Meiji	  leaders	  dispatched	  
three	   gunboats	   into	   Korean	   waters.	   On	   20	   September	   1875,	   one	   of	   the	   gunboats	  
reached	  Ganghwa	  Island.	  The	  island	  had	  been	  the	  site	  of	  conﬂict	  between	  Korean	  and	  
Western	   forces,	  and	  when	   the	  Japanese	  sent	   a	  small	   detail	   to	   explore	  the	   island,	  the	  
Korean	   shore	   batteries	   opened	   ﬁre.	   The	   Japanese	   responded	   and	   the	   superior	  
ﬁrepower	  of	  their	  gunboats	  quickly	  silenced	  the	  Korean	  guns.302 	  The	  Ganghwa	  Island	  
incident	  provided	  the	  pretext	  for	  the	  Japanese	  to	  press	  the	  Korean	  government	  to	  sign	  
the	  Korea-­‐Japanese	  Treaty	  of	  Amity	  of	  1876.	  The	  treaty	  formally	  ended	  Korea’s	  status	  
as	  a	  tributary	  state	  of	  China,	  it	  opened	  three	  ports	  to	  Japanese	  trade,	  and	  it	  extended	  
extraterritorial	  privileges	  to	  Japan.303	  Japan’s	  use	  of	  gunboat	  diplomacy	  and	  its	  issuing	  
of	   an	   unequal	   treaty	   with	   Korea	   is	   strikingly	   similar	   to	   the	   tactics	   utilized	   by	  
Commodore	  Perry	  just	  a	  few	  decades	  before.304	  This	  parallel	  was	  not	   lost	  on	  the	  Meiji	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leadership,305 	   who	   believed	   Japan	   could	   reassert	   its	   sovereignty	   by	   mirroring	   the	  
practices	  of	  the	  Western	  powers	   through	  social	  mobility.	  By	  acting	  within	  the	  norms	  
of	  the	  imperialist	  power	  hierarchy,	  Japanese	  leaders	  expanded	  their	  inﬂuence	  in	  Korea	  
and	   improved	   Japan’s	   international	   prestige.	   Nevertheless,	   Japanese	   action	   in	  Korea	  
also	  intensiﬁed	  its	  already	  perilous	  relationship	  with	  China.
	   Tensions	   came	   to	   a	   head	   in	   1882.	   A	   severe	   drought	   led	   to	   widespread	   food	  
shortages	  and	  the	  deteriorating	  economic	  situation	   forced	  the	  Korean	  government	  to	  
withhold	  payment	   from	   its	  military.	   In	  late	  July,	   soldiers	  stationed	  in	  Seoul	  mutinied	  
and	  rebels	  seized	  control	  of	  several	  rice	  granaries.	  The	  next	  morning	  the	  mob	  attacked	  
the	   royal	   palace,	   before	   turning	   their	   attention	   against	   the	   Japanese	   legation.	   The	  
surviving	  members	  of	  the	  legation	  ﬂed	  to	   Japan,	  prompting	  Meiji	   leaders	  to	  send	  four	  
warships	   and	   a	   troop	   regiment	   to	   Seoul.	   The	   Chinese	   countered	   the	   Japanese	   by	  
deploying	   their	   own	   troops,	   but	   a	   diplomatic	   solution	   was	   reached	   before	   the	  
hostilities	  escalated.306	  
	   A	  series	  of	  coups	  in	  1884	  further	  strained	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  relations.	  Pro-­‐Japanese	  
reformers	   temporarily	   overthrew	   the	   conservative	   Korean	   government,	   but	   their	  
success	   was	   short-­‐lived.	   With	   the	  assistance	  of	   the	   Chinese	  military,	   a	  pro-­‐Chinese	  
faction	  soon	  regained	  control	  of	  the	  Korean	  government.	  In	  an	  undertaking	  to	   avoid	  
all	   out	  war,	   the	   Japanese	   and	  Chinese	   again	  brokered	   a	  diplomatic	  solution.	   At	   the	  
Convention	   of	   Tientsin	   in	   1885,	   both	   sides	   agreed	   to	   withdraw	   their	   expeditionary	  
forces	  and	  military	  advisors	  from	  Korea	   	   and	  to	   notify	  one	  other	  beforehand	   of	   any	  
future	  deployments	  in	  Korea.307	  
	   The	  treaty	  only	  delayed	  the	  inevitable.	  Asserting	  Japanese	  authority	  over	  Korea	  
remained	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Meiji	  foreign	  policy.	  Yamagata	  Aritomo,	  one	  of	  the	  architects	  
of	   the	  modern	   Japanese	   military	   and	   future	   Prime	  Minister,	   believed	   expansionism	  
was	  essential	   to	   Japanese	   security.	  Yamagata	  noted	   in	   the	  1890s	   that	   ‘“the	  heritages	  
and	  resources	  of	  the	   East	   are	  like	   so	  many	  pieces	   of	  meat	   about	   to	   be	  devoured	  by	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tigers”’.308 	   In	   response,	   he	   advocated	   an	   aggressive	   foreign	   policy	   that	   extended	  
beyond	  Japan’s	  line	  of	  sovereignty	  (shukensen)	  towards	  its	  line	  of	  advantage	  (riekisen)	  
that	  included	  Korea	  and	  Manchuria,	  believing	  it	   the	  best	  method	  for	  enhancing	  state	  
power	  and	  fortifying	  Japanese	  sovereignty.
	   Domestic	  unrest	   in	  Korea	  provided	  Japanese	  elite	  with	   the	  pretext	   for	  war.	  In	  
1894,	  the	  King	  of	  Korea	  sent	  a	  request	  to	  China	  for	  assistance	  in	  subduing	  the	  growing	  
Tonghak	   Rebellion.309 	   The	   Chinese	   responded	   by	   sending	   troops	   to	   Korea,	   and	   in	  
accordance	  with	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Tientsin	   informed	   Japan	   of	   its	   intensions	   to	   support	  
Korea,310 	   which	   it	   described	   as	   a	   Chinese	   ‘protectorate	   and	   dependency’.311 	   Japan	  
rejected	  this	  justiﬁcation	  and	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	   exercise	  its	  long	  sought	  plans	  
to	   intervene.312	  Japanese	  soldiers	  were	  deployed	  to	   Seoul,	  with	  orders	  to	  seize	  replace	  
the	   Korean	   government	   with	   a	   pro-­‐Japanese	   faction.	   The	   new	   puppet	   government	  
then	  authorized	  the	   Japanese	  army	  to	   forcibly	  expel	   Chinese	  forces	   from	  Korea.	   The	  
resulting	  political	  fallout	  precipitated	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.313
	  
	   The	  ensuing	  military	  confrontation	  was	  by	  no	  means	  a	  contest	  between	  equals.	  
Japan’s	  military	  professionalism	  and	  advanced	   technology	  translated	  into	   a	  deﬁnitive	  
victory	  for	  the	  Japanese,	  who	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  months	  had	  destroyed	  Chinese	  naval	  
power,	  seized	  control	  of	  several	  strategic	  locations	  including	  China’s	  most	  viable	  ports,	  
and	  undermined	   the	  authority	  of	   the	   Chinese	  court.	   The	  Treaty	   of	   Shimonoseki	   (17	  
April	   1895)	  ended	  the	  hostilities,	  and	  forced	  China	  to	   recognize	   the	   independence	  of	  
Korea,	  cede	  the	  Liaodong	  Peninsula	  and	  Taiwan	  (including	   the	  surrounding	   islands)	  
to	   Japan,	   and	   pay	   an	   enormous	   war	   indemnity	   to	   Tokyo.314 	   The	   extent	   of	   Japan’s	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success	   troubled	   many	   in	   the	   West	   who	   worried	   that	   Japan’s	   growing	   regional	  
inﬂuence	   may	   inhibit	   their	   own	   imperialist	   pursuits.	   Russia,	   in	   particular,	   was	  
troubled	  by	  the	  consequences	  of	  Japanese	  possession	  of	  the	  the	  Liaodong	  Peninsula.315	  
	   Since	  the	  early	  1870s,	  Russia	  had	  been	  strengthening	   its	  inﬂuence	   in	  China	  to	  
counter	  British	  and	  increasingly	  Japanese	   interests	  in	  East	  Asia.316 	  Russia’s	  East	  Asian	  
strategy	  hinged	  upon	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Trans-­‐Siberian	  railroad	  and	  access	  to	  an	  
Eastern	  warm	  water	  port.317 	  Port	  Arthur	  on	   the	  Southern	   tip	   of	   Liaodong	   Peninsula	  
was	  geographically	   ideal	   and	   the	  target	  of	  Russian	  expansionist	   desires.	  When	  China	  
conceded	   the	   peninsula	   to	   Japan,	   Russia	   intervened	   with	   an	   ad	   hoc	   collation	  
supported	  by	  France	  and	  Germany.318	   	  This	  Triple	  Intervention	  pressured	  the	  Japanese	  
government	   to	   return	   Liaodong	   to	   China	   in	   exchange	   for	   an	   additional	   indemnity.	  
Russia	  presented	  its	  demands	  as	  a	  peaceful	  suggestion	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo,	  but	  
private	  correspondences	  between	   Japanese	  ministers	  reveals	   that	   ‘the	   real	  motive	   of	  
the	   Russian	   Government	   in	   opposing	   our	   territorial	   claim...owes	   to	   the	   fear	   that’	  
Japanese	   inﬂuence	   ‘would	   not	   be	   limited’	   to	   the	   Liaotung	   Peninsula,	   but	   ‘extend	   in	  
time	   over	   Korea’	   and	   over	   the	   ‘fertile	   district	   of	   Northern	  Manchuria’.319 	   Although	  
initially	   reluctant,	   Japan	   could	  not	   risk	   entering	   a	  war	  with	   three	   great	   powers	  and	  
relinquished	  the	  province.320	  
	   Following	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   Japanese	   troops,	   Russia	   occupied	   the	   peninsula	  
under	   the	   pretense	   of	   protecting	   Chinese	   sovereignty	   and	   extorted	   a	   lease	   of	   the	  
province	  from	  Chinese	  oﬃcials.	  Other	  European	  powers	  followed	  the	  Russian	  example	  
and	   exploited	   Chinese	   weakness	   to	   expanded	   their	   regional	   inﬂuence.321 	   Ruthless	  
political	   maneuvering	   was	   by	   no	   means	   a	   novelty	   to	   Japan’s	   leaders,	   who	   in	   the	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preceding	  decades	  had	  manufactured	  claims	  on	  Korea	  and	  exploited	  China’s	  weakness	  
to	  penetrate	  deeper	  into	  the	  Asian	  continent.	  
	   Although	  Russia’s	  actions	  were	  not	  altogether	  unsurprising	  to	  Japanese	  leaders,	  
it	   highlighted	  Japan’s	  tenuous	  position	  within	  the	  international	   system.	  On	  the	  verge	  
of	   great	   power	   status,	  Meiji	   leaders	   acknowledged	   that	  continued	  self	  strengthening	  
(national	   power)	   was	   necessary	   if	   it	   was	   to	   fully	   exert	   itself	   in	   the	   international	  
system.322 	   Furthermore,	   the	   intervention	   cemented	   the	   conﬂictual	   nature	   of	   great	  
power	  politics	  to	   Japanese	  elites.323	  As	  is	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  Triple	  Intervention	  
also	   conditioned	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   shift	   their	   foreign	   policy	   strategy	   away	   from	  
China	   and	   towards	   Russia.	  While	   from	   a	   geopolitical	   perspective	   such	   a	   shift	   may	  
seem	   minor,	   Russian	   embodied	   the	   modern	   imperial	   norms	   that	   Japan	   sought	   to	  
emulate.	  Resultantly,	  Japan’s	  attention	  was	  now	  centered	  towards	  imperialist	  rivalry.	  
	   The	   Triple	   Intervention	   also	   has	  several	   theoretical	   considerations.	   Following	  
the	  Meiji	   Restoration,	   all	  of	  the	  Western	  powers	  had	  in	   some	  part	   formed	  a	  referent	  
group	  for	  the	  Japanese.	   For	  example,	  the	  ranking	  of	  Western	  nations	  by	  members	  of	  
the	   Iwakura	   Mission	   indicated	   that	   Meiji	   leaders	   sought	   to	   import	   only	   the	   most	  
successful	   modernization	   norms,	   regardless	   of	   where	   those	   norms	   had	   ﬁrst	   been	  
institutionalized.	   Nevertheless,	   Meiji	   leaders	   remained	   closely	   tied	   to	   the	   British.	  
Satsuma-­‐British	  relations	  were	  essential	  during	  the	  Boshin	  War,	  the	  two	  states	  shared	  
geopolitical	   similarities,	  and	  English	  was	  the	  preferred	  language	  of	  Western	  learning.	  
Although	   the	   British	   did	   not	   intercede	   during	   the	   Triple	   Intervention,	   as	   some	  
Japanese	  leaders	   had	  hoped,	   both	   sides	   shared	   a	   common	   foe	   in	  Russia.	   The	   Triple	  
Intervention	  therefore	  elevated	  Britain	  to	  a	  position	  as	  Japan’s	  primary	  referent	  group.	  
Table	  4.4	   distills	   these	   factors	  within	  the	   framework	  of	   this	   thesis	   by	   building	   those	  
introduced	   in	   Table	   4.3.	   The	   strategy	   outlined	   below	   is	   continued	   beyond	   the	  
timeframe	   of	   this	  chapter,	   requiring	   the	   timeline	   to	   remain	  open-­‐ended.	  Also	   note,	  
that	  following	  the	  Satsuma	  uprising	  of	  1877,	  the	  subordinate	  identity	  group	  within	  the	  
domestic	  identity	  hierarchy	  shifted	  from	  “traditionalist”	  to	  “nationalist”.	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Social	  Mobility.	  With	  modernization	  in	  
full	  swing,	  Japanese	  leaders	  shift	  focus	  
from	  domestic	  to	  international	  interests.
Table	  4.4	  :	  Meiji	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1894)
	   Despite	   Russia’s	   interference,	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   nulliﬁed	   the	  
justiﬁcation	   for	  the	  unequal	   treaties	   levied	  against	   Japan,	   aﬀording	  Meiji	   leaders	  the	  
leverage	  to	   reassert	   it	   rights	  as	  a	  sovereign	   state.	  The	  shift	   in	  power	  that	  began	  with	  
Japan	  challenging	  Chinese	  suzerainty	  over	  Korea	  materialized	  with	  a	  visible	  reversal	  of	  
East	   Asia’s	   traditional	   hierarchical	   order.	   Among	   Asian	   nations,	   regional	   power	  
dynamics	  now	   Japan,	   a	   reality	   reﬂected	   in	   the	   quote	   from	  The	   North	   China	   Herald	  
which	  opened	  this	  chapter.	  
A	  terrible	  lesson	  has	  been	  administered	  to	  China	  ...	  she	  has	  lost	  her	  prestige	  which	  was	  nothing	  but	  
the	  shadow	  of	  a	  great	  name;	  that	  she	  lies	  exposed	  as	  a	  carcass	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  of	  which	  a	  cloud	  
of	  eagles	  is	  hovering;	  that	  her	  independence	  is	  gone	  for	  the	  moment,	  and	  that	  on	  pain	  of	  permanent	  
extinction	  as	  an	  autonomous	  Power	  she	  must	  submit	  to	  a	  prolonged	  tutelage.324
The	  prestige	  gain	  catapulted	  Japan	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Asian	  
states	  and	  sent	  shockwaves	  throughout	  the	  Western	  world.	  Japan	  could	  no	   longer	  be	  
ignored	  as	  a	  periphery	  state,	  and	  Western	  powers	  could	  no	   longer	  assume	  they	  were	  
the	  lone	  stewards	  of	  international	  aﬀairs.325
4.5	  The	  Burgeoning	  Regional	  Power
This	  chapter	  detailed	  Japan’s	  transition	  from	  a	  state	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  industrialization	  to	  
a	  recognized	  world	  power.	  Japan’s	  adoption	  of	  an	   imperialist	   foreign	  policy	  has	  been	  
linked	   to	   the	   characteristics	   of	   modern	   states,	   which	   for	   reasons	   of	   solidifying	   its	  
sovereignty,	   Japan	   sought	   to	   emulate.	   Japan’s	   transformation	   occurred	   ﬁrst	   as	   a	  
process	  of	  cultural	  borrowing,	  and	  later	  evolved	  into	  a	  more	  judicial	   incorporation	  of	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  Court	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  Gazette,	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April	  1895.
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  Paine	  2003,	  3-­‐7.
Western	  norms	  into	  Japan’s	  collective	  identity.	  Through	  this	  process,	  Meiji	  leaders	  set	  
the	   stage	   for	   Japan’s	   development	   into	   a	   regional	   power	   while	   retaining	   distinct	  
elements	  of	  the	  Japanese	  collective	  identity.	  This	  chapter	  concluded	  with	  a	  discussion	  
of	  the	  Meiji	  government’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategies	  of	  social	  mobility,	  focusing	  heavily	  
on	  the	  shifting	  power	  between	  China	  and	  Japan.
	   Following	   its	  victory	  during	  the	  First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  Japan	  was	  primed	  to	  
exert	   its	   regional	   authority,	   but	   external	   pressures	   constrained	   Japanese	   leaders.	  
Russian-­‐led	   interference	  hindered	   Japan’s	  emergence	   as	   East	  Asia’s	   dominate	   power	  
and	   had	   longstanding	   consequences	   on	   regional	   security.	   The	   Triple	   Intervention	  
pushed	  Japan	  closer	  to	  Britain	  (establishing	  Britain	  as	  Japan’s	  referent	  group)	  and	  loss	  
of	   face	   resulting	   from	   the	  Triple	  Intervention	   fostered	   a	   revanchism	   towards	  Russia	  
that	  materialized	  in	  the	  coming	  decade	  (explored	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  
	   By	  applying	   a	  consistent	   frame	   of	   analysis,	   two	   objectives	  have	  been	   fulﬁlled.	  
First,	  the	  robustness	  of	  this	  thesis’	   framework	  has	  been	  demonstrated.	  The	  transition	  
in	   foreign	   policy	   trajectory	   from	   isolationism	   to	   new	   imperialism	   (the	   ﬁrst	   of	   three	  
shifts	   covered	   in	   this	   research)	   was	   analyzed	   by	   exploring	   policy	   strategies	   derived	  
from	  SIT.	  The	  presented	  analysis	  improves	  the	  conclusions	  that	  could	  be	  drawn	  from	  
either	   a	   realist	   or	   constructivist	   framework.	   Neoclassical	   realism’s	   attentiveness	   to	  
concepts	  of	  statehood	  are	  essential	  but	  the	  theory	  oﬀers	  limited	  means	  for	  tracing	  the	  
ascendency	  of	  modernization	  norms.	  Similarly,	   constructivism	   provides	  key	   insights	  
into	   the	   role	   of	   norms	   in	   identity	   formation,	  but	   struggles	   to	   account	   for	  the	   rapid	  
abandonment	  of	  sonnō	  jōi	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Meiji	  consensus.	  
	   Second,	  this	   chapter	  answers	  the	  questions	  driving	  this	  research	  with	  the	  ﬁrst	  
period	  in	  modern	  Japan	  (1868	  -­‐	  1895).	  See	  summaries	  below.	  
1. How	   have	   concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	  
international	  system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	  
• It	   was	   demonstrated	   in	   Chapter	   3	   that	   encroachment	   of	   the	  Western	   powers	  
undermined	   Japanese	   sovereignty.	  This	   crisis	   of	  national	   security	   catalyzed	  the	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Meiji	  Restoration.	  Following	  the	  domestic	  shift	  in	  power,	  Meiji	  leaders	  reoriented	  
the	   state	   towards	   modernization	   through	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility.	   This	  
process	   ﬁrst	   occurred	   through	   the	   cultural	   borrowing	   of	   Western	   norms	   and	  
then	  into	  a	  more	  general	  process	  of	  modernization.	  
2. 	  How	  have	  these	  factors	  changed	  with	  time?	  	  
• Japanese	   leaders	   were	   initially	   coerced	   into	   trade	   agreements	   with	   Western	  
powers,	   but	   soon	   found	   that	   cooperation	   with	   the	   West	   enhanced	   Japan’s	  
regional	  position.	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  imperialist	  power	  hierarchy	  established	  
by	  the	  Western	   powers	   constitutes	   the	  primary	  external	   constrain	  acting	   upon	  
Japanese	   leaders.	   The	   decision	   to	   cooperate	   rather	   than	   challenge	   Western	  
regional	   supremacy	   resulted	   in	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   that	   enabled	  
dramatic	   improvements	   in	   Japanese	   power	   and	   sovereignty.	   Notably,	   this	  
strategy	   provided	   Meiji	   leaders	   with	   the	   necessary	   leverage	   to	   reverse	   the	  
unequal	  treaties	  that	  undermined	  Japanese	  sovereignty.	  
3.What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	   competing	   groups	   of	   Japanese	   political	  
elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?	  
• Meiji	   leaders	  maintained	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility	  that	  was	  underwritten	  by	  
the	  norms	  of	  modernization.	  This	  outward	   looking	  perspective	  transcended	  the	  
divide	   between	   premodern	   and	   modern	   Japan.	   Additionally,	   the	   concepts	   of	  
power	   and	   sovereignty	   that	   divided	   competing	   groups	   during	   the	   bakumatsu	  
continued	  to	  drive	  debates	  regarding	  the	  direction	  of	  Meiji	  foreign	  policy.	  
	   Chapter	   5	   builds	   upon	   these	   conclusions	   and	   explores	   Japanese	   eﬀorts	   to	  
distance	   itself	   from	   the	  Western-­‐centric	  status	   quo	   following	   the	   First	   World	  War.	  
The	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   fostered	   by	   early	   Meiji	   leaders	   is	   essential	   to	  
understanding	   this	   frequently	   cited	   but	   often	   misinterpreted	   shift.	   Furthermore,	  
ideological	   consistencies,	   such	   as	   the	   privileging	   of	   power	   and	   sovereignty,	   are	  
explored	  as	  mechanisms	  for	  establishing	  a	  link	  between	  the	  political	  developments	  of	  
the	  early	  Meiji	  period	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Empire	  of	  Japan.
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Chapter	  5
Great	  Power	  Politics	  and	  Japan,	  1895	  -­‐	  1931
Tsar	   Nicholas	   II	   waking	   from	   a	   nightmare	   of	   the	  
battered	   and	  wounded	   Russian	   forces	   returning	   from	  
battle.	  
-­‐Kiyochika	  Kobayashi,	  1904	  -­‐	  1905
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‘If	   political	  upheavals	  should	   reach	  Manchuria	   and	  Mongolia,	   disturbing	  
public	  order	  there,	  and	  threaten	  Japan’s	  special	   positions	  and	   interests	   in	  
these	  regions,	  the	  Japanese	  government	  will	  protect	  them	  no	  matter	  where	  
the	  threat	  comes	  from.’
-­‐	  Tanaka	  Giichi,	  1927
‘The	   Japanese	   are	   beating	   us	   with	  machine-­‐guns,	   but	   never	   mind:	   we’ll	  
beat	  them	  with	  icons!’
-­‐	  Russian	  General	  Dragomirov,	  1905
‘If	  …	  one	   takes	  a	  broader	  view	  of	  the	  future	  well-­‐being	  of	  both	  China	  and	  
Japan,	  one	  will	   be	  satisﬁed	  that	   there	   is	  no	  other	  course	   open	  to	  the	  two	  
nations	   than	  to	   pursue	   the	  path	  of	  mutual	   accord	   and	   cooperation	  in	  all	  
their	  relations,	  political	  and	  economic’
-­‐	  Shidehara	  Kijūrō,	  1930
‘Although	  the	  Chinese	  seem	  to	  believe	  Manchuria	  belongs	  to	  China,	  as	  far	  
as	   I	   can	   tell	   it	   was	   Russian	   territory.	   After	   the	   Boxer	   Rebellion,	   the	  
Japanese	   government	   had	   to	   obtain	   Russia’s	   permission	   to	   appoint	   a	  
consul	   in	  Yinkou.	  And	  it	  was	  Japan	  that	  expelled	  Russia	  from	  Manchuria.	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that,	  if	  left	  unattended,	  Manchuria	  would	  have	  been	  lost	  
from	  Chinese	  territory.’
-­‐	  Shidehara	  Kijūrō,	  1931
The	  Japanese	  victory	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1894-­‐5)	   catapulted	  the	  island	  state	  to	  
the	  forefront	   of	  East	  Asian	  power	  politics.	  Although	  China’s	  power	  had	  been	  waning	  
for	   decades,	   Japan’s	   victory	   left	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	   regional	   order	  now	   centered	   on	  
Japan.	   The	   successes	   of	   Japan’s	   modernization	   and	   the	   ongoing	   broadening	   of	   its	  
security	   interests,	   stirred	   concern	   among	   the	   Western	   powers	   that	   Japanese	  
expansionism	   would	   soon	   become	   a	   threat	   to	   their	   perceived	   monopoly	   on	  
imperialism.326	  
	   This	  chapter	  examines	   Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  from	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  First	  
Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   through	   the	   1920s.	   The	   geopolitical	   rivalry	   between	   Japan	   and	  
Russia,	   made	   apparent	   by	   the	   Triple	   Intervention,	   culminated	   with	   the	   Japanese	  
victory	   during	   the	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   War	   (1904-­‐5),	   which	   further	   elevated	   Japan’s	  
prestige	  and	  signaled	  to	  the	  international	  community	  that	  Japan	  had	  arrived	  as	  a	  great	  
power	  (Section	   5.1).	  This	   newfound	   position	   required	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   reevaluate	  
Japan’s	   position	  within	   the	  international	   power	  hierarchy,	  and	  to	  seek	   foreign	   policy	  
objectives	  that	  reinforced	  the	  new	  status	  quo	  that	  featured	  Japan	  as	  one	  of	  the	  premier	  
power	  players	  (Section	  5.2).	  The	  outbreak	   of	   the	  First	  World	  War	  provided	  Japanese	  
leaders	   additional	   opportunities	   to	   recommit	   to	   the	   existing	   power	   hierarchy,	   in	  
particular	  its	  alliance	  with	  Britain,	  and	  further	  its	  imperialist	  agenda	  in	  China	  (Section	  
5.3).	  
	   However,	   changing	   international	   norms	   following	   World	   War	   I	   required	  
Japanese	   leaders	   to	   temper	   their	   foreign	   policy	   agenda.	   The	   Versailles-­‐Washington	  
System	   stressed	   economic	  openness	   and	   a	   commitment	   to	   international	   peace,	   two	  
elements	   that	   contrasted	   sharply	   from	   the	   norms	   of	  new	   imperialism	   that	   Japanese	  
leaders	  had	  so	  aptly	  deployed.	  The	  eﬀorts	  to	  address	  these	  evolving	  external	  pressures	  
by	   Japanese	   policy	   makers	   rounds	   out	   this	   chapter	   (Section	   5.4).	   This	   shift	   in	  
international	  norms	   constitutes	   a	  prime	   external	   pressure	  acting	   upon	   Japan	  during	  
the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  corresponds	  with	  the	  ﬁrst	  pair	  of	  research	  questions	  -­‐	  
How	   have	   concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	  
international	   system	   inﬂuenced	   the	   dramatic	   shifts	   in	  modern	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy?	  
How	  have	  these	   factors	  changed	  with	  time?	  Tracing	  the	  interplay	  of	  Japan’s	  established	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new	  imperialist	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System	  is	  a	  key	  object	  of	  
analysis	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
	   This	   period	   is	   thus	   marked	   by	   two	   major	   conﬂicts	   that	   had	   a	   considerable	  
impact	  on	   the	  direction	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy,	   the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  and	  the	  
First	   World	  War.	   The	   events	   and	   the	   era	   covered	   in	   this	   chapter	   highlight	   Japan’s	  
continued	   commitment	   to	   its	   strategy	  of	   social	  mobility,	  whereby	   a	   group	   seeks	   to	  
increase	  its	  position	  by	  mirroring	  the	  practices	  of	  a	  referent	  group.	  This	  commitment	  
is	   particularly	   signiﬁcant	   as	   Japan’s	   growing	   military	   strength	   during	   the	   early	  
twentieth	  century	   is	  often	  oversimpliﬁed	  by	  literature	  seeking	  to	   connect	   this	  period	  
with	  the	  rampant	  expansionism	  of	  the	  1930s.	  Although	  the	  Japanese	  military	  did	  push	  
for	  continued	  expansion	  in	  the	  period	  following	  World	  War	  I,	  it	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  
the	   Japanese	   political	   leaders	   also	   explored	   options	   for	   incorporating	   the	   norms	   of	  
internationalism	   into	   the	   Japanese	  polity.	   Surveying	   the	  consistent	   strategy	  of	   social	  
mobility	  (outlined	  in	  Chapters	  4	   and	   5)	   is	  essential	   for	  answering	   the	  third	  research	  
question	   -­‐	  What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	  competing	   groups	   of	   Japanese	  
political	  elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?	  
5.1	  The	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1904	  -­‐	  1905)
Japan’s	   emergence	  as	   a	  potential	   adversary	   to	   the	  West	  was	  no	  more	   salient	   than	   in	  
Russia,	  whose	  Eastern	  frontier	  had	  already	  been	  the	  source	  of	  territorial	  disputes	  with	  
Japan.	   These	   tensions	   intensiﬁed	   as	   Japan	   expanded	   ﬁrst	   into	   the	  Korean	  peninsula	  
and	   then	   into	   the	   Chinese	   mainland.	   The	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   concluded	   with	   the	  
Treaty	   of	   Shimonoseki,	   which	   forced	   China	   to	   formally	   terminate	   its	   inﬂuence	   in	  
Korea,	   pay	   a	   vast	   war	   indemnity	   to	   Japan,	   and	   cede	   the	   Liaodong	   Peninsula	   and	  
Taiwan	   to	   the	   Japanese.	  327 	   Japan’s	   acquisition	   of	   the	   Liaodong	   Peninsula	   and	   the	  
subsequent	  Triple	  Intervention	  proved	  the	  most	  controversial.
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   In	   the	   wake	   of	   Russia’s	   check	   against	   Japanese	   imperial	   expansion	   in	   the	  
Chinese	  mainland,	   Tokyo	   realigned	   its	   foreign	   policy	   strategies.	   In	   the	   immediacy,	  
Japanese	   policy	   returned	   to	   the	   cautious	   conservatism	   that	   marked	   its	   pre-­‐1894	  
agenda.	  Japan	  proceeded	  by	  focusing	  on	  rearmament	  and	  exerting	  its	  imperial	  muscle	  
into	  areas	  where	  it	  had	  already	  established	  a	  foothold,	  mainly	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan,	  two	  
territorial	   possessions	  where	  Japan	  hoped	  to	   proceed	  free	  of	  Western	  interference.328	  
Despite	  these	  eﬀorts,	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  imperial	  rivalry	  only	  intensiﬁed.	  
	   The	   reorientation	   of	   foreign	   policy	   objectives	   corresponded	   with	   the	   further	  
establishment	   of	   expansionism	   norms	   (albeit	   with	   reﬁned	   strategies	   that	   avoid	  
confrontation	   with	   other	   great	   powers)	   within	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   making	  
apparatus.	   Yamagata	   began	   his	   second	   term	   as	   Prime	  Minister	   in	   November	   1898.	  
During	  his	  tenure,	  he	  granted	  the	  military	  control	  over	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  cabinet	  by	  
ruling	   that	   only	   an	   active	   military	   oﬃcer	   could	   serve	   as	   War	   Minister	   or	   Navy	  
Minister.	  Additional	  laws	  were	  passed	  to	  further	  restrict	  political	  party	  members	  from	  
holding	  key	  posts	  in	  the	  bureaucracy,	  eﬀectively	  making	  the	  military	  independent	  and	  
granting	  Yamagata	  the	  ability	  to	  dissolve	  the	  cabinet.	  Yamagata	  also	  actively	  opposed	  
Itō	  Hirobumi,	  leader	  of	  the	  civilian	  party,	  and	  exercised	  tremendous	  inﬂuence	  through	  
his	  protégés	  Katsura	  Tarō	  and	  Tanaka	  Giichi.329	  
	  
	   Despite	   the	  outward	   contestation	   over	   foreign	  policy	   between	  Yamagata	  and	  
Itō,	   they	  often	  coordinated	  eﬀorts	  (especially	  in	   the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  restoration)	   to	  
maintain	  domestic	   stability	   and	   improve	  Japan’s	  national	   strength.	  Writing	  to	   Itō	   in	  
1879	  regarding	   the	  democratic	  movement	   in	   Japan,	  Yamagata	  stated:	   ‘“Every	  day	  we	  
wait	  the	  evil	  poison	  will	  spread	  more	  and	  more	  over	  the	  provinces,	  penetrate	  the	  mind	  
of	   the	   young,	   and	   inevitably	   produce	   unfathomable	   evils.”’330 	   Itō	   listened	   to	  
Yamagata’s	  advice	  and	  together	  they	  reinforced	  the	  political	  oligarchy	  to	  counter	  what	  
Itō	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘“onslaught	  of	  of	  extremely	  democratic	  ideas”’.331	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   Imperial	   strategy	   concerning	   the	   direction	   of	   Japanese	   expansionism	   was	  
divided	  between	  two	  fronts.	  Those	  favoring	  northward	  expansion	  reasoned	  that	  Korea	  
should	  serve	  as	  a	  base	  for	  advancing	  Japanese	  interests	  into	  Manchuria,	  a	  contentious	  
region	  the	  Russians	  considered	  fundamental	   for	  their	  Eastern	  sphere	  of	  inﬂuence.	  To	  
the	   south,	   imperial	   strategy	   followed	   a	   similar	   line	   of	   reasoning.	   Much	   like	   Korea,	  
Taiwan	  was	  understood	  as	  a	  potential	   staging	  point	   for	  expansion	   into	   the	  Southern	  
Chinese	  mainland.332 	  The	  debate	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  Japanese	  expansion	  continued	  
until	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   and	   indicates	   a	   broader	   acceptance	   of	   Yamagata’s	  
strategic	  thinking	  by	  Japanese	  policy	  elites.	  
	   The	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1894-­‐5)	   provided	  the	  necessary	  political	   traction	  
of	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   reverse	   the	   unequal	   treaties	   that	   were	   levied	   against	   Japan	  
during	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century.	   This	   reassertion	   of	   Japanese	   sovereignty	  
corresponded	   with	   a	   shift	   in	   strategic	   thinking	   away	   from	   Yamagata’s	   line	   of	  
sovereignty	  (shukensen)	   towards	  his	   line	  of	  advantage	  (riekisen)	   that	   included	  Korea	  
and	  Manchuria	  as	  assets	  for	  enhancing	  state	  power	  and	  prestige.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  
this	  shift	  does	  not	  correlate	  with	  a	  change	  in	  policy	  strategy,	   rather	  with	  a	  refocusing	  
of	   policy	   objectives	   commensurate	  with	   Japan’s	   elevated	   position	   within	   the	  power	  
hierarchy.	   Social	   mobility	   through	   imperialism	   was	   in	   practice	   reinforced.	   Japan’s	  
success	  as	  an	  imperialist	   power	  enabled	   its	  leaders	  to	   explore	  avenues	  to	   enhance	  its	  
prestige	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  reclaiming	  sovereignty	  -­‐	  as	  had	  been	  the	  case	  prior	  to	  
the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.
	   Following	  the	  Triple	  Intervention,	  Japanese	  leaders	  tested	  expansionism	  in	  both	  
directions.	   Japan’s	   long-­‐held	  desire	  to	   transform	   Korea	  into	   a	  formal	   protectorate	  of	  
the	  empire	  had	  been	  met	  with	  resistance	  from	  within	  Korea	  and	  from	  Russia.	  In	  1895,	  
Japan’s	   leading	   resident	   minister	   in	   Korea	   became	   involved	   in	   a	  mismanaged	   coup	  
d'état	   that	   witnessed	   the	  Korean	   royal	   palace	   seized,	   the	   anti-­‐Japanese	  Queen	  Min	  
brutally	  murdered,	  and	  the	  King	  of	  Korea’s	  retreat	   from	  Seoul	   to	   take	  refuge	  among	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the	   Russian	   legation.333 	   Eye	   witness	   accounts	   communicated	   through	   the	   Russian	  
Minister	   reveal	   the	   horror:	   ‘more	   than	   thirty	   Japanese,	   in	   civilian	   dress,	   carrying	  
swords	  at	   their	   sides	  [and]	   former	  Korean	  soldiers,	   twenty	   or	   thirty,	   also	   in	  civilian	  
dress	   carrying	   swords...entered	   the	  Palace	  of	   the	  Queen...drew	   out	   the	  women,	  and	  
dragged	  them	  along	  the	  ground	  to	  the	  garden,	  and	  killed	  them	  with	  their	  swords’.334
	   When	   Japan’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   aﬀair	   became	   public,	   Tokyo	   replaced	   its	  
Korean	  ministers	   with	   seasoned	   diplomats	   charged	   with	   repairing	   Korean-­‐Japanese	  
relations	  and	   countering	   the	  growing	   Russian	   inﬂuence.335 	   Furthermore,	   some	  high	  
ranking	   Japanese	  oﬃcials	  called	   for	   ‘all	   the	  persons	   involved	   in	   the	   incident	   except	  
Government	  oﬃcials’	   to	  leave	  ‘Korea	  quickly	  and	  to	  punish	  them	  after	  their	  return	  to	  
Japan’.336 	   Despite	   the	   concerns	   of	   Japanese	   leaders,	   their	   Russian	   counterparts	  
remained	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   the	   emerging	   rivalry	   with	   Britain,	   allowing	  
signiﬁcant	  diplomatic	  progress	  between	  Russia	  and	  Japan.	  The	  two	  empires	  negotiated	  
railroad	   contracts,	   economic	   and	   banking	   rights,	   and	   the	   boundaries	   for	   their	  
respective	   spheres	   of	   inﬂuence.	   Russian	   leaders	   accommodated	   several	   of	   Japan’s	  
primary	   concerns,	   but	   it	   proved	   nearly	   impossible	   for	   Japan	   to	   completely	   counter	  
Russian	  inﬂuence.	  337
	   The	  acquisition	  of	  Taiwan	  in	  1895	  provided	  Japanese	  strategists	  with	  a	  gateway	  
for	  Japan’s	   ‘southward	  advance	  theory’	   (nanshin-­‐ron)	  into	  the	  Chinese	  mainland.	  The	  
southern	   advance	   contrasted	   the	   ‘northward	   advance	   theory’	   (hokushin-­‐ron),	   and	  
focused	   on	   Japanese	   eﬀorts	   in	   Manchuria.338 	   Of	   particular	   concern	   to	   Japan	   were	  
Chinese	   coastal	   possessions,	   namely	   the	   province	   of	   Fukien.	   With	   the	   support	   of	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several	  Japanese	  ministers	  stationed	  in	  Taiwan,	  Japan	  sought	  special	  concessions	  from	  
China	   with	   regard	   to	   territorial	   access	   and	   railroad	   contracts	   in	   Fukien.	   On	   both	  
accounts	   the	   Japanese	   were	   initially	   unsuccessful.339 	   Table	   5.1	   represents	   these	  
opposing	  strategies	  that	  are	  further	  examined	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
Strategy Operating	  Base Expansion	  Focus
southward	  advance	  theory	  (nanshin-­‐ron) Taiwan Fukien
northward	  advance	  theory	  (hokushin-­‐ron) Korea Manchuria
Table	  5.1	  :	  Southern	  vs	  Northern	  Expansionism	  Strategies
The	  norms	  of	  new	  imperialism	  framed	  the	  political	  discourse.	  Given	  Japan’s	  strategy	  of	  
social	  mobility	  within	  an	  international	  power	  hierarchy	  deﬁned	  by	  imperialist	  norms,	  
it	  was	  not	  a	  question	  if	  Japan	  should	  expand,	  but	  a	  question	  of	  where.	  	  
	   The	  Boxer	  Rebellion	  (1898	  -­‐	  1901)	  renewed	  Japanese	  optimism.	  At	  the	  request	  of	  
the	  British,	  Yamagata	  sent	  a	  massive	  contingent	  of	  over	  20,000	  troops	  (double	  that	  of	  
the	   British)	   to	   support	   the	   Eight-­‐Nation	   Alliance	   that	   intervened	   to	   pacify	   the	  
uprising.	  The	  aﬀair	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Japan	  to	  pressure	  the	  already	  strained	  
Chinese	  government.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1901,	  the	  Japanese	  presented	  the	  Chinese	  with	  
proposals	   for	  railroad	  concessions	  in	   Fukien	  and	  the	  neighboring	  provinces.	  Despite	  
modeling	   the	  proposals	   after	  Germany’s	   successful	   securement	   of	   railroad	   rights	   in	  
Shantung,	   the	   Japanese	   proposals	   were	   rejected.340 	   Japanese	   leaders	   responded	   by	  
developing	   plans	   to	   forcibly	   seize	   Amoy,	   the	   primary	   port	   of	   Fukien.	   These	   plans,	  
however,	   never	  came	  to	   fruition.341 	  The	  expedition	   could	  have	  brought	  the	   Japanese	  
into	   conﬂict	   with	   either	   the	   British	   or	   the	   Russians.342 	   The	   British	   had	   signiﬁcant	  
economic	  concerns	   in	   China,	   and	  British	   endorsement	   of	   the	  American	  Open	  Door	  
Policy	   assured	   a	   degree	  of	   protestation.343 	   In	   the	   north,	   the	  Boxer	  crisis	   intensiﬁed	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Russ0-­‐Japanese	  relations,	  and	  Japanese	  leaders	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  further	  complicate	  the	  
already	  contentious	  Korea-­‐Manchuria	  issue.	  
	   The	  prospect	  of	  balancing	  British	  and	  Russian	   interference	  in	  Japan’s	  imperial	  
agenda	   was	   debated	   by	   policy	   elites	   in	   1901.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   Japanese	  
leaders,	   placating	   both	   powers	   would	   have	   handicapped	   any	   future	   expansion.	  
Yamagata	  believed	  Russia	  was	   ‘“intent	   on	   the	  permanent	  occupation”’	   of	  Manchuria,	  
and	  pushed	   the	  government	   to	   temporarily	  halt	   its	  southern	  advance	  strategies	  and	  
focus	  its	  eﬀorts	  on	  defending	  the	  north.344	  The	  salience	  of	  this	  debate	  reveals	  several	  
factors	   constraining	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	   With	   Japanese	   sovereignty	   reaﬃrmed	  
following	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	   policy	   objectives	   shifted	   both	   in	   relation	   to	  
Yamagata	   (from	   securing	  sovereignty	   to	   expansionism)	   but	   also	   in	   terms	  of	  modern	  
state	   strategic	   preferences.	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	  4,	   alliances	   were	   a	   hallmark	   of	  
modern	   states	   and	   Japan’s	   elevated	   international	   standing	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	  
century	   provided	   the	   means	   to	   negotiate	   an	   alliance	   beneﬁcial	   to	   its	   expansionist	  
desires.
	  
	   As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   two	   factors,	   Japan’s	   elites	   explored	   policies	   designed	   to	  
enhance	   state	   power	   and	   prestige,	   and	   the	   division	   between	   groups	   favoring	  
sovereignty-­‐based	  strategies	  and	  power-­‐based	  strategies,	  as	  exhibited	  in	   the	  previous	  
two	  chapters,	  shifted	  to	  diﬀering	  strategies	  on	  expansionism	  (i.e.	  northern	  advance	  vs.	  
southern	   advance	   theory).	   The	  ongoing	   focus	   on	   power	  calculations	   by	   state	   elites	  
indicates	  strong	  ideological	  consistencies	  with	   the	  early	  Meiji	  period,	  where	  Japanese	  
leaders	   addressed	   deﬁciencies	   in	   state	   sovereignty	   resulting	   from	   unequal	   treaties.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  success	  of	  social	  mobility	  in	  improving	  Japan’s	  prestige	  continually	  
reinforced	  the	  norms	  of	  new	  imperialism	   to	   Japanese	   leaders.	   In	  terms	  of	  SIT,	   social	  
mobility	  supported	  the	  status	  seeking	  behavior	  of	  Japanese	  leaders.	  	  	  
	   While	  Japan	  achieved	  substantial	  success	  through	  social	  mobility,	  its	  eﬀorts	  to	  
emerge	  as	  a	  great	  power	  remained	  dependent	  upon	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  other	  modern	  
states.345	  The	  Triple	  Intervention	  demonstrated	  that	  Japan	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  accepted	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into	   the	   dominant	   group	   of	   elite	   great	   powers.	   Given	   its	   chosen	   strategy	   of	   social	  
mobility,	   Japanese	   leaders	   proceeded	   cautiously.	   In	   other	   words,	   Japanese	   leaders	  
sought	  to	  successfully	  navigate	  the	  constraints	  of	  multipolar	  great	  power	  politics	  while	  
maintaining	   eﬀorts	  to	   enhance	  its	  position	  within	   the	  existing	  power	  hierarchy.	  This	  
move	  should	  not	  be	  mistaken	  for	  the	  deference	  to	  Western	  authority	  Japan	  exhibited	  
following	   the	   Meiji	   Restoration.	   Japan’s	   deliberateness	   resulted	   from	   its	   eﬀorts	   to	  
avoid	   any	   future	  resistance	   reminiscent	   of	   the	  Triple	  Intervention,	   and	   indicates	  an	  
increasing	  level	  appreciation	  for	  international	  norms	  by	  Japanese	  policy	  makers.
	   Japanese	  leaders	  settled	  on	  a	  hedging	  strategy.	  Policy	  elites	  concluded	  that	  the	  
British	   agenda	   in	   China	   was	   driven	   mainly	   by	   economic	   concerns,	   providing	  
signiﬁcantly	   more	   ﬂexibility	   than	   the	   territorially	   driven	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   rivalry.	  
Russia’s	   behavior	  during	   the	  Boxer	  uprising	   was	   also	   cause	   for	   concern	   among	   the	  
Japanese.	   In	   response	   to	   Boxer	   attacks	   on	   Russian	   targets	   in	   Manchuria,	   Russia	  
deployed	   some	   100,000	   troops	   into	   the	   region.	   Despite	   Russian	   assurances	   to	   the	  
contrary,	   the	   troops	   remained	   stationed	   in	   Manchuria	   even	   after	   the	   Chinese	  
government	  had	  regained	  control	  of	  the	  region.	  346	  
	   Regardless	  of	  the	  growing	  tensions,	  some	  Japanese	  leaders	  sought	  a	  diplomatic	  
solution.	   Itō	   Hirobumi	   proclaimed	   that	   ‘“Manchuria	   is	   in	   no	   respect	   Japanese	  
territory,”’	   and	   suggested	   the	   two	   countries	   establish	   borders	   for	   their	   respective	  
spheres	  of	  inﬂuence.347 	  Itō	   proposed	  to	  scale	  back	   Japanese	  pursuits	  in	  Manchuria	  in	  
exchange	   for	   Russian	   recognition	   of	   Japanese	   control	   over	   Northern	   Korea.348	  
Negotiations	   continued	   into	   1904,	   with	   neither	   side	   willing	   to	   concede	   what	   they	  
perceived	   as	   contradictory	   ambitions.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   impasse,	   it	   should	   be	  
noted	  that	  Japanese	  negotiators	  displayed	  at	  least	  some	  level	  of	  cooperation,	  whereas	  
their	   Russian	   counterparts	   were	   unresponsive.	   By	   February	   1904,	   the	   Russians	   had	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ceased	   answering	   Japanese	   communications,	   prompting	   the	   Japanese	   to	   sever	  
diplomatic	  ties	  with	  Russia.349	  
	   As	   early	   as	   1901,	   Japanese	   leaders	   had	   expressed	   their	   concern	   over	   Russia	  
permanently	  occupying	  Manchuria.	  Similarly,	   the	  British	   had	   grown	  concerned	  over	  
other	   powers,	   Russian	   included,	   infringing	   upon	   their	   economic	   considerations	   in	  
China.350 	  Prime	  Minister	  Katsura	  Tarō	   argued	   that	   Russian	   possession	  of	  Manchuria	  
was	  a	  precursor	  of	  their	  encroachment	  into	  Korea.	  According	  to	  Katsura,	  Russia	  ‘“will	  
inevitably	  extend	  into	  Korea	  and	  will	  not	  end	  until	  there	  is	  on	  room	  left	  for	  us”’.351 	  The	  
Japanese	  solution	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  British	  that	  provided	  Japan	  
with	   much	   needed	   support	   to	   defend	   its	   northern	   interests.352 	   The	   Anglo-­‐Japanese	  
alliance	  was	  signed	  in	  1902,	  and	  in	  addition	  to	  guaranteeing	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  
considerations	   of	   Japan	  and	  Britain	   in	   China,	   it	   assured	  that	   Britain	  would	  come	  to	  
Japan’s	   aid	  should	  it	  ﬁnd	  itself	  at	  war	  with	  more	  than	  one	  adversary.	  This	  eﬀectively	  
handicapped	  Russia’s	  ability	  to	  call	  upon	  its	  European	  allies	  should	  conﬂict	  with	  Japan	  
arise.353 	   The	   alliance	   also	   provided	   the	   British	   with	   much	   needed	   naval	   relief	   in	  
protecting	  its	  Far	  East	  possessions.354	  
	   Conceptually,	  the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  alliance	  represents	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  
social	   mobility	   adopted	  by	   Japanese	   leaders.	  As	  previously	   discussed,	   alliances	   were	  
notable	  features	  of	  modern	  states.	  The	  political	   leverage	  aﬀorded	  to	   Japanese	  leaders	  
following	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  facilitated	  the	  alliance,	  which	  solidiﬁed	  Japan’s	  
position	  as	  a	  major	  player	  within	  the	  international	  power	  hierarchy.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
choice	   of	   Britain	   as	   a	   military	   partner	   corresponds	  with	   the	   decision	   to	   establish	   a	  
foreign	  policy	  strategy	  that	  utilized	  Britain	  as	  the	  referent	  group	  for	  the	  Japanese	  elite.	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Figure	  5.2	  reinforces	  this	  dynamic	  by	  presenting	  the	  variables	  relevant	  to	  the	  analyzing	  

















Social	  Mobility.	  Westernization	  generally	  
accepted	  for	  short	  period	  before	  giving	  
way	  to	  more	  nuanced	  modernization	  





Social	  Mobility.	  With	  modernization	  in	  
full	  swing,	  Japanese	  leaders	  shift	  focus	  
from	  domestic	  to	  international	  interests.
Table	  5.2	  :	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1868	  -­‐	  1918)
	  
	   Unlike	   previous	   iterations	   of	   this	   table,	   two	   periods	   in	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	  
history	   are	   displayed.	   This	   presentation	   clariﬁes	   two	   conceptual	   factors:	   (1)	   the	  
narrowing	   of	   referent	   group	   selection	   mentioned	   above;	   and	   (2)	   the	   evolution	   of	  
norms	   within	   the	   domestic	   identity	   hierarchy.	   This	   latter	   factor	   requires	   further	  
explication.	   The	   early	   Meiji	   period	   was	   marked	   by	   fervent	   modernization	   that	  
transformed	   the	   domestic	   institutions	   of	   Japan	   (Chapter	   4).	   Once	   these	   domestic	  
institutions	  were	   in	   place,	  Meiji	   leaders	  were	   charged	  with	   crafting	   a	   foreign	   policy	  
strategy.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  modernization	  norms	  present	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  were	  
transformed	  into	  imperialist	  norms	  in	  the	  international	  sphere.	  
	   The	  conceptual	  linkages	  between	  Chapters	  3	  -­‐	  5	  have	  been	  designed	  to	  trace	  the	  
interplay	  between	  domestic	  modernization	  and	  international	   imperialism,	  where	  it	  is	  
demonstrated	  that	  Western	  norms	  were	  ﬁrst	  imported	  into	  Japan,	  transformed	  by	  the	  
Japanese	  people,	  and	  then	  translated	  into	  foreign	  policy.	  As	  such,	  theoretical	  ﬂexibility	  
that	   accounts	   for	   both	   external	   and	   internal	   variables	   is	   necessary.	   A	   neorealist	  
analysis	   might	   have	   expected	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   immediately	   adopt	   an	   assertive	  
foreign	  policy	  to	   bolster	  Japan	  against	   further	  encroachment	  from	  external	  pressures,	  
but	   this	   approach	   neglects	   the	   domestic	   transformation	   of	   those	   pressures	   into	   a	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foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  Likewise,	   strict	  ideational	  interpretations	  cannot	  convincingly	  
account	   for	   the	   security	   imperatives	   that	   drove	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   mimic	   the	   very	  
behavior	  (imperialist	  norms)	  that	  had	  undermined	  Japanese	  sovereignty.	  
	   Brewing	   hostilities	   with	   Russia	   erupted	   on	   8	   February	   1904	   with	   a	   Japanese	  
surprise	  attack	  by	  on	  the	  Russian	  stronghold	  at	  Port	  Arthur.	  Over	  the	  next	  year	  and	  a	  
half,	   Japanese	  forces	  decimated	   the	  Russian	  Navy.	   By	  the	  end	  of	   the	  war,	  Russia	  had	  
lost	  much	  of	  its	  Paciﬁc	  and	  Baltic	  ﬂeets,	   reducing	  Russian	  naval	   strength	  to	   that	  of	  a	  
second	  tier	  power.355 	  Japanese	  strategy	  on	   land	  hinged	  upon	  massed	  infantry	  assaults	  
against	   Russian	   fortiﬁcations.	   The	   tactic	   proved	   highly	   successful	   in	   overrunning	  
Russian	  defensive	  positions,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  heavy	  Japanese	  casualties.356
	   Following	  the	  decisive	  Japanese	  naval	  victory	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Tsushima	  in	  May	  
1905,	  the	  Japanese	  army	  occupied	  the	  Sakhalin	  Islands,	  thereby	  forcing	  the	  Russians	  to	  
sue	  for	  peace.	   Russia’s	  defeat	   shocked	  the	   international	   system.	   The	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  
War	  marked	   the	   ﬁrst	   modern	   victory	   of	   an	   Asian	   state	   over	   a	   European	   power.357	  
Furthermore,	   Japan’s	   rapid	   modernization	   and	   development	   into	   a	   military	  
powerhouse	  removed	  any	  suspicion	  that	  the	  preeminence	  of	  Western	  Powers	  resulting	  
from	  cultural	  or	  intellectual	  superiority.358	  Through	  its	  defeat	  of	  China	  in	  the	  previous	  
decade,	  Japan	  had	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  premier	  Asian	  power.	  A	  decade	  later,	  Japan	  
was	  a	  globally	  recognized	  great	  power.
	   Although	  both	  the	  Japanese	  political	  elite	  and	  general	  public	  had	  clamored	  for	  
war,	  the	  Emperor	  Meiji	  himself	  greeting	  the	  outbreak	  of	  hostilities	  with	  ambivalence.	  
On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  attack	  on	  Port	  Arthur,	  he	  wrote	  the	  following	  poem:
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Yomo	  no	  umi	  	   	   	   On	  all	  four	  seas	  
Mina	  harakara	  to	  	   	   I	  thought	  all	  men	  were	  brothers
Omou	  yo	  ni	  	   	   	   Yet	  in	  this	  world
Nado	  namikaze	  no	  	   	   Why	  do	  winds	  and	  waves	  
Tachisawaguran	  	  	   	   Now	  rise	  and	  stir?	  359
The	   emperor	   remained	   a	   poignant	   voice	   throughout	   the	   war,	   publishing	   in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  Imperial	  Poetry	  Bureau	  over	  seven	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  poems	  on	  
subjects	   ranging	   from	   duty,	   sacriﬁce,	   political	   legitimacy	   and	   even	   more	   abstract	  
concepts	   such	   as	   the	  nature	   of	   war	   itself.	  Most	   surprising	   is	   that	   the	   emperor	  had	  
remained	  quiet	   a	   decade	   earlier	  during	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  360 	  While	   it	   is	  
impossible	   to	   substantiate	   the	   emperor’s	   true	   motivation,	   this	   inconsistency	   does	  
parallel	   the	  diﬀering	   roles	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  power	  in	  relation	  to	   the	  two	  wars.	  The	  
First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  reasserted	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  other	  imperialist	  
states	  (albeit	  through	  an	  aggressive	  war	  over	  Korea)	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  Japan	  had	  
successfully	   modernized.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   War	   served	   to	  
further	   Japanese	   power	   and	   prestige	   after	   Japan	   had	   already	   established	   itself	   as	   a	  
modern	  state.	  
	   The	  war	  formally	  concluded	  in	  September	  1905	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  The	  Treaty	  
of	  Portsmouth.	  Under	  its	  terms,	  Russia	  agreed	  to	   relinquish	  its	  claim	   in	  the	  Liaotung	  
Peninsula,	   acknowledge	   Japan’s	   freedom	   of	   action	   within	   Korea,	   and	   cede	   the	  
Southern	  half	  of	  Sakhalin	  to	  Japan.361	  See	  Map	  5.1	  for	  details.	  Russian	  withdrawal	  from	  
Laiotung	  facilitated	  the	  transfer	  of	  principle	  rights	  in	  Manchuria	  from	  Russia	  to	  Japan,	  
thus	  reversing	  the	  controversial	  leasing	  of	  the	  province	  by	  Russia	  in	  1898	  following	  the	  
Triple	   Intervention.	   The	   victory	   resulted	   in	   a	   monumental	   boost	   to	   Japan’s	  
international	   prestige,	   and	   a	   corresponding	   deterioration	   of	   Russia’s	   position.	   The	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heavy	   causalities	   and	   crippling	   ﬁnancial	   cost	   sustained	   by	   Japan	   inﬂuenced	   some	  
Japanese	  to	   expect	   terms	  comparable	  to	   the	  Treaty	  of	  Shimonoseki,	   and	  viewed	  the	  
Portsmouth	  proceedings	  as	  unnecessarily	  restrained.362
Map	  5.1	  :	  Kwantung	  Leased	  Territory,	  1932363
	   Most	   notable	   among	   these	  concerns	  was	   the	  absence	  of	   a	  war	   indemnity	  and	  
underwhelming	  territorial	   gains.	   Japanese	  leaders	  justiﬁed	   the	  terms	  by	  arguing	   that	  
Russians	   would	  have	   continued	   ﬁghting	  had	   Japanese	  negotiators	  pressed	   for	  more	  
severe	  concessions.364	  This	  rationalization	   is	  reasonable	  when	  considering	   the	  cost	   to	  
human	   life	   and	   the	   ﬁnancial	   burden	   incurred	   by	   the	   Japanese.	   Additionally,	   the	  
Western	   powers,	   America	   in	   particular,	   had	   pressured	   the	   Japanese	   to	   compromise	  
during	   the	   negotiation	   process.	   Yet	   these	   factors	   had	   little	   impact	   on	   the	   Japanese	  
people.	   For	   the	  ﬁve	   weeks	  between	   signing	   of	   the	   treaty	   and	   its	   ratiﬁcation	  by	   the	  
Chapter	  5:	  Great	  Power	  Politics	  and	  Japan,	  1895	  -­‐	  1931	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145
362	  Kennedy	  1963,	  204.
363	  Adapted	  from:	  China	  and	  Japan	  (Source:	  League	  of	  Nations	  (ed.):	  Appeal	  by	  the	  Chinese	  
Government.	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  of	  Enquiry.	  Appendix,	  Map	  No.	  1,	  Geneva:	  League	  of	  
Nations,	  1932)
364	  Ibid.,	  204-­‐5.
emperor,	  uprisings	  erupted	  across	  Japan	  injuring	  over	  a	  thousand	  people	  and	  claiming	  
eleven	  lives.365
	   It	  is	  too	  simplistic	  to	  conceptualize	  this	  violence	  as	  a	  nascent	  outpouring	  of	  the	  
Japanese	  jingoism	  that	  would	  surface	  over	  the	  next	  half	  century.	  In	  little	  over	  a	  decade,	  
Japan	  had	  defeated	  China,	   the	  traditional	   hegemon	  of	  Asia,	  and	  Russia,	  a	  recognized	  
Western	  great	  power.	  Although	  these	  victories	  propelled	  Japan	  into	  the	  upper	  echelon	  
of	   prestige	   and	   power	   within	   the	   international	   system,	   Japanese	   gains	   were	  
suboptimal.	   Ancillary	   factors,	   such	   as	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	   multipolar	  
international	   system,	  were	  the	  main	  contributor	   to	   these	  results.	   In	   the	  case	   of	  the	  
Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  this	  pressure	  materialized	  with	  the	  Triple	  Intervention.	  To	  a	  lesser	  
extent,	   war	   exhaustion	   coupled	   with	   Western	   eﬀorts	   to	   stabilize	   their	   economic	  
interests	  had	  likewise	  impacted	  Japanese	  gains.	  
	   These	  factors	   clariﬁed	   to	   the	  Japanese	  leadership	  the	  necessity	  of	  successfully	  
interpreting	   signals	   from	   the	   international	   system.	   This	   evolution	   of	   thought	   is	  
evident	   from	   the	  diﬀerences	  between	  the	  Shimonoseki	  and	  Portsmouth	  Treaties.	  The	  
Treaty	   of	   Shimonoseki	   demanded	   a	   crippling	   war	   indemnity	   from	   China	   and	   the	  
cession	   of	   the	  Laiotung	   Peninsula	   and	   Taiwan.	   These	  bold	  demands	  were	  met	  with	  
resistance	  by	   the	  multipolar	   international	   community.	   Ten	   years	   later,	   the	   Japanese	  
elite	   pursued	   similar	   ends	   through	   more	   palatable	   means.	   Rather	   than	   seeking	  
outright	   territorial	   possession	   of	   the	   Laiotung	   Peninsula,	   Japan	   negotiated	   the	  
transference	  of	  the	  Russian	  lease	  of	  Laiotung	   Peninsula	  and	   their	  principle	  rights	   in	  
Manchuria.	   These	   measures	   eﬀectively	   amounted	   to	   greater	   gains	   than	   those	  
negotiated	  at	  Shimonoseki,	   and	  where	  in	   line	  with	  the	  expressed	  economic	   interests	  
(norms	   themselves)	   of	   the	  other	   great	   powers	   in	   China.	  With	   control	   of	   both	  Port	  
Arthur	  and	  Dairen,	  Japan	  possessed	  the	  ﬁnest	  naval	   port	   and	  trading	  centers	   in	  all	  of	  
Northeast	  Asia.366 	   In	   addition,	   the	  Japanese	  leaders	  solidiﬁed	  their	  position	  in	  Korea	  
by	  expanding	  their	  sphere	  of	  inﬂuence	  into	  Manchuria.	  The	  degree	  of	  this	  victory	  was	  
obfuscated	  by	  a	  public	  expecting	  treasure	   in	  the	  form	   of	  territory	  and	  indemnities	  as	  
compensation	   for	   their	   sacriﬁces.	  The	  violent	   response	  by	   the	   Japanese	  public	  must	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therefore	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   result	   of	   a	   disconnect	   between	   the	   Japanese	   elite	  
balancing	   power	   politics	   and	   the	   expansionist	   dreams	   of	   a	   growingly	   nationalist	  
public.	  	  
	   The	   security	   driven	   focus	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Portsmouth	   reinforces	   the	   core	  
assumptions	  of	   state	  behavior	  derived	   from	   this	   thesis’	   theoretical	   framework.	  Since	  
the	   Meiji	   Period,	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   had	   displayed	   a	   fundamental	   concern	   in	  
reaﬃrming	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  and	  bolstering	  state	  power.	  As	  detailed	  in	  Chapters	  3	  
and	  4,	   this	  emphasis	  derived	  from	   the	  early	  Meiji	   period	  where	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  
was	  compromised	  by	  Western	  encroachment.	  The	  foreign	  policy	  agendas	  designed	  to	  
address	  these	  security	  concerns	  remained	  dependent	  upon	  the	  perception	  of	  Japanese	  
political	   elite,	   accounting	   for	   the	   evolution	   of	   negotiation	   agendas	   between	  
Shimonoseki	   and	   Portsmouth	   and	   the	   disconnect	   between	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	  
Japanese	  public	  and	  their	  political	   leaders.	  This	  increased	  sensitivity	  to	   the	  norms	  of	  
new	  imperialism,	  of	  which	  great	  power	  balancing	  was	  one	  element,	  combined	  with	  the	  
ongoing	  successes	  of	  social	  mobility,	  reinforcing	  the	  existing	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  to	  
Japanese	  leaders.	  
	   It	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  consider	  these	  events	  with	  regard	  to	  social	  mobility.	  The	  
Japanese	   attack	   on	   Russia	   did	   not	   represent	   a	   shift	   in	   strategy	   away	   from	   social	  
mobility	  towards	  that	  of	  social	  competition.	  The	  new	  imperialism	  of	  the	  ninetieth	  and	  
twentieth	   century	   was	   marked	   by	   ﬁerce	   geopolitical	   rivalries	   that	   frequently	  
culminated	   in	  bloodshed.	  The	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  must	   be	   interpreted	  within	   these	  
parameters.	  Japan	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  directly	  challenge	  the	  norms	  of	  imperialism	  with	  its	  
attack	   on	   Port	   Arthur.	   Conversely,	   Japan’s	   actions	   embodied	   the	   very	   principles	  
imperialism,	  as	  they	  provided	  the	  vehicle	  through	  which	  Japan	  achieved	  great	   power	  
status.
5.2	  Directions	  in	  Foreign	  Policy	  (1905	  -­‐	  1911)
The	   ramiﬁcations	   of	   the	   Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	   extended	   far	   beyond	   Northeast	   Asia.	  
With	   its	   defeat	   of	   a	  Western	   power,	   Japan	   had	   not	   only	   solidiﬁed	   its	   great	   power	  
status	  but	  destroyed	  the	  air	  of	  invincibility	  surrounding	  Western	  powers.	  Prior	  to	  the	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Japanese	  victory,	  Asian	  nationalism	  had	   existed	  as	  a	   politically	   negligible,	   and	   often	  
xenophobic,	   response	   to	   Western	   encroachment.	   Pockets	   of	   politically	   active	  
nationalist	   groups	  did	  exist	  throughout	  Western-­‐held	  Asian	   territories,	   ranging	   from	  
the	  Philippines	  and	  Dutch	  East	  Indies	  in	  the	  East	  onto	   the	  mainland	  in	  French	  Indo-­‐
China	  and	  across	   the	  continent	   into	   India,	  but	  their	  activities	  were	  kept	   in	  check	  by	  
their	  imperial	  possessors.	  However,	  the	  defeat	  of	  a	  Western	  power	  by	  an	  Asian	  power	  
reinvigorated	  the	  movement.367
	   Japan	  had	  itself	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  Western	  encroachment.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  Japan	  was	  the	  only	  state	  to	  have	  successfully	  reversed	  the	  
trend.	   Through	   its	  incorporation	  of	  modernization	   norms	   and	   its	   skillful	   diplomatic	  
and	  domestic	  leadership,	   Japan	  provided	  Asian	  nationalists	  with	  a	  model	  to	   emulate.	  
Revolutionary	   nationalists	   throughout	   Asia	   looked	   to	   Japan	   for	   support,	   including	  
Indo-­‐Chinese	  anti-­‐colonialist	  Phan	  Boi	  Chau	  who	   lived	   in	  Japan	  from	  1905-­‐8.368	  To	  a	  
greater	   extent,	   Chinese	   revolutionary	   Sun	   Yat-­‐sen’s	   political	   career	   was	   heavily	  
dependent	  upon	  his	  relationship	  with	  Japan,	  where	  he	  received	  safe	  haven	  during	  his	  
exile	  and	  political	  support	  during	  the	  1911	  and	  1913	  Revolutions.369	  
	   While	   Japan	   had	  successfully	  resisted	  the	  West,	   it	   had	  done	  so	   by	  emulating	  
not	   rejecting	   Western	   imperialism	   through	   social	   mobility.	   Japan	   was	   initially	  
motivated	   by	   the	  desire	   to	   redress	   its	   compromised	   sovereignty,	   but	   as	   Japan	   grew	  
stronger	   the	  perceived	  security	   concerns	  of	   its	   political	   elite	  expanded.	  The	   shift	   in	  
perception	   is	   evident	   in	   the	   wide	   acceptance	   of	   Yamagata’s	   concentric	   lines	   of	  
sovereignty	  and	  interest	  that	  were	  continually	  reinforced	  by	  his	  protégés	  and	  political	  
allies.	  This	  evolution	  corresponds	  with	  Japan’s	  stated	  purpose	  to	   join	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  
great	  powers.	   It	  was	  not	  until	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  that	  the	  inherent	  
contradiction	  of	  Japanese	  imperialism	  became	  apparent	  to	  Asian	  nationalists.370	  In	  the	  
interim,	   Japanese	   leaders	   were	   successful	   at	   utilizing	   their	   wealth	   and	   status	   to	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inﬂuence	  nationalists	  supportive	  of	  Japan	  and	  thus	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  Japanese	  
Empire’s	  later	  exploitation	  of	  Pan-­‐Asian	  ideology.
	   The	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   war	   also	   uncovered	   ambiguities	   in	   Japan’s	   imperialist	  
agenda.	  During	  the	  early	  Meiji	  years,	  Japanese	  leadership	  had	  deliberated	  at	  length	  on	  
the	  Korea	  question.	  Ostensibly,	  their	  concern	  laid	  with	  the	  security	  threat	  Korea	  posed	  
to	   Japan,	   stated	   most	   famously	   by	   Prussian	   advisor	   Major	   Klemens	   Meckel	   who	  
referred	  to	  Korea	  as	  ‘“a	  dagger	  thrust	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Japan”’.371 	  Once	  ﬁrmly	  entrenched	  
in	  Korea,	  Japan	  was	  thrust	  into	  a	  geopolitical	  rivalry	  with	  Russia	  over	  their	  competing	  
spheres	   of	   inﬂuence	   in	   Northern	   Korea	   and	   Manchuria.	   At	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	  
Russo-­‐Japanese	  war,	  Japan’s	  sphere	  of	  inﬂuence	  was	  safely	  established,	  facilitating	  the	  
formal	  annexation	  of	  Korea	  in	  1910,	  but	  new	  vulnerabilities	  emerged.	  
	   Policy	  leaders	  were	  charged	  with	  redeﬁning	  Japan’s	  security	  concerns.	  With	  the	  
empire’s	   northern	   interests	   secure,	   the	  question	   of	  where	   to	   focus	   Japan’s	   imperial	  
drive	   again	   surfaced.	   The	   Japanese	   elite	   revisited	   army-­‐ﬁrst	   vs	   navy-­‐ﬁrst	   strategies,	  
revealing	   an	   implicit	   assumption	   that	   only	  one	  military	   branch	   should	  primarily	  be	  
entrusted	  with	   the	  burden	  of	  empire,	   a	  consideration	   that	  may	  have	  been	  inherited	  
from	   their	   study	   of	   European	   power	   politics.	   While	   the	   ﬁrst	   two	   aspects	   of	   the	  
postbellum	   debate	   presuppose	   continued	   expansionism,	   Japanese	   leaders	   also	  
discussed	   whether	   Japan	   should	   maintain	   its	   expansionist	   drive.	   Broad	   overlap	  
between	  these	  groups	  existed,	  with	   arguments	   favoring	   northern	   strategies	   generally	  
focusing	   on	   expansionism	   in	   Manchuria	   through	   the	   army,	   while	   proponents	   of	   a	  
southern	  strategy	  often	  favored	  a	  naval	  agenda	  that	  maintained	  the	  status	  quo.	  372	  
	   Much	  of	  the	  clamor	  for	  continued	  expansion	  came	  from	  the	  Japanese	  military,	  
whose	   institutional	   strength	   within	   Japan’s	   political	   apparatus	   depended	   upon	   an	  
imperial	   agenda,	   and	   which	   had	   grown	   considerably	   under	   Yamagata’s	   eﬀorts	   to	  
‘“expand	   [Japanese]	   national	   interests	   and	   sovereign	   rights”’.373 	   Divisions	   between	  
groups	   persisted,	   with	   the	   army	   generally	   favoring	   more	   aggressive	   continental	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expansion	  and	   the	  navy	  warning	  of	   the	  geopolitical	   consequences	   of	   an	   island	  state	  
over-­‐investing	   itself	   on	   the	   continent.	   While	   these	   views	   did	   favor	   continued	  
expansionism,	  their	  proponents,	  such	  as	  military	  strategists	  Colonel	  Tanaka	  Giichi	  and	  
naval	  Captain	  Satō	  Tetsutarō,	  represented	  an	  older	  generation	  of	  Japanese	  leaders	  who	  
cautioned	   against	   blind	   aggression.	   Nevertheless	   Giichi,	   who	   later	   served	   as	   Prime	  
Minister	  in	  the	  1920s,	  believed	  that	  Japan	  ‘“should	  break	  free	  from	  its	  insular	  position,	  
become	   a	   continental	   state,	   and	   conﬁdently	   extend	   its	   national	   power.”’374 	   More	  
aggressive	  views	  did	   exist,	  such	   as	   those	  of	  Colonel	  Matsuishi	   Yasuji,375 	  who	   favored	  
simultaneous	   advances	   to	   the	   north	   and	   the	   south	   (nanboku	   heishin-­‐ron).376 	   The	  
division	  between	  these	  groups	  expands	  upon	  the	  diﬀering	  strategies	  outlined	  in	  Table	  
5.1,	   and	   provides	   further	   evidence	   that	   the	   norms	   of	   new	   imperialism	   remained	  
entrenched	  within	  the	   Japanese	  polity.	   It	  was	  how	  these	  norms	  were	  translated	  into	  
policy	   that	   remained	   contentious,	   and	   must	   be	   considered	   when	   examining	   the	  
ideological	   consistencies	   between	   state	  elites	   as	   outlined	   by	   the	  research	   questions.	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   Although	  both	  army-­‐ﬁrst	  and	  navy-­‐ﬁrst	  strategies	  did	  warrant	  consideration,	  it	  
must	  be	  noted	  that	  much	  of	  the	  debate	  precipitated	  from	  the	  bureaucratic	  struggle	  for	  
power	   within	   Japan.	   For	   the	   time,	   the	   Japanese	   government	   advocated	   a	   cautious	  
approach	  that	  clearly	  exempliﬁed	  Japan’s	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	  In	  July	  1908,	  the	  
Katsura	  cabinet	  concluded	  that	  ‘“Japan	  should	  solidify	  the	  alliance	  with	  England,	  strive	  
to	  maintain	  the	  entente	  with	  Russia,	   improve	  old	  friendships	  with	  Germany,	  Austria,	  
and	   Italy	   while	   preserving	   cooperation	   with	   the	   US.”’377 	   Japan’s	   desire	   to	   proceed	  
within	   the	   accepted	   parameters	   of	   the	   international	   system	   reveals	   its	   eﬀorts	   to	  
maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  assert	  itself	  within	  the	  international	  system	  via	  a	  strategy	  
of	  social	  mobility.	  The	  ideological	  constraints	  outlined	  by	  this	  thesis’	   framework	  diﬀer	  
from	   what	   might	   be	   expected	   from	   a	   neorealist	   or	  oﬀensive	   realist	   analysis.	   In	   the	  
years	  preceding	  WWI,	  there	  were	  clear	  opportunities	  for	  Japan	  to	   expand	  its	  position	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   other	   great	   powers.	   This	  might	   be	   considered	   a	  missed	   opportunity	   if	  
considering	  only	  power	  calculations,	  but	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  SIT,	  social	  mobility	  
continued	  to	  oﬀer	  non-­‐confrontational	  avenues	  for	  status	  seeking	  behavior.	  	  	  
	   Over	  time,	   this	  discretion	  would	  diminish	  with	   the	  growing	  political	   inﬂuence	  
of	   the	   Japanese	   armed	   forces.	   Following	   Itō	   Hirobumi’s	   death	   in	   1909,	   Yamagata	  
became	   the	  most	   inﬂuential	  member	  of	   the	  genrō.	  Genrō	   or	  “principle	   elders”	   were	  
elder	   Japanese	   statesmen	   who	   constituted	   an	   extraconstitutional	   oligarchy	   that	  
dominated	   the	   Meiji	   government.	   Although	   Yamagata	   entered	   semi-­‐retirement	  
following	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War,	  he	   remained	  president	   of	   the	  Privy	  Council	   from	  
1909	  until	   1922.	   In	   1912,	   Yamagata	  set	   the	  dangerous	  precedent	   that	   the	   army	   could	  
dismiss	   the	   cabinet,	   contributing	   to	   the	   already	   expanding	   politicization	   of	   the	  
military.378 	  This	  latter	  element	   contributed	  signiﬁcantly	  to	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  young	  
generation	   of	   nationalistic	   Japanese	   leaders	   eager	   to	   displace	   the	   caution	   of	   their	  
predecessors.379
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   Diplomatically,	  Japanese	  elites	   focused	  on	   solidifying	   its	   relationship	  with	  the	  
other	   great	   powers.	   The	  prestige	   gained	  from	   its	  victory	   in	   the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  
provided	   the	   context	   for	   renegotiating	   the	   Angl0-­‐Japanese	   alliance	   on	   terms	   more	  
favorable	   to	   the	   Japanese.380 	   During	   this	   period,	   the	   Japanese	   also	   established	   the	  
Russo-­‐Japanese	   Entente,	   the	   Franco-­‐Japanese	   Entente,	   and	   the	   Root-­‐Takahira	  
Agreement	   with	   the	   US,	   which	   buttressed	   each	   state’s	   economic	   stake	   in	   China.	  
Japan’s	   preference	   for	   diplomatic	   cooperation	   resulted	   in	   part	   from	   necessity.	   The	  
costs	   of	   the	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   war	   were	   tremendous.	   Establishing	   ententes	   provided	  
Japanese	   leaders	   with	   an	   opportunity	   to	   rebuild	   its	   strength.381 	   Moreover,	   these	  
agreements	   displayed	   Japan’s	   methodical	   commitment	   to	   institutionalizing	   its	  
position	  within	  the	  international	  power	  hierarchy.	  
	   In	  1910,	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Russians	  reached	  a	  secret	  agreement	  that	  partitioned	  
Manchuria	  into	  two	  separate	  but	  equal	  spheres	  of	  inﬂuence.	  This	  agreement	  provided	  
the	  pretext	   for	  eventual	   annexation,	  and	  even	   included	  contingencies	  for	  Russia	  and	  
Japan	  to	  come	  to	  each	  other’s	  aid	  should	  a	  third	  party	  intervene	  in	  their	  plans.382	  The	  
agreement	   is	   rather	   signiﬁcant	   given	   Japan’s	   contentious	   relationship	   with	   Russia.	  
Japanese	  preference	  for	  diplomatic	  solutions	  suggests	  that	  policy	  elites	  believed	  state	  
power	  and	  prestige	  were	  strengthened	  through	  the	  existing	  power	  hierarchy.	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	   state	   leaders	   maintained	   their	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility.	   It	   was	   not	   until	   the	  
aftermath	   of	  the	  First	  World	  War,	   when	  the	  norms	   of	   the	   international	   community	  
shifted	  away	  from	  new	  imperialism,	  that	  social	  mobility	  was	  challenged.	  Nevertheless,	  
it	   should	  be	  noted	  that	   following	   these	  negotiations	  with	  Russia,	  Yamagata	  explored	  
revisionist	   foreign	   policy	   options.	   Yamagata	  argued	   that	   the	  Angl0-­‐Japanese	  alliance	  
had	   outlived	   its	   usefulness,	   and	   in	   1907	   he	   presented	   his	   “Basic	   Plan	   for	   National	  
Defense”	  which	  listed	  Russia	  as	  a	  potential	  adversary.383	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5.3	  The	  First	  World	  War	  (1914	  -­‐	  1918)
When	  hostilities	  erupted	  following	  the	  assassination	  of	  Archduke	  Franz	  Ferdinand	  on	  
28	  June	  1914,	  Japan	  was	  not	  obligated	  to	  join	  the	  British	  war	  eﬀort.	  Under	  the	  terms	  of	  
the	   1911	   revisions	  to	   the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Alliance,	   Japanese	  military	   commitment	  was	  
only	  required	  in	  the	  event	   that	  Germany	  attacked	  British	  possessions	   in	  the	  Far	  East.	  
Germany	  had	  wisely	  not	   pursued	  this	   strategy,	  but	  clashes	  between	   the	  British	  Navy	  
and	  German	  armed	  merchant	   vessels	  in	  Chinese	  coastal	  waters	  prompted	  the	  British	  
to	   seek	   Japanese	  assistance.384	  The	  oﬃcial	   Japanese	  response	  stated	  that	   ‘hunting	  out	  
and	   destroying	   the	   armed	   German	   merchant	   cruisers...is	   no	   doubt	   an	   act	   of	   war	  
against	  Germany.	  Once	  a	  belligerent	  Power,	   Japan	   cannot	  restrict	   her	  action	  only	   to	  
the	   destruction	   of	  hostile	  armed	  merchant	   cruisers’	   and	  inquired	  as	   to	   whether	  the	  
British	   were	   agreeable	   to	   such	   a	   declaration	   of	   war.385 	   The	   British	   were	   initially	  
apprehensive	   of	   Japan’s	  willingness	   to	   attack	  Germany,	   but	   eventually	   accepted	   the	  
Japanese	  oﬀer.386
	   Japan’s	  declaration	  of	  war	  came	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Japanese	  Army	  was	  largely	  
pro-­‐German	   and	   Japanese	   strategists	   believed	   Germany	   would	   be	   victorious.	   It	   is	  
telling	  then	  that	  the	  Japanese	  still	  pursued	  the	  warpath.	  In	  part,	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  
to	  revenge	  Germany’s	  role	  in	  the	  Triple	  Intervention	  and	  to	  expand	  Japanese	  claims	  on	  
the	  Chinese	  mainland.387	  With	  the	  other	  great	  powers	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  European	  
war,	   the	   Japanese	   were	   aﬀorded	   an	   ideal	   opportunity	   to	   expand	   their	   continental	  
ambitions.388	  Nonetheless,	  Japanese	  leaders	  expressed	  a	  genuine	  interest	  in	  conﬁrming	  
Japan’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  alliance.	  The	  Angl0-­‐Japanese	  Alliance	  was	  the	  cornerstone	  
of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy,	  described	  by	  the	  Cabinet	  council	  as	  the	  ‘marrow	  of	  imperial	  
diplomacy’,	   reaﬃrming	   that	   Japanese	   leaders	   perceived	   the	   British	   as	   the	   primary	  
reference	  group	  for	  their	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.389
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   In	   August	   1914,	   Japan	   issued	   an	   ultimatum	   to	   Germany	   demanding	   their	  
withdrawal	  from	  Tsingtao	  and	  the	  disarmament	  of	  German	  warships	  patrolling	  oﬀ	  the	  
Chinese	   coast.	   The	   Japanese	   waited	   eight	   days	   for	   a	   reply	   that	   never	   came	   before	  
declaring	   war.	   Japanese	   operations	   were	   decisive.	   The	   poorly	   defended	   German	  
possessions	   in	   the	  Paciﬁc	  fell	   almost	   immediately.	  After	   laying	   siege	  to	   Tsingtao	   for	  
over	  a	  month,	  the	  ﬁnal	   assault	  was	  delivered	  on	  6	  November.	  It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  
during	   the	   siege	   of	   Tsingtao,	   the	   British	   placed	   a	   small	   force	   of	   army	   and	   navy	  
personnel	  directly	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  marking	  the	  ﬁrst	   time	  in	  history	  
that	  Western	  soldiers	  fought	  under	  Japanese	  commanders.	  Although	  a	  minor	  aﬀair	  in	  
world	  history,	  this	  rare	  occurrence	  reveals	  just	  how	  far	  Japan	  had	  advanced	  in	  the	  eyes	  
of	  the	  leading	  imperial	  powers.390	  
	   The	   ultimatum	   issued	   by	   Japan	   included	   provisions	   to	   return	   German	  
possessions	   in	   China	   proper	   to	   the	   Chinese	   government.	   However,	   following	   the	  
approximately	  1,500	  causalities	  sustained	  by	  the	  Japanese	  in	  securing	  these	  objectives,	  
the	   Japanese	   government	   believed	   these	   territories	   their	  rightful	   spoils.391 	   Following	  
the	   expulsion	   of	  German	   forces	   from	   Shandong,	   the	   Chinese	   requested	   that	   Japan	  
withdraw	  its	  troops	  from	  the	  region.	  The	  Japanese	  response	  was	  to	  clandestinely	  issue	  
the	  infamous	  Twenty-­‐one	  Demands,	  which	  if	  accepted	  would	  have	  transformed	  China	  
into	  a	  protectorate	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.392
	   The	   content	   of	   the	   Twenty-­‐one	   Demands	   was	   soon	   disclosed	   to	   the	   Allied	  
powers.	   Several	   of	   the	   provisions	   undermined	   British	   and	   American	   economic	  
concerns,	  including	  the	  loosely	  accepted	  Open	  Door	  Policy,	  and	  the	  secretive	  manner	  
of	  Japan’s	  maneuvering	  damaged	  its	  international	  standing.393	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  West,	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Although	  this	  thesis	  has	  noted	  a	  distinction	  between	  militarists	  and	  diplomats	  during	  this	  era,	  there	  
is	  some	  considerable	  blurring	  regarding	  foreign	  policy	  expectations.	  Yamagata	  opposed	  the	  Twenty-­‐
one	  Demands	  believing	  them	  to	  be	  dishonorable.	  It	  was	  ultimately	  liberal	  leaning	  diplomats	  who	  
pushed	  forward	  with	  the	  plan.
393	  Yang,	  Toward	  a	  History	  Beyond	  Borders:	  Contentious	  Issues	  in	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  Relations,	  vol.	  340,	  
Harvard	  East	  Asian	  Monographs	  	  (Harvard	  University	  Asia	  Center,	  2012).
Japan	  exploited	  the	  war	  for	  its	  own	  gain.	  Its	  hapless	  attempts	  to	  control	  China	  shocked	  
even	   Japan’s	   closest	   Western	   allies,	   some	   of	   whom	   (Britain	   and	   France)	   had	   been	  
willing	   to	   concede	   Japan’s	   claim	   on	   the	   former	  German	   possessions.	   For	   their	   part,	  
many	  within	  Japan	  also	  criticized	  the	  move	  for	  undermining	  Japan’s	  relationship	  with	  
the	  West	  and	  doing	  untold	  damage	  to	  their	  economic	  future	  in	  China.394	  
	   Japan	   attempted	   to	   recover	   from	   the	   diplomatic	  disaster	  by	   renegotiating	   its	  
demands	   through	   the	   Peking	   Conferences.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   rift	   created	   by	   the	  
Twenty-­‐one	   Demands	   deepened	   as	   the	   war	   progressed.	   When	   America	   and	   China	  
formally	   entered	   the	   war	   in	   1917,	   the	   Japanese	   leaders	   found	   themselves	   at	   a	  
diplomatic	   disadvantage.	   As	   an	   Allied	   power,	   China	   was	   entitled	   to	   demand	  
concessions	  to	   uphold	  its	  territorial	   sovereignty.	  A	   claim	  that	  was	  backed	  by	  the	  US,	  
who	  pressured	  Japan	  to	  lessen	  their	  demands	  at	  the	  Peking	  conferences.395	  
	   The	   Allied	   response	   to	   the	   October	   Revolution	   further	   complicated	   Japan’s	  
relationship	   with	   the	   Western	   powers.	   The	   Bolshevik	   peace	   with	   Germany	   in	   1917	  
presented	  a	  monumental	  challenge	  to	  Britain	  and	  France.	  Anxiety	  over	  the	  collapse	  of	  
the	  Eastern	  Front	  and	  the	  advantage	  it	  would	  provide	  Germany	  added	  to	  concern	  over	  
the	   possession	   of	   Allied	   weapon	   stockpiles	   in	   Russia	   and	   the	   50,000	   strong	   Czech	  
Legion	   now	  trapped	  behind	  enemy	   lines.	  The	   remaining	  Entente	  Powers	   resolved	  to	  
intervene	  into	  the	  Russian	  Civil	  War,	  and	  called	  upon	  their	  allies	  to	   join	  the	  eﬀort.396	  
Japanese	  leaders,	  particularly	  those	  in	  the	  military,	  concluded	  that	  the	  call	  to	  arms	  was	  
an	  ideal	  opportunity	   to	  maximize	   its	  continental	  gains.397 	  While	   the	  British,	   French,	  
and	   Americans	   each	   deployed	   contingents	   of	   7,000,	   the	   Japanese	   mobilized	   some	  
70,000	   men	   for	   the	   Siberian	   Intervention.	   Additionally,	   the	   Japanese	   expedition	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lingered	  in	  Siberia	  after	  the	  intervention	  had	  formally	  concluded.398	  Under	  the	  guise	  of	  
bulwarking	   China	   against	   the	   revolutionary	   tide,	   the	   Japanese	   negotiated	   a	   joint-­‐
defense	  treaty	  with	  China.	  By	  November	  1918,	  the	  Japanese	  had	  established	  a	  massive	  
military	   operational	   zone	   that	   stretched	   from	   Lake	   Baikal	   in	   the	   north,	   through	  
Sinkiang	  Province	  in	   the	  west,	  and	  extending	   in	  the	  south	  to	   the	  island	  territories	  of	  
Micronesia.399
5.4	  The	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System
As	  with	  any	  multifaceted	  historical	  trend,	  it	  is	  diﬃcult	  to	  determine	  the	  exact	  moment	  
of	   shifts	  within	   the	  international	   system.	  Nevertheless,	   less	  than	   four	  years	   after	  the	  
First	  World	  War,	  the	  norms	  of	  imperialism	   began	  to	   give	  way	   to	  new	  global	   trends.	  
Through	   the	   Paris	   Peace	   Conference	   (1919)	   and	   Washington	   Conference	   (1921-­‐22)	  
America	  and	  Britain	  instituted	  a	  new	  international	  order	  that	  replaced	  the	  old	  balance	  
of	   power	   system	   with	   the	   ideals	   embodied	   by	   international	   liberalism.400 	   The	   new	  
order	  was	  designed	  to	  freeze	  the	  postwar	  status	  quo	   between	  the	  victorious	  Western	  
Allies;	  the	  dissatisﬁed	  secondary	  powers	  of	  Germany	  and	  Italy;	   and	  outliners	  such	  as	  
Japan	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.401	  
	   The	   emerging	   system	   represented	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   outright	   imperialism	  
towards	  economic	  openness,	  a	  principle	  that	  a	  half	  century	  later	  would	  reemerge	  as	  a	  
dominant	   international	  norm.	  The	  shift	  had	  a	  considerable	  impact	   on	   Japan.	  During	  
the	  era	  of	  new	  imperialism,	  Japan	  not	  only	  accepted	  the	  geopolitical	  struggle	  for	  power	  
and	   prestige,	   but	   earned	   a	   respected	   place	   near	   the	   apex	   of	   the	   power	   hierarchy	  
through	  adherence	  to	   social	  mobility.	  The	  signiﬁcant	  ideological	   shift	   in	  international	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Many	  Japanese	  political	  elite,	  including	  Tanaka	  Giichi	  ,	  agreed	  the	  engagement	  went	  on	  far	  too	  long.	  
This	  dynamic	  raises	  questions	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  Japanese	  politicians	  and	  military	  
oﬃcers	  and	  how	  they	  reacting	  to	  prestige	  and	  nationalism,	  specially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  general	  
public.	  This	  question	  would	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  the	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  for	  useful	  future	  research.	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norms	   following	   WWI	   required	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   either	   abandon	   its	   imperialist	  
foreign	  policy	  or	  to	  abandon	  social	  mobility.	  
	   During	  the	  negotiations	  at	  the	  Paris	  Peace	  Conference,	  the	  Japanese	  delegation	  
had	   two	   major	   objectives.	   The	   ﬁrst	   was	   to	   secure	   de	   jure	   authority	   over	   its	   newly	  
acquired	  territories.	  The	  second	  was	  to	  push	   for	  racial	   equality	   for	  peoples	  of	  Asian	  
descent.	  Japan	  succeeded	  in	  inheriting	  the	  German	  rights	  in	  Shandong,	  but	  her	  claim	  
was	   short-­‐lived.	   America	   opposed	   any	   measures	   that	   further	   compromised	   the	  
sovereignty	   of	   China.	   It	   was	   only	   after	   the	   revelation	   that	   Britain	   and	   France	   had	  
already	   agreed	   to	   Japan’s	   demands	   that	   America	   acquiesced	   to	   Japan’s	   territorial	  
claims.	  American	  resistance	  stemmed	   from	   the	  fear	  that	   Japan	  was	  a	  growing	   threat,	  
and	   contributed	   to	   the	   American	   withdrawal	   from	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   and	   its	  
refusal	  to	   sign	  the	  peace	  treaty.	   In	  China,	  anti-­‐Japanese	  boycotts	  and	  riots	  erupted	  in	  
major	  cities.	  This	  surge	  of	  social	   unrest	  proved	  vital	   to	   Chinese	  communists,	  who	   in	  
the	  coming	  decades	  exploited	  Chinese	  nationalism	  to	  press	  their	  political	  agenda.402	  
	   Japan’s	   second	   objective	   was	   outright	   rejected.	   The	   Japanese	   delegation	  
proposed	  amending	  the	  charter	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  with	  a	  racial	  equality	  clause.	  
The	   proposal	   was	   designed	   to	   reverse	   the	   discrimination	   experience	   by	   Japanese	  
nationals	  abroad	  and	  challenge	  any	  racially	  motivated	  prejudice	  against	   the	  Japanese	  
state.403	  Since	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  unequal	  treaties	  against	  Japan	  in	  the	  mid-­‐ninetieth	  
century,	   Japanese	   leaders	   were	   extremely	   sensitive	   to	   how	   Japan	   was	   perceived	  
internationally.	  Through	  its	  emulation	  of	  Western	  imperialism,	  Japan	  had	  reversed	  the	  
treaties,	  proven	   itself	  to	   be	   the	  premier	  Asian	  power,	   and	  demolished	  any	  illusion	  of	  
inherent	   Western	   superiority	   through	   its	   defeat	   of	   Russia.	   The	   Racial	   Equality	  
Proposal	  must	  therefore	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  eﬀort	  by	  Japan	  to	  institutionalize	  what	  it	  
believed	  was	  the	  successful	   execution	  of	  its	   strategy	  of	   social	  mobility.	  404 	   In	   light	   of	  
the	   Anglo-­‐Japanese	   Alliance	   and	   Japanese	   eﬀorts	   in	  WWI,	   the	   proposal	   provides	   a	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404	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  had	  the	  act	  been	  ratiﬁed,	  the	  universalist	  language	  of	  the	  proposal	  would	  
have	  also	  required	  Japan	  to	  treat	  its	  own	  minority	  subjects	  in	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  with	  equality	  -­‐	  a	  
consideration	  the	  Japanese	  showed	  little	  interest	  in	  instituting.	  
telling	   insight	   that	   the	   Japanese	   elite	   believed	   they	   had	   ﬁnally	   reached	   parity	  with	  
Western	   powers.	  The	   act	   was	  eventually	   overturned	   by	   President	  Wilson,	   despite	  a	  
majority	   vote	   from	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   Commission,	   a	  move	   that	   would	   breed	  
resentment	  among	  the	  Japanese	  and	  explode	  into	  a	  nationalistic	  fervor	  in	  the	  coming	  
decades.405	  
	   American	   resistance	   strained	   relations	   between	   the	   two	   powers.	   In	   the	  years	  
following	   the	  Paris	   Peace	   Conference,	   America	   and	   Japan	  commissioned	   large-­‐scale	  
naval	   buildups	   leading	   to	  a	  short	  but	  intense	  arms	  race.	  American-­‐Japanese	  relations	  
were	  further	  complicated	  by	  President	  Wilson’s	  proclamation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  self-­‐
determination	  were	  interpreted	  by	  many	   under	   the	  yoke	  of	  Japanese	   imperialism	   as	  
support	   for	  their	  independence.	  By	  1921,	  rising	  tensions	  pressured	  both	  sides	  to	   enter	  
negotiations.	  At	   the	  Washington	  Naval	  Conference,	  America	  and	  Japan	  set	   limits	  on	  
naval	   expenditures	   and	   the	   fortiﬁcation	   of	   strongholds	   in	   the	   Paciﬁc.	   The	   Japanese	  
agreed	  to	  ﬁeld	  only	  three	  capital	  ships	  for	  every	  ﬁve	  produced	  in	  America	  and	  Britain,	  
which	  relegated	  the	  Japanese	  Navy	  to	  a	  position	  of	  inferiority	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  British	  and	  
American	  ﬂeets.406	  Japan’s	  acceptance	  of	  this	  cap	  discredits	  ahistorical	  interpretations	  
of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   that	   present	   a	   linear	   progression	   from	   Japanese	  
industrialization	  to	  its	  bellicose	  policies	  during	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s.	  
	   It	   has	   been	   established	   that	   the	   norms	   of	   new	   imperialism	   were	   ﬁrmly	  
entrenched	  among	   the	   Japanese	   political	   elite.	   From	   a	   constructivist	   perspective,	   it	  
may	   be	   expected	   that	   these	   norms,	   which	   formed	   a	   signiﬁcant	   part	   of	   Japan’s	  
collective	   identity	   and	   had	   been	   transmitted	   through	   successive	   generations	   of	  
politicians,	  would	  continue	  to	  dominate	  policy	  decisions.	  However,	  when	  considering	  
the	   Japanese	   strategy	  of	  social	   mobility,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   Japan’s	   ongoing	   struggle	   for	  
great	   power	   status	   developed	   within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   established	   power	  
hierarchy.	   As	   suggested	   by	   SIT,	   Japanese	   leaders	   were	   less	   committed	   to	   speciﬁc	  
norms	   than	   they	   were	   to	   status	   seeking	   behavior.	   Although	   Japanese	   leaders	  
ultimately	   maintained	   imperialist	   norms	   (the	   reasons	   for	   which	   are	   detailed	   in	  
Chapter	   6)	   this	   ideological	   ﬂexibility	   harkens	   back	   to	   the	   ready	   acceptance	   of	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modernization	   norms	   during	   the	   bakumatsu	   (Chapter	   3)	   and	   emergence	   of	  
mercantilist	  norms	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Chapter	  6	  and	  7).
	   Additionally,	   the	   Japanese	   agreed	   to	   withdraw	   its	   troops	   from	   Shandong,	  
Siberia,	  and	  Northern	  Manchuria	  and	  realign	  its	  relationship	  with	  China	  under	  terms	  
more	  equitable	  than	  those	  dictated	  by	  the	  Twenty-­‐one	  Demands/Peking	  Conferences.	  
In	   exchange,	   America	   supported	   the	   Paciﬁc	   status-­‐quo	   and	   refrained	   from	   further	  
militarizing	  its	  Paciﬁc	  strongholds.407 	  The	  marquee	  agreement	  of	  the	  conference	  was	  
the	  Nine	  Power	  Pact,	  which	  institutionalized	  America’s	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  in	  China	  by	  
supplanting	  all	  existing	  treaties	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  economic	  openness.408
	   Given	  Japan’s	  established	  imperialist	  foreign	  policy,	  this	  deferment	  to	  Western	  
interests	  can	  prove	   troubling	   to	   traditional	   international	   relations	   interpretations	   of	  
Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   has	   been	   established	   that	   the	   Japanese	  
strategy	  was	  one	  of	  social	  mobility.	  As	  such,	  Japan	  was	  less	  beholden	  to	  the	  norms	  of	  
imperialism	  than	  might	  be	  expected.	  Prime	  Minister	  Hara	  Takashi	  expressed	  a	  desire	  
to	   pursue	   Japanese	   national	   interests	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   emerging	   “global	  
trends”	   of	   internationalism	   by	   focusing	   his	   eﬀorts	   on	   the	   League	   of	   Nations.409	  
Government	  leaders	  concluded	  that	  they	  should	  actively	  participate	  in	  the	  Paris	  Peace	  
Conference	   as	   a	   means	   of	   demonstrating	   Japan’s	   commitment	   to	   peace.410 	   Oﬃcial	  
communications	   between	   the	   Japanese	   delegation	   and	   Tokyo	   expressed	   a	  
‘“wholehearted	   agreement	   in	   principle	   to	   [the]	   draft	   resolution”’.411 	   This	   sentiment	  
suggests	   that	   Japan’s	   preference	   for	   status	   seeking	   behavior	   remained	   bound	   by	   to	  
social	  mobility.	  
	   Practical	   considerations	   likewise	   inﬂuenced	   the	   Japanese.	   The	   principles	  
embodied	   by	  the	   Versailles-­‐Washington	   System	   reinforced	  the	  status	   quo.	  The	  new	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system	   upheld	   Japan’s	   concessions	   in	   Korea	   and	   Northern	   China,	   two	   areas	   Japan	  
believed	   to	   be	   core	   security	   concerns.	   The	   reduction	   in	   hostilities	   and	   improved	  
cooperation	   with	   America	   and	   Britain	   also	   held	   the	   potential	   for	   future	   defensive	  
agreements	   with	   both	  powers.	  This	   second	   component	   again	   conﬁrms	   the	   Japanese	  
preference	   for	   fortifying	   its	  position	  within	  the	   recognized	  power	   hierarchy.	   Finally,	  
Japanese	   compliance	   with	   the	   Versailles-­‐Washington	   System	   was	   essentially	   non-­‐
binding.	   The	  League	  of	  Nations	  lacked	  the	  ability	  to	   enforce	  any	  sanctions	   that	  may	  
result	   from	   a	   future	   Japanese	   decision	   to	   change	   its	   foreign	   policy	   strategy,	   thus	  
providing	  the	  Japanese	  an	  opportunity	  to	  bide	  its	  time.412	  
	   The	   direction	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   in	   the	   postbellum	   years	   must	   be	  
considered	   within	   the	   context	   of	   social	   mobility.	   Japan’s	  wartime	   advances	   did	   not	  
meet	   with	   Japanese	   expectations	   regarding	   its	   international	   prestige.	   Even	   its	  
intentions	   to	   reassure	   its	   status	  by	   reversing	   the	   racial	   exclusion	  experienced	  by	   its	  
citizens	   in	   Western	   nations	   through	   the	   Racial	   Equality	   Proposal	   were	   rebuﬀed.413	  
Japanese	  leaders	  were	  not	   deterred	  by	   the	  changing	   international	   environment.	   The	  
nascent	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System	  encouraged	  a	  new	  world	  order	   founded	  upon	  
global	   capitalism	   and	   liberal	   political	   institutions.	   Still	   seeking	   to	   enhance	  its	  status	  
through	   social	   mobility,	   Japan	   again	   adapted	   to	   international	   mores.	   Borrowing	  
heavily	   from	   the	   American	   capitalist	   model,	   Japan	   explored	   a	   new	   foreign	   policy	  
designed	   to	   fortify	   its	   national	   strength	   by	   substituting	   military	   strength	   with	  
economic	  growth.414
	   The	   new	   internationalist	   principles	  were	   soon	   thrust	   to	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	  
Japanese	  policy	   debate.	   During	   the	   1920s,	   warlords	   and	  militarized	   political	   groups	  
carved	   China	   into	   violently	   contentious	   regions,	   which	   threatened	   the	   security	   of	  
Japanese	   holdings	   in	   Northern	   China.	   The	   most	   prominent	   policy	   strategist	  
committed	   to	   adhering	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   Versailles-­‐Washington	   System	   was	  
Foreign	   Minister	   Shidehara	   Kijūrō.	   Shidehara’s	   diplomatic	   stance	   espoused	   three	  
internationalist	   minded	   foreign	   policy	   principles:	   a	   desire	   for	   international	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collaboration	   centering	   on	   diplomacy	   and	   the	   League	   of	   Nations,	   a	   preference	   for	  
economic	  integration	  over	  imperialism,	  and	  a	  non-­‐interventionist	  policy	  in	  China.	  The	  
liberal	   posture	   of	   “Shidehara	   diplomacy”	   was	   a	  hallmark	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	  
during	  the	  1920s.415
	   By	   1925,	   Shidehara	   had	   signiﬁcantly	   improved	  Sino-­‐Japanese	   relations,	   which	  
was	  in	  no	   small	  part	  a	  result	  of	  his	   support	  of	  China’s	  demands	  for	   tariﬀ	   autonomy,	  
and	  his	  overt	  optimism	  regarding	  Manchuria	  where	  he	  believed	   the	  ‘“Japanese	  could	  
cohabit	  with	  the	  Manchurians	  and	  Koreans	  in	  mutual	   friendship	  and	  cooperation”’.416	  
Continued	  unrest	  in	  China	  undermined	  Japan’s	  adoption	  of	  internationalist	  principles.	  
Following	  the	  Nanjing	  Incident	  in	  March	  1927,	  which	  witnessed	  attacks	  by	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐
shek’s	  Kuomintang	  forces	  on	  consulates	  and	  foreign	  residences,	  Shidehara	  declined	  to	  
join	   the	   Americans	   and	   British	   in	   exacting	   retribution.	   Shidehara’s	   soft	   stance	   on	  
China	   directly	   contributed	   to	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Wakatsuki	   administration	   in	   the	  
following	  month.417	  
	   The	  new	  government	  replaced	  Shidehara	  with	  Tanaka	  Giichi.	  Tanaka	  adopted	  a	  
more	   aggressive	   stance	   towards	   China,	   underwritten	   ostensibly	   by	   eﬀorts	   at	  
‘“protecting	   the	  Japanese	  residents	   in	  China”’.418	   In	  May	   1927,	  Tanaka	   dispatched	  an	  
army	   brigade	   to	   Shantung	   to	   support	   Northern	   warlords	   against	   Kuomintang	  
advances.	  A	  conference	  of	  experts	  summoned	  by	  Tanaka	  concluded	  that:	   ‘“If	  political	  
upheavals	   should	   reach	   Manchuria	   and	   Mongolia	   ...	   and	   threaten	   Japan’s	   special	  
positions	  and	  interests	  ...	  the	  Japanese	  government	  will	  protect	  them	  no	  matter	  where	  
the	   threat	   comes	   from”’.419 	   Despite	   Tanaka’s	   eﬀorts	   to	   back	   Chinese	   warlords	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%20submitted%20on%20January%2024.pdf.	  2.
419	  Ibid.,	  6.
supportive	   of	   Japan,	   by	   1928	   the	   Kuomintang	   became	   China’s	   internationally	  
recognized	  government.420
	   Deteriorating	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  relations	  corresponded	  with	  a	  distancing	  of	  Japan	  
and	  the	  West.	  America	  and	  Britain	  quickly	  normalized	  relations	  with	  the	  Kuomintang,	  
and	  even	  conceded	  tariﬀ	  autonomy	  to	   the	  new	  government.421	  Tanaka	  failed	  to	  secure	  
Japanese	   claims	   in	   China,	   and	   in	   1929	   Shidehara	   returned	   as	   Foreign	   Minister.422	  
Shidehara	  shared	  Tanaka’s	  belief	  that	   Japanese	  interests	  needed	  to	   be	  protected,	  but	  
pushed	  for	  diplomatic	  answers.	  Shidehara’s	  immediate	  aim	  was	  to	  normalize	  relations	  
with	   Chiang	   Kai-­‐shek	   and	   reinstitute	   Japan’s	   noninterventionist	   stance.423 	   As	  
Shidehara	  later	  noted:	  ‘If	  …	  one	  takes	  a	  broader	  view	  of	  the	  future	  well-­‐being	  of	  both	  
China	  and	  Japan,	   one	  will	  be	  satisﬁed	  that	   there	   is	  no	   other	  course	  open	  to	   the	   two	  
nations	   than	   to	   pursue	   the	   path	   of	   mutual	   accord	   and	   cooperation	   in	   all	   their	  
relations,	  political	  and	  economic.’424	  
	   Although	  Shidehara	  was	  once	  again	  criticized	  by	  the	  military	  for	  his	  perceived	  
weakness,	   his	   preference	   for	   internationalist	   principles	   reveals	   the	   tension	   between	  
competing	   domestic	   groups	   on	   the	   “Manchuria	   Question”.	   This	   concern	   persisted	  
through	   the	   1930s	   and	   redirected	   the	   trajectory	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   towards	  
confrontation	  with	  the	  West.	  Table	  5.4	  provides	  a	  reference	  for	  these	  factors.
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  Pyle	  2007,	  168-­‐9.
421	  Hata	  1988,	  290.
422	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  despite	  Tanaka’s	  hawkish	  tactics,	  his	  aim	  was	  secure	  Japanese	  interests	  in	  
China,	  not	  to	  block	  Chinese	  reuniﬁcation	  nor	  undermine	  Japan’s	  cooperative	  relationship	  with	  the	  
West.
423	  Schlichtmann,	  Japan	  in	  the	  World:	  Shidehara	  Kijūrō,	  Paciﬁsm,	  and	  the	  Abolition	  of	  War,	  vol.	  II	  
(Lexington	  Books,	  2009),	  55-­‐9.





















1927	  -­‐	  1929 Military Interventionist
Social	  Competition:	  Challenge/ignore	  the	  emerging	  
Versailles-­‐Washington	  System.
Table	  5.4	  :	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Manchuria	  Question
	   The	   Versailles-­‐Washington	   System	   ultimately	   succumbed	   to	   a	   myriad	   of	  
destabilizing	  elements.	  The	  new	  international	  order	  faced	  domestic	  upheavals	  in	  China	  
and	   Russia,425 	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   alliance	   faltered	   as	   America	   emerged	   as	   the	  
predominate	   Pacific	   naval	   power,	   and	   the	   global	   economy	   collapsed,	   sending	   the	  
developed	   nations	   into	   an	   economic	  depression.	   Perhaps	  most	   significantly,	   America	  
and	  Britain	  reneged	  their	  self-­‐assigned	  responsibilities	  within	  the	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  
System.	  Neither	  state	  was	  willing	  to	  commit	  the	  necessary	  resources	  to	  assure	  prolonged	  
stability	  in	  East	  Asia;	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  ongoing	  pressures	  of	  the	  international	  
environment,	  they	  reacted	  with	  insular	  and	  protectionist	  policies	  that	  undermined	  the	  
idealistic	   principles	   upon	   which	   the	   system	   was	   founded.426 	   This	   turn	   left	   Japanese	  
leaders	  with	  no	  clear	  signal	  as	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  international	  norms.	  Table	  5.5	  expands	  
the	  analysis	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  variables	  examined	   throughout	  this	   thesis.	  Note	  that	  
two	   groups	   are	  bolded	  within	   the	   domestic	   identity	   hierarchy,	   indicating	  a	   period	   of	  
ambiguity	  with	  no	  dominate	  group	  identity.	  This	  ambiguity	  did	  not	  bring	  Japan	  in	  direct	  
confrontation	   with	   the	   West	   nor	   did	   it	   overtly	   challenge	   the	   still	   evolving	  
internationalist	   norms	   of	   the	   international	   community,	   resulting	   in	   a	   tentative	  



















Social	  Mobility.	  Imperialist	  and	  
internationalist	  directions	  in	  FP	  explored.	  
Considerable	  ambiguity	  in	  dominant	  
identity.	  Western	  powers	  not	  
confronted.
Table	  5.5	  :	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1918	  -­‐	  1931)
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425	  Notably,	  the	  Warlord	  Era	  in	  China	  and	  the	  eﬀects	  of	  the	  Bolshevik	  Revolution	  in	  Russia.
426	  Pyle	  2007,	  168-­‐69.
5.5	  Japan	  in	  Flux
	   The	   role	   of	   two	   crucial	   aspects	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   evolution	   are	  
explicated	  in	  this	  chapter.	  First,	  Japan’s	  continued	  ascension	  to	  great	  power	  status	  was	  
explored	   with	   particular	   reference	   to	   the	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   imperial	   rivalry.	   This	  
discussion	  drew	  from	  the	  concerns	  over	  sovereignty	  and	  power	  (developed	  in	  Chapter	  3)	  
and	   the	  norms	   of	  new	   imperialism	   (covered	   in	  Chapter	   4)	   that	   exempliﬁed	   Japan’s	  
strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	  Second,	  Japan’s	  evolving	  knowledge	  of	  international	  norms	  
and	   power	   relations	   were	   analyzed	   through	   the	   neoclassical	   realist	   and	   ideational	  
factors	  highlighted	  by	  this	  thesis’	  framework.	  SIT	  was	  used	  to	   frame	  this	  analysis	  and	  
assure	  consistency	  when	  considering	  the	  variables	  underwriting	  the	  policy	  approach	  of	  
Japanese	  leaders.	  
	   Of	   particular	   note	   is	   Japan’s	   rise	   to	   the	   pinnacle	   of	   the	   international	   power	  
hierarchy	  through	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	  Although	  Japanese	  leaders	  maintained	  
relative	  consistency	  in	  their	  policy	  strategy,	  world	  events	  forced	  Japan	  to	  reﬁne	  certain	  
corresponding	   variables.	   The	   Russo-­‐Japanese	   War	   reinforced	   Britain's	   position	   as	  
Japan’s	  referent	  group.	  The	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  which	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  era	  of	  
internationalism,	   served	   as	   an	   impetus	   for	   considerable	   ambiguity	   regarding	   the	  
future	  trajectory	  of	  foreign	  policy.
The	  following	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  by	  revisiting	  the	  research	  questions:	  
1. How	   have	   concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	  
international	  system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	  	  
• Japanese	  leaders	  remained	  sensitive	  to	   external	   pressures	  while	  pursuing	  status	  
seeking	   behavior	   through	   social	   mobility.	   This	   consistency	   is	   evidenced	   by	  
Japanese	  participation	  in	  WWI,	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  norms	  emerging	  from	  the	  
Versailles-­‐Washington	   System,	   and	   policy	   ambiguity	   regarding	   instability	   in	  
China.	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2. 	  How	  have	  these	  factors	  changed	  with	  time?	  	  
• The	   most	   notable	   shift	   occurred	   following	   WWI,	   where	   the	   Versailles-­‐
Washington	   System	   replaced	   the	   norms	   of	   new	   imperialism	   with	   the	   ideals	  
embodied	  by	  international	  liberalism.	  The	  new	  order	  was	  designed	  to	  freeze	  the	  
postwar	   status	   quo,	   and	   fundamentally	   challenged	   the	   imperialist	   norms	  
underwriting	  Japan’s	  existing	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  
3. What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	  competing	   groups	  of	   Japanese	   political	  
elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?	  
• As	  international	  trends	  shifted,	  a	  split	  materialized	  between	  political	  groups	  over	  
the	  Manchuria	  Question.	   Diplomats	  were	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   emerging	   liberal	  
trends	  of	  the	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System	  while	  the	  military	  upheld	  the	  norms	  
of	  new	  imperialism	  inherited	  	  from	  the	  now	  fading	  Meiji	  Consensus.	  
	   The	   emphasis	   this	   chapter	   places	   on	   competition	   between	   political	   groups	  
regarding	   the	  Manchuria	  Question	   is	  expanded	   in	   the	   following	   chapter,	  where	   the	  
collapse	   of	   Japan’s	   longstanding	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   is	   detailed.	   It	   is	  
demonstrated	   that	   the	   ambiguity	   resulting	   from	   the	   struggle	   between	   these	  groups	  
provided	   fringe	   members	   of	   the	   military	   an	   opportunity	   to	   force	   the	   Japanese	  
government	  towards	  social	  competition.	  A	  strategic	  move	  that	  thrust	  Japan	  into	  direct	  
confrontation	  with	  its	  former	  allies.
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Chapter	  6
New	  Directions	  in	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1931	  -­‐	  1972
Emperor	  Hirohito	  and	  General	  MacArthur	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  
Tokyo,	  27	  September,	  1945
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When	  military	  preparations	  are	  complete,	  we	  need	  not	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  
to	   ﬁnd	  a	  motive	   or	  occasion.	  All	  we	   need	   to	   do	   is	  pick	  out	   time	  and	  then	  
proclaim	   to	   the	  world	   our	  absorption	  of	  Manchuria	  and	  Mongolia	  as	  we	  
proclaimed	  the	  annexation	  of	  Korea.
-­‐	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Ishiwara,	  1931	  
[The	  Tripartite	  Pact]	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  that	  could	  have	  happened	  to	  us.	  The	  
trend	  towards	  victory	  in	  the	  war	  of	  resistance	  has	  been	  decided.
-­‐	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  1940
When	  I	   recall	   ...	   the	  way	  in	  which	  our	  so-­‐called	   ‘progressive’	   intellectuals	  
speak	  today	  of	  Japan	  as	  little	  better	  than	  an	  American	  colony	  ...	   it	  makes	  
me	  wonder	  if	  these	  critics	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  race	  of	  people	  who	  only	  ﬁfty	  
years	  ago	  had	  acted	  with	  such	  decision	  and	  judgment.
-­‐	  Yoshida	  Shigeru,	  1957
For	  years	   I	  have	   believed	   that	  war	   should	   be	   abolished	   as	   an	   outmoded	  
means	  of	  resolving	  disputes	  between	  nations	  ...	  my	  abhorrence	  reached	  its	  
height	  with	  the	  perfection	  of	  the	  atom	  bomb.
-­‐	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  1964
Japan’s	   ascension	   to	   great	   power	   status	   resulted	   from	   the	   successful	   adoption	   of	  
imperialist	  norms	  by	  Japanese	  leaders,	  but	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  signaled	  a	  
shift	  in	  international	   trends.	  In	  an	  eﬀort	  to	  reinforce	  the	  postwar	  status	  quo,	  America	  
and	   Britain	   reoriented	   the	   international	   power	   hierarchy	   away	   from	   the	   norms	   of	  
imperialism	   towards	   those	   of	   internationalism.	   This	   shift	   fundamentally	   challenged	  
Japan’s	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility,	  which	  was	  contingent	  upon	  accepting	  the	  dominant	  
norms	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  Maintaining	  social	  mobility	  now	  required	  Japanese	  
leaders	  to	   forgo	   the	   imperialist	   agenda	  that	   served	   Japan	   since	   the	  Meiji	  Restoration	  
and	  embrace	  the	  nascent	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System.	  
	   This	  chapter	  expands	  upon	  the	  policy	  options	  facing	  Japanese	  leaders	  between	  
imperialist	   and	   internationalist	   directions	   in	   foreign	   policy,	   with	  a	   speciﬁc	   focus	  on	  
the	   decision	   by	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	   maintain	   an	   imperialist	   foreign	   policy,	   thereby	  
aborting	   social	  mobility.	   	  Particular	  attention	  is	  given	   to	   the	  conspiracy	  surrounding	  
the	   Mukden	   Incident	   in	   1931,	   which	   provided	   the	   Imperial	   Japanese	   Army	   with	   a	  
pretext	   for	   invading	   Manchuria	   without	   government	   authorization.	   The	   incident	  
handicapped	   the	   Japanese	   government,	   forcing	   state	   oﬃcials	   to	   abandon	   their	  
attempts	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	  changing	  global	   trends,	  and	  pushed	   Japan	   to	   challenge	  the	  
existing	  power	  hierarchy	  through	  social	  competition	  (Section	  6.1).	  To	  facilitate	  a	  more	  
comprehensive	  examination	  of	  the	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  invasion	  of	  Manchuria	  
(1931),	   the	   Second	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1937-­‐1945),	   and	   the	  Paciﬁc	  War	  427 (1941-­‐1945)	  
are	   organized	   into	   a	   single	  conceptual	   unit.428 	  Over	   this	   period,	   Japan	   experienced	  
near	  constant	  warfare.	  Furthermore,	  Japanese	  leaders	  maintained	  a	  consistent	  strategy	  
of	   social	   competition	   that	   ﬁrmly	   rejected	   the	   Western-­‐centric	   power	   hierarchy	  
(Section	  6.2).	  
	   The	  occupation	  of	  Japan	  by	  Allied	  forces	  in	  1945	  is	  then	  surveyed	  (Section	  6.3).	  
Although	  the	  occupation	  crippled	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  capacity,	  state	  leaders	  utilized	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427	  The	  Paciﬁc	  Theater	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Paciﬁc	  War”	  in	  line	  with	  
Japanese	  historical	  scholarship.	  
428	  This	  approach	  has	  become	  popular	  among	  Japanese	  historians.	  For	  further	  details	  see:	  Hata	  1988,	  
302.	  This	  conceptualization	  is	  discussed	  with	  reference	  to	  Japanese	  postwar	  ideology	  in	  Coox,	  "The	  
Paciﬁc	  War,"	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  Japan,	  ed.	  Marius	  B.	  Jansen	  John	  W.	  Hall,	  Madoka	  
Kanai,Denis	  Twitchett	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  381-­‐2.
the	  paciﬁst	   elements	  of	  the	  postwar	   constitution	   throughout	   the	   1950s	  and	   1960s	  to	  
institute	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   creativity.	   Social	   creativity	   occurs	  when	   a	   state	   deﬁnes	  
original	   parameters	   for	   status	   seeking	   behavior	   that	   do	   not	   challenge	   the	   existing	  
power	  hierarchy.	  By	  leaning	  upon	  America	  to	  assure	  Japanese	  national	  security,	  state	  
elites	  directed	   their	   eﬀorts	   towards	   rebuilding	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   (Section	   6.4).	  
This	  process	  had	   a	  profound	   impact	   on	  the	   political	   groups	   operating	  within	   Japan,	  
and	   is	   closely	   examined	   to	   answer	   the	   third	   research	   question	   -­‐	   What	   ideological	  
continuities	   exist	   between	   competing	   groups	   of	   Japanese	   political	   elite	   from	   one	  
historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?
	   Detailing	   the	   two	   strategy	   transitions,	   from	   social	   mobility	   to	   social	  
competition	   and	   from	   social	   competition	   to	   social	   creativity,	   through	   a	   consistent	  
theoretical	   approach	   avoids	   the	   pitfall	   of	   overemphasizing	   prewar	   militarism	   or	  
postwar	  paciﬁsm	  without	  the	  appropriate	  historical	  nuance.	  It	  clariﬁes	  the	  factors	  that	  
must	   be	   examined	   when	  engaging	  with	   the	   ﬁrst	   set	   of	   research	   questions	   over	   this	  
time	  period	   -­‐	  How	  have	   concerns	   over	  national	   security	  and	   other	   external	   pressures	  
from	  the	   international	   system	  inﬂuenced	   the	   dramatic	   shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	   foreign	  
policy?	  How	  have	  these	   factors	  changed	  with	  time?	  Furthermore,	  this	  chapter	  presents	  
the	   emergence	   of	   postwar	   Japan	   as	   a	   socially	   creative	   state	   driven	   by	   economic	  
considerations	  within	  the	   same	  theoretical	   framework	   as	  the	   Japanese	   government’s	  
rebuﬃng	   of	   the	   international	   community	   and	   its	   adoption	   of	   socially	   competitive	  
foreign	  policy	  during	  the	  1930s	  and	  early	  1940s.	  This	  consistency	  enhances	  the	  veracity	  
of	   the	  conclusions	  oﬀered	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  robustness	  of	  
the	  framework	  through	  which	  this	  analysis	  is	  derived.
6.1	  The	  Mukden	  Incident	  of	  1931	  
The	   organization	   of	   the	  Manchurian	   Invasion	   (1931),	   the	  Second	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  
(1937-­‐1945),	   and	   the	   Paciﬁc	   War	   (1941-­‐1945)	   as	   a	   uniﬁed	   period	   provides	   a	   clear	  
narrative	  of	  the	  historical	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  Japan’s	  empire.	  In	  addition,	  
it	   corresponds	   with	   the	   established	   theoretical	   framing	   of	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	  
evolution.	   During	   this	   period,	   Japan	   rejected	   the	   existing	   power	   hierarchy	   and	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challenged	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Western	   powers	   through	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	  
competition.	  Direct	  military	  confrontation	  with	  the	  West	  may	  not	  have	  occurred	  until	  
the	   1940s,	   but	   throughout	   this	  period,	   Japan	  rebuﬀed	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  confronted	  
Western	   dominance	   in	   peripheral	   regions.	   Following	   the	   First	   World	   War,	   Japan	  
entered	   a	   decade	   of	   political	   ambiguity.	   Its	   foreign	   policy	   oscillated	   between	   the	  
imperialist	  norms	  that	  had	  dominated	  the	  international	  system	  over	  the	  previous	  ﬁfty	  
years	   and	   the	   internationalist	   norms	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   Versailles-­‐Washington	  
System.	  Japan’s	  struggle	  to	  maintain	  its	  sensitivity	  to	  global	  trends	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  
political	   conﬂict	   between	   Tanaka	   (who	   favored	   imperialism)	   and	   Shidehara	   (who	  
favored	  internationalism)	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  
	  
	   Shidehara’s	  diplomatic	  engagement	  with	  China	  faced	  vigorous	  opposition	  from	  
conservative	  factions	  within	  Japan’s	  political	  apparatus.	  This	  opposition	  was	  no	  more	  
evident	   than	   within	   the	   Japanese	   military.	   The	   army	   reacted	   adversely	   when	   the	  
Kuomintang	   government	   in	   China	   called	   for	   ‘“the	   rapid	   abolition	   of	   all	   unequal	  
treaties	   and	   the	   recovery	   of	   all	   rights	   and	   interests”’	   in	   1930.429 	   The	   proclamation	  
directly	   challenged	   Japanese	   extraterritorial	   claims	   in	   China,	   which	   had	   been	  
conceptualized	   by	   both	   politicians	   and	   the	   army	   as	   Japan’s	   economic	   “lifeline”	   and	  
lynchpin	  of	   Japan’s	  “national	   survival”.430 	  Even	   Shidehara	  noted:	   ‘“Some	  of	  the	  rights	  
we	  enjoy	  in	  Manchuria	  are	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  our	  nation’s	  existence,	  and	  no	  matter	  
how	  generous	  a	  policy	  we	  take	  towards	  China,	  these	  rights	  can	  never	  be	  given	  up”’.431	  
	   Further	  distancing	   between	   the	  government	   and	  the	  military	  occurred	  in	   the	  
wake	   of	   Shidehara’s	   acquiescence	   to	   Western	   demands	   at	   the	   Washington	   Naval	  
Conference	  (1921)	  and	  London	  Naval	  Conference	  (1930).432 	  A	  naval	   arms	  race	  between	  
America	  and	   Japan	   following	   the	  Paris	   Peace	  Conference	   (1919)	   placed	   considerable	  
constraints	   on	   the	   economics	   of	   both	   states,	   leading	   to	   a	   compromise	   whereby	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  Hata	  1988,	  294.
430	  Beasley	  1987,	  190.
431	  Samuels	  2007,	  25.
432	  Hata	  1988,	  294.
Japanese	  construction	  of	  capital	  ships	  was	  capped.433	  Eﬀorts	  by	  the	  three	  governments	  
to	   expand	   the	   same	   restraints	   to	   additional	   types	   of	   warships	   at	   the	   London	  
Conference	   was	   vehemently	   opposed	   by	   Japanese	   navy.	   When	   the	   Hamaguchi	  
government	   ultimately	  decided	   to	   ignore	   the	  navy	   and	   agreed	   to	   expand	   the	   ratio,	  
members	  of	  the	  military	  establishment	   (both	  navy	  and	  army)	  united	  in	  protestation.	  
Citing	   the	  Meiji	  Constitution,	  which	  dictated	  that	   the	  appropriate	  Chief	  of	  Staﬀ	  was	  
directly	  responsible	  to	   the	   emperor	   in	  matters	   concerning	  national	   defense,	  military	  
leaders	  argued	  that	   the	  cabinet	  had	  no	   authority	  to	  overrule	  the	  navy’s	  decision.	  This	  
constitutional	   restriction	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  government	   from	  proceeding,	  but	  it	  did	  
prompt	   the	   military	   to	   explore	  more	   comprehensive	  methods	   for	  bypassing	   Japan’s	  
civilian	  authority	  when	  faced	  with	  perceived	  national	  security	  crises	  in	  the	  future.434	  
	   The	  economic	  impact	  of	  the	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System	  further	  complicated	  
the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  relations.	  Japanese	  exports	   to	   China	   fell	   sharply	  between	   1929	  and	  
1931,	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  American	  and	  British	   endorsed	  Open	  Door	  Policy	  and	  
the	   consequences	   of	   the	   Great	   Depression.	   During	   the	   same	  period,	   Japanese	   trade	  
with	   Taiwan	   and	   Korea	   continued	   to	   rise,	   providing	   credibility	   to	   economically	  
minded	   politicians	   on	   the	   political	   right	   who	   believed	   that	   the	   depression	   could	  be	  
stymied	   in	  areas	  where	  Japan	  exerted	  political	  authority.	  As	  the	  political	  tide	  shifted,	  
Shidehara	  lost	   the	  support	  of	  both	  the	  business	  and	  rural	  communities	  who	  favored	  a	  
more	   aggressive	  approach	  to	   foreign	   policy.	   Conservative	  politicians	  argued	   that	   the	  
world	   was	   in	   a	   state	   of	   “economic	   warfare”	   and	   that	   Japan	   must	   create	   its	   own	  
economic	  bloc	  to	   protect	   its	   interests.435 	   In	   reference	   to	   deteriorating	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  
relations,	   Shigemitsu	  Mamoru,	   consul-­‐general	   in	   Shanghai,	   argued	   that	   Japan	  must	  
‘“cope	  with	  East	  Asian	  matters	  on	  its	  own	  responsibility	  and	  at	  its	  own	  risk”’.436
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   The	   conﬂuence	   of	   political	   and	   military	   opposition	   coalesced	   into	   a	   “reform	  
movement”	   (kakushin	   undō)	   between	   the	   army	   and	   ultraconservative	   groups.	   The	  
movement	  sought	  to	  enhance	  the	  political	  strength	  of	  the	  army	  by	  replacing	  political	  
parties	   with	   the	   military,	   thereby	   expanding	   the	   approach	   of	   Yamagata	   Arimoto	  
(discussed	   in	  Chapter	  5)	   who	   instituted	  policies	   to	   increase	  the	  political	   strength	   of	  
the	   military.	   In	   March	   1931,	   young	   army	   oﬃcers	   belonging	   to	   the	   Cherry	   Blossom	  
Society	  (Sakurakai)	   conspired	  to	  overthrow	  the	  government.437 	  The	  conspirators	  had	  
signiﬁcant	   support	   within	   the	   military	   establishment	   and	   right-­‐wing	   nationalist	  
groups	   that	   believed	   Shidehara	   had	   undermined	   Japanese	   security.	   The	   coup	   was	  
eventually	   abandoned,	   but	   the	   failed	   putsch	   reaﬃrmed	   to	   inﬂuential	   oﬃcers	   that	  
military	  action	  in	  Manchuria	  must	  be	  given	  the	  highest	  priority.438	  A	  similar	  situation	  
emerged	   in	   October	   of	   the	   same	   year	   when	   naval	   oﬃcers	   of	   the	   Cherry	   Blossom	  
Society	  and	  political	   activists	  organized	  a	  second	  unsuccessful	   coup.439	  This	   surge	  of	  
political	  unrest	  was	  also	  evident	  among	  fringe	  nationalist	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Patriotic	  
Society	  (Aikokisha).440
	   The	  growing	  rift	  between	  diplomatically	  minded	  politicians	  who	  favored	  social	  
mobility	  and	  militaristic	  groups	  favoring	  social	  competition	  crippled	  the	  eﬀectiveness	  
of	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   apparatus.	   This	  dynamic	  must	   be	  considered	   in	   relation	  to	  
aforementioned	   research	  questions.	   The	   changing	   international	   norms	   embodied	  by	  
the	   Versailles-­‐Washington	   System	   intensiﬁed	   the	   domestic	   conﬂict	   over	   the	  
Manchuria	  Question.	  Yet	  by	  the	  1930s,	  the	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System	  had	  proved	  
ineﬀectual	   in	   fortifying	   the	   postwar	   status	   quo.	   The	   ambiguity	   in	   a	   policy	   strategy	  
within	  Japan	  thus	  corresponded	  with	  ambiguity	  within	  the	  international	   system.	   It	  is	  
among	   this	   ﬂux	   within	   the	   international	   system	   that	   the	   Japanese	   military,	   which	  
remained	  driven	  by	  imperialist	  norms,	  pushed	  Japan	  towards	  social	  competition.	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   Following	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1904-­‐5),	  the	  Japanese	  army	  began	  fortifying	  
Kwantung,	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  the	  Liaodong	  Peninsula.	  The	  Kwantung	  Army	  was	  the	  
foundation	  of	  these	  fortiﬁcation	  eﬀorts,	  and	  over	  the	  following	  two	  decades	  it	  became	  
the	   largest	   and	   one	   of	   the	   most	   respected	   commands	   among	   imperial	   forces.	  
Kwantung	   oﬃcers	  were	   also	  highly	   inﬂuential	  within	  the	   Imperial	  Way	  Faction,441 	  a	  
group	  which	  advocated	  a	  Shōwa	  Restoration,442	  whereby	  the	  Taishō	  democracy	  would	  
be	  violently	  overthrown	  and	  political	  power	  would	  be	  concentrated	  within	  the	  military	  
and	  vested	  with	  the	  emperor.443	  
	   The	   turmoil	   of	   the	   early	   1930s	   provided	   Kwantung	   Army	   oﬃcers	   with	   the	  
necessary	   traction	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	   the	   civilian	   authority	   in	   Tokyo.	  
Lieutenant	   Colonel	   Ishiwara	  Kanji	   and	  Colonel	   Itagaki	   Sishirō,	   two	   politically	   active	  
oﬃcers	   of	   the	   Kwantung	   Army,	   devised	   plans	   to	   force	   the	   ambiguity	   regarding	  
Manchuria	  towards	  a	  military	  solution.	  By	  merging	  his	  knowledge	  of	  military	  science	  
with	  elements	  of	  Nichiren	  Buddhism,	  Ishiwara	  developed	  a	  theory	  of	  ultimate	  global	  
war.444 	   Ishiwara	   asserted	   that	   ‘“Manchuria	   and	   Mongolia	   [were	   the]	   ﬁrst	   line	   of	  
defense”’,445 	   a	   belief	   that	   he	   disseminated	   through	   pamphlets	   to	   newspapers,	  
periodicals,	  and	  tens	  of	  thousands	  government	  oﬃces.446	  Itagaki	  managed	  their	  eﬀorts	  
through	   both	   organizing	   support	   within	   the	   Kwantung	   Army	   and	   through	  
communications	   with	   sympathetic	   political	   groups,	   such	   as	   the	   Cherry	   Blossom	  
Society.447	  
	   The	   plotting	   of	   the	   Kwantung	   Army	   came	   to	   fruition	   in	   September	   of	   1931,	  
when	  members	  of	   the	  Second	  Battalion	  detonated	   an	   explosive	  device	  on	   the	  South	  
Manchuria	  Railway	  in	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Mukden.	   The	  staged	  incident	  was	  designed	  to	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derail	   the	  Dairen	  Express,	  and	  thus	  provided	  the	  pretext	  for	  the	  Japanese	  occupation	  
of	  Manchuria.448 	  The	  explosion	  proved	  too	  weak	   to	  suﬃciently	  damage	  the	  track,	  and	  
the	  targeted	  train	  passed	  safely	  onto	  its	  destination.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Kwantung	  Army	  
acted	  upon	  the	  Mukden	  Incident,	  citing	  their	  “Basic	  Plan	  of	  Operations”	  which	  stated	  
that	   once	   contact	   was	   made	   with	   opposing	   forces	   ‘“the	   army	   will	   press	   towards	  
Mukden	  with	  all	  its	  strength,	  deliver	  a	  united	  attack	  against	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Mukden	  
army...and	   resolve	  the	  matter	  with	   the	  utmost	  expedition”’.449 	  Over	  the	  next	   several	  
months,	   Japan	   executed	   a	   full	   invasion	   of	   Manchuria	   and	   eventually	   establish	   the	  
puppet-­‐state	  of	  Manchukuo.450
	   The	  Mukden	  Incident	  had	  a	   tremendous	   impact	   on	   the	  trajectory	  of	  Japanese	  
foreign	  policy.	  The	  conspiring	  of	  the	  Kwantung	  Army	  proceeded	  without	   the	  consent	  
of	   the	   Japanese	   government.	   When	   Japanese	   intelligence	   oﬃcers	   reported	   to	   the	  
government	   that	   the	  Kwantung	  Army	  was	  devising	  plans	  to	   force	  a	  conﬂict	  between	  
Japan	   and	   China,	   the	   government	   responded	   by	   holding	   a	   number	   of	   high-­‐level	  
meetings	   designed	   to	   ‘“deprive	   the	   Kwantung	   Army	   of	   an	   excuse	   for	   going	   into	  
action”’.451 	  When	  Kwantung	  oﬃcers	  learned	  of	   the	  government’s	  plans	  to	   thwart	  the	  
incident,	   they	  hastened	  the	  timeline	  of	  the	  conspiracy,	  which	  may	  have	  undermined	  
the	  eﬀectiveness	  of	  their	  eﬀorts.452	  
	   Once	   the	   bomb	   had	   been	   detonated	   and	   the	   Kwantung	   Army	   moved	   into	  
Mukden,	   the	  government	  was	   left	  with	   little	   choice	   but	   to	   renounce	  the	   diplomatic	  
stance	   embodied	  by	  Shidehara	   and	  proceed	  with	   the	  occupation	  of	  Manchuria.	  This	  
element	  cannot	  be	  understated,	  as	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Kwantung	  Army	  represent	  a	  clear	  
challenge	   to	   the	   political	   authority	   of	   the	   Japanese	   government.453 	   The	   aﬀair	   also	  
undermined	  Japan’s	  diplomatic	  relationship	  with	  America	  and	  Britain	  when	  the	  truth	  
of	  the	  Mukden	  Incident	  was	  revealed	  to	   the	  international	  community.	  Ultimately,	  the	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fallout	  from	   the	  aﬀair	  led	  to	  Japan’s	  withdrawal	   from	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  in	  March	  
1933.454
	   A	  consensus	  soon	   formed	  around	  these	  converging	  strains	  of	   imperialism	  and	  
nationalism	   that	   utilized	  Pan-­‐Asian	   idealism	   to	   further	  Japan’s	  military	  objectives.455	  
The	   convergence	   of	   these	   two	   groups	   formed	   the	  basis	   of	   the	  militarism	   frequently	  
discussed	  during	  this	  period.456	  Prince	  Konoye	  Fumimaro,	  a	  prominent	  member	  of	  the	  
imperial	   family,	  publicly	  challenged	  the	  preeminence	  of	  Britain	  and	  America	   in	  Asia.	  
At	   Versailles	   he	   observed	   how	   Japan’s	   eﬀorts	   for	   racial	   equality	   where	   cast	   aside,	  
leaving	   him	   to	   reject	   current	   status	  quo,	   believing	   it	   to	   favor	  Western	   interests.	  He	  
encouraged	  Asian	  politicians	  to	   boycott	   free	  trade	  as	  an	  oppressive	  institution	  of	  the	  
Western	  powers.	  Regarding	  the	  League	  of	  Nations,	  he	  proclaimed:	  ‘“Japan	  should	  join	  
the	   League,	   but	   it	   should	   insist	   on	   the	   exclusion	   of	   economic	   imperialism	   and	  
discriminatory	   treatment	   between	   white	   and	   yellow	   races.	   It	   is	   not	   only	   militarism	  
which	  harms	  social	  justice.”’457	  
	   In	  1933,	  Konoye	  created	  the	  Shōwa	  Research	  Association,	  a	  political	  think	   tank	  
he	   utilized	   to	   develop	   a	   theoretical	   basis	   of	   the	   Greater	   East	   Asia	   Co-­‐Prosperity	  
Sphere.	  Through	  appeals	  to	   a	  universal	  Asian	  heritage,	  it	  encouraged	  the	  cultural	   and	  
economic	  unity	  of	   the	  East	  Asian	   race	  and	  promoted	  a	   ‘“bloc	  of	  Asian	  nations	  led	  by	  
the	  Japanese	  and	  free	  of	  Western	  powers”’.458	  When	  Konoye	  became	  Prime	  Minister	  in	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  twentieth	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  further	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  Macmillan,	  2013);	  
Saaler	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  Modern	  Japanese	  History:	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and	  Borders	  (Taylor	  &	  Francis,	  2007);	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  and	  Szpilman,	  eds.,	  Pan-­‐Asianism:	  A	  Documentary	  
History,	  1920–Present	  (Rowman	  &	  Littleﬁeld	  Publishers,	  2011);	  Tankha,	  Okakura	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  and	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Asianism:	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  Past	  (Global	  Oriental,	  2007).
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  more	  details	  
see:	  Tiedemann	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1937,	  he	  deployed	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Shōwa	  Research	  Association	  to	  forward	  Pan-­‐Asianist	  
propaganda	  that	  argued	  Japanese	  military	  aggressiveness	  served	  to	   liberate	  Asia	  from	  
Western	  imperialism.459	  
	   It	   is	   within	   this	   context	   that	   the	   beneﬁts	   of	   conceptualizing	   the	   Mukden	  
Incident,	   the	   Second	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	   and	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War	  (the	  latter	   two	   will	   be	  
covered	  in	  the	  following	  section)	  as	  a	  single	  prolonged	  conﬂict	  becomes	  evident.	  Prior	  
to	   the	   occupation	   of	   Manchuria,	   the	   Japanese	   government,	   speciﬁcally	   under	   the	  
guidance	   of	   Shidehara,	   generally	   favored	   a	   diplomatic	   approach	   to	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  
relations.	   Hawkish	   groups	   within	   Japan	   continually	   challenged	   this	   position.	  
Shidehara’s	   diplomatic	   stance	   was	   consistent	   with	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility,	  
whereby	  he	  sought	  to	  conform	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  to	  the	  internationalist	  norms	  of	  
the	   Versailles-­‐Washington	   System.	   However,	   the	   occupation	   of	  Manchuria	   isolated	  
Japan	  from	  the	  international	  community,	  thus	  inhibiting	  social	  mobility.	  
	  
	   The	  Mukden	  Incident	  must	  therefore	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  event	  which	  ended	  
the	  Japanese	  government’s	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility,	  a	  position	  it	  had	  held	  since	  the	  
early	  days	  of	  the	  Meiji	  Restoration.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  incident	  brought	  to	  a	  head	  the	  
confrontation	   between	   imperialist/militarist	   and	   internationalist	   norms	   that	   had	  
divided	  the	  Japanese	  polity	  since	   the	  conclusion	  of	  World	  War	  I.	  Notably,	   it	  was	  the	  
shifting	  norms	   of	   the	   international	   community,	   to	   which	   Japanese	   leaders	   failed	   to	  
adapt,	  that	  undermined	  Japan’s	  position	  with	  the	  Western	  powers.	  The	  occupation	  of	  
Manchuria	  was	   in-­‐line	  with	   the	  norms	   of	   new	   imperialism,	  which	   had	   been	   widely	  
accepted	   by	   the	   great	   powers	   in	   the	   previous	   decades,	   but	   now	   represented	   an	  
ideological	  challenge	  to	   the	  existing	  power	  hierarchy.	  It	  is	  out	  of	  this	  controversy	  that	  
Japan’s	  strategy	  of	  social	  competition	  emerged.	  
	   While	   this	   ideological	   confrontation	   has	   been	   discussed	   within	   historical	  
accounts	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy,	   evaluating	   the	   theoretical	   consequences	   of	   the	  
incident	  provides	  a	  much	  needed	  frame	  of	  reference	  for	  analyses	  of	   Japanese	  foreign	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459	  Samuels	  2007,	  60-­‐2.
policy	  within	   the	  study	  of	   international	   relations.460 	  The	  rejection	  of	  internationalist	  
norms	  by	  the	  Japanese	  government	  was	  not	  a	  planned	  eﬀort	  to	  discard	  the	  strategy	  of	  
social	   mobility.	   Conversely,	   the	   Japanese	   government	   was	   coerced	   by	   fringe	  groups	  
within	  the	  military	  to	   pursue	  war.	  Given	  the	  political	   strength	  and	  popularity	  of	  the	  
military	  within	  prewar	  Japanese	  society,	   the	  government	  had	  few	  options	  other	  than	  
supporting	  their	  actions.	  Having	  abandoned	  social	  mobility	  in	  favor	  of	  reaﬃrming	  the	  
imperialist	  norms	  now	  spurned	  by	  the	  international	  community,	  Japan’s	  path	  towards	  
confrontation	  with	  the	  other	  great	  powers	  was	  set	  in	  motion.
	   The	   diﬀerence	   in	   motivations	   between	   these	   groups	   must	   be	   considered.	  
Diplomatically	   minded	   politicians	   like	   Shidehara	   were	   sensitive	   to	   shifting	   global	  
trends,	   and	  sought	   to	   avoid	   confrontation	  with	  West.	  While	   the	  militarists	   pursued	  
avenues	   for	   enhancing	   state	   power	   through	   continued	   promotion	   of	   imperialist	  
norms.	   Prolonged	   competition	   between	   these	   groups	   within	   the	   domestic	   identity	  
hierarchy	   resulted	   inhibited	   a	   cohesive	   foreign	   policy	   direction.	   This	   thesis	   has	  
presented	   several	   political	   crossroads	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   modern	   Japan’s	   foreign	  
policy,	   but	   few	   historical	   moments	   are	   as	   signiﬁcant	   as	   this	   ﬁssure	   between	   the	  
Japanese	  government	  and	  military.	  The	  two	  groups	  possessed	  fundamentally	  diﬀerent	  
perceptions	  of	  the	   ambiguous	  external	   pressures	  of	  the	   international	   system.	  Such	  a	  
critical	   moment	   requires	   analysis	   within	  a	   framework	   that	   can	   assess	   the	  numerous	  
factors	   at	   play.	   The	   framework	   of	   this	   thesis	   accounts	   for	   neoclassical	   realism’s	  
emphasis	  on	  power	  distributions	  and	  the	  perceptions	  of	  political	   elites,	   incorporates	  
constructivism’s	   insights	   into	   identity	   formation	   and	   norms,	   and	   utilizes	   SIT’s	  
understanding	  of	  group	  dynamics.	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460	  Beasley	  frames	  this	  dynamic	  between	  “colonialist”	  and	  “internationalist”	  ideologies	  in	  Beasley	  1987,	  
190-­‐1.	  While	  Hata	  refers	  as	  a	  conﬂict	  between	  “Expansionist”	  and	  “Non-­‐expansionist”	  factions	  in	  Hata	  
1988,	  303.	  Samuels	  also	  discusses	  these	  groups	  as	  “Big	  Japan	  Militarists”	  and	  “Liberal	  
Internationalists”	  in	  Samuels	  2007,	  15.	  
6.2	  Fifteen	  Years	  of	  War	  (1931	  -­‐	  1945)
There	  are	   three	   avenues	   through	  which	  a	  state	   can	   aﬃrm	   its	  position	   and	  prestige	  
within	   the	   international	   system:	   social	   mobility,	   social	   competition,	   and	   social	  
creativity.	  Japan’s	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility	  was	  undermined	  by	  the	  Kwantung	  Army’s	  
occupation	   of	  Manchuria.	   The	   politicization	   of	   the	   Japanese	   military	   corresponded	  
with	   the	   transformation	  of	  imperialist	  norms	   into	   those	   of	  overt	  militarism,	  thereby	  
thrusting	   Japan	   into	   social	   competition	   with	   the	   other	   industrialized	   states.	   Social	  
competition	   occurs	   when	   a	   lower-­‐status	   group	   seeks	   to	   challenge	   the	   dominant	  
group’s	  superiority.	   In	  conventional	  international	   relations	  terminology,	  Japan	  turned	  
from	  a	  status	  quo	  to	  a	  revisionist	  power.461 	  It	  is	  within	  this	  theoretical	  context	  that	  the	  
Second	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   (1937-­‐1945)	   and	   the	   Paciﬁc	   War	   (1941-­‐1945)	   must	   be	  
examined.	   Table	   6.1	   provides	   a	   reference	   for	   this	   shift	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   Japan’s	  
foreign	  policy.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  under	  social	  competition,	  the	  referent	  group	  is	  
the	   primary	   group	   that	   is	   being	   challenged.	   Since	   Japan	   challenged	   the	   Anglo-­‐


















Social	  Competition.	  Imperialist	  norms	  
transform	  in	  outright	  militarism	  that	  
challenges	  the	  Western-­‐centric	  
hierarchical	  order.
Table	  6.1	  :	  Socially	  Competitive	  Foreign	  Policy	  (1931	  -­‐	  1945)
	   Following	   the	  occupation	  of	  Manchuria	  in	   1931,	  clashes	  between	  Japanese	  and	  
Chinese	   forces	   occurred	   with	   regularity,	   but	   these	   incidents	   remained	   relatively	  
isolated	  aﬀairs.462	  It	  was	  not	  until	   the	  Japanese	  army	  clashed	  with	  Kuomintang	  forces	  
at	  the	  Marco	  Polo	  Bridge	  in	  July	  1937	  that	  total	  war	  erupted.	  The	  Japanese	  won	  several	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461	  For	  more	  on	  the	  commitment	  problem	  see:	  Kang	  2007,	  201.
462	  During	  1935-­‐6	  there	  was	  some	  diplomatic	  headway	  between	  Japan	  and	  China.	  For	  more	  details	  see:	  
Hata	  1988,	  304-­‐5.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  heightened	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  states,	  the	  growing	  
jingoism	  within	  Japan,	  and	  ongoing	  political	  factionalism	  inhibited	  diplomatic	  eﬀorts.	  For	  more	  
details	  on	  the	  conﬂict	  between	  the	  Imperial	  Army	  and	  the	  Japanese	  government	  see:	  Hoyt	  2001,	  
195-­‐7.
key	  battles	  during	   the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  war,	   including	  the	  capture	  of	  Nanking	  and	  
Battle	   of	   Wuhan,	   which	   forced	   the	   Chinese	   government	   to	   relocate	   to	   Chongqing.	  
However,	   as	   the	   war	   continued	   into	   1939	   and	   1940,	   the	   Japanese	   were	   unable	   to	  
suppress	  both	  the	  Nationalists	  (Kuomintang)	  under	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  and	  the	  Chinese	  
Communists	  under	  Mao	  Zedong.463	  The	  stalemate	  was	  only	  resolved	  with	  the	  eventual	  
defeat	  of	  the	  Empire	  of	  Japan	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War.
	   While	  the	  conﬂict	  with	  China	  can	  be	  framed	  as	  a	  progression	  resulting	  from	  the	  
Mukden	  Incident,	  the	  bombing	  of	  Pearl	  Harbor	  in	   1941	  requires	   further	  analysis.	  The	  
isolation	   of	   Japan	   experienced	   following	   its	  withdrawal	   from	   the	  League	   of	  Nations	  
conditioned	  its	  leaders	  to	  seek	  support	  elsewhere	  within	  the	  international	  community.	  
Britain	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   degree	   America	   (from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   Japanese	  
government	   the	   two	   nations	   were	   inseparable)	   had	   constituted	   Japan’s	   primary	  
referent	   group	   while	   adhering	   to	   its	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility.	   The	   Japanese	  
occupation	  of	  Manchuria	  forced	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	   reassess	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  
other	   great	   powers.	   The	   Japanese	   government	   had	   demonstrable	   fondness	   for	   the	  
Germany	   stemming	   from	   the	   early	   Meiji	   leaders’	   desire	   to	   emulate	   the	   military	  
professionalism	   of	   the	  German	   army.464 	   With	   Germany	   having	   already	   overrun	   the	  
Netherlands	   and	   France,	   two	   established	   colonial	   powers	   within	   East	   Asia,	   and	  
advancing	   towards	   Britain,	   the	   Tripartite	   Pact	   between	   Germany,	   Italy,	   and	   Japan	  
presented	  Japanese	  leaders	  a	  strategic	  resolution	  to	  its	  isolation.465
	   German	   advances	   in	   Europe	  also	   prompted	   Japanese	  militarists	   to	   revisit	   the	  
debate	   regarding	   Japan’s	   southern	   advance	   strategy.	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	  5,	   the	  
objectives	   of	   northern	   advance	   proponents	   were	   underlined	   by	   securing	   Japanese	  
interests	  in	  Korea	  and	  Manchuria.	  With	  the	  creation	  of	  Manchukuo,	  which	  solidiﬁed	  
Japan’s	   hold	   on	   north	   China,	   leaders	   within	   the	   government	   and	   military	   began	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463	  Akira,	  "Japanese	  Aggression	  and	  China's	  International	  Position,"	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  China:	  
Republican	  China	  1912-­‐1949,	  Part	  2,	  ed.	  Albert	  Feuerwerker	  John	  King	  Fairbank,	  Denis	  Crispin	  
Twitchett	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  440-­‐6.
464	  This	  element	  is	  referenced	  in	  Chapter	  4	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  Iwakara	  Mission	  and	  it	  is	  again	  covered	  
in	  Chapter	  5	  regarding	  Japan’s	  entry	  into	  the	  First	  World	  War.
465	  Hata	  1988,	  310.
favoring	   a	  move	   into	   Southeast	   Asia.466 	   The	   European	   powers’	   preoccupation	   with	  
Germany	  provided	  Japanese	  leaders	  with	  what	  they	  believed	  was	  a	  perfect	  opportunity	  
to	   secure	   its	   position	   in	   continental	   Asia	   against	   Chinese	   Communists	   and	  
Nationalists.	   What	   Japan	   did	   not	   anticipate	   was	   the	  American	   response	   to	   Japan’s	  
occupation	   of	   Northern	   Indochina,	   which	   was	   interpreted	   in	   Washington	   as	   a	  
potential	  threat	  to	  its	  strategic	  concerns	  in	  the	  Taiwan	  straits.467	  In	  response,	  America	  
issued	  the	  Hull	  Note	  in	  November	  1941.	  The	  bold	  proclamation	  called	  for	  a	  return	  to	  
the	  pre-­‐Mukden	  Incident	  status	  quo,	  and	  instituted	  an	  embargo	  on	  strategic	  materials	  
(namely	   petroleum	   and	   scrap	  metal)	   exports	   to	   Japan.	   From	   this	   point	   forward,	   a	  
confrontation	   between	   America	   and	   Japan	   approached	   inevitability	   from	   the	  
perception	   of	   Japanese	   politicians	   and	  military	   leaders.468 	   Tōgō	   Shigenori,	   Japanese	  
Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Aﬀairs,	  noted	  in	  his	  memoirs:
I	   was	   shocked	  to	   the	  point	  that	  I	   was	   blinded	  by	  utter	  disbelief	   ... 	  In	   the	  end,	  [the	  United	  States]	  
completely	   disregarded	   the	  many	   years	   of	   sacriﬁce	   made	  by	   Japan,	   forcing	   us	   to	   forgo	   the	   great	  
nation	  status	  that	  we	  had	  striven	  so	  hard	  to	   establish	   in	  the	  Far	  East. 	  To	  do	   so	  for	  Japan,	  however,	  
would	  only	  mean	  suicide.	  We	  had	  no	  other	  choice	  but	  to	  rise.469
	   Negotiations	  between	   Japan	  and	   the	  other	  great	   powers	   proved	   fruitless.	   The	  
Japanese	  responded	  with	  a	  plan	  to	  occupy	  European	  colonies	  in	  Asia,	  thereby	  seizing	  
valuable	   strategic	   resources	   and	   creating	   a	   large	   defensive	   parameter	   to	   bulwark	  
against	  the	  response	  from	  the	  Allied	  powers.470	  To	  fortify	  this	  defensive	  parameter,	  the	  
Japanese	  military	  organized	  concurrent	  attacks	  on	  British	  and	  American	  strongholds,	  
including	   the	  bombing	  of	  Pearl	   Harbor,	   the	  seizing	   of	   fortiﬁcations	   in	  Thailand	  and	  
Malaysia,	  and	  the	  invasion	  of	  Hong	  Kong.	  Throughout	  1942,	  Japanese	  forces	  routinely	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  Young,	  Japan's	  Total	  Empire:	  Manchuria	  and	  the	  Culture	  of	  Wartime	  Imperialism	  (University	  of	  
California	  Press,	  1998),	  48-­‐51.	  There	  did	  continue	  to	  be	  an	  internal	  debate	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  
Japanese	  military	  should	  focus	  its	  attention	  on	  pushing	  into	  Siberia,	  as	  noted	  in	  Hata	  1988,	  310.	  This	  
debate	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  Southern	  vs	  Northern	  advance	  theories	  discussed	  in	  the	  preceding	  
chapters.	  
467	  Ibid.
468	  Minohara,	  ""No	  Choice	  but	  to	  Rise":	  Tōgō	  Shigenori	  and	  Japan's	  Decision	  for	  War,"	  in	  Tumultuous	  
Decade:	  Empire,	  Society,	  and	  Diplomacy	  in	  1930s	  Japan,	  ed.	  Tosh	  Minohara	  Masato	  Kimura	  (Toronto:	  
University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2013),	  258-­‐9.
469	  Quoted	  in:	  Ibid.,	  258.
470	  Weinberg,	  A	  World	  at	  Arms:	  A	  Global	  History	  of	  World	  War	  Ii	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  
310-­‐2.
overran	  Allied	  positions,	   seizing	   control	   of	  Burma,	  Malaysia,	   the	   Dutch	  East	   Indies,	  
Singapore,	  and	  the	  Philippines.	  Japanese	  forces	  also	  achieved	  major	  naval	  victories	  the	  
South	  China	  Seas,	  Java	  Sea,	  and	  the	  Indian	  Ocean.471 	  Map	  6.1	   represents	  the	  farthest	  
expanses	  of	  the	  Empire	  of	  Japan	  in	  1942.	  
Map	  6.1	  :	  Empire	  of	  Japan,	  1942472
	   The	   Japanese	  military	   soon	   found	   itself	  over-­‐stretched	   and	  on	   the	   defensive.	  
Allied	   naval	   victory	   in	   the	   Battle	   of	   Coral	   Sea	   halted	   Japanese	   attempts	   to	   invade	  
Australian	   territories,	   and	   by	   May	   1942	   the	   Americans	   had	   broken	   Japanese	   naval	  
codes	  and	  used	  this	  information	  against	  the	  Japanese	  at	  the	  decisive	  American	  victory	  
Chapter	  6:	  New	  Directions	  in	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1931	  -­‐	  1972	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181
471	  Gruhl,	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  (Transaction	  Publishers,	  2009),	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Weinberg	  2005,	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472	  Adapted	  from	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  Wikimedia	  Commons	  ﬁle:	  "Japanese_Empire_(orthographic_projection).svg"
at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Midway.473 	  The	  cumulative	  eﬀects	  of	   the	  Allied	  victories	  at	  Coral	  Sea	  
and	  Midway	  reduced	  Japan’s	   oﬀensive	  capabilities	  and	   facilitated	  Allied	   landings	  on	  
Guadalcanal	   and	   the	  Solomon	   Islands	   campaign.	  Combined,	   these	   victories	   enabled	  
the	  Allies	   to	   turn	  the	   tide	  of	   the	  Paciﬁc	  War	  and	  take	  oﬀensive	  action	   against	  Japan	  
that	  culminated	  with	  the	  ﬁre	  bombing	  of	  Tokyo	  and	  the	  decimation	  of	  Hiroshima	  and	  
Nagasaki	  by	  atomic	  bombs.474	  
	   Both	  the	  Second	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  and	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War	  contain	  nuances	  that	  
will	  not	  be	  surveyed	  here,	  as	  both	  conﬂicts	  have	  been	  dealt	  with	  extensively	  within	  the	  
relevant	  literature.475 	  What	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  
conceptual	   link	   between	   the	   Japanese	  government’s	  abandonment	  of	  social	   mobility	  
for	   social	   competition,	   whereby	   Japanese	   leaders	   directly	   challenged	   the	   power	  
hierarchy	   of	   the	   international	   system.	  While	   this	   period	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	  
(1931	   -­‐	   1945)	   conﬂicted	  with	   the	  prevailing	   international	   norms,	   Japan’s	   decision	   to	  
maintain	  an	   imperial	   foreign	  policy	  was	  not	   one	  determined	  entirely	  by	  government	  
oﬃcials.	   Although	   the	   Japanese	   government	   could	   have	   resisted	   the	   path	   towards	  
militarism	   with	  greater	  resolve,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Kwantung	  Army	  greatly	  restricted	  
Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  options.	  Furthermore,	  the	  success	  Japan	  experienced	  through	  its	  
adherence	   to	   imperialist	   norms	   contributed	   the	   diﬃculty	   in	   shifting	   away	   from	  
imperialism.	  
	   The	   ideological	   ﬂexibility	   that	   had	   enabled	   the	   successes	   of	   the	  Meiji	   period	  
was	  contingent	  upon	  a	  clearly	  deﬁned	  international	  system	  with	  identiﬁable	  norms,	  an	  
established	   power	   hierarchy,	   and	   emulative	   great	   power	   politics.	   The	   ambiguous	  
international	  system	  of	  the	  1930s	  and	  early	  1940s	  oﬀered	  limited	  avenues	  for	  Japanese	  
elites	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  changing	  global	   trends.	  Early	  twentieth	  century	  institutionalism	  
was	  at	  its	  best	  a	  tenuous	  international	  consensus,	  whose	  two	  main	  advocates,	  America	  
and	   Britain,	   had	   themselves	   retreated	   away	   from	   their	   commitment	   to	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  (Johns	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  University	  Press,	  2000),	  367-­‐9.
474	  Parshall	  and	  Tully,	  Shattered	  Sword:	  The	  Untold	  Story	  of	  the	  Battle	  of	  Midway	  (Potomac	  Books,	  2005),	  
422-­‐3;	  Symonds,	  The	  Battle	  of	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  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  USA,	  2011),	  133-­‐74,	  333-­‐62;	  Weinberg	  
2005,	  333-­‐37,	  883-­‐919.
475	  For	  excellent	  sources	  related	  to	  Japanese	  history,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  literature	  review	  oﬀered	  in	  
Chapter	  1.
internationalism	   as	   a	   result	   of	   war	   exhaustion	   and	   the	   Great	   Depression.	   	   Status	  
seeking	  behavior	  within	  the	  nascent	  institutionalism	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  and	  the	  
Versailles-­‐Washington	  System	  ultimately	  proved	  impossible	  for	  Japanese	  leaders.	  
6.3	  The	  Occupation	  Years	  (1945	  -­‐	  1952)
The	  Empire	  of	  Japan	  collapsed	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  crippled	  economy,	   the	  death	  of	  
approximately	   three	   million	   Japanese	   people,	   and	   two	   nuclear	   detonations.	   At	   its	  
height	  of	  power	  in	  1942,	  the	  empire	  had	  in	  less	  than	  ﬁfty	  years	  expanded	  to	  encompass	  
an	   area	   of	   7,400,000	   square	   kilometers,	   a	   space	   twenty-­‐times	   larger	   than	   of	   the	  
377,944	  square	  kilometers	  of	  Japan’s	  home	  islands.	  The	  haste	  of	  Japan’s	  expansionism	  
was	  only	  matched	   by	  its	   retreat	   from	   peripheral	   holdings	   following	   its	   surrender	   in	  
1945.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War,	  Japan	  had	  returned	  to	   its	  pre-­‐First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  
War	  (1894-­‐5)	  status	  as	  a	  small	  island	  state.476	  
	   The	  cost	  of	  expansionism	  was	  astronomical.	  Colonial	   holdings	  rarely	  yielded	  a	  
proﬁt	   for	   their	   imperial	   possessors,	   and	   this	   dilemma	   was	   no	   more	   true	   for	   Japan	  
whose	  empire	  spanned	  an	  area	  relatively	  poor	  in	  resources.477 	  The	  Allied	  powers	  had	  
blocked	   Japanese	  maritime	   transport	  during	   the	  war,	   cutting	   Japan	  oﬀ	   from	   the	  raw	  
materials	   necessary	   for	   the	  maintenance	   of	   their	   industry.478 	   During	   the	   war	  years,	  
military	   expenditures	   accounted	   for	   85	   percent	   of	   the	   national	   income,	   and	   the	  
strained	  economy	  could	  not	  meet	   the	  demands	  of	   both	   the	  military	   and	   the	  public,	  
causing	   living	   standards	   to	   drop	   rapidly	   following	   the	   outbreak	   of	   hostilities	   with	  
China	   in	   1937.479 	   At	   the	   time	   of	   its	   surrender,	   Japan	   was	   isolated	   from	   the	   global	  
economy	  and	  its	  people	  where	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  starvation.480
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  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  Japan,	  ed.	  Marius	  B.	  
Jansen	  John	  W.	  Hall,	  Madoka	  Kanai,Denis	  Twitchett	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  
494.
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   Although	   liberated	   from	   the	  yoke	   of	   Japanese	   imperialism,	   several	   of	   Japan’s	  
former	  colonies	  faced	  numerous	  crises.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  infrastructure	  
costs,	  Japanese	  war	  crimes	  decimated	  areas	  of	  East	  Asia.	  The	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Army	  
committed	  innumerable	  atrocities,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  racially	  motivated.	  During	  the	  
Nanking	   Massacre,	   which	   followed	   its	   capture	   in	   December	   1937,	   hundreds	   of	  
thousands	  Chinese	  civilians	  and	  prisoners	  of	  war	  were	  murdered	  by	  Japanese	  soldiers.	  
Estimates	  place	  the	  death	  toll	  at	  between	  70,000	  -­‐	  300,000	  persons.481	  Widespread	  war	  
rape	  and	  looting	  also	  befell	  Nanking	  over	  the	  six-­‐week	  period.482	  
	   Sanctioned	   mass	   murders	   occurred	   throughout	   Japanese	   occupied	   territories	  
both	   elsewhere	   in	   China	   and	   across	   the	   empire,	   including	   the	   Manila	   Massacre	  
(approximately	  100,000	  deaths).483	  There	  were	  numerous	  instances	  where	  prisoners	  of	  
war	   were	   executed.	   Tens	   of	   thousands	   (some	   estimates	   are	   in	   the	   hundreds	   of	  
thousands)	   of	   “comfort	   women”	   were	   forced	   into	   prostitution.484 	   Forced	   labor	  and	  
biological	   weapon	   testing	   (on	  human	   subjects)	   were	   also	   conducted,	  none	  of	  which	  
are	   more	   infamous	   than	   Unit	   731,	   a	   covert	   biological	   and	   chemical	   research	   unit.	  
Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  General	  Shirō	  Ishii,	  unit	  731	  performed	  vivisections,	  biological	  
attacks,	   and	   weapon	   experiments	   on	   thousands	   of	   civilians.485 	   These	   atrocities	  
transpired	   with	   at	   least	   nominal	   sanctioning	   by	   the	   Japanese	   government,	   whose	  
questionable	  involvement	  in	  these	  events	  remains	  contested	  in	  modern	  Japan.486	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481	  The	  number	  of	  civilians	  killed	  is	  highly	  disputed.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  see:	  Yoshida,	  The	  
Making	  of	  the	  "Rape	  of	  Nanking"	  :	  History	  and	  Memory	  in	  Japan,	  China,	  and	  the	  United	  States:	  History	  
and	  Memory	  in	  Japan,	  China,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  USA,	  2006),	  94-­‐6.
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  primary	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  see:	  Brook,	  Documents	  on	  the	  Rape	  of	  
Nanking	  (University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1999).
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  World	  War	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  (Westview	  Press,	  1997),	  92-­‐104.	  See	  
also:	  Tanaka,	  Japan's	  Comfort	  Women:	  Sexual	  Slavery	  and	  Prostitution	  During	  World	  War	  Ii	  and	  the	  
Us	  Occupation	  (Routledge	  Chapman	  &	  Hall,	  2002).
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  Peter	  Williams,	  Unit	  731:	  Japan's	  Secret	  Biological	  Warfare	  in	  World	  War	  Ii	  (Free	  Press,	  1989).
486	  This	  modern	  impact	  of	  these	  events	  on	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7.
	   With	  Japan’s	  formal	  surrender	  aboard	  the	  USS	  Missouri	  on	  September	  2nd	  1945,	  
it	   capitulated	   its	   sovereignty	   to	   the	   Allied	   powers.	   In	   accordance	  with	   the	  Potsdam	  
Declaration,	   President	   Truman’s	   formal	   proclamation	   regarding	   the	   terms	   of	  
surrender,487	  occupation	  forces	  soon	  arrived	  under	  the	  command	  of	  General	  Douglas	  
MacArthur.488	  The	  absence	  of	  strong	  regional	  allies	  left	  America	  as	  the	  principle	  power	  
responsible	  for	  reconstruction	   in	  the	  Asia-­‐Paciﬁc.	  China,	  an	  American	  ally	  during	  the	  
war,	   was	   at	   the	   brink	   of	   a	   renewed	   civil	   war,	   and	   the	   European	   nations	   were	  
preoccupied	   with	   their	  own	   recovery.489 	   In	   his	   role	   as	   Supreme	   Commander	   of	   the	  
Allied	  Powers	  (SCAP),	  MacArthur	  was	  responsible	  for	  coordinating	  occupation	  eﬀorts	  
between	  General	   Headquarters	   (GHQ),	   which	  consisted	  of	  several	   thousand	  civilian	  
and	  military	  personnel	  assigned	  to	  domestic	  posts	  throughout	  Japan,	  and	  the	  Japanese	  
government.	   GHQ	   eﬀorts	   were	   directed	   at	   dismantling	   the	  Meiji	   State,	   particularly	  
Japan’s	  capacity	  to	  wage	  oﬀensive	  war.490	  
	   To	   this	   end,	   occupation	   forces	   initially	   planned	   to	   decentralize	   the	   Japanese	  
economy	  by	  permitting	  only	  ‘such	  industries	  as	  will	  sustain	  her	  economy’	  and	  moving	  
additional	   industry	   (particularly	   heavy	   industry)	   overseas.491 	   This	   strategy	  was	   short	  
lived.	   It	   provided	   little	  means	   through	   which	   the	   Japanese	   could	   contribute	   to	   the	  
domestic	   rebuilding	   process	   or	   pay	   for	   potential	   reparations.492 	   For	   example,	   the	  
blockade	  on	  maritime	  transport	   of	   raw	  materials	  continued	  during	   the	  ﬁrst	   years	   of	  
the	  occupation,	  contributing	  to	   the	  real	  GNP	  per	  capita	  in	  1946	  to	  drop	  to	  55	  percent	  
of	   the	   1934-­‐6	   level.493 	  Economic	  considerations	   and	  various	   levels	  of	   social	   disorder	  
lead	  Secretary	  of	  the	  American	  Army	  Kenneth	  Royall	  to	  comment	  ‘“that	   Japan	  cannot	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support	   itself	  as	  a	  nation	  of	  shopkeepers	  and	  craftsmen	  and	  small	  artisans	  any	  more	  
than	  it	  can	  exist	  as	  an	  agricultural	  nation”’.494
	   As	   the	  consensus	   in	  Washington	  shifted	  away	  from	   punitive	   economic	  policy	  
towards	  transforming	   Japan	   into	  a	  self-­‐suﬃcient	  state,	  America	  dispatched	  renowned	  
economist	   and	   banker	   Joseph	   Dodge	   to	   Japan	   in	   1949.	   Dodge	   was	   an	   expert	   on	  
postwar	   economic	   recovery,	   having	   previously	   developed	   economic	   reconstruction	  
plans	  in	  West	  Germany.495	  Charged	  with	  designing	  a	  similar	  strategy	  for	  Japan,	  Dodge	  
instituted	   ﬁscally	   conservative	   economic	   policies	   collectively	   known	   as	   the	   “Dodge	  
line”	   that	   aggressively	   addressed	   the	   national	   budget,	   reduced	   government	  
intervention	  in	  the	  economy,	  and	  established	  a	  ﬁxed	  exchange	  rate	  for	  the	  yen	  to	  keep	  
Japanese	  export	  prices	  low.496 	  Dodge’s	  polices	   eventually	  pushed	  Japan	  towards	  self-­‐
suﬃciency,	   but	   in	   the	   short	   term	   they	   led	   to	   increased	   unemployment	   and	   social	  
distress,	  and	  were	  predictably	  unpopular	  amongst	  the	  Japanese	  public.497	  
	   The	   Japanese	   government	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   during	   the	   occupation	   years.	  
While	  the	  Japanese	  government	  was	  often	  forced	  to	  defer	  to	   GHQ,	  they	  were	  mainly	  
cooperative	  with	  demobilization	  eﬀorts.498	  The	  signiﬁcance	  of	  this	  collaboration	  could	  
be	  disregarded	  as	  an	  attempt	  by	  Japanese	  politicians	  to	   appease	  occupation	   forces	  in	  
the	   hopes	   of	   beneﬁting	   their	   political	   career,	   but	   such	   cursory	   treatment	   does	   not	  
adequately	   address	   the	   ideological	   imperatives	   of	   postwar	   Japan.	   The	   occupation	  
purged	   approximately	   200,000	   individuals	   from	   public	   aﬀairs	   and	   dissolved	   all	   of	  
Japan’s	   rightwing	   political	   organizations.	   Resultantly,	   the	   numerous	   vacancies	   in	  
government	  were	  ﬁlled	  with	   left-­‐leaning	   civil	   servants	  who	   demonstrated	   a	  genuine	  
desire	   to	  steer	  Japan	  away	  from	   its	  past	  militarism,	  an	  evolution	  within	   the	  Japanese	  
polity	  that	  will	   later	  be	  shown	  to	  have	  greatly	  aﬀected	  its	  foreign	  policy.499	  The	  purge	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realigned	   the	   political	   discourse	   in	   Japan.	   The	   prewar	   consensus	   that	   had	   formed	  
around	  nationalism	   and	  militarism	  was	  eﬀectively	  dismantled,	  opening	  the	   Japanese	  
polity	  to	  suppressed	  norms,	  namely	  those	  of	  internationalism	  and	  economic	  openness	  
championed	   by	   Shidehara.	   While	   the	   occupation	   inhibited	   Japanese	   leaders	   from	  
engaging	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  domestic	  factors	  (e.g	  identity	  formation	  and	  intergroup	  
competition)	   that	   form	   part	   of	  this	   thesis’	   framework	   were	   still	   at	   work.	   The	   purge	  
elevated	   liberal	   norms	   to	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   domestic	   identity	   hierarchy.	   In	   the	  
coming	   years,	   these	   norms	   established	   the	   foundation	   of	   Japan’s	   postwar	   foreign	  
policy.
	   In	  stark	  contrast	   to	   the	  postwar	  political	   environment	   in	  Germany,	  where	  the	  
Nazi	  government	  was	  thoroughly	  dismantled,	  GHQ	  was	  eager	  to	   utilize	  the	  Japanese	  
government	   as	  a	  means	   of	  furthering	   its	   objectives.	  This	   desire	  was	   reﬂected	   in	   the	  
Potsdam	  Declaration,	  which	  spoke	  to	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  Japanese	  government	  
to	   ‘remove	   all	   obstacles	   to	   the	   revival	   and	   strengthening	   of	   democratic	   tendencies	  
among	  the	  Japanese	  people’	  rather	  than	  outlining	  its	  delegitimization.500 	  Much	  of	  the	  
cooperation	   between	   Japanese	   politicians	   and	   GHQ	   hinged	   upon	   the	   fate	   of	   the	  
Imperial	   family.	   MacArthur	   exonerated	   Emperor	   Hirohito	   and	   the	   entire	   Imperial	  
family	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  facilitating	  a	  peaceful	  political	   transition.	  MacArthur	  reasoned	  
that	   if	   the	   emperor	   retained	   ﬁgurative	  power,	   Hirohito	   could	   provide	   the	   Japanese	  
people	  with	  a	  “symbol”	  of	  continuity	  and	  thusly	  undermine	  anti-­‐occupation	  dissent.501	  
Hirohito’s	   involvement	   within	   the	   armed	   forces	   is	   subject	   to	   debate,	   but	   some	  
historians	  contest	  that	  he	  held	  substantial	  leverage	  over	  the	  wartime	  military	  and	  that	  
MacArthur	   went	   to	   extraordinary	   lengths	   to	   spare	   Hirohito	   from	   war	   crime	  
indictment.	   This	   may	   have	   included	   corrupting	   witness	   testimony	   to	   defer	   political	  
responsibility	  away	   from	   Hirohito	   and	  onto	   other	  prominent	  ﬁgures,	  namely	  Hideki	  
Tōjō.502	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   The	   International	  Military	  Tribunal	   for	  the	  Far	  East	   (IMTFE)	   brought	   to	   trial	  
twenty-­‐eight	  Japanese	  military	  and	  political	  leaders	  who	  were	  charged	  with	  conspiracy	  
to	   start	   and	   wage	   oﬀensive	   war	   or	   ‘crimes	   against	   peace’	   (Class	   A	   war	   crime).503	  
Thousands	   more	   were	   later	   tried	   for	   ‘conventional	   atrocities	   or	   crimes	   against	  
humanity’	   (Class	  B)	   and	   ‘the	  planning,	  ordering,	   authorization,	  or	  failure	  to	   prevent	  
such	  transgressions	  at	  higher	  levels	  in	  the	  command	  structure’	  (Class	  C).504	  All	  Class	  A	  
defendants	  were	  found	  guilty	  and	  seven	  were	  sentenced	  to	  execution.	  The	  occupation	  
forces	   also	   made	   eﬀorts	   to	   shame	   the	   Japanese	   people	   into	   blaming	   the	   Imperial	  
military	  for	  driving	  the	  country	  to	  a	  ruinous	  end.505 	  Conceptually,	   the	  trials	  expanded	  
the	  political	  purge	  instituted	  by	  the	  occupation	  forces,	  delegitimizing	   the	  militaristic	  
and	  nationalistic	  elements	  within	  Japanese	  political	  society	  that	  had	  instituted	  Japan’s	  
deleterious	  strategy	  of	  social	  competition.	  Nevertheless,	  protecting	  the	  Imperial	  house	  
inhibited	  a	  severing	  of	  the	  past	  comparable	  to	   the	  denaziﬁcation	  of	  Germany.	  Japan’s	  
contentious	  relationship	  with	  its	  past	  continues	  to	  haunt	  its	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  
China.
	   The	   most	   lasting	   consequence	   of	   the	   occupation	   was	   the	   1946	   Postwar	  
Constitution.506	  The	  primary	  aim	  of	  occupation	  forces	  was	  to	  remove	  potential	  threats	  
in	   the	  Paciﬁc	  by	  disarming	   Japan,	  and	  redirecting	   the	  Japanese	  government	   towards	  
American	  strategic	  concerns.	  Notwithstanding	  that	  the	  constitution	  was	  drafted	  (and	  
subsequently	   redrafted)	   by	   Americans,	   the	   drafters	   were	   sensitive	   to	   the	   Meiji	  
Constitution	   and	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   Japanese	   politicians.507 	   Under	   the	   new	  
constitution,	   the	   emperor	   was	   made	   into	   a	   ﬁgurehead.	   The	   democratically	   elected	  
Diet	   became	   ‘the	   highest	   organ	   of	   the	   state’,	   placing	  matters	   of	   authority,	   political	  
responsibility,	   and	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   Japanese	   people.508 	   Japanese	  
politicians	  played	  a	  signiﬁcant	  role	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  especially	  with	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regards	  to	  Article	  9,	  in	  which	  Japan	  formally	  renounced	  the	  use	  of	  war	  as	  a	  sovereign	  
right.	  Article	  9	  reads:
Aspiring	  sincerely	  to	  an	  international	  peace	  based	  on	  justice	  and	  order,	  the	  Japanese	  people	  forever	  
renounce	  war	  as	  a	  sovereign	  right	  of	   the	  nation	  and	  the	  threat	  or	  use	  of	   force	  as	  means	  of	  settling	  
international	  disputes.
In	  order	  to	  accomplish	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  preceding	  paragraph,	  land,	  sea,	  and	  air	  forces,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
war	   potential,	   will	   never	   be	   maintained.	   The	   right	   of	   belligerency	   of	   the	   state	   will	   not	   be	  
recognized.509
Responsibility	   for	   Japanese	   security	   was	   therefore	   vested	   primarily	  with	   occupation	  
forces.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  Constitution	  also	   called	   for	  Japan	   to	   maintain	   a	  
minimal	  Self-­‐Defense	  Force	  to	  maintain	  its	  sovereignty.	  
	   Authorship	   of	   the	   clause	   remains	   disputed.	  MacArthur	  wrote	   in	   his	  memoirs	  
that	  it	  was	  Shidehara	  who	  ‘wanted	  it	  to	   prohibit	  any	  military	  establishment	   for	  Japan
—any	   military	   establishment	   whatsoever’.510 	   According	   to	   MacArthur,	   Shidehara	  
believed	  the	  military	  had	  lost	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people,	  and	  that	  rearmament	  
would	   hinder	   Japan’s	   recovery.	   MacArthur	   mirrored	   this	   sentiment	   himself,	   stating	  
‘[f]or	  years	   I	   have	   believed	  that	   war	  should	  be	   abolished	  as	   an	  outmoded	  means	   of	  
resolving	  disputes	  between	  nations’.	  511 	  This	  paciﬁst-­‐leaning	  sentiment	  was	  shared	  by	  
other	   prominent	   Japanese	   politicians,	   namely	   Yoshida	  Shigeru,	   whose	   two	   terms	  as	  
Prime	   Minister	   between	   1946	   -­‐	   1953	   had	   an	   indelible	   impact	   on	   the	   direction	   of	  
Japanese	  foreign	  policy.
	   The	   egalitarian	  measures	   of	   the	   postwar	   constitution	   quickly	   found	   traction	  
among	  the	  public,	  which	  adapted	  the	  ascending	   liberal-­‐paciﬁst	  norms	  with	  the	  same	  
pragmatism	   witnessed	   during	   the	  Meiji	   Period.512 	   This	   ideological	   ﬂexibility,	  which	  
was	   previously	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   must	   be	   considered	   when	   conceptualizing	  
Japanese	  foreign	   policy	  during	   this	   period.	   The	   occupation	  of	   Japan	  was	   unlike	  any	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other	  period	  of	  Japanese	  history.	  Some	  correlation	  can	  be	  drawn	  to	  the	  late	  Tokugawa	  
period,	  in	  which	   foreign	   encroachment	   fundamentally	  altered	  the	  direction	  of	  Japan.	  
However,	  the	  Meiji	  Restoration	  occurred	  mainly	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  danger	  
posed	   by	   foreigners,	   as	   opposed	   to	   outright	   occupation.	   The	   economically	  minded	  
practitioners	   of	   gunboat	   diplomacy	   were	   ultimately	  more	   interested	   in	   opening	   up	  
Japan	  for	  trade	  than	  fundamentally	  altering	  the	  Japanese	  political	  structure.513
	   Similarities	   do	   exist	   regarding	   the	   impact	   of	   foreign	   pressures	   upon	   foreign	  
policy.	   Considering	   that	   Japan	   was	   an	   occupied	   country	   between	   1945	   and	   1952,	   it	  
would	  be	  inappropriate	  to	  discuss	  a	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  Other	  variables	  that	  would	  
eventually	   condition	   policy	   in	   the	   subsequent	   decades	  were	   rooted	   in	   the	   political	  
developments	   of	   the	   occupation	   years.	   The	   purge	   of	   the	   Japanese	   polity	   and	   the	  
disarmament	   of	   its	  military	   infrastructure	   opened	   the	  way	   for	  more	   diplomatically	  
minded	   politicians,	   such	   as	   Shidehara	   and	   Yoshida,	   and	   facilitated	   the	  ascension	   of	  
liberal-­‐paciﬁst	   norms.	   Although	   these	   individuals	   are	   often	   oversimpliﬁed	   as	   mere	  
paciﬁsts,	   it	   will	   be	   shown	   in	   the	   following	   section	   that	   they	   adapted	   the	   postwar	  
constitution	   towards	   rebuilding	   Japan	   through	   a	   strategy	  of	   social	   creativity.	   In	   this	  
sense,	   the	   paciﬁsm	   often	  associated	  with	   Yoshida	   was	  a	   vehicle	   for	   enhancing	   state	  
power	  through	  economic	  growth,	  a	  socially	  creative	  strategy	  that	  both	  elevated	  Japan’s	  
international	   standing	   and	   formed	  the	  basis	   of	   the	   global	   capitalist	   norms	   that	   has	  
blossomed	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  
6.4	  The	  Postwar	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1952	  -­‐	  1972)
The	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  shifted	  the	  nature	  of	  US-­‐Japanese	  relations.	  During	  the	  ﬁrst	  
years	  of	   the	  occupation,	   American	   strategy	  in	  the	   Paciﬁc	  hinged	  upon	  developing	   a	  
strong	  relationship	  with	  Kuomintang	  China	  and	  disarming	  Japan.	  As	  American	  foreign	  
policy	  became	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  countering	  Communism,	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  non-­‐
industrialized	   and	   demilitarized	   Japan	   concerned	   American	   policy	   experts	   who	  
worried	  that	   Japan	  may	  succumb	  to	   the	  Communist	   tide.	  This	  evolution	   in	   strategic	  
thinking	  was	  furthered	  by	  the	  Communist	  victory	  in	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War	  (1945-­‐1949)	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and	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   Korean	   war	   (1950-­‐1953).514 	   Consequently,	   Japan	   became	  
America’s	  ﬁrst	   line	  of	  defense	  against	  Communism,	  and	  the	  reconstruction	  eﬀort	  was	  
refocused	  on	  developing	  Japan	  into	  a	  powerful	  Asian	  ally.515
	   During	  the	  ﬁnal	  years	  of	  the	  occupation,	  the	  ancillary	  eﬀects	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  
had	   a	   tremendous	   impact	   on	   the	   occupation.	   MacArthur	   was	   replaced	   by	   General	  
Matthew	   B.	   Ridgeway	   in	   1951	   for	   openly	   disagreeing	   with	   President	   Truman	   over	  
Korean	  War	  Policy.516	   In	  MacArthur’s	  wake,	  Truman	  appointed	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  as	  
special	   ambassador	   to	   Japan	   and	   charged	   him	   with	   re-­‐negotiating	   the	   security	  
relationship.	  Dulles	   attempted	   to	   convince	   Yoshida	   that	   Japan,	   while	   remaining	   an	  
American	   ally,	   should	   participate	   more	   completely	   in	   its	   own	   national	   defense.	  
Yoshida	  rejected	  Dulles’s	  proposal,	   citing	   the	  restrictions	  of	  Article	  9	  as	  justiﬁcation.	  
Yoshida’s	   careful	   political	   maneuvering	   was	   motivated	   by	   his	   desire	   to	   avoid	  
burdening	  the	  anemic	  postbellum	  economy	  with	  the	  costs	  of	  participating	  in	  the	  ﬁght	  
against	  communism.517	  The	  economic	  mindedness	  of	  Yoshida	  remained	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  
Japan’s	  postwar	  policies,	  and	  became	  a	  key	  component	  in	  developing	  a	  foreign	  policy	  
strategy	  once	  the	  occupation	  had	  ended.	  
	   Yoshida	  was	  well	   versed	   in	  American	   strategic	  thinking.	  He	  had	  emerged	  as	  a	  
leading	   politician	   under	   MacArthur,	   and	   helped	   coordinate	   eﬀorts	   between	  
occupation	   forces	   and	   the	   Japanese	   government.518 	   Yoshida	   had	   been	   essential	   in	  
establishing	   a	   working	   relationship	   between	   liberal	   and	   conservative	   elements	   of	  
Japanese	   government.519 	   Despite	   rejecting	   the	   American	   proposal,	   Yoshida	   was	  
conﬁdent	   that	   Japanese	   security	   remained	   uncompromised.	   Japan’s	   geopolitical	  
signiﬁcance	  and	  the	  American	  investment	   in	  occupation	  were	  indicative	  of	  a	  broader	  
global	   agenda	   contingent	   upon	   extending	   the	   security	   of	   the	   American	   nuclear	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umbrella	  to	  Japan.520	  Regarding	  the	  constitutional	  restraints,	  Yoshida	  later	  wrote	  in	  his	  
memoirs:	  ‘To	  the	  question	  of	  rearmament...I	  have	  always	  held	  the	  view	  that	  Article	  9	  -­‐	  
the	  renunciation-­‐of-­‐war	  clause	  -­‐	  does	  not	  need	  to	   be	  amended.	  And	   I	  still	   adhere	  to	  
that	  view’.	  521	  
	   Yoshida’s	  consistent	  privileging	  of	  economic	  factors,	  themselves	  norms,	  formed	  
the	   basis	   of	   Japan’s	   postwar	   strategy	   of	   social	   creativity.	   Social	   creativity	   is	   a	   re-­‐
imagining	   of	  the	   status	   hierarchy	   by	  a	  subordinate	  group	   (Japan)	   with	   the	   intent	   of	  
achieving	   recognition	   for	   excelling	   in	   an	   alternate	   domain	   that	   does	   not	   directly	  
challenge	  the	  dominate	  group	  (America).	  Yoshida’s	  resistance	  to	  American	  pressure	  is	  
a	  clear	  indication	  of	   this	   emerging	   strategy,	  where	  he	  directed	   Japan	   towards	  status	  
seeking	  behavior	  underwritten	  by	  economic	  norms.	  Interpreting	   this	  emerging	  phase	  
in	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   evolution	   requires	   an	   understanding	   of	   both	  material	   and	  
ideational	   factors.	   Yoshida	   was	   not	   solely	   motivated	   by	   paciﬁst	   norms,	   as	   a	  
constructivist	  reading	  may	  suggest.	  He	  had	  a	  keen	  understanding	  of	  Cold	  War	  power	  
politics,	  and	  exploited	  America’s	  anti-­‐Communist	  eﬀorts	  towards	  rebuilding	  Japan.	  
	   Dulles	   and	   Yoshida	   did	   eventually	   compromise	   on	   the	   establishment	   of	  
Japanese	   Police	   Reserve	   that	   would	   inherit	   domestic	   security	   concerns	   from	  
occupation	   forces.	   In	   later	  years,	   this	  policing	   force	  transformed	   into	   the	   Japan	   Self-­‐
Defense	   Forces	   (JSDF).	   The	   compromise	   was	   a	   precursor	   for	   establishing	   a	   formal	  
security	  treaty	  between	  the	  two	  states.522	  The	  Treaty	  of	  San	  Francisco	  was	  signed	  on	  8	  
September	  1951	  and	  oﬃcially	  concluded	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War,	  ended	  the	  age	  of	  imperialism	  
in	  Japan,	  and	  restored	  some	  sovereignty	  to	  the	  Japanese	  state.	  The	  treaty	  also	  returned	  
the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Japan’s	  former	  colonial	   holdings	  to	   indigenous	  rule.523	  A	  security	  
treaty	  between	   the	   two	   powers	   established	  American	   territorial	   rights	   within	   Japan	  
and	  restricted	  the	  Japanese	  government	  from	  entering	  security	  agreements	  with	  third	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parties	  without	  American	  consent.524	  Yoshida	  later	  wrote	  ‘Mr[.]	  Dulles	  had	  taken	  upon	  
himself	  the	  responsibility	  of	  shouldering	  all	  the	  diﬃculties	  of	  negotiation,	  and	  thereby	  
won	  for	  Japan	  most	  important	  concessions	  from	  the	  other	  Allied	  Governments	  that	  we	  
ourselves	  at	  the	  time	  would	  have	  been	  in	  no	  position	  to	  secure’.525
	   These	  two	   treaties	  deﬁned	  the	  direction	  of	   Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  and	  ended	  
Japan’s	   isolation	   from	   the	   international	   community.	   The	   Japanese	   economy	   was	  
opened	  to	  trade	  with	  other	  democratic	  states,	  but	  remained	  cut	  oﬀ	  from	  relations	  with	  
China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  world	  Japan	  entered	  was	  decidedly	  diﬀerent	  than	  the	  
one	   it	   had	   been	  thrust	   into	   during	  the	  ninetieth	   century.	   The	  multipolar	   imperialist	  
hierarchical	   order	   had	   given	   way	  to	   Cold	  War	   bipolarity.	   Japan	   faced	   two	   potential	  
directions	   in	   foreign	   policy.	   First,	   Japanese	   leaders	   could	   uphold	   Article	   9	   and	  
accelerate	   economic	   recovery	   by	   capitulating	   its	   sovereignty	   to	   America	   (social	  
creativity).	   Second,	   state	   elites	   could	   strain	   the	   postwar	   economy	   in	   the	   hopes	   of	  
reasserting	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  by	  developing	  a	  military	  complementary	  to	  American	  
interests	   thereby	   increasing	   its	   relative	   position	   among	   the	   other	   American	   allies	  
(social	  mobility).	  
	   Yoshida	  believed	   that	   Japan’s	   natural	   historical	   position	  was	   allying	  with	   the	  
world’s	  strongest	  power	  and	  utilizing	   this	   relationship	   to	   strengthen	   Japan.	   In	   other	  
words,	  Yoshida	  favored	  policies	  aimed	  at	  self-­‐strengthening	  (state	  power)	   rather	  than	  
addressing	  Japan’s	  compromised	  sovereignty.	  In	  defense	  of	  his	  pro-­‐American	  position,	  
Yoshida	   drew	   parallels	   to	   Anglo-­‐Japanese	   relations	   of	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century,	  
which	  harken	  back	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  modern	  states	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4:	  
What	  strikes	  one	  about	  these	  events	  ...	  [is	  the]	  contrast	  to	  the	  dissension	  concerning	  the	  attitude	  to	  
be	  taken	   towards	  Great	  Britain	  and	   the	   United	  States	   ... 	  At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  Angl0-­‐
Japanese	  Alliance,	  Great	  Britain	  was	   at	  the	  height	  of	   her	  power	   ...	  while	   Japan	  was	  an	  insigniﬁcant	  
island	  nation	   ... 	  which	  had	  only	  just	  begun	  to	   rise	  from	  obscurity.	  The	  diﬀerence	   -­‐	  in	  international	  
signiﬁcance	   and	  power	  potential	   -­‐	  between	   the	  two	   countries	   was	   far	  greater	   than	  the	  diﬀerences	  
which	   exist	   between	   Japan	   and	   the	   United	   States	   today.	   Yet	   the	   Anglo-­‐Japanese	   Alliance	   was	  
welcomed	  by	  Government	  and	  people	  alive	  and	  no	  one	  viewed	  that	  document	  as	  meaning	  that	  Japan	  
was	  truckling	  to	  British	  imperialism	  or	  in	  any	  danger	  of	  becoming	  a	  gloriﬁed	  British	  colony.526	  
Chapter	  6:	  New	  Directions	  in	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1931	  -­‐	  1972	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193
524	  Ibid.,	  199-­‐201.
525	  Yoshida	  1961,	  254.
526	  Ibid.,	  4.
The	   security	   agreement	  with	  America	  provided	  Yoshida	  with	   the	  necessary	   political	  
traction	   to	  dedicate	  the	  Japanese	  government	   towards	  economic	  growth	  and	  deﬁned	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  Japan	  could	  exercise	  “self-­‐defense”.527	  
	   Yoshida’s	   commitment	   to	   economic	   recovery	   laid	   the	   foundation	   for	   Japan’s	  
transformation	   from	   a	   defeated	   nation	   on	   the	   verge	   of	   starvation	   to	   an	   economic	  
superpower.	   Under	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   American	   nuclear	   umbrella,	   Japanese	  
military	   spending	   was	   locked	   to	   1	   percent	   of	   the	   GNP,	   which	   freed	   the	   Japanese	  
government	   from	   the	  vast	   expenditures	   of	   the	   Cold	  War.	   Much	   of	   this	   capital	   was	  
invested	   into	   subsidies	   for	   selected	   industries,	   providing	   a	   much	   needed	   spark	   to	  
economic	   growth.	   The	   Japanese	   also	   experimented	   with	   new	   employment	   and	  
management	   systems,	   and	   expanded	   the	   social	   services	   available	   to	   its	   citizens.	  
Technology	  transfers	  from	  American	  investors	  eager	  to	  gain	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  Japanese	  
market	   supplied	  Japanese	  businessmen	  with	   the	  means	   to	   rebuild	   Japan’s	   industrial	  
sector.	   The	   Japanese	   explored	   every	   opportunity	   to	   expand	   its	   economy,	   including	  
proﬁting	   greatly	   by	   supplying	   UN	   forces	   during	   the	   Korean	   War.	   The	   Japanese	  
government’s	  commitment	  to	  low	  military	  spending	  and	  a	  low	  diplomatic	  proﬁle	  also	  
eased	   tensions	   regarding	   postwar	  Japan,	   allowing	   the	   Japanese	  government	   to	   enter	  
into	  peaceful	  economic	  agreements	  with	  other	  states.528
	   Yoshida’s	  preference	  for	  economic	  development	  and	  deference	  to	  the	  American	  
military	  remained	  ﬁrmly	   entrenched	   in	  the	   Japanese	  polity	  after	  his	   tenure	  as	  Prime	  
Minister.	   Collectively,	   these	   policies	   became	   known	   as	   “The	   Yoshida	   Doctrine”.529	  
Yoshida’s	  strategy	  of	  social	  creativity	  has	  considerable	  theoretical	  implications.	  Out	  of	  
the	  contentious	  occupation	  period,	  Yoshida	  was	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  eﬀective	  means	  of	  
pursing	   status	   seeking	   behavior.	   This	   strategy	   occurred	  under	   tremendous	   external	  
pressure	   from	   America	   to	   support	   its	   eﬀorts	   at	   containing	   communism.	   Yoshida’s	  
balancing	   of	  both	  domestic	  concerns	  and	  external	  constraints	  established	  a	  new	  way	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of	   approaching	   foreign	   policy	   that	  quickly	  ascended	   to	   the	  apex	  of	   Japan’s	  domestic	  
identity	  hierarchy.	  
	   Yoshida	   did	   face	   opposition	   from	   conservative	   factions,	   particularly	   from	  
unindicted	   Class	   A	   war	   criminal	   and	   future	   Prime	   Minister	   Kishi	   Nobusuke	   who	  
declared:	   ‘“It	   is	   not	   the	   policy	   of	   an	   independent	   nation	   to	   have	   troops	   of	   a	  foreign	  
country	  based	  on	  its	  soil”’.530 	  Nonetheless,	  Yoshida	  Diplomacy	  remained	  a	  ﬁxture	  of	  
Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.531 	  Table	  6.2	  represents	   these	  
divergent	  views	  in	  relation	  to	  foreign	  policy	  strategies.
Leader Years	  as	  PM Norm	  Set FP	  Strategy
Yoshida	  Shigeru	  
May	  1946	  -­‐	  May	  1947
Oct.	  1948	  -­‐	  Dec.	  1954
Liberal/	  
Progressive
Social	  Creativity:	  Enhance	  state	  power	  by	  focusing	  
on	  economic	  strength	  and	  deferring	  military	  
concerns	  to	  US.
Kishi	  Nobusuke Feb	  1957	  -­‐	  July	  1960
Conservative/
Traditionalist
Social	  Mobility:	  Fortify	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  by	  
developing	  a	  traditional	  security	  position	  and	  
revising	  relationship	  with	  US.	  
Table	  6.2	  :	  Yoshida	  vs	  Kishi	  *	  Foreign	  Policy	  Approaches
Ikeda	  Hayato,	   who	   served	  as	  Prime	  Minister	   from	   1960	   -­‐	   1964,	   instituted	   additional	  
economic	   reforms.532 	   Ikeda	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Japanese	   government	  
investing	   in	   the	   emerging	   technological	   sectors,	   namely	   those	   surrounding	   the	  
transistor	   radio,	   prompting	   Charles	   de	   Gaulle	   to	   dismiss	   Ikeda	   as	   a	   “transistor	  
salesman”.533	  According	  to	  prominent	  Japanese	  historian	  Nakamura	  Takafusa:
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Conservatives	  who	  opposed	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  governed	  between	  1955-­‐1960,	  but	  their	  attempts	  to	  
revise	  the	  constitution	  faced	  considerable	  resistance.	  
*	  	  Due	  to	  the	  incapacitation	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Ishibashi	  Tanzan,	  then	  Foreign	  Minister	  Kishi	  Nobusuke	  
served	  as	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  31	  January	  1957	  until	  his	  election	  on	  25	  February	  1957.
532	  Matray,	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  a	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  (Greenwood	  Publishing	  Group	  Incorporated,	  2001),	  
170-­‐1.
533	  Partner,	  Assembled	  in	  Japan:	  Electrical	  Goods	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Consumer	  (University	  of	  
California	  Press,	  1999),	  206..	  
Ikeda	  was	   the	  single	  most	  important	  ﬁgure	  in	  Japan’s	   rapid	  growth.	  He	  should	  be	  remembered	  as	  
the	  man	  who	   pulled	   together	  a	  national	   consensus	   for	  economic	  growth	  and	  who	   strove	   for	   the	  
realization	  of	  the	  goal...From	  a	  broader	  perspective,	  however,	  Japan	  consistently	  adhered	  to	  Yoshida	  
Shigeru’s	  view	  that	  armaments	  should	  be	  curbed	  and	  military	  spending	  suppressed	  while	  all	  eﬀorts	  
were	  concentration	  on	  the	  reconstitution	  of	  the	  economy.534
Yoshida	   and	   his	   successors	   skillfully	   employed	   the	   tenets	   of	   Japan’s	   paciﬁst	  
constitution	  to	   counter	  both	  foreign	   and	  domestic	  pressures	  to	   militarize	  Japan	  and	  
maintain	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   creativity.	   According	   to	   Andrew	   Oros,	   what	   emerged	  
from	   the	   debate	   over	   Japanese	   security	   is	   a	   security	   identity	   of	   “domestic	  
antimilitarism”	   that	   restricts	   domestic	  militarism	   but	   acknowledges	   a	  defensive	   role	  
for	  a	  military,	  which	  embodies	  much	  of	  the	  social	   creative	  strategy	  forwarded	  by	  the	  
Yoshida	  Doctrine.535	  
	   Under	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine,	  the	  dollar	  value	  of	  items	  imported	  into	  Japan	  rose	  
from	  $69	  million	  in	  1949-­‐1955	  to	  $3.2	  billion	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.536	  The	  economic	  growth	  
averaged	   9.2	   percent	   per	   annum	   between	   1956-­‐1973,537 	   and	   Japan’s	   GDP	   rose	   from	  
8369.5	  billion	  yen	  in	  1955	  to	  148,327.1	  billion	  yen	  in	  1975.538	  The	  economy	  grew	  steadily	  
until	   the	   oil	   shock	   of	   1972	   (which	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   Chapter	   7).539 	   Ongoing	  
economic	   growth	   hinged	   upon	   stability	   within	   US-­‐Japanese	   relations.	   The	   treaties	  
signed	  in	  1951,	  which	  capitulated	  Japanese	  national	  security	  to	  America,	  were	  revisited	  
at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   decade.	   On	   19	   January	   1960,	   the	   two	   states	   signed	   the	   Treaty	   of	  
Mutual	   Cooperation	   and	   Security.	   The	   treaty	   renewed	   America’s	   commitment	   to	  
Japanese	  security,	   and	   required	   a	   collective	   response	   should	   a	  military	   threat	   befall	  
Japan.	  Notably,	  the	  agreement	  did	  not	  require	  Japan	  to	  reciprocate	  should	  there	  be	  an	  
attack	  against	  American	  interests	  or	  territory.540	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534	  Quoted	  in:	  Pyle	  1996,	  32-­‐3.
535	  Oros	  2008,	  6.	  
536	  Jansen	  2002,	  731.
537	  Saitō,	  The	  Japanese	  Economy	  (World	  Scientiﬁc	  Publishing	  Company	  Incorporated,	  2000),	  100-­‐3.
538	  Japan,	  "Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  Classiﬁed	  by	  Economic	  Activities	  -­‐	  	  68sna,	  Benchmark	  Year	  =	  1990	  
(1955-­‐-­‐1998)."
539	  Kōsai	  1988,	  495.
540	  Japan,	  "Treaty	  of	  Mutual	  Cooperation	  and	  Security	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America,"(19	  January	  1960).	  
	   When	   analyzing	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   two	  
constraints	   that	   conditioned	   postwar	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	   First,	   the	   American	  
occupation	   limited	   the	  policy	   options	   available	   to	   Japan.	   Even	   after	   the	   occupation	  
ended,	   the	   security	   agreements	   between	   America	   and	   Japan	   required	   the	   Japanese	  
government	   to	   defer	   to	   Washington	   regarding	   matters	   of	   security.	   Unsurprisingly,	  
these	  factors	  resulted	  in	  America	  emerging	  as	  the	  dominant	  group	  through	  which	  the	  
Japanese	   government	   deﬁned	   its	   strategy	   of	   social	   creativity.	   As	   the	   leader	   of	   the	  
democratic	  states	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  it	  was	  through	  the	  alliance	  system	  deﬁned	  by	  
America	   that	   enabled	   Japan	   to	   regain	   its	   international	   footing.	   The	   decision	   by	  
Japanese	  leaders	  to	   deﬁne	  their	  own	   terms	  of	   success	  corresponds	  theoretically	  with	  
the	  Japanese	  state	  forming	  its	  own	  referent	  group.	  
	   The	   bipolar	   structure	   of	   the	   international	   system	   further	   restricted	   policy	  
options.	   When	   Japan	   emerged	   from	   its	   isolation	   in	   the	   1860s,	   the	   multipolar	  
international	   system	   provided	   considerable	   opportunity	   for	   upward	   mobility.	   Such	  
maneuverability	  within	   the	   Cold	  War	   power	   hierarchy	   was	   impossible	   for	   Japan,	   a	  
state	  inherently	  limited	  by	  resources	  and	  still	   recovering	   from	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War.	  Other	  
American	   allies,	   particularly	   those	   in	   Europe,	   invested	   heavily	   in	   their	   respective	  
militaries	   during	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Through	   the	   skillful	   manipulation	   of	   the	   “peace	  
clause”	   of	  the	   Japanese	   constitution,	   Yoshida	  and	  his	   successors	   resisted	   this	   call	   to	  
arms,	  and	  dedicated	  the	  entire	  state	  towards	  economic	  growth.	  The	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  
must	   therefore	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   creativity,	   whereby	   Japanese	  
leaders	  deﬁned	   their	  own	   parameters	  for	   status	  seeking	   behavior	  within	   the	  greater	  

















Social	  Creativity.	  Article	  9	  utilized	  to	  oﬀ-­‐
load	  security	  costs	  onto	  America,	  
aﬀording	  Japan	  opportunity	  to	  focus	  on	  
domestic	  rebuilding	  and	  economic	  
growth.
Table	  6.3	  :	  Postwar	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1952	  -­‐	  1972)
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   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  social	  creativity,	  while	  privileging	  norms	  diﬀerent	  than	  
those	  that	  underwrote	  Meiji	   social	  mobility,	  exhibits	  considerable	  political	  contiguity.	  
The	  Yoshida	  quote	  previously	  presented	  draws	  a	  direct	   connection	  to	  the	  beneﬁts	  of	  
Japan	   allying	   itself	   with	   the	  strongest	   international	   power.	   Britain	   fulﬁlled	   this	   role	  
during	   the	  Meiji	   Years,	   culminating	   with	   the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	   alliance	   of	   1902.	   Fifty	  
years	  later,	   the	   Japanese	  government	   cultivated	  its	   relationship	  with	  America	  until	  a	  
new	  unequal	  treaty	  relationship	  was	  formed	  in	  1960.	  The	  treaty	  renewed	  the	  American	  
commitment	   to	   Japan	   while	   not	   requiring	   the	   Japanese	   to	   aid	   in	   the	   defense	   of	  
American	  territory.	  Although	  this	  arrangement	  did	  require	  Japan	  to	  forfeit	  elements	  of	  
its	  sovereignty,	  it	  was	  a	  carefully	  considered	  tradeoﬀ	  that	  enabled	  social	  creativity.	  
	   This	  strategy	  greatly	  enhanced	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Japanese	  state,	  and	  must	  not	  be	  
oversimpliﬁed	  as	   simply	   “paciﬁst”	   or	  misconstrued	  as	  a	  pseudo-­‐imperialist	  American	  
policy.	   This	   nuance	   exempliﬁes	   the	   analytical	   capacity	   of	   this	   thesis’	   framework.	  
Neoclassical	   realist	   interpretations	   provide	   a	   strong	   case	   for	   the	   external	   pressures	  
restricting	   Japan’s	   policy	   options,	   but	  may	   underplay	   the	   ideological	   motivations	   of	  
leaders	   such	   as	   Shidehara	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   postwar	   political	   purge.	  
Constructivism	  is	  useful	  when	  considering	  the	  ascension	  of	  liberal-­‐paciﬁst	  norms,	  but	  
does	  not	  account	  for	  Yoshida’s	  pragmatic	  exploitation	  of	  Article	  9.	  A	  synthesis	  of	  both	  
theories	  bound	  by	  the	  insights	  of	  SIT	  provides	  the	  necessary	  means	  for	  analyzing	  this	  
contentious	  period	  in	  Japanese	  history	  with	  consistency.	  
6.5	  	  One	  Step	  the	  Right,	  Two	  to	  the	  Left
This	  chapter	   reviewed	   the	  collapse	   of	   Imperial	   Japan	   and	  the	  emergence	   of	  postwar	  
Japan	  governed	  under	  the	  1947	  Constitution.	  Two	  signiﬁcant	  shifts	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  
Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  were	  examined:	  (1)	  Japan’s	  rejection	  of	  social	  mobility	  during	  the	  
1930s	  and	  turn	  towards	  a	  socially	  competitive	  revisionist	  state	  [Shift	  A];	  and	  (2)	  Japan’s	  
adoption	  of	  a	   socially	   creative	  foreign	  policy	   that	   privileged	  economic	   recovery	  over	  
traditional	   security	   following	   the	   Paciﬁc	  War	   [Shift	   B].	   For	   clarity,	   these	   shifts	   are	  
referred	   to	   in	   the	   subsequent	   conclusions	   as	   “Shift	   A”	   and	   “Shift	   B”	   respectively.	  
Despite	   the	   multitude	   of	   factors	   contributing	   to	   both	   of	   these	   shifts,	   the	   oﬀered	  
Chapter	  6:	  New	  Directions	  in	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1931	  -­‐	  1972	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198
framework	  has	  clariﬁed	  the	  most	   salient	  variables	  and	  provided	  a	  consistent	  frame	  of	  
analysis.	  The	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  this	  thesis’	   research	  questions	  are	  listed	  below.	  
Since	  this	  chapter	  discusses	  two	  shifts	  in	  Japan’s	  policy	  evolution,	  research	  questions	  1	  
and	  2	  are	  answered	  together.
1. How	   have	   concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	  
international	  system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	  
How	  have	  these	  factors	  changed	  with	  time?	  
• 	  [Shift	  A]	  -­‐	  Following	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  the	  imperialist	  norms	  governing	  the	  
international	  community	  were	  displaced	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  internationalism.	  
Japanese	   leaders	   initially	   experimented	   with	   these	   new	   norms,	   but	   rising	  
domestic	  opposition,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Versailles-­‐Washington	  System,	  and	  the	  
actions	   of	   the	   Kwantung	   Army	   restricted	   the	   foreign	   policy	   options	   of	   the	  
Japanese	   government.	   Ultimately,	   Japan	   maintained	   its	   commitment	   to	  
imperialism	  regardless	  of	  the	  changes	  within	  the	  international	  power	  hierarchy,	  
thereby	  instituting	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  competition.	  
• [Shift	   B]	   -­‐	   The	   surrender	   of	   Imperial	   Japan	   ended	   its	   strategy	   of	   social	  
competition,	   and	   the	   Allied	   occupation	   undermined	   Japanese	   sovereignty.	  
During	  the	  occupation,	  Japanese	  leaders	  were	  unable	  to	  exercise	  a	  full	  range	  of	  
diplomatic	  options.	  When	  the	  occupation	  ended	  in	  1952,	  many	  of	  the	  militarist	  
political	  elements	  were	  purged	   from	   the	  Japanese	  government,	   facilitating	  the	  
rise	  of	  more	  diplomatically	  minded	  leaders.	  Rising	  tensions	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  
prompted	  the	  Americans	  to	   pressure	   the	  Japanese	   towards	  a	  more	  traditional	  
security	  posture,	  but	  Prime	  Minister	  Yoshida	  and	  his	  successors	  utilized	  Article	  
9	   to	   maintain	   a	   low	  diplomatic	   proﬁle	   and	   focused	   the	  government’s	   eﬀorts	  
upon	  rebuilding	  the	  economy	  through	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  creativity.	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2. What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	  competing	   groups	  of	   Japanese	   political	  
elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?	  
• [Shift	   A]	   -­‐	   The	   maintenance	   of	   imperialist	   norms	   came	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
embracing	   the	  emerging	   global	   trends	   of	   the	  international	   system,	   a	  decision	  
which	  sharply	  contrasted	  with	  social	  mobility	  that	  had	  been	  prevalent	  since	  the	  
Meiji	  Restoration.	  The	  rising	  inﬂuence	  of	  the	  military	  and	  swelling	  nationalism	  
transformed	  the	  established	  imperialist	  norms	  into	  those	  of	  overt	  militarism.	  In	  
this	  manner,	  continuity	  existed	  with	  regard	  to	  norms	  but	  not	  strategy.	  Imperial	  
Japan	   practiced	   a	   socially	   competitive	   foreign	   policy	   that	   challenged	   the	  
international	   power	   hierarchy,	   and	   diverged	   from	   the	   social	   mobility	   of	  
preceding	  generations.	  
• 	   [Shift	   B]	  -­‐	  The	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  enabled	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	   deﬁne	  their	  own	  
parameters	  for	  prestige	  and	  power	  within	  an	  international	  system	  driven	  by	  the	  
strategic	  interests	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.	   It	   would	  be	  erroneous	  to	   assume	  Yoshida	  
and	   his	   successors	   were	   driven	   solely	   by	   ideological	   factors.	   Yoshida	   was	  
attuned	   to	   the	  bipolarity	   of	   the	  Cold	  War.	   He	  utilized	  the	  American	  nuclear	  
umbrella	  to	   assure	  Japanese	  security	  while	  directing	   the	  Japanese	  government	  
towards	  domestic	  recovery.	  Yoshida’s	  willingness	  to	   accept	  compromised	  state	  
sovereignty	   while	   fortifying	   national	   strength	   harkens	   to	   the	   early	   Meiji	  
strategy	   regarding	   the	   unequal	   treaties,	   where	   Japanese	   leaders	   favored	  
national	  strength	  over	  sovereignty.
	   The	   direction	   set	   by	   Yoshida	   provided	  an	   avenue	   for	  status	   seeking	  behavior	  
that	  	  eventually	  elevated	  Japan	  to	  a	  position	  comparable	  with	  that	  achieved	  with	  social	  
mobility	   during	   the	   height	   of	   imperialism.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   external	   pressures	  
following	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  would	   fundamentally	   alter	   the	   Japanese	  
strategy.	  The	  next	  chapter	  analyzes	  Japan’s	  late	  Cold	  War	  and	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  policy	  by	  
exploring	  the	  highs	  and	  lows	  of	  Yoshida’s	  social	  creativity.
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When	  you	  pass	   through	   Japan,	   you	  should	   perhaps	   talk	   a	  bit	   more	  with	  
them.	  You	  only	  talked	  with	  them	   for	  one	   day	  and	   that	   isn't	  very	  good	   for	  
their	  face.
-­‐	  Chairman	  Mao	  speaking	  to	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  1973
The	  bonds	  of	  friendship	  which	  unite	   us	   are	   even	  greater	  than	  the	  ocean	  
which	  divides	   us.	   Nichi-­‐bei	   no	   yuho	   wa	   eien	   desu.	   [Japanese-­‐American	  
friendship	  is	  forever.]
-­‐	  President	  Reagan,	  1983
I	   believe	   that	   it	   is	   the	   duty	  of	  the	   political	   leadership	   to	   consider	  what	  
kind	  of	  structure	   can	  be	   created	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  state	  or	  the	  people	  
are	  exposed	  to	  crises	  and	  I	  intend	  to	  move	   forward	  with	  consideration	  on	  
emergency	  legislation.
-­‐	  Prime	  Minister	  Koizumi,	  2001
[I]f	  Japan	  is	  going	  to	  play	  a	  full	  role	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  and	  become	  a	  full	  
active	  participating	  member	  of	   the	   Security	  Council,	  Article	  Nine	  would	  
have	  to	  be	  examined
-­‐	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Colin	  Powell,	  2004
The	  bipolarity	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  Japan’s	  decimated	  domestic	  infrastructure	  created	  
a	  unique	  historical	  moment	   that	   enabled	   Japanese	  leaders	   throughout	   the	  1950s	  and	  
1960s	   to	  embrace	  the	  loose	   isolationism	  of	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine.	  However,	   from	   the	  
1970s	   onward,	   external	   pressures	   have	   increasingly	   reduced	   the	   practicality	   of	  
maintaining	  a	  low	  diplomatic	  proﬁle.	  Tracing	  this	  process	  is	  necessary	  to	  answer:	  How	  
have	  concerns	  over	  national	  security	  and	  other	  external	  pressures	  from	  the	  international	  
system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	   shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?	  How	  have	   these	  
factors	  changed	  with	  time?
	   Political	   tensions	   during	   the	   1970s	   tested	   the	   Yoshida	  Doctrine	   (Section	   7.1).	  
Instability	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  that	  cut	  oﬀ	  the	  ﬂow	  of	  oil	  into	   Japan,	  the	  termination	  of	  
the	   Bretton	   Woods	   system,	   and	   the	   Sino-­‐American	   rapprochement	   left	   Japan	  
vulnerable	   to	   external	   factors.	   Combined,	   these	   elements	   forced	   state	   elites	   to	  
reconsider	   the	   low	   diplomatic	   stance	   upon	   which	   social	   creativity	  was	   rooted.	   The	  
ongoing	   ﬁnancial	   success	  of	  Japan	  during	   the	  1980s	   coincided	  with	   a	  more	  assertive	  
foreign	  policy	  stance	  (Section	  7.2).	  Prime	  Minister	  Nakasone	  sought	   to	  utilize	  Japan’s	  
tremendous	   economic	   strength	   to	   further	   Japan’s	   position	   within	   the	   international	  
power	  hierarchy	  without	  outright	  violating	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine.	  
	   When	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  collapsed,	  Japan	  possessed	  the	  second	  largest	  economy	  
in	  the	  world	  and	  had	  abstained	  from	  the	  vast	  military	  expenditures	  that	  typiﬁed	  Cold	  
War	  politics.	  Many	  commentators	  looked	   to	   Japan	  as	  a	  model	   state	  ready	  to	   assume	  
the	  mantle	   of	   leadership	  within	  the	   emerging	   international	   order	   (Section	  7.3).	   The	  
implosion	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  and	  the	  backlash	  against	  Japan’s	  non-­‐participation	  
in	   the	   Gulf	   War	   soon	   undermined	   this	   optimism.	   The	   ensuing	   “lost	   decade”	   of	  
economic	  stagnation	  crippled	  the	  Japanese	  strategy	  of	  social	  creativity	  and	  prompted	  
Japanese	  leaders	  to	  explore	  new	  directions	  in	  foreign	  policy	  (Section	  7.4).	  
	   The	  1990s	  were	  marked	  by	  considerable	  ambiguity	  in	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy,	  as	  
Japanese	   leaders	   struggled	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	   changing	   international	   environment.	  
Following	   the	   terrorist	   attacks	   of	   September	   11th	   2001,	   Prime	   Minister	   Koizumi	  
forwarded	  a	  more	  assertive	  policy	  stance	   that	  pushed	   Japan	  towards	  social	   mobility.	  
The	  Koizumi	  government	  considerably	  strengthened	  ties	  with	  America	  and	  sponsored	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several	   pieces	   of	   groundbreaking	   legislation	   that	   reduced	   the	   restrictions	   governing	  
JSDF	  deployment	   (Section	  7.5).	  Since	  returning	   to	  power	  in	  2012,	  Prime	  Minister	  Abe	  
has	   considerably	   furthered	   the	   normalist	   cause	   by	   reinterpreting	   the	   Japanese	  
constitution	  to	  enable	  Japan	  to	  act	  in	  some	  degree	  on	  behalf	  of	  collective	  self-­‐defense.	  
Nevertheless,	   constitutional	   restrictions	   still	   inhibited	   the	   shift	   towards	   social	  
mobility,	   and	  this	   chapter	  concludes	  with	   a	  discussion	  of	   the	   constitutional	   reform	  
eﬀorts	  by	  the	  Liberal	  Democratic	  Party	  (LDP)	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Japan	  (DPJ)	  
(Section	  7.5).541	  
	   By	   framing	   Japan’s	   constitutional	   concerns	   within	   the	   developed	   theoretical	  
framework,	   it	   is	   demonstrated	   that	   debate	   surrounding	   Article	   9	   is	   the	   primary	  
variable	  upon	  which	  the	  future	  trajectory	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  is	  dependent.	  The	  
ideological	   factors	   underpinning	   the	   question	   -­‐	   What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	  
between	  competing	  groups	   of	  Japanese	   political	   elite	   from	   one	   historical	  period	   to	   the	  
next?	   -­‐	  are	  outlined	   through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine,	   the	  policies	  of	  
Nakasone	  and	  Koizumi,	  and	  the	  political	  groups	  relevant	  to	  constitutional	  reform.
7.1	  Late	  Cold	  War	  Political	  Challenges	  (1973	  -­‐	  1982)	  
The	   resurgent	   Japanese	   economy	   faced	   two	   “shocks”	   during	   the	   1970s	   that	  
jeopardized	   Japan’s	   recovery.	   The	   ﬁrst	   shock	   centered	   on	   Japan’s	   dependence	   on	  
foreign	  resources.	  As	  an	   island	  nation	  with	  poor	  reserves	  of	  fossil	   fuels,	   Japan	  relies	  
upon	  imports	  and	  is	  vulnerable	  to	   the	  direction	  of	  global	  politics.542	  The	  embargo	  on	  
crude	  oil	  implemented	  by	  the	  Americans	  and	  the	  British	  in	  1941,	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  
6,	  was	  a	  primary	  factor	  in	  pushing	   Japan	  towards	  war.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  instability	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	   had	   severe	   repercussions	  for	   Japan.	   American	   support	   for	  Israel	   during	  
the	   1973	   Yom	   Kippur	   War	   was	   answered	   by	   the	   major	   oil	   producing	   countries	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541	  Discussion	  of	  these	  competing	  political	  parties	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  ﬁnal	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  due	  to	  
LDP	  preeminence.	   From	  1955	  until	   2009	   the	  LDP	   remained	   in	  power	  with	  the	  exception	   of	   an	   11	  
month	  period	  between	  1993	  and	  1994.	  The	  DPJ	  was	  in	  power	  2009	   -­‐	  2012,	  but	  has	  again	  become	  the	  
minority	  party.	  
542	  Berger	  2004,	  138;	  Georg	  Koopmann,	  Klaus	  Matthies,	  and	  Reszat,	  Oil	  and	  the	  International	  Economy:	  
Lessons	  from	  Two	  Price	  Shocks	  (Transaction	  Publishers,	  1984),	  359-­‐60.
restricting	  oil	  output	  to	   America	  and	   its	  allies.543 	  Although	   Japan’s	  support	   of	  Israel	  
was	  cursory	  at	   best,	   and	  more	   a	  product	   of	   its	   security	  agreement	  with	  America,	   it	  
was	  one	  of	  the	  many	  states	  targeted	  by	  the	  embargo.	  
	   Japan	   appeased	   the	  Arab	   nations	  by	  distancing	   itself	  from	   Israel	   and	  backing	  
the	  Palestinian	   claim	   for	  a	  homeland.	  These	  measures	   reopened	   the	  ﬂow	  of	  oil	   into	  
Japan,	   but	   the	   restricted	  output	   resulted	   in	  a	   fourfold	   (in	   dollars)	   cost	   increase	  and	  
pushed	  the	  economy	  into	  a	  recession.544	  Real	  GDP	  growth	  dropped	  from	  an	  average	  of	  
9.6	   percent,	   which	   had	   been	   sustained	   between	   1960	   and	   1973,	   to	   3.8	   percent.545	  
Higher	  oil	   prices	  also	   triggered	   the	  worst	   inﬂation	   rate	   since	   the	   1940s,	  and	   in	   1974	  
consumer	  prices	  increased	  by	  25	  percent.546	  The	  Japanese	  government	  responded	  with	  
a	   stalwart	   campaign	   to	   reduce	   oil	   consumption	   and	   push	   towards	   a	   more	   self-­‐
suﬃcient	  economy.	  While	  Japan	  remained	  dependent	  upon	  energy	  imports,	  by	  1980	  it	  
had	  reduced	  its	  oil	  imports	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  by	  12	  percent.547	  These	  conservation	  
and	   diversiﬁcation	   eﬀorts	   also	   equipped	   Japan	   for	   future	   oil	   crises,	   such	   as	   the	   oil	  
shortage	  following	  the	  Iranian	  revolution	  in	  1978.548	  
	   The	  second	  shock	  developed	  from	  from	  the	  political	  maneuverings	  of	  the	  Nixon	  
administration.	   In	   1971,	   President	   Nixon	   canceled	   the	   direct	   convertibility	   of	   the	  
American	  dollar	   into	   gold,	   thus	   signaling	   the	   end	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	   system.549 	   The	  
transition	  to	  free	  ﬂoating	  currency	  ended	  the	  ﬁxed	  exchange	  rate	  of	  360	  yen	  to	  1	  dollar	  
that	  had	  been	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  controversial	   “Dodge	  Line”.	  Nixon	  was	  driven	  to	  end	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what	   his	   administration	   perceived	   as	   Japan’s	   unfair	   trade	   advantages.550 	   Japan’s	  
balance	  of	   trade	  with	  America	  shifted	   from	   severe	   deﬁcits	  during	   the	  early	  postwar	  
years,	  towards	  parity	  in	  the	  1960s,	  to	  a	  massive	  trade	  surplus	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  favored	  
Japanese	   exports.	   See	   Figure	   7.1	   for	   details.	   American	   leaders	   coerced	   the	   Japanese	  
government	   to	   cap	   the	  ﬂow	   of	   Japanese	   goods	   into	   America.	   The	   sale	   of	   steel	   was	  
restricted	   in	   1969	   as	   was	   the	   sale	   of	   textiles	   in	   1972.551 	   The	   revaluing	   of	   the	   yen	  
diminished	  the	   trade	  imbalance,	  as	  the	  yen	  proved	  undervalued	  when	   it	   rose	   to	   300	  
and	  peaked	  at	  87	  yen	  to	  the	  dollar.552	  
Figure	  7.1	  :	  American	  Trade	  Balance	  with	  Japan	  between	  1965-­‐1989	  553
	   Nixon’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  posed	  additional	  challenges	  to	  Japan.	  The	  Nixon	  
Doctrine	  of	  1969	  called	  for	  America’s	  Asian	  allies	  to	   enhance	  their	  role	  in	  countering	  
communism.554 	   Nixon	   believed	   that	   as	   America’s	   primary	   ally	   in	   the	   region,	   Japan	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needed	   to	   assume	  greater	   responsibility	   in	   the	  collective	  security	  of	  Asia.555 	  Despite	  
this	   pressure,	   former	   Foreign	   Minister	   Ōhira	   Masayoshi	   explored	   “comprehensive	  
security”	  measures	  designed	   to	   enhance	  both	  national	   and	  regional	   security	  through	  
an	  emphasis	  on	  diplomatic,	  economic,	  and	  technological	  cooperation.556	  
	   The	  most	   signiﬁcant	   political	   challenge	   to	   Japan	   came	   from	   Nixon’s	   surprise	  
opening	  of	  relations	  with	  China	  in	  1971.	  Sino-­‐American	  rapprochement	  came	  without	  
forewarning	  to	  Japanese	  government,	  leaving	  Japanese	  ministers	  scrambling	  to	  quickly	  
normalize	  their	   relationship	  with	  China.557 	  While	   the	  rapprochement	   did	  eventually	  
ease	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   relations	   and	   improve	   America’s	   stance	   in	   Asia,	   Nixon’s	  
ambivalence	   towards	   Japan	   raised	   questions	   as	   to	   the	   continued	   viability	   of	   the	  
security	  agreement	  between	  the	  two	  states.558 	  According	  to	  esteemed	  Japanese	  author	  
and	  diplomat	   Ogata	   Sadako:	   ‘“No	   American	   action	   left	   a	  more	   profound	   impact	   on	  
Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  than	  the	  unilateral	  decision	  by	  President	  
Nixon	  to	  go	   to	  Beijing	  and	  seek	  rapprochement...It	  changed	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐
Japan	  Security	  Treaty	  and	  forthwith	  the	  alliance	  itself”’.559
	   Through	   adherence	   to	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine,	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   had	  
rebounded,	   but	   it	   was	   a	   policy	   approach	   contingent	   upon	   social	   creativity.	   Social	  
creativity	   holds	   that	   political	   leaders	   deﬁne	   their	   own	   parameters	   of	   success	   and	  
prestige	  within	  the	  greater	  boundaries	  of	  the	  existing	  international	  order.	  In	  practice,	  
this	  strategy	  entailed	  Japan	  deferring	  it	  national	  security	  to	  America	  while	  focusing	  on	  
economic	  and	  domestic	  rebuilding.	  The	  dual	  shocks	  of	  the	  1973	   oil	  crisis	  and	  Nixon’s	  
foreign	   policy	   highlight	   three	   elements	   of	   Japan’s	   Cold	   War	   strategy	   that	   require	  
further	  examination.
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   First,	   these	   events	   demonstrated	   that	   Japan	   was	   intricately	   tied	   to	   the	  global	  
community.	   While	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   advocated	   a	   low	   diplomatic	   stance,	   the	  
Japanese	  economy	  remained	  vulnerable	  to	  external	  variables.	  Additionally,	  any	  illusion	  
that	  Japan	  could	  exist	  in	  semi-­‐isolation	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  American	  security	  
umbrella	  was	  shattered	  by	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  rapprochement,	  which	  forced	  Japan	  to	  
quickly	   normalize	   its	   relations	   with	   China.	   Japanese	   leaders	   maintained	   social	  
creativity	   in	   spite	   of	   these	   external	   constraints.	   Realist	   interpretations	   that	   contest	  
that	   foreign	   policy	   is	   derived	  primarily	   as	   a	   response	   to	   external	   pressures	   (namely	  
neorealism)	   are	   therefore	   insuﬃcient	   for	   conceptualizing	   this	   consistency	   of	   social	  
creativity	  that	  continued	  to	  minimize	  Japan’s	  international	  presence.	  
	   Second,	  Japan’s	  postwar	  grace	  period	  was	  deteriorating.	  During	   the	  early	  years	  
of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  America	  was	  content	  to	  subsidize	  the	  unbalanced	  security	  agreement	  
while	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   recovered.	   Although	   America	   had	  pushed	   for	   stronger	  
Japanese	   involvement	   in	   regional	   security	   during	   the	   1960s	   (speciﬁcally	   during	   the	  
Korean	  War),	   it	   had	  upheld	  the	  economic	  and	   security	  advantages	   that	  enabled	  the	  
Yoshida	  Doctrine	  to	   ﬂourish.	  As	  the	   Japanese	  economy	  matured	  and	  America’s	  anti-­‐
communist	   strategy	   became	   more	   entangled	   in	   Southeast	   Asia,	   the	   American	  
leadership	  looked	  to	  Japan	  to	  shoulder	  greater	  regional	  responsibility.
	   Third,	   Nixon’s	   unilateral	   realignment	   with	   Communist	   China	   and	   economic	  
policies	   sowed	   tensions	  between	  America	   and	   Japan.	   The	  American	   strategy	  during	  
the	  Cold	  War	  centered	  on	  containing	  communism	  by	  isolating	  communist	  regimes.	  In	  
Asia,	   America	   had	   coerced	   Japan	   to	   support	   its	   aggressive	   anti-­‐communist	   posture,	  
which	  ultimately	  left	  Japan	  isolated	  from	  China560.	  The	  sudden	  shift	  in	  policy	  angered	  
and	   embarrassed	   Japanese	   leaders,	   who	   in	   spite	   of	   strong	   domestic	  opposition	   had	  
supported	   American	   security	   initiatives.561 	   The	   slight	   did	   not	   go	   unnoticed	   by	   the	  
international	  community.	   Chairman	  Mao	   suggested	  to	   Kissinger	  during	   their	  private	  
meetings:	   ‘When	   you	   pass	   through	   Japan,	   you	   should	  perhaps	   talk	   a	   bit	   more	  with	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them.	  You	  only	  talked	  with	  them	  for	  one	  day	  and	  that	  isn't	  very	  good	  for	  their	  face’.562	  
The	   economic	   restrictions	   on	   Japanese	   goods	   further	   complicated	   US-­‐Japanese	  
relations.	   The	   Japanese	   government	   “voluntarily”	   agreed	   to	   the	   measures,	   but	   the	  
political	   pressure	  was	   intense.	   Given	   Japan’s	  dependence	   on	   the	   security	   agreement	  
with	  America,	  begrudging	  compliance	  was	  the	  only	  option.563
	   These	  three	  factors	  resulted	  in	  moderate	  revisions	  to	   the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  that	  
are	  best	  conceptualized	  through	  the	  oﬀered	  framework.	  Social	  creativity	  persisted,	  but	  
external	   pressures	  heightened	   Japan’s	  participation	   in	  global	   aﬀairs.	   These	  pressures	  
were	  not	  signiﬁcant	  enough	  to	  reorient	  its	  policy	  strategy,	  but	  the	  preference	  for	  a	  low	  
diplomatic	  proﬁle	  embodied	  within	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  was	  reduced.	  The	  norms	  of	  
privileging	  economic	  growth	  over	  military	  strength	  were	  maintained.
7.2	  Nakasone	  Questions	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  (1982	  -­‐	  1987)
While	  none	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  pressures	  resulted	  in	  an	  immediate	  realignment	  of	  
the	  US-­‐Japanese	  Security	  Treaty,	   they	  were	  precursors	  to	   the	  challenges	   the	  alliance	  
would	  soon	  face.	  Amidst	   the	  growingly	  complex	  political	   and	  economic	  environment	  
of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   the	  Japanese	  economy	  proved	   incredibly	  verbose.	   As	   the	   Japanese	  
economy	  matured,	   the	  average	  GNP	  growth	  rate	  settled	  between	  4	   and	  5	  percent.564	  
Moderate	  inﬂation	  persisted	  despite	  this	  growth	  and	  unemployment	   remained	  below	  
2	  percent.565 	  This	  excess	  of	  capital	  coincided	  with	  soaring	   levels	  of	  FDI.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   1980s,	   Japan’s	   global	   FDI	   stood	   at	   sixty-­‐seven	   billion	   dollars,	   a	  marked	   increase	  
from	  the	  $227	  million	  in	  FDI	  that	  Japan	  had	  mustered	  in	  1966.566	  Japan’s	  export	  surplus	  
continued	  to	  grow.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  Japanese	  trade	  surplus	  with	  America	  was	  valued	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at	  ﬁfty	  billion	  dollars.567	  As	  Japanese	  imports	  saturated	  the	  American	  market,	  calls	  for	  
trade	   liberalization	   came	   from	   Washington.	   American	   policy	   makers	   responded	   by	  
establishing	  quotas	  that	  further	  restricted	  the	  ﬂow	  of	  Japanese	  goods	  into	  America.568
	   The	   success	   of	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   corresponded	   with	   a	   more	   assertive	  
political	   posture.	   In	   1982,	   conservative	   leader	   Nakasone	   Yasuhiro	   became	   Prime	  
Minister.	  Nakasone	  was	   an	   outspoken	   critic	  of	   the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine,	   and	  during	   his	  
ﬁve	  year	  tenure	  he	  undertook	  an	  ambitious	  eﬀort	  to	   redeﬁne	  Japan’s	  national	  security	  
interests.569 	   At	   the	   heart	   of	  Nakasone’s	   philosophy	  was	   the	  belief	   that	   the	  Yoshida	  
Doctrine	  was	  a	   temporary	  policy	  borne	  out	   of	  the	  necessities	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  
Nakasone	  pushed	  for	  autonomous	  defense,	  a	  traditional	  alliance	  with	  America,	  and	  ‘“a	  
constitution	  independently	  drawn	  up	  by	  the	  Japanese	  people”’.570	  He	  openly	  approved	  
the	   transfer	   of	   military	   technology	   to	   America,	   which	   departed	   from	   the	   Yoshida	  
Doctrine’s	  ban	  on	  the	  export	  of	  arms.571	  Nakasone	  furthermore	  declared	  an	  end	  to	  the	  
taboo	  on	  discussing	  revisions	  to	  Article	  9	  and	  questioned	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  restriction	  
on	  defense	  spending	  that	  limited	  SDF	  expenditures	  to	  1	  percent	  of	  the	  GNP.572	  
	   Nakasone’s	   hawkish	   attitude	  was	  well	   received	  by	  other	  conservative	  leaders,	  
particularly	   President	   Reagan,	   who	   boldly	   proclaimed	   that	   the	   ‘“Japanese-­‐American	  
friendship	   is	   forever”’.573 	  The	  Ron-­‐Yasu	   relationship,	   as	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
two	  leaders	  became	  known,	  enhanced	  Japan’s	  prestige	  among	  the	  Western-­‐bloc	  states	  
and	  provided	  Nakasone	  with	  a	  platform	  for	  deﬁning	  his	  vision	  for	  Japan.574	  It	  was	  in	  a	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Washington	   news	   conference	   that	   Nakasone	   declared	   that	   Japan	   sought	   ‘“complete	  
control	   [of	  the	  Sea	  of	  Japan]	  so	   that	   there	  should	  be	  no	  passage	  of	  Soviet	  submarines	  
and	  other	  naval	  activities	  in	  time	  of	  emergency.”’575	  Although	  such	  proclamations	  were	  
commonplace	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  for	  a	  country	  whose	  Cold	  War	  posture	  had	  been	  
defensive	   and	   reserved,	   Nakasone’s	   statements	   were	   a	   radical	   departure	   from	   the	  
recent	  past.	  
	   Under	  Nakasone,	  Japan	  also	  became	  a	  more	  active	  member	  of	  the	  international	  
economic	   community.	   In	   1985,	   G-­‐7	   leaders	   agreed	   to	   the	   Plaza	   Accord,	   which	  
depreciated	  the	  yen	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  Japan’s	  trade	  surplus	  and	  to	  stimulate	  the	  
struggling	  American	  economy.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  dollar	  versus	  the	  yen	  declined	  sharply	  
between	   1985	  to	   1987,	   but	   structural	   conditions	   in	   Japan	   inhibited	   a	   leveling	   of	   the	  
trade	   imbalance.576 	   Furthermore,	   the	   Plaza	   Accord	   may	   have	   been	   a	   signiﬁcant	  
contributor	  to	  the	  Japanese	  asset	  price	  bubble	  that	   in	  the	  coming	  decade	  drove	  Japan	  
into	   a	   serious	   recession.577 	   Despite	   these	   shortcomings,	   the	   central	   role	   played	   by	  
Japan	   during	   the	   negotiations	  demonstrates	   its	   position	   as	   a	   major	   economic	  actor	  
during	  the	  late	  Cold	  War	  period.
	   According	   to	  Kenneth	  Pyle,	  Nakasone	  ‘sought	  an	  internally	  generated	  sense	  of	  
national	   purpose.	   Rather	   than	   adapting	   to	   international	   trends,	   he	  would	   lay	   out	   a	  
self-­‐determined	   course	   of	   the	   nation’.578 	   Pyle	   continues:	   ‘Nakasone	   set	   out	   to	  
transform	  the	  pragmatic,	  opportunistic,	  and	  reactive	  pattern	  of	  Japan’s	  politics.	  Japan	  
had	   to	   set	   forth	   its	   own	   self-­‐generated	   objectives	   and	   principles’.579 	   Pyle’s	   analysis	  
implies	   a	   divergence	   from	   the	   sensitivity	   to	   international	   trends	   and	   pragmatism	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highlighted	   throughout	   this	   thesis.	   This	   divergence,	   however,	   is	   perhaps	   better	  
interpreted	  through	  this	  thesis’	  framework.
	   Nakasone	  was	  driven,	   as	  were	  all	   Japanese	  politicians	  hereinbefore	  discussed,	  
by	   a	   desire	   to	   fortify	   Japanese	   national	   strength	   against	   external	   pressures.	   For	  
Nakasone,	   these	   pressures	   were	   partially	   constituted	   by	   the	   restrictions	   of	   the	  
Japanese	  constitution	   (authored	   by	  Americans)	   and	   by	   the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine,	  which	  
deferred	   Japanese	   security	   to	   an	   outside	   authority	   (America).	   These	   factors	  
compromised	   Japanese	   sovereignty	   and	   restricted	   its	   ability	   to	   exercise	   national	  
power.	   The	   neoclassical	   realist	   elements	   of	   this	   thesis	   contest	   that	   power	   and	  
sovereignty	  comprise	   the	  core	  variables	  of	  statehood.	  As	   Japan	   regained	   its	   regional	  
position	   through	   economic	   growth,	   Nakasone	   addressed	   what	   he	   perceived	   as	   a	  
deﬁciency	  in	  sovereignty.	  Nakasone’s	  distancing	   from	   the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  is	  in-­‐line	  
with	  the	  expectations	  outlined	  by	  the	  oﬀered	  framework.	  Furthermore,	  this	  dynamic	  is	  
reminiscent	  of	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  unequal	  treaties	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  
discussed	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4.
	   The	  diﬀerence	  between	  Nakasone	  and	  his	  predecessors	  was	  one	  of	  strategy,	  not	  
philosophy.	  While	  politicians	  of	  the	  Yoshida	  camp	  were	  visibly	  less	  militarily	  oriented	  
than	   Nakasone,	   they	   all	   possessed	   a	   fundamental	   desire	   to	   strengthen	   Japan.	  
Nakasone	  diverged	  from	  the	  social	  creativity	  of	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine,	  which	  restricted	  
Japanese	  national	   power	   to	   economics.	  For	  Nakasone,	   Japan	  also	   needed	   traditional	  
military	  strength	  that	  corresponded	  with	   its	  economic	  power,	   a	  position	  reminiscent	  
of	  the	  social	  mobility	  that	  characterized	  pre-­‐1930s	  Japanese	  policy	  (see	  Chapters	  5	  and	  
6).	  In	  other	  words,	  Nakasone	  pushed	  for	  Japanese	  normalization.	  
	   Within	   this	   understanding	   of	   social	   mobility,	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Reagan	  
administration	   that	   emphasized	   military	   strength	   and	   the	   heightened	   tensions	  
between	   superpowers	   during	   late	   Cold	   War	   period,	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   the	  
relevant	   global	   trends	   Nakasone	   was	   charged	   with	   interpreting.	   Nakasone	   was	  
therefore	  decidedly	   sensitive	   to	   international	   trends,	   albeit	   the	   trends	  embodied	  by	  
the	  antagonism	  of	  Reagan’s	  foreign	  policy.	  Table	  7.1	  visualizes	  Nakasone’s	  divergence	  
from	   the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine.	  Note	   that	  Nakasone	   sought	   to	   improve	   Japan’s	  position	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within	   the	   Western-­‐bloc	   hierarchy	   by	   mirroring	   the	   practices	   of	   other	   secondary	  
partners	  in	  America’s	  bilateral	  network	  of	  alliances,	  resulting	  in	  Britain	  being	  listed	  as	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Table	  7.1	  :	  Nakasone’s	  Approach	  vs	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine
	   Nakasone	   did	   not	   undo	   Yoshida	   Doctrine,	   but	   his	   divergence	   from	   social	  
creativity	  remains	  important	   to	  understanding	  Japan’s	   current	   foreign	  policy	  debate.	  
Conceptually,	   Nakasone	   was	   a	   precursor	   to	   the	   resurgence	   of	   an	   assertive	   foreign	  
policy	   that	   followed	   9/11,	   which	   is	   discussed	   in	   Section	   7.5.	   Table	   7.2	   provides	   a	  
reference	  for	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  during	  the	  late	  Cold	  War	  period.	  The	  emergence	  of	  



















Social	  Creativity.	  Japan	  maintains	  its	  low	  
diplomatic	  proﬁle,	  but	  its	  growing	  
economic	  strength	  enhances	  its	  power	  
and	  prestige.
Table	  7.2	  :	  Late	  Cold	  War	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1972	  -­‐	  1991)
7.3	  The	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Challenge	  (1989	  -­‐	  1992)
During	   the	  late	   1980s,	   the	  American	   public	  became	   increasingly	  apprehensive	  about	  
Japan.	  The	  Plaza	  Accord	  failed	  to	  rectify	  the	  trade	  imbalance,	   leaving	  some	  American	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industries,	  notably	  the	  automotive	  sector,	  struggling	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  their	  Japanese	  
counterparts.	   Additionally,	   Japanese	   investors	   made	   several	   high-­‐proﬁle	   real	   estate	  
purchases	  including	  the	  Rockefeller	  Center	  in	  New	  York	   (1989)	   and	  the	  Pebble	  Beach	  
golf	   course	   (1990),	   stirring	   fears	   of	   a	   hostile	   Japanese	   takeover	   of	   the	   American	  
marketplace.580 	   Pulitzer	   Prize	   winning	   journalist	   Theodore	   H.	   White’s	   evocatively	  
titled	  article	  “The	  Danger	  From	   Japan”	  claimed	  that	  Japan	  had	  instituted	  a	  long-­‐term	  
plan	   to	   undermine	   the	   American	  economy.	   According	   to	  White,	   other	   rising	   states	  
‘seek	  to	  follow	  Japan's	  course,	  at	  whatever	  cost	  to	  American	  jobs.	  Conscience	  prevents	  
Americans	   from	   spurning	   the	   poor	   and	   suﬀering	   of	   the	   world	   who	   seek	   to	   better	  
themselves;	  but	  common	  sense	  forbids	  a	  course	  that	  permits	  their	  betterment	  by	  our	  
impoverishment’.581
	   President	   George	   H.W.	   Bush	   utilized	   the	   Structural	   Impediments	   Initiative	  
(SII)	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  these	  concerns.	  The	  SII	  was	  a	  committee	  established	  in	  
1979	  by	  the	  American	  and	  Japanese	  governments	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  
experts.582 	   The	   talks	   provided	   no	   viable	   solutions,	   prompting	   American	   politicians	  
towards	  more	  aggressive	  solutions.583	  Eventually,	  the	  “Super	  301”	  provision	  of	  the	  1988	  
Omnibus	   Trade	   and	  Competitiveness	   Act	   was	  applied	   to	   Japan.	   The	   act	   authorized	  
trade	   sanctions	   against	   countries	   impeding	   America	   exports.	   These	   retaliatory	  
measures	   were	   deplored	   by	  many	   in	   Japan,	   but	   under	   the	   threat	   of	   sanctions,	   the	  
Japanese	  government	   approved	  tariﬀ	   revisions	  and	  enhanced	  American	  access	  to	   key	  
sectors	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy.584	  
	   The	  ongoing	   struggle	  to	   correct	   the	   trade	   imbalance	  highlights	  the	  persistent	  
success	   of	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   during	   the	   Cold	   War.	   When	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  
collapsed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  Japan	  was	  at	  the	  height	  of	  its	  power.	  The	  impact	  on	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both	   the	   international	   system	   and	   the	   direction	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   was	  
monumental.	   The	  absence	   of	   a	   second	   superpower	   left	   America	   with	   unquestioned	  
military	   supremacy,	   ushering	   in	   an	   era	   of	   American	   hegemony.	   This	   shift	   from	  
bipolarity	   to	   unipolarity	   was,	   however,	   limited	   to	   the	   sphere	  of	   traditional	  military	  
power.	   The	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   resulted	   not	   from	   the	   military	  
confrontation	  for	  which	   it	  had	  been	  prepared,	  but	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  domestic	  and	  
ideological	   constraints.	   	  Key	  among	   these	  factors	  was	  the	   inoperability	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
economic	  model,	  demonstrating	  that	   even	   the	  mostly	  militarily	  developed	  states	  are	  
vulnerable	  to	  economic	  variables.585
	   The	   abrupt	   Soviet	   downfall	   accentuated	   the	   limits	   of	  military	   spending,	   and	  
served	  as	  a	  victory	  not	  only	  for	  America	  but	  for	  global	  capitalism.	  Cold	  War	  bipolarity	  
was	  a	  consequence	  of	  two	   superpowers	  engaged	  in	   social	  competition.	  By	  employing	  
their	  colossal	  material,	  ideological,	  and	  technological	  strength,	  America	  and	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  attempted	  to	  geopolitically	  best	  one	  another.	  The	  relative	  power	  parity	  between	  
superpowers	   (especially	  with	   regard	  to	   nuclear	  deterrence)	   created	  a	   stalemate,	   and	  
each	  superpower	  resided	  over	  hierarchical	  power	  distributions	  within	  their	  respective	  
sphere	   of	   inﬂuence.	   Each	   sphere	   was	   bound	   by	   unique	   political	   norms,	   the	   most	  
obvious	  being	  the	  competition	  between	  democratic	  and	  communist	   norms.	  With	  no	  
discernible	   challenge	   to	   the	   American	   hegemony	   following	   the	   Soviet	   collapse,	   the	  
security	   basis	   for	   the	   Cold	   War	   privileging	   of	  military	   norms	   in	   the	  Western-­‐bloc	  
(containing	  communism)	  vanished.	  	  
	  
	   The	   new	   international	   order	   had	   yet	   to	   take	   shape.	   This	   thesis’	   framework	  
contests	   that	  power	  is	   deﬁned	  by	   international	   norms	  and	  remains	  dependent	   upon	  
the	  perception	  of	  state	  elites.	  With	  Soviet	  communism	   removed	  from	   the	  ideological	  
landscape,	   the	   binding	   norms	   of	   the	   victorious	   Western-­‐bloc	   acquired	   new	  
signiﬁcance.	   Key	  among	   these	  were	  economic	  norms,	  where	  American	  preeminence	  
was	  not	   assured.	   Japan	   soon	   emerged	  as	  the	  primary	  challenger	  to	   the	  American	  led	  
Chapter	  7:	  A	  Resurgent	  Japan,	  1972	  -­‐	  2014	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215
585	  Mccauley,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Longman,	  2008),	  448-­‐51.;	  Strayer,	  Why	  Did	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  Collapse?:	  Understanding	  Historical	  Change	  (M.E.	  Sharpe,	  1998),	  56-­‐63.
economic	  order.586 	  Decades	  of	  steady	  growth	  had	  elevated	   the	  Japanese	  economy	  to	  
the	   second	   largest	   in	   the	   world.	   Japan’s	   economic	   success	   hinged	   upon	   the	   social	  
creativity	   of	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine,	   which	   privileged	   economic	   development	   over	  
military	  expenditures.587	  The	  state-­‐driven	  capitalism	  of	  the	  Japanese	  model	  provided	  a	  
viable	  alternative	  to	   the	  American	  model,	  and	  was	  exported	  to	   other	  states.	  Japanese	  
style	   capitalism	  had	  already	  provided	   the	   ideological	   and	  political	   foundation	  of	  the	  
so-­‐called	  “Asian	  miracle”,	  where	  several	  Asian	  states	  experienced	  a	  quarter	  century	  of	  
remarkable	  growth.588	  
	   Kenneth	  Pyle	  notes	  that	   ‘there	  was	  widespread	  belief	  that	  Japan	  had	  succeeded	  
in	  developing	  a	  superior	  economic	  system,	  one	  that	  had	  not	  only	  caught	  up	  with	  the	  
other	   advanced	   economics	   but	   was	   now	   prepared	   to	   lead	   a	   new	   international	  
system’.589	  This	  “new	  international	  system”	  was	  contingent	  upon	  a	  decreased	  emphasis	  
on	   military	   strength.	   States	   that	   avoided	   the	   immense	  military	   expenditures	   of	   the	  
Cold	  War	  were	  perceived	  as	   forerunners	   of	   a	  new	  economically	  driven	  international	  
system.	   Paul	   Kennedy’s	   famous	   book	   The	   Rise	   and	   Fall	   of	   Great	   Powers	   (1987)	  
envisioned	  the	  decline	  of	  America	  and	  rise	  of	  Japan.590 	  Others	  repeatedly	  proclaimed	  
‘The	  Cold	  War	  is	  over,	  and	  Japan	  won’.591	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  summarized	  this	  perspective	  
by	  stating	  that	   ‘[w]hat	  promised	  to	  be	  the	  American	  century	  will	  be	  halved	  by	  Japan's	  
remarkable	  economic	  resurgence,	  or	  so	  they	  say’.592
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   As	   the	   international	   community	   shifted	   away	   from	   the	   Cold	   War	   system	  
towards	   power	   relations	   dependent	   upon	   economic	   strength,	   Japan	   was	   uniquely	  
positioned	  for	  success.	  This	  nuance	  is	   lost	  on	  interpretations	  of	  international	  politics	  
that	   underplay	   economic	   variables.	   The	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   had	   enabled	   Japanese	  
leaders	   to	   exploit	   the	   US-­‐Japanese	   alliance	   to	   redirect	   capital	   that	   may	   have	   been	  
exhausted	  by	  defense	  spending	  into	  the	  economic	  health	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  welfare	  
of	   Japanese	   citizens.	   Through	   social	   creativity,	   Japanese	   elites	   deﬁned	   their	   own	  
parameters	   of	   success	   outside	   the	   arena	   of	   geopolitical	   competition.	   With	   no	  
perceivable	  threat	   to	  the	  American	  military	  and	  global	   stability	  all	   but	   assured,	  other	  
states	  began	  exploring	  similar	  strategies.
	   Robert	   Gilpin	   summarized	   the	   changing	   norms	   of	   the	   international	  
environment	  by	  stating:	  
Western	  liberal	  societies	  ﬁnd	  Japanese	  economic	  success	  particularly	  threatening	  because	  it	  is	  
the	   ﬁrst	  non-­‐Western	   and	   nonliberal	   society	   to	   outcompete	   them.	   Western	   economies	   are	  
based	  on	  belief	  in	  the	  superior	  eﬃciency	  of	  the	  free	  market	  and	  individualism,	  the	  market	  and	  
individual	   in	   Japan	   are	   not	   relatively	   autonomous	   but	   are	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   a	   powerful	  
nonliberal	  culture	  and	  social	  system.593
Traditional	   military	   power	   remained	   deﬁnitively	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   America,	   but	  
economic	   supremacy	   was	   contentious.	   As	   the	   Gilpin	   quote	   emphasizes,	   there	   was	  
serious	  concern	  that	  Japan	  may	  head	  the	  emerging	  economic	  multipolarity.	  The	  tenets	  
of	  Japan’s	  social	  creativity	  needed	  only	  to	  be	  exported	  and	  emulated,	  which	  had	  been	  
the	  case	  with	  the	  “Asian	  Miracle”,	  by	  other	  states	  seeking	  to	  realign	  their	  foreign	  policy	  
strategies	   to	   favor	  economic	   strength	   over	  military	   strength.	   Although	   the	   Japanese	  
economy	  did	  falter	  in	  the	  coming	  years,	  should	  Japan	  remained	  a	  model	  for	  economic	  
success,	   its	  strategy	  of	  social	   creativity	  may	  have	  deﬁned	  the	  norms	  of	   the	  economic	  
power	  hierarchy.	  In	  this	  alternate	  history,	  Japan	  would	  have	  constituted	  the	  dominant	  
and	   referent	   groups	   for	  other	   states.	   The	  principles	   of	   the	   Yoshida	  Doctrine	  would	  
have	   set	   the	   parameters	   for	   those	   states	   seeking	   social	   mobility	   through	   mirroring	  
Japan’s	   successes.	  Table	   7.3	   summarizes	   the	  transitioning	   international	   system.	  Note	  
the	  tiering	  eﬀect	  of	  military	  unipolarity	  and	  economic	  multipolarity.	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Social	  Mobility:	  Upward	  mobility	  
possible	  within	  group	  of	  American	  
Allies.
Economic Multipolar




Social	  Mobility:	  Economic	  
strength	  provides	  prestige	  and	  
power	  within	  power	  hierarchy.
Table	  7.3	  :	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  International	  Order	  (1991)
7.4	  The	  Lost	  Decade	  (1990	  -­‐	  2000)
The	  optimism	  surrounding	  Japan	  during	  the	  early	  1990s	  soon	  faded.	  Domestic	  factors	  
combined	  with	  the	  inability	  of	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	  respond	  to	  external	  constraints	  and	  
undermined	  Japan’s	  position.	  Two	  events	  in	  particular,	   the	  Gulf	  War	  (1990-­‐1)	   and	  the	  
Japanese	  asset	  price	  crisis	  (1990-­‐2),	  warrant	  further	  consideration.
	   Japan’s	   position	   as	   a	   global	   leader	   and	   the	   feasibility	   of	   the	   US-­‐Japanese	  
alliance,	  which	  was	  necessary	  for	  maintaining	  social	  creativity,	  were	  tested	  in	  the	  early	  
1990s.	  Despite	  broad	  international	  support	  to	  move	  against	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  invasion	  
of	  Kuwait,	  the	  restrictions	  of	  Article	  9	  that	  ‘forever	  renounce	  war	  as	  a	  sovereign	  right’	  594	  
and	   lack	   of	   support	   among	   the	   public	   prevented	   Japanese	   leaders	   from	   acting.595	  
Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  LDP,	  Ozawa	  Ichirō,	   argued	  that	   Japan’s	  participation	   in	  the	  
UN-­‐authorized	   multilateral	   intervention	   was	   consistent	   with	   the	   preamble	   of	   the	  
Japanese	   constitution,	   which	   acknowledged	   Japanese	   responsibilities	   to	   the	  
international	  community.	  This	  interpretation	  of	  collective	  security	  (shūdanteki	  anzen	  
hoshō)	   did	  not	   violate	   the	   constitutional	   ban	   on	   collective	   self-­‐defense	   (shūdanteki	  
jieiken).	  Ozawa’s	  eﬀorts	   were	  halted	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Kaifu	   Toshiki	   who	   held	   that	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JSDF	  deployment	  was	  ‘“constitutionally	  impossible”’.	  596 	  The	  fallout	  over	  the	  Gulf	  War	  
created	  a	  rift	  within	  the	  LDP	  that	  led	  to	  Ozawa’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  party.597	  
	   Prominent	  American	  leaders	  responded	  to	  Japan	  by	  questioning	  the	  practicality	  
of	   maintaining	   the	   American	   security	   guarantee.	   Rust	   Deming,	   former	   Principal	  
Deputy	  Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  East	  Asian	  and	  Paciﬁc	  aﬀairs	  at	  the	  State	  Department,	  
chastised	  Japan,	  stating	  that	  it	  had	  for	  too	  long	  enjoyed	  a	  ‘“free	  ride	  on	  the	  back	  of	  the	  
US”’.598	  Tensions	  further	  escalated	  when	  Japan	  hesitated	  in	  oﬀering	  ﬁnancial	   support	  
for	  the	  Gulf	  War.	  In	  response,	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  voted	  in	  September	  1990	  
to	   remove	   American	   troops	   stationed	   in	   Japan	   unless	   the	   Japanese	   government	  
provided	   a	  monetary	   contribution	   for	   maintenance	   of	   said	   troops.599 	   The	   Japanese	  
government	  eventually	  provided	  $13	  billion	  to	  support	  the	  war,	  and	  agreed	  to	  shoulder	  
ﬁfty	  percent	   of	  the	  maintenance	  costs	   for	  the	  American	  troops	  stationed	   in	  Japan.600	  
While	   the	   Japanese	   ﬁnancial	   commitment	   was	   signiﬁcant,	   the	   protracted	   process	  
through	  which	   it	  materialized	   embittered	  both	  sides.	  American	  politicians	  contested	  
that	   ﬁnancial	   support	   did	   not	   alleviate	  the	  human	  cost	   of	  war.	   Japanese	   leaders	   felt	  
their	  contribution	  was	  under-­‐appreciated	  and	  resented	  American	  ignorance	  regarding	  
the	  nuances	  of	  the	  Japanese	  constitution.601
	   The	   most	   damaging	   blow	   to	   Japan’s	   position	   within	   the	   emerging	   power	  
hierarchy	  was	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Japanese	  asset	  bubble.	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
economy	   was	   the	   foundation	   of	   its	   rising	   international	   position.	   Through	   social	  
creativity,	   Japanese	   leaders	   had	   indirectly	   but	   eﬀectively	  provided	   the	   international	  
community	  with	   an	   alternative	  to	   the	  militarily	  distribution	  of	  power	  dominated	  by	  
America.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Japanese	   economic	  model	   provided	   emerging	   economic	  
powers	   with	   a	   variant	   of	   capitalism	   that	   emphasized	   societal	   interconnectivity	   and	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income	   equality,	   which	   contrasted	  with	   the	   inherent	   competitiveness	   of	   American-­‐
style	  free	  market	  capitalism.602	  
	   The	  Japanese	  asset	  bubble	  lasted	  from	  1986-­‐1991	  and	  was	  characterized	  by	  rapid	  
price	   increases	   and	   unchecked	   credit	   expansion.	   The	   excessive	   easing	   of	  monetary	  
policies	   provided	   a	   ready	   supply	   of	   investment	   capital,	   leading	   to	   a	   score	   of	   bad	  
investments.603	  The	  Tokyo	  stock	  exchange	  crashed	  in	  1990,	  with	  its	  index	  falling	  from	  
33,000	   to	   13,000.604 	  Although	   the	  market	   rallied	   in	   the	   following	   year,	   by	   1992	   the	  
bubble	   had	   burst.	   The	   stock	   exchange	   index	   fell	   again,	   to	   an	   average	   of	   14,000.605	  
Consumer	   and	   investment	   conﬁdence	   plummeted.	   The	   Japanese	   government	  
responded	   with	   a	   series	   of	   policies	   to	   revive	   the	   economy,	   but	   it	   was	   already	   too	  
late.606 	   Over	   the	   next	   decade,	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   ﬂoundered	   and	  GDP	   growth	  
ﬂatlined.	  
	   The	   social	   creativity	   of	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   limited	   Japan’s	   international	  
presence	  to	  the	  economic	  sphere,	  but	  as	  the	  grandeur	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  faded,	  
so	  did	  the	  potential	  of	  Japan	  as	  a	  global	   leader.	  The	  domestic	  elements	   that	   enabled	  
Japan’s	   economic	  rise	  proved	  unable	   to	   guide	  a	  mature	   Japanese	  economy,	   reducing	  
the	  viability	  of	   Japan	  as	  a	  referent	  group	  both	   for	  its	  own	  strategy	  of	  social	   creativity	  
and	   for	   other	   states	   seeking	   to	   expand	   their	   economic	   interests	   through	   social	  
mobility.607 	   Other	   factors	   further	   eroded	   Japan’s	   international	   position.	   The	  
liberalization	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  following	  the	  Soviet	  collapse	  facilitated	  the	  rise	  of	  
other	  states.	  Regionally,	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Indian	  economies	  surged	  while	  the	  Japanese	  
economy	   remained	   stagnant.	   Figure	   7.2	   provides	   a	   visual	   representation	   of	   GDP	  
growth	  rate	  between	  these	  economies	  during	  the	  1990s.	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Figure	  7.2	  :	  GDP	  Growth	  Rate,	  China,	  India,	  Japan	  between	  1991	  -­‐	  2000	  608
	   In	   the	   domestic	   sphere,	   political	   scandals	   rocked	   the	   once	   dominant	   LDP.	  
Cracks	  in	  the	  LDP	  position	  surfaced	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  when	  the	  LDP	  was	  for	  the	  ﬁrst	  
time	   pushed	   into	   a	   minority	   position.609 	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   former	   LDP	   leaders	  
Hosokawa	  Morihiro	   and	  Ozawa	   Ichirō	   left	   the	  party	  and	  spearheaded	   the	  ﬁrst	   non-­‐
LDP	  government	  since	  1955.610	  Although	  Hosokawa’s	  victory	  was	  a	  landmark	  moment	  
for	   political	   plurality	   in	   Japan,	   the	   political	   environment	   of	   the	   1990s	   was	  unstable.	  
From	  1989	  until	  2001,	   Japan	  had	  nine	  prime	  ministers	  who	  averaged	  little	  over	  a	  year	  
in	   oﬃce.	   In	  comparison,	   from	   1948	  until	   1989,	   only	  thirteen	  men	  (including	  Tanzan	  
Ishibashi	  whose	  term	  was	  limited	  to	  68	  days	  by	  a	  stroke)	  were	  elected	  Prime	  Minister.	  
	   A	   further	   shock	   to	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   came	   in	   1997,	   when	   the	   Asian	  
economic	   crisis	   spread	   throughout	   Southeast	   Asia.	   A	   ﬂood	   of	   investment	   capital	  
during	  the	  1990s	  created	  an	  economic	  bubble	  in	  the	  region,	  which	  burst	   towards	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  decade.611	  Japanese	  banks	  were	  particularly	  vulnerable.	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	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domestic	  real	   estate	  market	   left	   Japanese	  banks	  with	   a	  host	  of	  nonperforming	   loans.	  
The	   economic	   crisis	   compounded	   the	   already	   precarious	   position	   of	   some	   of	   these	  
banks.	   The	   Japanese	   government	   allowed	   several	   banks	   to	   fail,	   and	   responded	   by	  
injecting	  public	  money	  into	  the	  economy	  to	  stabilize	  the	  banking	  sector.612	  
	   The	   conﬂuence	   of	   these	   factors	   inhibited	   Japan’s	   position	   within	   the	  
international	   power	   hierarchy,	   and	   refocused	   the	   eﬀorts	   of	   government	   leaders	  
towards	   stabilizing	   the	   US-­‐Japanese	   alliance.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   backlash	   against	  
Japanese	   non-­‐participation	   in	   the	   Gulf	   War,	   Japanese	   politicians	   enacted	   the	  
International	   Peace	   and	  Cooperation	   Law	   (IPCL)	   in	   June	   1992,	   which	  permitted	   the	  
JSDF	   to	   engage	   in	   UN	   peacekeeping	   missions.	   The	   scope	   of	   the	   IPCL	  was	   limited,	  
restricting	   the	  JSDF	   to	   supporting	   roles,	   but	   it	  was	   a	   signiﬁcant	   departure	  from	   the	  
established	  legal	  parameters	  that	  had	  conﬁned	  the	  JSDF	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
mainland.613
	   Further	   revisions	   came	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   regional	   instability.	   In	   March	   1993,	  
Pyongyang	   announced	   its	   intent	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	   Nuclear	   Non-­‐Proliferation	  
Treaty,	   and	   in	   May	   the	   North	   Korean	   government	   successfully	   test-­‐launched	   a	  
medium	  range	  ballistic	  missile	  into	  the	  Sea	  of	  Japan.	  American	  negotiators	  eventually	  
brokered	   a	   diplomatic	  solution,	   but	   the	   lack	   of	  military	   operability	   forced	   Japan	   to	  
remain	  politically	   reserved	  throughout	   the	  crisis.614 	  Political	   pressure	   for	  revision	   of	  
JSDF	  regulations	  mounted	  in	  Japan,	  prompting	  Prime	  Minister	  Morihiro	  Hosokawa	  to	  
order	  a	   review	  of	  the	  existing	  defense	  guidelines.615 	  New	  guidelines	  were	  ﬁnalized	  in	  
October	   1995,	   which	   called	   for	   stronger	   military	   cooperation	   with	   America,	  
emphasized	   the	   importance	   of	   Japanese	   contributions	   to	   regional	   security,	  616 and	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authorized	   JSDF	   deployments	   in	   ‘situations	   in	   the	   areas	   around	   Japan	   that	   have	   a	  
direct	  eﬀect	  on	  Japan’s	  security.’617	  
	   Chinese	  opposition	  to	  Taiwanese	  President	  Lee	  Teng-­‐hui’s	  suggestions	  of	  de	  jure	  
independence	   during	   the	   summer	   of	   1995	   further	   eroded	   the	   viability	   of	   Japanese	  
leaders	   maintaining	   social	   creativity.	   The	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   emphasized	   a	   low	  
diplomatic	   proﬁle,	   but	   the	   1995–1996	   Taiwan	   Strait	   Crisis	   was	   marked	   by	   highly	  
publicized	  Chinese	  military	  exercises	  and	  Beijing’s	  suspension	  of	  high-­‐level	   dialogues	  
with	   Washington	   and	   Taipei.	   The	   conﬂict	   was	   only	   resolved	   following	   President	  
Clinton’s	   dispatching	   of	   two	   carrier	   battle	   groups	   into	   Taiwanese	   waters.618	  
Furthermore,	  Chinese	   regional	   aggressiveness	   intensiﬁed	  the	   territorial	   dispute	  over	  
the	  Senkaku	  Islands	  between	  China	  and	  Japan.	  
	   The	   instability	   of	   the	   1990s	   pushed	   Japan	   towards	   stronger	   participation	   in	  
regional	   security	  through	   a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  alliance.	   In	  April	   1996,	  
President	   Clinton	   and	   Prime	   Minister	   Hashimoto	   signed	   the	   US-­‐Japan	   Joint	  
Declaration	   on	   Security,	   which	   refocused	   the	   alliance’s	   objectives	   on	   regional	  
security.619	  The	  US-­‐Japan	  Defense	  Guidelines	  were	  revised	  in	  September	  1997.	  The	  new	  
guidelines	   reinterpreted	  Article	   9	  to	   enable	   JSDF	   participation	   in	   ‘situations	   in	  areas	  
surrounding	   Japan’	   through	   non-­‐combat	   roles,	  such	   as	  rear-­‐end	   logistics	  and	   search	  
and	  rescue	  missions.620
	   Despite	  these	  eﬀorts,	  Japan’s	  position	  within	  the	  international	  power	  hierarchy	  
was	  severely	  compromised.	   	  The	  combination	  of	  factors	  both	  external	  (the	  Gulf	  War,	  
the	   rise	   of	   other	   powers,	   and	   the	   Asian	   ﬁnancial	   crisis,	   regional	   instability)	   and	  
internal	  (the	  asset	  bubble	  crash,	  political	   instability)	  forced	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	  move	  
away	  from	  the	  establish	  strategy	  of	  social	  creativity.	  Structural	  pressures	  also	  played	  a	  
role.	   The	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   excelled	   under	   the	   bipolarity	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   which	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shielded	   Japan	  behind	   the	   American	  nuclear	  umbrella.	  When	   the	  Cold	  War	   ended,	  
Japan	  was	   thrust	   onto	   the	   international	   stage	  and	  expected	  by	  many	   to	   assume	  the	  
mantle	   of	   leadership.	   This	   expectation	   shattered	   under	   the	   weight	   of	   a	   stagnant	  
economy	  and	  Japan’s	  hesitancy	  towards	  liberal-­‐internationalist	  initiatives,	  such	  as	  the	  
Gulf	  War,	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  kept	  in	  check	  by	  Soviet	  counterbalancing.	  
	   For	  a	   state	  whose	  previous	   successes	  had	   been	   founded	  on	   a	   low	   diplomatic	  
proﬁle	   and	   economic	   growth,	   these	   factors	   strained	   the	   existing	   strategy	   of	   social	  
creativity.	   Although	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   remained	   tentatively	   in	   place,	   Japanese	  
politicians	   explored	   new	   avenues	   for	   status	   seeking	   behavior.	   The	   response	   was	   a	  
combination	   of	   eﬀorts	   to	   revive	   the	  economy	   and	   a	   renewed	   emphasis	   on	   the	  US-­‐
Japanese	  alliance.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  of	  Japan	  during	  the	  1990s	  
was	  reactive	  and	  largely	  ambiguous.	  
	   The	   combination	   of	   international	   and	   external	   pressures	   also	   limited	   the	  
dissent	   between	   political	   groups.	   Despite	   its	   struggles,	   the	   LDP	   remained	   Japan’s	  
premiere	  party.	   	  While	   inconsistent	   leadership	  followed	   the	  high	  turnover	  of	  prime	  
ministers,	   there	  was	   some	   consistency	  in	  LDP	   eﬀorts	   to	   counter	   regional	   instability	  
and	  to	   address	   the	  political	   backlash	   that	   followed	  the	  Gulf	  War.	  A	  hedging	   strategy	  
emerged,	   which	   utilized	   Japan’s	   waning	   economic	   strength	   (Japan	   remained	   the	  
world’s	  second	  largest	  economy	  until	   2010)	   and	   enhanced	  military	   cooperation	  with	  
America	  to	  supplement	  for	  losses	  in	  international	  prestige.
	   Although	   the	   JSDF	   remained	   limited	   by	   Article	   9,	   revisions	   to	   parameters	  
governing	  JSDF	  deployment	  elevated	  the	  position	  of	  political	  groups	  seeking	  Japanese	  
normalization	   within	   the	   domestic	   identities	   hierarchy.	   The	   expanded	   role	   for	   the	  
JSDF	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1990s	  diverged	  considerably	  from	  the	  low	  diplomatic	  proﬁle	  
that	  underscored	  Japan’s	  Cold	  War	  social	   creativity.	  As	   is	   expanded	  in	  the	   following	  
section,	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   that	   positioned	   Japan	   as	   a	   more	   traditional	  
regional	  power,	  was	  emerging.	  While	  constructivism	  accounts	  for	  diﬀerences	  in	  group	  
identities	  (mercantilist	   vs.	  normalist)	   and	  neoclassical	  realism	  explores	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
national	   power,	   a	   synthesis	   of	   the	   two	   approaches	   broadens	   their	   analytical	   power.	  
Furthermore,	   exploring	   these	   dynamics	   within	   a	   framework	   that	   also	   utilizes	   SIT	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reveals	   the	   material	   and	   ideational	   diﬀerences	   between	   these	   groups.	   Table	   7.4	  




















N/A Ambiguous.	  Japan	  maintains	  its	  security	  
deference	  to	  America,	  but	  begins	  move	  
away	  from	  social	  creativity	  following	  the	  
Gulf	  War	  and	  economic	  crash.Economic	  
Multipolar
High Self
Table	  7.4	  :	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  (1991	  -­‐	  2001)
	   The	   ambiguous	   strategy	   direction	   of	   the	   1990s	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   Japanese	  
foreign	   policy	   following	   the	   First	   World	  War,	   which	   wavered	   between	   the	   existing	  
imperialist	  norms	  and	  accepting	  the	  nascent	  internationalist	  norms	  of	  the	  Versailles-­‐
Washington	  System.	  While	  the	  diﬀerences	  in	  global	  trends	  were	  not	  as	  pronounced	  in	  
the	  1990s	  as	  they	  were	  in	   the	  1920s,	   the	  rise	  of	  American	  military	  hegemony	  and	  the	  
fall	   of	   a	   counterbalance	   to	   liberal	   Western-­‐bloc	   norms	   (mainly	   democracy	   and	  
capitalism)	  were	  strong	  indicators	  of	  the	  emerging	  international	  system.	  
7.5	  The	  Rise	  of	  Koizumi	  (2001	  -­‐	  2006)
The	   aforementioned	   eﬀorts	   to	   address	   Article	   9	   were	   notable	   precursors	   to	   the	  
unfolding	  of	   global	   events	   during	   the	  2000s.	   The	   terrorist	   attacks	   of	   September	   11th	  
renewed	   the	  American	   emphasis	   on	   its	   network	   of	   bilateral	   relationship,	   providing	  
Japanese	  leaders	  an	  opportunity	   to	   shift	   gears	  away	  from	   the	   increasingly	  ineﬀectual	  
strategy	  of	  social	  creativity.
	   Structurally,	   the	  hierarchical	  order	  of	  the	  international	   system	   remained	   largely	  
unchanged	   between	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s.	   America’s	   unmatched	   military	   strength	  
resulted	   in	   a	  unipolar	  military-­‐power	  hierarchy.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   rise	   of	   secondary	  
military	   powers	   such	   as	   China,	   India,	   and	   a	   rebounding	   Russia	   should	   be	   noted.	  
Economic	  multipolarity	  continued	   throughout	   the	  decade,	  preserving	  the	   two-­‐tiered	  
international	   order	   that	   enabled	   states	   to	   utilize	  economic	   strength	   as	  a	   vehicle	   for	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fortifying	  their	  international	  position.	  
	   America’s	  War	  on	  Terror	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  same	  vein	  as	  containment	  
strategies	   during	   the	   Cold	   War.	   While	   not	   focused	   directly	   at	   the	   bipolar	   social	  
competition	  of	  superpowers,	  the	  nature	  of	  American	  eﬀorts	  against	  terrorism	  have	  had	  
a	   similar	   impact	   on	   power	   relations.	   Consequently,	   secondary	   powers	   can	   enhance	  
their	   international	   position	   within	   the	   American-­‐led	   unipolar	   power	   hierarchy	   by	  
supporting	   the	  War	   on	   Terror,	   much	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   that	   states	   like	   Britain	  
maintained	   high	   international	   prestige	   throughout	   the	   Cold	   War	   through	   strong	  
integration	  with	  American	  security	  objectives.621 	  The	  Blair	  administration	  maintained	  
this	  strategy	   through	  support	   for	  the	  wars	   in	   Afghanistan	   (2001)	   and	   Iraq	  (2003).	   A	  
similar	   strategy	   was	   adopted	   in	   Japan.	   In	   this	   manner,	   Britain	   provided	   a	   referent	  
group	  for	   a	  successful	   secondary	  alliance	  partner	  for	   Japan.	   Given	   the	  constitutional	  
restraints	   of	   Article	   9	   and	   the	   hesitancy	   exhibited	   by	   Japanese	   leaders	   during	   the	  
1990s,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	   examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  US-­‐Japanese	  relations	  of	  the	  2000s	  
and	  2010s	  in	  further	  detail.	  
	   Japan’s	  role	  in	  American	  strategic	  planning	  was	  prescribed	  in	  October	  2000	  by	  a	  
report	   from	   the	   Institute	   for	   National	   Strategic	   Studies	   (INSS)	   titled	   “The	   United	  
States	   and	  Japan:	   Advancing	   toward	   a	  Mature	  Partnership”.	   The	   report	  was	   lead	  by	  
Richard	  Armitage	  (later	  appointed	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  by	  President	  Bush)	  and	  
Joseph	   Nye,	   and	   advocated	   enhanced	   security	   cooperation	   through	   technology	  
exchanges,	  the	  adaption	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Defense	  (BMD)	  program,	  
intelligence	  sharing,	  and	  the	  rescinding	  of	  Japan’s	  ban	  on	  collective	  self-­‐defense.	  The	  
report	   concluded:	   ‘the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	  Asian	   security	   setting	   pose	   new	  and	   complex	  
challenges	   to	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Japan.	   How	   the	   two	   countries	   respond,	  
individually	  and	  as	  alliance	  partners,	  will	  deﬁne	  signiﬁcantly	  the	  security	  and	  stability	  
of	   the	   Asia-­‐Paciﬁc’.622 	   The	   bipartisan	   report	   was	   widely	   utilized	   by	   the	   Bush	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621	  Social	  creativity	  remains	  possible	  given	  this	  interpretation.	  For	  example,	  French	  and	  German	  
opposition	  to	  the	  Iraq	  War	  is	  evidence	  of	  their	  rejection	  of	  the	  American	  security	  norms.	  Japan	  could	  
have	  opted	  to	  follow	  a	  similar	  path	  but	  a	  conﬂuence	  of	  factors	  including	  Japanese	  dependence	  on	  the	  
American	  security	  guarantee	  and	  a	  conservative	  government	  (discussed	  in	  detail	  throughout	  this	  
section),	  conditioned	  Japanese	  leaders	  towards	  social	  mobility.	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  National	  Defense	  University,	  "The	  United	  States	  and	  Japan:	  Advancing	  toward	  a	  Mature	  
Partnership,"(Institute	  For	  National	  Strategic	  Studies	  Special	  Report,	  October	  2000),	  7.
administration.623
	   In	   April	   2001,	   Koizumi	   Junichiro	   was	   elected	   Prime	  Minister,	   and	   under	   his	  
leadership	   Japan	   adopted	   a	  more	   assertive	   foreign	   policy	   stance	   that	   embraced	   the	  
measures	   outlined	   by	   the	   INSS	   report,	   and	   pushed	   Japan	   towards	   normalization.	  
Koizumi	  endorsed	  America’s	  armed	  response	  against	  the	  Taliban	  in	  Afghanistan	  (2001)	  
and	  endorsed	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Special	  Measures	  Law,	  which	  authorized	  Koizumi	  to	  
send	   support	   vessels	   and	   personnel	   into	   the	   Persian	   Gulf.	   The	   unprecedented	   law	  
created	   legal	   ambiguities	   regarding	   JSDF	   deployments.	   American	   action	   in	  
Afghanistan	  was	  not	  authorized	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  and	  therefore	  fell	  outside	  
the	   1992	   IPCL,	  which	  permitted	   JSDF	   deployments	   in	   support	   of	   UN	   peacekeeping	  
operations.	   Geographically,	   the	   Persian	   Gulf	   was	   well	   beyond	   the	   limits	   1999	  
Situations	   Law	   that	   sanctioned	   JSDF	   action	   in	   the	   areas	   surrounding	   Japan.	   The	  
expanded	   guidelines	   eﬀectively	   circumvented	   the	   extant	   restrictions	   on	   JSDF	  
deployments.624	  
	   This	   reinterpretation	   of	   security	   coincides	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   social	  
mobility	  during	  the	  1990s,	  and	  is	  mirrored	  by	  Koizumi’s	  statement	  that:	  ‘“it	  is	  the	  duty	  
of	   the	   political	   leadership	   to	   consider	  what	   kind	  of	   structure	   can	   be	  created	   in	   the	  
event	   that	   the	  state	  or	  the	  people	  are	  exposed	  to	  crises	  and	  I	  intend	  to	  move	  forward	  
with	  consideration	  on	  emergency	  legislation”’.625	  The	  implementation	  of	  contingency	  
laws	  were	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  Koizumi	  government,	  and	  indicative	  of	  Koizumi’s	  desire	  to	  
move	  away	   from	   social	   creativity	   and	   position	   Japan	   as	   a	  more	   traditional	   regional	  
power.
	   Following	   the	   invasion	   of	   Iraq	   in	   2003,	   the	   Japanese	   government	   enacted	  
additional	   measures	   that	   granted	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   emergency	   powers	   and	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sanctioned	   JSDF	   action	   in	   Iraq.626 	   While	   JSDF	   eﬀorts	   in	   Iraq	   were	   limited	   to	  
supporting	  roles,	  the	  deployment	  of	  ground	  personnel	  further	  compounded	  the	  legal	  
understanding	   of	   Japanese	   defense.	   Iraq	   posed	   no	   threat	   to	   Japanese	   security,	  
eliminating	  justiﬁcation	  for	  JSDF	  deployment	  under	  the	  emergency	  powers	  granted	  to	  
Koizumi.	   Furthermore,	   the	   invasion	   elicited	   a	   contentious	   response	   from	   the	   UN	  
Security	  Council,	  creating	  an	   inconsistency	  with	  the	  UN	  peacekeeping	  mandates	  that	  
precipitated	  past	  JSDF	  operations	  in	  Mozambique	  (1993-­‐1995),	  Kosovo	  (1999),	  and	  East	  
Timor	  (2002).627	  
	   Security	   dialogues	   via	   the	   Security	   Consultative	   Committee	   (SCC)	   also	  
intensiﬁed	   following	   9/11.	   The	   SCC	   was	   established	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   but	   under	  
Koizumi	   	  the	  meetings	  became	  central	   to	  alliance	  strengthening.	  The	  committee	  met	  
in	  December	  2002	  to	   address	  the	  changing	  security	  environment,	  and	  to	  establish	  the	  
parameters	   of	   mutually	   shared	   security	   responsibilities	   between	   the	   states.628	  
Reciprocity	  between	  allies	  is	  not	  unusual.	  However,	  given	  the	  hesitancy	  exhibited	  by	  
Japanese	   leaders	   operating	   under	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine,	   the	   redeﬁning	   of	   Japan’s	  
regional	   role	   indicates	   support	   from	   both	   American	   and	   Japanese	   leaders	   for	   social	  
mobility	  though	  normalization.629	  The	  SCC	  met	  twice	  in	  2005	  to	  solidify	  the	  alliance’s	  
strategic	  objectives,	   and	   proclaimed	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  relationship	  as	   the	   ‘bedrock	   of	  
Japan’s	  security	  and	  anchor	  of	  regional	   stability.’630	   It	  was	  a	  bold	  statement,	  one	  that	  
indistinguishably	  linked	  Japanese	  security	  to	  that	  of	  the	  region.	  
	   Japanese	  commitment	  to	  the	  SCC	  objectives	  corresponded	  with	  a	  more	  assertive	  
foreign	   policy.	   For	   example,	   under	   pressure	   from	   American	   diplomats,	   the	   SCC	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identiﬁed	   the	   peaceful	   resolution	   of	   the	   Taiwan	   controversy	   as	   a	   prime	   strategic	  
concern.631	  This	  marked	  the	  ﬁrst	  oﬃcial	  Japanese	  declaration	  regarding	  Taiwan,	  which	  
precipitated	   a	   contentious	   response	   from	   the	   Chinese,	   and	   represents	   a	   signiﬁcant	  
departure	   from	   the	   low	   diplomatic	   stance	   of	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine.632 	   SCC	   has	  
continued	  to	  meet	  with	  some	  regularity,	  and	  these	  meetings	  have	  focused	  on	   further	  
security	   cooperation,	   including	   increased	   integration	   of	   American	   and	   Japanese	  
command	   structures,	   missile	   defense	   deployments,	   and	   defense	   force	   exercises	  
between	  the	  JSDF	  and	  American	  military.633
	   The	  measures	  enacted	  under	  Koizumi	  circumvented	  aspects	  of	  Article	  9	  without	  
requiring	   constitutional	   reform.	   Although	   considerable	   constraints	   on	   JSDF	  
deployment	  persisted,	  the	  authority	  Article	  9	  once	  carried	  eroded.	  In	  terms	  of	  norms	  
and	  identity,	  Koizumi	   elevated	  the	  status	  of	   the	  normalist	   group	  while	  reducing	  that	  
of	  the	  mercantilist	  group,	  which	  had	  previously	  utilized	  Article	  9	  to	  minimize	  Japan’s	  
commitment	   to	   regional	   security.	   Counterarguments	   may	   contest	   that	   without	  
constitutional	   reform	   social	   mobility	   through	   normalization	   is	   impossible.	   There	   is	  
some	  validity	   to	   this	  argument,	  and	  it	   is	  explored	   in	  the	  following	  section.	  However,	  
constitutional	   restrictions	   do	   not	   always	  reﬂect	  political	   realities.	  America	  has	   in	   its	  
history	  only	  issued	  a	  handful	   formal	   declarations	  of	  war	  as	  outlined	  by	  the	  American	  
constitution,	  in	  spite	  of	  dozens	  upon	  dozens	  of	  oversees	  military	  operations.	  
	   Military	   integration	   between	  America	  and	   Japan	  provides	   a	   second	   conceptual	  
tool	  for	  tracing	  the	  move	  away	  from	  social	  creativity.	  Shared	  missile	  defense	  initiatives	  
occurred	  throughout	  the	  2000s.	  Missile	  defense	  has	  a	  long	  history	  in	  Japan,	  beginning	  
with	   Nakasone	  support	   for	   the	   Star	  Wars’	   Defense	   Initiative	   in	   1986	   and	  numerous	  
joint-­‐studies	  between	  American	  and	  Japanese	  defense	  contractors.634	  Japan’s	  adoption	  
of	   missile	   defense	   has	   been	   driven	   by	   ballistic	   missile	   proliferation	   in	   East	   Asia,	  
Chapter	  7:	  A	  Resurgent	  Japan,	  1972	  -­‐	  2014	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229
631	  Bisley	  2008,	  77.
632	  Arase	  July/August	  2007,	  580.
633	  Meetings	  occurred:	  May	  2007,	  May	  2010,	  June	  2011,	  April	  2012.
634	  Hughes	  2004,	  108.
notably	   	   the	   North	   Korean	   missile	   tests	   in	   1990,	   1993,	   and	   1998.635 	   Japan	   began	  
purchasing	   oﬀ-­‐the-­‐shelf	  missile	   defense	   systems	   from	   America	   following	   9/11,	  while	  
maintaining	   the	   existing	   joint-­‐research	   ventures.636 	   Integration	   within	   America’s	  
missile	   defense	   program	   has	   improved	   Japan’s	   defense	   posture,	   but	   it	   also	   pushed	  
Japan	  further	  away	  from	  the	  low	  diplomatic	  proﬁle	  of	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine.	  
	   The	  continuity	  between	  Nakasone	  and	  Koizumi	  must	  not	  be	  understated.	  Both	  
leaders	   forwarded	   normalist	   strategies	   derived	   out	   of	   a	   perceived	   need	   to	   address	  
deﬁciencies	  in	  Japanese	  security.	  The	  combination	  of	  Japan’s	  stalled	  economy	  and	  the	  
post-­‐9/11	   international	   environment	   provided	   the	   necessary	   political	   traction	   for	   a	  
push	  towards	  social	  mobility	  under	  Koizumi.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  Koizumi’s	  approach	  was	  a	  
reinterpretation	  of	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  alliance	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  normalization.	  While	  
Japan	  remained	  the	  junior	  member,	  Koizumi	  envisioned	  Japan	  as	  more	  a	  partner	  and	  
less	   as	   a	   client	   within	   the	   American	   security	   framework.	   This	   dynamic	   harkens	   to	  
Koizumi’s	  predecessors	  who	   forged	  the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  alliance	  in	   1902	  and	  the	  early	  
Meiji	   leaders	  who	   themselves	  countered	  security	  deﬁciencies	   in	   the	  form	  of	  unequal	  
treaties.	  
	   Under	   Koizumi’s	   leadership,	   the	   domestic	  debate	   over	   sovereignty	   and	  power	  
were	   refocused	   towards	   social	   mobility.	   Although	   elements	   of	   social	   creativity	  
persisted	   through	   Article	   9,	   the	   policy	   ambiguity	   of	   the	   1990s	   was	   signiﬁcantly	  
reduced.	  Within	  the	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy,	  the	  normalist	  group	  supplanted	  the	  
mercantilist	   group.	   Social	   creativity	   stymied	   Japan’s	   response	   to	   the	   Gulf	   War.	   A	  
decade	   later,	   the	   Koizumi	   reacted	   to	   the	   wars	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq	   with	   an	  
assertiveness	   that	   had	   been	   absent	   from	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   since	   before	   the	  
American	  occupation.	  Koizumi’s	  foreign	  policy	  approach	  is	  represented	  in	  Table	  7.5.
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Social	  Mobility.	  Japanese	  constitution	  
reinterpreted	  to	  expand	  JSDF	  operations.	  
Article	  9	  prevents	  full	  institutionalization	  of	  
normalists	  within	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy.Economic	  
Multipolar
High America
Table	  7.5	  :	  Koizumi	  Era	  Foreign	  Policy	  (2001	  -­‐	  2006)
	   The	  nature	  of	  Koizumi’s	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility	  was	  characterized	  by	  both	  the	  
unipolar	  power	   hierarchy	   and	   by	   the	   multipolar	   economic	  hierarchy.	   The	   Japanese	  
government	   maintained	   its	   commitment	   to	   economic	   initiatives,	   but	   began	   acting	  
more	   like	  a	   traditional	   power.	   Given	   the	   strengthening	   of	   the	   US-­‐Japanese	   alliance	  
during	   these	   years,	   social	   mobility	   is	   best	   understood	   when	   considering	   America’s	  
network	   of	   bilateral	   alliances.	  While	  some	  states,	   such	  as	  France,	  drifted	  away	   from	  
American	   hegemony	   in	   protestation	   against	   the	   Iraq	  War	   (which	   is	   indicative	   of	   a	  
French	   foreign	  policy	   strategy	  of	  social	   creativity),	   other	   states,	   including	   Japan	  and	  
Britain,	   pursued	   strategies	   to	   enhance	   their	   international	   position	   through	   alliance	  
strengthening.	  
	   The	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   adopted	   by	   the	   Japanese	   government	   was	  
therefore	   contingent	   upon	   military	   support	   for	   American	   strategic	   objectives	   in	   a	  
manner	  similar	  to	  other	  secondary	  partners	  in	  American	  alliances.	  Under	  this	  strategy,	  
Britain	  provided	  Japan	  with	   the	  prime	   referent	  within	  the	   group	  of	  America’s	  allies.	  
America	   constitutes	   the	   dominant	   group	   under	   this	   strategy,	   however	   the	   reliance	  
America	  placed	  on	   its	   allies	   increased	   the	   permeability	   of	   the	   power	   hierarchy.	   See	  













Social	  Mobility:	  Upward	  mobility	  
possible	  within	  group	  of	  American	  
Allies.
Economic Multipolar America Variable
Social	  Mobility:	  Economic	  
strength	  elevates	  international	  
standing.
Table	  7.6	  :	  Post-­‐9/11	  Multitiered	  International	  System
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7.6	  Japanese	  Constitutional	  Reform	  
Conceptualizing	   this	   trend	   of	   normalization	   through	   the	   developed	   framework	  
provides	   crucial	   insights	   for	   understanding	   the	   ongoing	   question	   of	   Japanese	  
constitutional	   reform	  and	  the	  trajectory	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy.	  Although	  nearly	  a	  
decade	  has	  passed	   since	   the	  end	  of	  Koizumi’s	  premiership,	  his	   eﬀective	  bypassing	   of	  
Article	  9	  fundamentally	  altered	  the	  security	  debate	  within	   Japan.	  Using	  SIT	   to	   frame	  
this	   shift	   is	   essential.	   Strict	   realist-­‐leaning	   interpretations	   too	   often	   default	   to	   the	  
status	  quo	   state	  vs.	   revisionist	   state	  debate	   that	   does	  not	   eﬀectively	  encapsulate	  the	  
controversy	   surrounding	   Japan.	   Similarly,	   constructivist	   interpretations	   may	  
overemphasize	  the	  paciﬁst	  norms	  prevalent	  within	  the	  Japanese	  public.	  While	  paciﬁst	  
norms	  do	  have	  some	  impact	  on	  the	  Japanese	  political	  system,	  in	  the	  post-­‐Koizumi	  era	  
these	  norms	  have	  had	  remarkably	  little	  impact	  on	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  output.	  
	   Nowhere	   is	   this	   shift	   towards	   social	   mobility	   more	   evident	   than	   when	  
considering	  the	  applicability	  of	  Article	  9	  within	  the	  debate	  over	  constitutional	  reform.	  
Normalist	   norms	   within	   the	   Liberal	   Democratic	   Party	   (LDP)	   were	   elevated	   by	  
Nakasone’s	   support	   for	   Japan’s	   right	   to	   exercise	   collective	   self-­‐defensive.	  637 	   Under	  
Koizumi,	   the	  LDP	  reinterpreted	   the	  Japanese	  constitution	   to	   suit	  a	   strategy	  of	  social	  
mobility,	  thereby	  propelling	   the	  norms	  of	  the	  normalist	  group	  to	   the	  apex	  of	  Japan’s	  
domestic	  identity	  hierarchy.	  
	   The	   LDP	   proposed	   legislation	   in	   2004	   and	   2005	   to	   expand	   JSDF’s	   capabilities,	  
arguing	   that	   Japan	   should	   be	   permitted	   to	   act	   in	   a	  manner	   commensurate	   with	   its	  
great	  power	  status.	  From	   this	  perspective,	   Japan	   should	  possess	  a	  traditional	  military	  
charged	  with	  national	   self-­‐defense	  and	  permitted	   to	  be	  deployed	  in	   accordance	  with	  
collective	   defense.	  LDP	  proposals	  aimed	  to	   circumnavigate	  Article	  9	  by	   establishing	  
new	   laws	   that	   enabled	   collective	   defense	   without	   constitutional	   reform.638 	   These	  
measures	   created	   legal	   ambiguities	   regarding	   the	   status	   of	   the	   JSDF,	   prompting	   a	  
domestic	  debate	  between	  the	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  over	  constitutional	  reform.	  The	  two	  houses	  
of	   the	  Diet	   issued	   a	  report	   in	  April	   2005	  that	   recognized	  the	  need	  for	  constitutional	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637	  Tsuchiyama	  2007,	  65.
638	  Hughes	  2009,	  120.
revisions,	  but	  no	  consensus	  between	  the	  parties	  was	  reached.639
	   Koizumi’s	  successor,	  Abe	  Shinzō	  actively	  pursued	  constitutional	  reform	  during	  
his	  ﬁrst	  term	  as	  prime	  minister	  (2006–7),	  stating	  that	  ‘it	  is	  important	  that	  we	  Japanese	  
write	   a	   constitution	   for	   ourselves	   that	   would	   reﬂect	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   country	   we	  
consider	  desirable	  in	  the	  21st	  century’.640	  Richard	  J.	  Samuels	  notes	  that:	  ‘Once	  in	  power	  
[Koizumi	   and	   Abe]	   seized	   the	   opportunity	   to	   reform	   the	   domestic	   institutions	   of	  
national	   security	   and	   to	   marginalize	   their	   political	   opponents.’641 	   Abe	   successfully	  
pushed	   new	   legislation	   through	   the	   Diet	   that	   placed	   a	   three-­‐year	   moratorium	   on	  
proposing	   drafts	   to	   the	   Diet,	   permitting	   the	   LDP	   time	   to	   solidify	   its	   political	  
position.642	  
	   Following	  Abe’s	  ﬁrst	   tenure	  as	  prime	  minister,	  there	  was	  a	  notable	  decrease	  in	  
the	  debate	  over	  constitutional	  revision,	  largely	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  DPJ	  rising	  to	  power.	  
The	  DPJ	  lower	  house	  victory	   in	  August	  2009	  marked	  only	  the	  second	  time	  since	  1955	  
that	   the	   LDP	   was	   ousted	   from	   power.	   Nevertheless,	   this	   apparent	   rise	   of	   plurality	  
within	  Japan	  has	  done	  little	  to	   alter	  Japan’s	  move	  towards	   social	  mobility.	  While	  the	  
DPJ	   generally	   opposes	   the	   LDP’s	   approach	   to	   reform,	   seeing	   the	   ongoing	  
reinterpretations	   of	   the	   constitution	   as	   “hollowing	   out”	   of	   the	   constitution’s	  
underlying	   principles,	   the	   DPJ	   approach	   implicitly	   accepts	   a	   degree	   of	  
normalization.643
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  Ibid.,	  118.
640	  Weymouth,	  "A	  Conversation	  with	  Shinzo	  Abe,"	  The	  Washington	  Post	  April	  22,	  2007.
641	  Samuels	  2007,	  6.
642	  Hughes	  2009,	  122-­‐3.
643	  Ibid.,	  127-­‐8.	  There	  is	  considerable	  variation	  within	  the	  DPJ	  regarding	  constitutional	  revisions.	  For	  
more	  detail	  see:	  Hirata	  2008;	  Hughes	  2009;	  Kushida	  and	  Lipscy,	  Japan	  under	  the	  Dpj:	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Transition	  and	  Governance	  (Walter	  H.	  Shorenstein	  Asia-­‐Paciﬁc	  Research	  Center,	  2013);	  Shinoda,	  
"Japan’s	  Failed	  Experiment:	  The	  Dpj	  and	  Institutional	  Change	  for	  Political	  Leadership,"	  Asian	  Survey,	  
52,	  no.	  5	  	  (2012);	  Shinoda,	  Contemporary	  Japanese	  Politics:	  Institutional	  Changes	  and	  Power	  Shifts	  
(Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  Tsuchiyama	  2007.
	   The	  DPJ	  seeks	  to	  clearly	  delineate	  the	  legal	  parameters	  of	  the	  JSDF’s	  role	  in	  self-­‐
defense,	  support	   of	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  alliance,	  and	  international	   security	  coalitions.644	  
LDP	  defector	  and	  former	  president	  of	  the	  DPJ	  Ozawa	  Ichirō	  championed	  this	  position	  
by	   arguing	   that	   constitutional	   revision	   should	   be	   primarily	   driven	   by	   a	   desire	   to	  
enhance	   Japanese	  participation	   in	   ‘“maintaining	  and	   resorting	  peace	   and	  security	   of	  
international	   society”’.645 	   The	   DPJ’s	   election	   manifesto	   of	   2009	   addressed	  
constitutional	   reform,	  stating	   that:	   ‘deﬁciencies	  in	   the	  present	  constitution	  are	   to	  be	  
supplemented	  and	  points	   requiring	  revision	   are	   to	  be	  revised’.646 	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  
that	  the	  momentum	  for	  constitutional	  reform,	  however,	  remained	  low	  between	  2009	  -­‐	  
2012,	   as	   the	  DPJ	  remained	   focused	   on	  other	  political	   objectives.647 	   Additionally,	   the	  
DPJ’s	  junior	  coalition	  partner,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party,	  ﬁrmly	  opposed	  revisions	  to	  
Article	  9.	  648	  
The	  loosening	  of	  JSDF	  restrictions	  and	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  alliance	  
that	  occurred	  under	  Koizumi,	  and	  continued	  under	  Abe,	  formed	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  
strategy	  of	  social	  mobility.	  Although	  the	  LDP	  was	  out	   of	  power	  between	  2009	  -­‐	  2012,	  
the	  DPJ	  did	  not	   reverse	  this	  trend.	   In	  some	  regards,	  DPJ	  policies	   reinforced	  those	  of	  
the	  LDP.	  For	  example,	  the	  DPJ	  maintained	  the	  anti-­‐piracy	  eﬀorts	  initiated	  by	  the	  LDP.	  
Japan	   has	   taken	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   combating	   international	   piracy,	   resulting	   in	   the	  
establishment	   of	   a	   JSDF	   base	   in	   Djibouti.	   The	   base	   was	   completed	   in	   2011	   and	  
constitutes	  the	  ﬁrst	  overseas	   base	  of	  operations	   since	   the	  passing	  of	  Japan’s	  postwar	  
constitution.649	  
	   While	   the	   DPJ’s	   overarching	   strategy	   focused	   heavily	   on	   domestic	  economic	  
and	  social	  considerations,	  the	  party	  also	  sought	  to	  improve	  Japan’s	  security	  posture	  by	  
redeﬁning	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   US-­‐Japanese	   alliance	   and	   expanding	   Japan’s	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commitment	  to	   international	  peace.650 	  Although	  the	  DPJ	  may	   favor	  diﬀerent	  policies	  
than	  the	  LDP,	  such	  measures	  are	  further	  evidence	  of	  normalization	  via	  social	  mobility.	  
That	   is	   to	   say,	  both	  parties	  are	  concerned	  with	  regional	   security	  measures	   that	   exist	  
well	  beyond	  the	  low	  diplomatic	  proﬁle	  that	  deﬁned	  the	  social	  creativity	  of	  the	  Yoshida	  
Doctrine.	   Furthermore,	   as	   Kenji	   E.	   Kushida	   and	   Phillip	   Y.	   Lipscy	   have	   noted,	  
‘international	   structural	   constraints—particularly	   regional	   threats	   and	   Japan’s	  
continuing	   reliance	   on	   the	   United	   States	   for	   security—forced	   the	   DPJ	   to	   quickly	  
abandon	  its	  plans	  to	  diﬀerentiate	  itself	  from	  the	  LDP’.651	  
	   In	   April	   2012,	   the	   LDP	   presented	   a	   draft	   proposal	   designed	   to	   ‘make	   the	  
Constitution	  more	  suitable	   for	  Japan’.652 	  The	  revised	  draft	   reduced	   the	  provisions	   of	  
Article	  9	  that	  prohibit	   the	  maintenance	  and	  use	  of	  armed	  forces,	  and	  modiﬁed	  Article	  
96	   to	   lower	   the	   voting	   requirements	   for	   constitutional	   amendments	   to	   a	   simple	  
majority	   of	  both	   houses	   of	   the	  Diet	   (currently,	   a	   two-­‐thirds	   majority	   is	   needed).653	  
Since	  his	   return	   to	   the	   prime	  ministership	   in	  December	  2012,	   Abe	  has	   revisited	   the	  
issue	   of	   Article	   9.	   Over	   the	   past	   several	   months,	   Abe	   has	   announced	   new	  
interpretations	   of	   the	   constitution	   to	   enable	   Japan	   to	   participate	   in	   collective	   self-­‐
defense.	  Abe’s	   interpretation	  will	   allow	   Japan	   to	   exercise	  the	  use	   of	   force	   should	   its	  
allies	   come	   under	   attack.	   The	   controversial	   move	   represents	   a	   dramatic	   shift	   away	  
from	  the	  restrictions	  codiﬁed	  in	  Article	  9.654	  Additional	  evidence	  of	  the	  ongoing	  shift	  
towards	   social	   mobility	   can	   be	   witnessed	   by	   Japan’s	   defense	   ministry	   recently	  
requesting	  a	  budget	  of	  ¥5.05	  trillion	  ($48.7	  billion),	  marking	  the	  third	  straight	  year	  of	  
budget	  increases	  after	  almost	  a	  decade	  of	  cutbacks.655	  The	  increase	  returns	  the	  military	  
budget	   to	   a	   level	   comparable	   with	   that	   of	   the	   Koizumi	   administration	   during	   the	  
mid-­‐2000s.	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   The	  debate	  surrounding	   constitutional	   reform	   clariﬁes	  the	   future	  direction	   of	  
Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	   Koizumi	   pushed	   Japan	   towards	   social	   mobility,	   but	   full	  
normalization	  is	  restricted	  by	  Article	  9.	  The	  divide	  between	  LDP	  and	  DPJ	  approaches	  
to	   constitutional	   reform	   highlights	   the	   contentiousness	   of	   the	   issue.	   Nonetheless,	  
there	   is	   considerable	   support	   for	   some	   level	   of	   constitutional	   reform	   within	   both	  
parties.656 	   While	   political	   competition	   between	   the	   two	   parties	   exacerbates	   their	  
diﬀerences,	  when	   considering	   the	   overall	   picture	  of	  the	   Japanese	  polity,	   there	  exists	  
considerable	  ideological	  overlap.	  
	   Richard	  J.	  Samuels	  distinguishes	  four	  distinct	  groups	  within	  the	  normalization	  
debate.	   The	   four	   groups	   are:	   (1)	   the	   paciﬁsts	   who	   outright	   reject	   the	   military	  
institution	   and	   embrace	   unarmed	   neutrality;	   (2)	   the	  middle	   power	   internationalists	  
who	  believe	  ‘Japan	  must	  remain	  a	  small	  power	  with	  self-­‐imposed	  limits	  on	  its	  right	   to	  
belligerency’;	   (3)	   the	   neoautonomists	   who	   desire	   ‘an	   independent,	   full-­‐spectrum	  
Japanese	  military	   that	   could	   use	   force’;	   and	   (4)	   the	   normal	   nation-­‐alists	   who	   favor	  
normality	  and	  ‘wish	  Japan	  to	  become	  a	  great	  power’	  and	  to	  ‘step	  onto	  the	  international	  
stage	   as	   an	   equal	   of	   the	  United	  States’.657 	   These	   four	   groups	  are	  divided	   along	   two	  
crucial	  variables,	  the	  use	  of	  force	   in	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  alliance.658	  By	  
applying	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	   Samuels’	   conclusions	  and	  renaming	  some	  of	  
Samuels’	   groupings	  to	   ﬁt	  with	  the	  oﬀered	  analysis,	   the	  trajectory	  of	   Japanese	  foreign	  
policy	   comes	   into	   focus.	   Table	   7.7	   is	   derived	   from	   a	   similar	   graphic	   presented	   by	  
Samuels.	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  Ibid.	  
Normal	  Use	  of	  Force
Revise	  Article	  9
Enhance	  Sovereignty	  
by	  distancing	  from	  US
Nationalists	   Normalists
Enhance	  Power	  by	  
strengthening	  ties	  
with	  America.
Revise	  constitution	  to	  
contribute	  to	  
international	  peace.
Social	  Competition	  by	  not	  directly	  
challenging	  to	  America	  but	  rejection	  
of	  American	  hegemony.	  Utilizes	  
nationalist	  rhetoric.	  Revisionist	  
views	  of	  history.	  Politically	  limited.
Social	  Mobility	  by	  improving	  
position	  within	  group	  of	  American	  
allies.	  Seeks	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  
with	  power	  capabilities.	  Championed	  
by	  Koizumi	  and	  Abe	  as	  LDP	  leaders.
Paciﬁsts Mercantilists	  
Social	  Creativity	  through	  ideology.	  
Negative	  views	  of	  history.	  Minority	  
group	  seeking	  to	  improve	  
sovereignty	  through	  economic	  and	  
social	  prosperity.	  Politically	  limited	  
to	  NGOs	  and	  minor	  political	  groups.
Ambiguous.	  Social	  Creativity	  
through	  prosperity	  but	  limited	  by	  
stagnant	  economy.	  Social	  Mobility	  
through	  security	  commitment	  to	  in	  
international	  peace.	  	  Some	  
representation	  in	  DPJ.
Restrict	  Use	  of	  Force
Table	  7.7	  :	  Political	  Groups	  within	  Contemporary	  Japan
	   This	  representation	  also	   accounts	  for	  the	  ongoing	  struggle	  between	  enhancing	  
national	  power	  and	  reaﬃrming	  sovereignty	   that	   has	  continually	  resurfaced	  since	  the	  
encroachment	   of	   Western	   imperialist	   powers	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	  
Consequently,	   the	   neoclassical	   realist	   core	   concepts	   of	   statehood	   discussed	  
throughout	   this	  thesis	  are	  combined	  with	  the	  constructivist	  self-­‐other	  divide	  between	  
political	  groups	  and	  SIT	  strategies	  of	  status	  seeking	  behavior.	   	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  
the	   mercantilist	   group	   possesses	   an	   ambiguous	   strategy	   resulting	   from	   the	  
inoperability	  of	  pure	  social	  creativity	  amid	  Japan’s	  economic	  struggles.
	   Despite	  diﬀerences	  in	  their	  political	  platforms,	  and	  variations	  regarding	  Japan’s	  
commitment	   to	   international	   peace,	   there	   is	   widespread	   support	   for	   both	   the	   US-­‐
Japanese	   alliance	   and	   considerable	   interest	   for	   reﬁning	   the	   Japanese	   constitution	  
within	  the	  LDP	  and	  DPJ.	  Resultantly,	   the	  push	  towards	  social	  mobility	  that	  began	  in	  
the	   mid-­‐2000s	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   reversed	   without	   a	   dramatic	   realignment	   of	   the	  
political	  discourse	  in	  Japan.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  supported	  by	  several	  informative	  texts,	  
such	   as	   the	  works	  of	  Kenneth	   Pyle	   and	   Christopher	  W.	  Hughes.659 	  While	  Article	  9	  
inhibits	   social	  mobility	   from	  being	   fully	   institutionalized	  within	   the	  Japanese	  polity,	  
the	   recent	   measures	   adopted	   by	   Abe	   have	   reinforced	   the	   LDP	   strategy	   of	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659	  Hughes	  2004;	  Hughes	  2009;	  Pyle	  2007
circumventing	   constitutional	   limitations	  and	  pursing	  social	  mobility	  without	  directly	  
addressing	  Article	  9.	  
	   When	  considering	  the	  alternatives	  available	  to	   Japan,	  it	   is	  unlikely	  that	   a	  new	  
strategy	   will	   materialize	   to	   supplant	   social	   mobility.	   	   Japan	   does	   not	   possess	   the	  
material	   power	   nor	   political	   will	   to	   rebuﬀ	   their	   ties	   to	   the	   American-­‐led	   power	  
hierarchy,	   thus	   eliminating	   a	   possible	   strategy	   of	   social	   competition	   (nationalist	  
strategy).	  Similarly,	  with	  Japan’s	  two	  major	  political	  parties	  placing	  a	  high	  value	  on	  the	  
US-­‐Japanese	  alliance	  and	  the	   Japanese	   economy	   no	   longer	  uniquely	  positioned	  as	   it	  
was	  before	  the	  asset	  bubble	  crash,	  there	  are	  few	  avenues	  for	  establishing	  a	  strategy	  of	  
social	   creativity	  (mercantilist	  and	  paciﬁst	  strategy).	  The	  potential	   for	  social	   creativity	  
through	   multilateral	   institutionalism	   is	   a	   possibility.	   However,	   the	   organizations	  
powerful	   enough	   to	   facilitate	   this	   option	   are	   also	   heavily	   dominated	   by	   America,	  
further	  binding	   Japan	   to	   its	   longstanding	  alliance	   partner.	   Should	  America	  maintain	  
its	   record	   of	   international	   security	   operations,	   which	  necessitates	  military	  ﬂexibility	  
from	   it	   allies,	   Japanese	   leaders	   will	   be	   further	   conditioned	   towards	   normalization.	  
Ultimately,	   Japan	  has	  few	  options	  beyond	  maintaining	  social	  mobility.	  Constitutional	  
revisions	  or	  further	  circumventive	  measures	  are	   likely	   to	  materialize	  as	  the	  direction	  
set	  by	  Koizumi	  and	  Abe	  becomes	  a	  more	  permanent	   fixture	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy.	  
Figure	  7.8	   visualizes	  this	  approach.	  Note	  that	  although	  some	  ambiguity	  will	  remain	  until	  
Article	  9	  is	  revised	  or	  completely	  disregarded,	  the	  normalist	  group	  has	  supplanted	  the	  





















Social	  Mobility.	  LDP	  measures	  have	  greatly	  
eroded	  the	  eﬀectiveness	  of	  Article	  9.	  
Negligible	  resistance	  oﬀered	  by	  opposition	  
parties.	  Normalization	  becoming	  more	  




Table	  7.8	  :	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Policy	  (2001	  -­‐	  2014)
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7.7	  Surging	  Towards	  Social	  Mobility
This	   chapter	  detailed	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   from	   the	   1970s	   until	   the	   present.	   The	  
framework	   of	   this	   thesis	   was	   utilized	   to	   identify	   and	   analyze	   the	   variables	   driving	  
Japan’s	   policy	   options.	   Theoretical	   consistency	   is	   necessary,	   as	   this	   chapter	   deals	  
heavily	   with	   yet	   unresolved	   aspects	   of	   Japan’s	   policy	   evolution.	   The	   following	  
conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  by	  revisiting	  the	  research	  questions:	  
1. How	   have	   concerns	   over	   national	   security	   and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	  
international	  system	  inﬂuenced	  the	  dramatic	  shifts	  in	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy?
	  	  	   • Throughout	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   Japanese	   leaders	  maintained	   the	  
social	  creativity	  of	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine.	  Nevertheless,	  external	  pressures	  arising	  
from	  Middle	  Eastern	   instability	  and	   the	  Sino-­‐American	   rapprochement	   forced	  
Japanese	  leaders	  to	  reﬁne	  their	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  A	  low	  diplomatic	  proﬁle	  
persisted,	  but	   Japan’s	  vulnerability	  to	  external	  pressures	  conditioned	  its	  leaders	  
towards	  a	  more	  assertive	  foreign	  policy	  stance.	   This	  assertiveness	  materialized	  
in	   the	   1980s	   under	   Nakasone,	   who	   sought	   to	   enhance	   Japan’s	   international	  
position	  through	   security	   objectives	  that	   diverged	   from	   the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine.	  
Although	  Nakasone	  was	  unable	  to	  shift	  Japan	  away	  from	  its	  social	  creativity,	  his	  
eﬀorts	  set	  the	  direction	  for	  future	  strategy	  developments.
2. 	  How	  have	  these	  factors	  changed	  with	  time?	  	  
• The	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   fundamentally	   alternated	   the	   international	  
power	  hierarchy	   (from	   bipolarity	   to	   unipolarity).	   The	   conﬂuence	   of	   domestic	  
unrest	   following	  the	   crash	  of	  the	   Japanese	   asset	   bubble	   and	   Japan’s	   lackluster	  
response	  to	   the	  Gulf	  War	  undermined	  Japan’s	  position	  within	  the	  international	  
power	  hierarchy.	   	  Throughout	   the	  1990s	   Japan	  struggled	  to	   clarify	  its	   national	  
direction.	  As	  Japan’s	  once	  dominant	   economy	   faltered,	  social	   creativity	  ceased	  
to	  provide	  the	  power	  and	  prestige	  Japanese	  leaders	  desired.
• Following	   9/11,	   Koizumi	   pushed	   Japan	   towards	   social	   mobility	   through	  
normalization.	   Koizumi	   envisioned	   a	   Japan	   less	   deferent	   to	   the	   American	  
security	   guarantee	   and	   more	   participatory	   in	   assuring	   regional	   security.	   The	  
direction	   of	   social	   mobility	   established	   under	   Koizumi	   has	   been	   furthered	   by	  
Abe,	  but	  remains	  limited	  by	  Article	  9.	  The	  shift	  away	  from	  social	   creativity	  has	  
thus	   been	   gradual	   and	   is	   not	   entirely	   institutionalized	   within	   the	   Japanese	  
polity.	  Nonetheless,	  a	   review	  of	  the	  current	  debate	  surrounding	   constitutional	  
reform	  reveals	  that	  Japan	  is	  unlikely	  to	  diverge	  from	  social	  mobility	  without	  the	  
dramatic	  reorientation	  of	  the	  current	  political	  environment.	  
3. What	   ideological	   continuities	   exist	   between	  competing	   groups	  of	   Japanese	   political	  
elite	  from	  one	  historical	  period	  to	  the	  next?	  
• Two	   ideological	   camps	  are	  traced	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	  ﬁrst	  group	  embodied	  the	  
norms	   of	   the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine,	  which	  privileged	  a	   low	   diplomatic	  proﬁle	  and	  
economic	  growth.	  Within	  the	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy,	  this	  group	  remained	  
preeminent	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	  War.	   Aspects	   of	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	  
remain	   salient	   to	   the	   political	   discourse	   in	   Japan,	   particularly	   the	   debate	  
surrounding	   Article	   9.	   The	   second	   group	   of	   normalists	   emerged	   under	  
Nakasone,	   and	   rose	   to	   dominance	   through	   Koizumi’s	   push	   towards	   social	  
mobility.	  Normalist	  norms	  are	  currently	  being	  reinforced	  by	  Abe	  ongoing	  eﬀorts	  
to	   reinterpret	  Article	  9.	  While	  some	  ambiguity	  persists	  within	  Japan’s	  domestic	  
identity	  hierarchy,	   not	   even	   the	  DPJ	  has	  labored	  to	   reverse	   this	   trend	  towards	  
normalization,	   suggesting	   that	   Article	   9	  will	   either	   be	   revised	   or	   completely	  
disregarded	  to	  accommodate	  Japan’s	  socially	  mobile	  foreign	  policy	  trajectory.
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Conclusions
The	  Trajectory	  of	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Policy
DDH-­‐181	  JDS	  Hyuga	  of	  the	  Japan	  Maritime	  Self-­‐Defense	  Force
Contemporary	   Japan	   possesses	   all	   the	   qualities	   of	   a	  great	   power.	   It	  wields	   the	  third	  
largest	   economy	   in	   the	   world,	   features	   highly	   developed	   social	   and	   political	  
institutions,	  and	  is	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  technological	  advancement.	  Yet	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
crafting	   foreign	  policy,	   the	  options	  available	  to	   Japanese	  leaders	  are	  greatly	  restricted	  
by	   Article	   9,	   which	   prohibits	   the	   use	   of	   force	   as	   an	   instrument	   for	   settling	  
international	  disputes.	  Even	  more	  unusual	   is	   that	   for	  a	  state	  with	  wide-­‐ranging	   legal	  
limits	   on	   the	   legitimate	   use	   of	   force,	   Japan	   possess	   one	   of	   the	  most	   advanced	   and	  
powerful	  militaries	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  addition	  to	  Japan’s	  own	  high	  level	  of	  technological	  
development	   and	   economic	   capabilities,	   the	   JSDF’s	   close	   integration	   with	   the	  
American	  military	  has	  signiﬁcantly	  bolstered	  Japan’s	  military	  capability.
	   While	   the	   JSDF	   is	   equipped	   and	   often	   times	   functions	   as	   a	   conventional	  
military	   force,	   it	   remains	   legally	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   police,	   serving	   theoretically	   to	  
only	   bolster	   domestic	   security.	   This	   restriction	   hinders	   Japan’s	   ability	   to	   act	  
independently	   of	   America,	   limits	   its	   contributions	   to	   regional	   and	   international	  
security,	  and	  jeopardizes	  it	  position	  within	  international	   institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  UN.	  
In	   recent	   decades,	   Prime	   Ministers	   Koizumi	   and	   Abe	   have	   introduced	   policies	   to	  
signiﬁcantly	   reduce	   the	   scope	   of	   Article	   9.	   	   While	   these	  measures	   have	   improved	  
Japan’s	  security	  posture,	  full	  normalization	  remains	  hindered	  by	  the	  paciﬁst	  elements	  
of	  Japan’s	  constitution.
	   Japan’s	   history	   is	   similarly	   riddled	   with	   ambiguities	   arising	   from	   seemingly	  
irreconcilable	   shifts	   in	   its	   foreign	   policy	   strategy.	   The	   encroachment	   of	   Western	  
powers	   into	   East	   Asia	   undermined	   Japan’s	   centuries	   of	   self-­‐imposed	   isolation,	  
requiring	  Japanese	  leaders	  to	  quickly	  adapt	  to	  the	  international	  system	  of	  the	  ninetieth	  
century.	  Within	  only	  a	  few	  decades,	   Japan	  had	  successfully	  modernized,	  and	  utilized	  
its	   newfound	   political	   and	  military	   strength	   to	   reverse	   the	   unequal	   treaties	   it	   was	  
coerced	  into	  signing.	  The	  emergence	  of	  Japan	  as	  a	  great	  power	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  
military	  and	  economic	  prowess	  of	  the	  Western	  powers	  was	  a	  result	  of	  technological	  
advancement	  and	  not	   of	  cultural	   superiority,	  thus	  providing	  peripheral	   states,	  which	  
had	  been	  similarly	  marginalized,	  a	  successful	  state	  model	  that	  could	  be	  emulated.	  Yet	  
the	   deleterious	   consequences	   of	   Japanese	   militarism	   left	   another	   equally	   indelible	  
impact	   on	   the	   region.	   The	   historical	   legacy	  of	   Japan’s	   occupation	  of	  Taiwan,	  Korea,	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Manchuria,	   its	   invasion	   of	   China,	   and	   war	   of	   aggression	   against	   the	   Allied	   powers	  
remains	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  that	  often	  threatens	  regional	  stability.
	   Unraveling	  the	  mechanisms	  behind	  the	  foreign	  policy	  output	  of	  any	  state	  is	  a	  
challenge	  at	  the	  best	  of	  times.	  For	  a	  state	  like	  Japan	  -­‐	  whose	  policy	  history	  has	  shifted	  
from	   isolationist	   to	   expansionist,	   from	   expansionist	   to	   militarist,	   from	   militarist	   to	  
mercantilist,	   and	   from	   mercantilist	   to	   the	   political	   enigma	   Japan	   is	   today	   -­‐	   this	  
challenge	   can	   be	   outright	   daunting.	   With	   any	   body	   of	   research,	   certain	   calculated	  
choices	   are	  made.	   These	   decisions	   determine	  which	   case	   studies	   are	  examined,	   the	  
literature	  utilized,	  and	  the	  framework	  deployed.	  Within	  a	  discipline	  as	  far	  reaching	  as	  
international	  relations,	  these	  decisions	  are	  sometimes	  complemented	  and	  often	  times	  
contradicted	  by	  other	  researchers,	  who	   themselves	  must	  place	  limits	  upon	   the	  scope	  
of	   their	   research.	   Resultantly,	   certain	   problematics	  persist.	   State-­‐centric	   analyses	   of	  
foreign	  policy	  trends	  too	  often	  truncate	  history	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  excising	  inconvenient	  
or	   ambiguous	   periods	   in	   a	   state’s	   historical	   evolution.	   So	   too	   are	   cultural	   norms	  
frequently	  ignored	   in	  pursuit	   of	  theoretical	  parsimony,	   or	  if	   the	  pendulum	  swings	  in	  
the	   opposite	   direction,	   cultural	   uniqueness	   is	   conveniently	   employed	   to	   counter	  
theoretical	  shortcomings.
	   To	   forestal	   these	   limitations,	   this	   thesis	   developed	   a	   unique	   theoretical	  
framework.	  Neoclassical	   realism	   and	  constructivism	   were	  ﬁrst	   combined	   to	   broaden	  
each	  theory’s	  range	  of	  analysis.	  In	  addition	  to	  providing	  a	  basis	  for	  engaging	  with	  the	  
core	  neoclassical	  realist	  assumptions	  of	  statehood,	  neoclassical	  realism	  contends	  that	  
the	  perception	  of	  political	  leaders	  must	  be	  considered	  when	  analyzing	  a	  state’s	  foreign	  
policy	   output.	   	   Constructivism	   oﬀers	   insights	   into	   the	   norms	   and	   identities	   that	  
determine	   how	   the	   perception	   of	   state	   elites	   is	   formed.	   The	   relationship	   between	  
neoclassical	   realism	   and	   constructivism	   is	   thus	   complementary,	   with	   neoclassical	  
realist	   assumptions	  regarding	   inter-­‐state	   relations	   forming	  a	   foundation	   upon	  which	  
ideational	  factors	  can	  be	  engaged.	  Although	  this	  amalgamated	  approach	  considerably	  
furthered	   the	   existing	   scholarship	   of	   both	   theoretical	   traditions,	   when	   considering	  
how	   subjective	   factors	   (such	   as	   the	   perception	   of	  state	   elites)	   translate	   into	   foreign	  
policy	  strategies,	  it	  proved	  necessary	  to	  draw	  upon	  additional	  analytical	  tools.	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   The	   incorporation	   of	   SIT	   expands	   the	   analytical	   capacity	   of	   this	   neoclassical	  
realist-­‐constructivist	  hybridization.	  SIT	  examines	  how	  perception,	  identity,	  and	  norms	  
translate	  into	  group	  behavior.	  When	  applied	  to	   international	  relations,	  SIT	  provides	  a	  
useful	   mechanism	   for	   conceptualizing	   foreign	   policy	   strategies	   and	   identifying	   the	  
constraints	  acting	  upon	  state	  elites.	  SIT	  thereby	  presents	  a	  focused	  analytical	  lens	  that	  
employs	   social	   psychology	  to	   clarify	  the	   interplay	  of	   international	   relations	  concepts.	  
While	  SIT	  has	  been	  used	  to	  a	  limited	  degree	  within	  international	  relations,	  this	  thesis	  
dramatically	  expands	   the	  current	   literature	   through	   its	   application	  of	  SIT	   to	   foreign	  
policy	  analysis	  and	  Japanese	  history.
	   By	   tracing	   the	   aforementioned	   theoretical	   elements	   over	   a	   broad	   historical	  
timeframe,	   this	   thesis	   forwards	   a	   multilevel	   framework	   that	   accounts	   for	   both	   the	  
international	   and	   domestic	   factors	   that	   shape	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   designates	  useful	  
terminology	  for	  deﬁning	  foreign	  policy	  strategies.	  This	  framework	  is	  distinctive	  in	  that	  
it	   remains	   theoretically	   parsimonious	  while	   accounting	   for	   the	  often	  misinterpreted	  
shifts	   in	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   strategies.	   By	   applying	   contemporary	   international	  
relations	   interpretations	   of	   key	   variables	   (e.g.	   power,	   sovereignty,	   and	   norms)	   to	  
historical	   events	   that	   pre-­‐date	   the	  very	  emergence	   of	   the	  discipline,	   this	   thesis	   has	  
arrived	  at	  several	  far	  ranging	  empirical	  conclusions.	  
	   The	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis	  -­‐	  How	  have	  concerns	  over	  national	  security	  
and	   other	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	   international	   system	   inﬂuenced	   the	   dramatic	  
shifts	   in	   modern	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy?	   How	   have	   these	   factors	   changed	   with	   time?	  
What	  ideological	  continuities	  exist	  between	  competing	  groups	  of	  Japanese	  political	  elite	  
from	  one	   historical	   period	   to	   the	   next?	   -­‐	  necessitated	   a	  broad,	   longitudinal	   historical	  
survey.	  To	  facilitate	  a	  comprehensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  noted	  theoretical	  components,	  
and	   to	   engage	   fully	   with	   the	   research	   questions,	   each	   of	   the	   preceding	   empirical	  
chapters	   is	  bound	   to	   a	   speciﬁc	  time	  period.	  With	   the	  conclusions	  of	   these	   chapters	  
already	  presented,	  it	  is	  now	  possible	  to	  unravel	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  continuities	  that	  have	  
been	  observed.	  
	   Three	   historical	   and	   one	   contemporary	   (ongoing)	   shift	   in	   modern	   Japan’s	  
foreign	   policy	   evolution	   are	   discussed.	   These	   are:	   (1)	   the	   severing	   of	   historical	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isolationism	   and	  embracing	  of	   social	   mobility	   through	   imperialism	   during	   the	  Meiji	  
Restoration;	   (2)	   the	   turn	   from	   social	   mobility	   to	   social	   competition	   that	   coincided	  
with	  a	  revisionist	  Japan	  in	  the	  1930s;	  (3)	  the	  postwar	  development	   of	  social	   creativity	  
embodied	  in	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine;	  and	  (4)	  the	  ongoing	  push	  towards	  social	  mobility	  
catalyzed	  by	  Koizumi	  and	  furthered	  by	  Abe.	  
	   The	   arrival	   of	  the	  Western	   imperialist	   powers	   during	   the	  nineteenth	   century	  
was	  a	  systemic	  shock	  that	  undermined	  centuries	  of	  Sino-­‐centric	  regional	  hierarchy.	  As	  
Japanese	   leaders	   scrambled	   to	   fortify	   Japan	   against	   gunboat	   diplomacy,	   numerous	  
political	   groups	   emerged.	   Confrontation	   between	   these	   groups	   played	   out	   over	   the	  
next	   several	   decades,	  until	   a	   consensus	   formed	  around	  pro-­‐modernization	  and	   pro-­‐
restoration	  norms	  following	  the	  Satsuma-­‐Chōshū	  victory	  during	  the	  Boshin	  War.	  The	  
internal	   and	   external	   constraints	   that	   embodied	   these	  competing	   identities	  must	  be	  
contextualized.	  The	  external	   challenges	   to	   Japan’s	   isolation,	   its	  unequal	   treaties	  with	  
the	  West,	   and	  the	   internal	   political	   struggle	   resulting	   from	   Western	   encroachment,	  
pushed	   Japan	   towards	   social	   mobility	   through	   modernization.	   Japanese	   leaders	  
believed	  that	  by	  emulating	  the	  successful	  practices	  of	  the	  imperialist	  Western	  powers,	  
Japan	   would	   gain	   the	   necessary	   state	   power	   and	   political	   traction	   to	   reaﬃrm	   its	  
compromised	  sovereignty.	  Understanding	   the	  historical	   context	  of	   Japan’s	  transition	  
from	  isolation	  to	  an	  outward	  looking	  state	  preoccupied	  with	  sovereignty	  and	  power	  is	  
essential,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  ﬁlter	  though	  which	  future	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  were	  crafted.
	   By	  the	   early	  twentieth	  century,	  Japan	  had	  metamorphosed	   into	   an	  imperialist	  
global	   power.	   Through	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	   mobility	   that	   hinged	   upon	   rapid	  
modernization,	   Japanese	   leaders	   quickly	   reached	   a	   level	   of	   parity	  with	   the	  Western	  
powers,	  and	  shifted	  the	  nucleus	  of	  East	  Asian	  power	  politics	  to	  center	  on	  Japan.	  This	  
elevated	   Japan’s	   position	   within	   the	   international	   power	   hierarchy,	   aﬀording	   the	  
necessary	  political	   capital	   to	   reverse	  the	   unequal	   treaties	   and	  forge	   an	   alliance	  with	  
Britain.	  Having	   reclaimed	   its	   compromised	   sovereignty,	   Japanese	   state	   elites	   turned	  
their	  attention	  toward	  overseas	  territorial	  acquisition.	  Given	  the	  imperialist	  norms	  of	  
the	   period,	   this	   approach	   constituted	   a	   primary	   means	   of	   enhancing	   state	   power	  
through	  social	  mobility.	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   The	  aftermath	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  era	  of	  internationalism	  
and	  created	  considerable	  ambiguity	  regarding	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  
policy.	   Japan	   initially	   experimented	   with	   both	   imperialist	   and	   internationalist	  
approaches	   to	   foreign	   policy.	   Yet	   rising	   domestic	   opposition,	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  
Versailles-­‐Washington	   System,	   and	   the	   conspiring	   of	   the	   Kwantung	   Army	   in	  
Manchuria	  restricted	  the	  foreign	  policy	  options	  of	  the	  Japanese	  government.	  Japanese	  
leaders	   ultimately	   maintained	   their	   commitment	   to	   imperialist	   norms,	   thereby	  
rejecting	   the	   global	   trends	   of	   the	   international	   system.	   Although	   Japan	   maintained	  
ideological	   consistency	   with	   regard	   to	   norms,	   its	   persistent	   imperialist	   outlook	  
isolated	  it	  from	  its	  allies,	  and	  represents	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  social	  mobility.	  
	  
	   The	   rising	   inﬂuence	  of	   the	  military	  and	  swelling	  nationalism	   transformed	  the	  
established	   imperialist	   norms	   into	   those	   of	   overt	   militarism.	   From	   the	   Mukden	  
Incident	   of	   1931	   until	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   Paciﬁc	  War	   in	   1945,	   Japan	   practiced	   a	  
socially	  competitive	  foreign	  policy	  that	   challenged	   the	  Western-­‐centric	  international	  
power	  hierarchy.	  Appropriately	  framing	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  status	  quo	  to	  revisionist	  
power	  (from	   social	  mobility	  to	  social	   competition)	   requires	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  
of	   international	   norms,	   the	   changing	   external	   constraints,	   and	   the	   established	  
preoccupation	   with	   power	   and	   sovereignty	   borne	   out	   of	   the	   Western	   imperial	  
encroachment.	  Such	  nuance	  is	  often	   	  lost	  by	  literature	  that	   hints	  at	  Japan’s	  militarist	  
past	   without	   contextualizing	   certain	   historical	   continuities.	   While	   not	   seeking	   to	  
downplay	   the	   numerous	   atrocities	   committed	   by	   the	   Imperial	   military,	   it	   must	   be	  
noted	   that	   Japan	   maintained	   ideological	   consistency	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   imperialist	  
norms	  that	  had	  deﬁned	  the	  geopolitics	  of	  the	  previous	  decades.	  
	   The	  Allied	  occupation	  in	  1945	  once	  again	  undermined	  Japanese	  sovereignty	  and	  
precipitated	   the	   third	   policy	   shift.	   Occupation	   forces	   purged	   the	   majority	   of	   the	  
militarist	   political	   elements	   within	   the	   Japanese	   government,	   facilitating	   the	   rise	   of	  
more	   diplomatically	   minded	   leaders.	   While	   the	   occupation	   did	   initially	   coerce	   the	  
Japanese	  elite	   towards	   a	   paciﬁst	   foreign	   policy	   under	   the	  postwar	   constitution,	   the	  
rising	   tensions	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   prompted	   the	   American	   government	   to	   pressure	  
Japanese	   leaders	   towards	   a	  more	   traditional	   security	  posture.	   Nevertheless,	   Yoshida	  
and	   his	   successors	   utilized	   Article	   9	   to	   resist	   the	   external	   pressure	   to	   rebuild	   the	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Japanese	  military,	  and	  opted	  to	  maintain	  a	  low	  diplomatic	  proﬁle	  while	  rebuilding	  the	  
Japanese	   economy.	   The	   foreign	   policy	   of	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   must	   therefore	   be	  
interpreted	   as	   a	   socially	   creative	   strategy	   that	   deﬁned	   new	   parameters	   for	   gauging	  
prestige	  and	  power	  within	  an	  international	   system	  driven	  by	  the	  strategic	  interests	  of	  
the	  Cold	  War.
	   Notably,	   this	   strategy	  was	   not	   simply	   one	  of	   paciﬁsm,	   as	   suggested	   by	   texts	  
attempting	  to	  link	  the	  current	  anti-­‐war	  sentiment	  within	  the	  Japanese	  public	  with	  the	  
postwar	  paciﬁst	  moment.	  While	  Yoshida	  and	  many	  of	  his	  contemporaries	  expressed	  a	  
aversion	   for	   war,	   which	   coincided	   with	   the	   palpable	   war	   exhaustion	   prevalent	   in	  
postwar	  Japan,	  the	  Yoshida	  Doctrine	  was	  designed	  to	  increase	  Japan’s	  national	  power.	  
As	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   negotiations	   between	   Dulles	   and	   Yoshida,	   Japanese	   leaders	  
skillfully	  navigated	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  the	  emerging	  bipolarity	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  
rebuild	   the	   Japanese	   infrastructure	   and	   strengthen	   Japan’s	   national	   power	   through	  
economic	  norms.	  
	   This	  distinction	  might	  appear	  minor	  at	  ﬁrst,	  but	  the	  historical	  context	  through	  
which	   the	   Yoshida	   Doctrine	   emerged	   must	   be	   considered.	   In	   each	   case	   study	  
examined,	  state	  elites	  balanced	  the	  trade-­‐oﬀs	  of	  bolstering	  state	  power	  and	  fortifying	  
sovereignty.	   During	   the	   early	   Meiji	   period	   it	   suited	   Japan’s	   leaders	   to	   temporarily	  
accept	   the	   loss	   of	   sovereignty	   resulting	   from	   the	   unequal	   treaties,	   while	   they	  
endeavored	   to	   strengthen	   Japan’s	   national	   power.	   In	   the	   postwar	   period,	   Japanese	  
leaders	  similarly	  utilized	  losses	  of	  sovereignty	  -­‐	  those	  resulting	  from	  Allied	  occupation,	  
the	   paciﬁst	   constitution	   (which	   was	   heavily	   inﬂuenced	   by	   the	   Allies),	   and	   the	  
American	   security	   guarantee	   -­‐	   to	   oﬄoad	   the	   ﬁnancial	   burden	   of	   Japan’s	   national	  
security.	   This	   approach	   enabled	   Japanese	   elites	   to	   direct	   their	   eﬀorts	   towards	  
enhancing	  state	  power	  through	  economic	  growth.	  As	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  matured,	  
normalist	  leaders	  like	  Nakasone	  attempted	  to	  reclaim	  aspects	  of	  Japan’s	  sovereignty	  by	  
rebalancing	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  alliance	  and	  pushing	  for	  autonomous	  defense.
	   Japan’s	  strategy	  of	  social	   creativity	  reached	  the	  height	  of	  its	  success	  just	   as	  the	  
Cold	  War	  ended.	   Possessing	   the	   second	   largest	   economy	  in	   the	  world	  and	   removed	  
from	  the	  rampant	  military	  spending	  of	  Cold	  War	  power	  politics,	  many	  looked	  to	  Japan	  
Conclusions:	  The	  Trajectory	  of	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  247
as	   a	   model	   state	   for	   the	   new	   international	   system.	   This	   optimism	   was	   short-­‐lived,	  
however,	  as	  the	  crash	  of	  the	  Japanese	  asset	  bubble	  and	  Japan’s	  lackluster	  response	  to	  
the	  Gulf	  War	  quickly	  undermined	  its	  international	  prestige	  and	  challenged	  its	  strategy	  
of	   social	   creativity.	   Throughout	   the	  1990s	   Japanese	   leaders	   struggled	   to	   clarify	   their	  
national	   direction,	   leading	   to	   a	   decade	   of	   relative	   policy	   ambiguity.	   Following	   9/11,	  
Koizumi	   and	   Abe	   pushed	   several	   pieces	   of	   landmark	   legislation	   through	   the	   Diet,	  
granting	   Japanese	   leaders	   unprecedented	   ﬂexibility	   in	   deploying	   the	   JSDF	   without	  
outright	  challenging	   Article	  9.	  The	  direction	   forged	  by	  Koizumi	   and	  Abe	  was	  one	  of	  
relative	   social	   mobility,	   where	   Japan	   sought	   to	   join	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   elite	   states	  by	  
participating	  in	  American	  security	  objectives	  without	  constitutional	  revision.	  A	  decade	  
later,	   no	   signiﬁcant	   counter	   to	   the	   LDP’s	   push	   towards	   social	   mobility	   has	   yet	  
emerged.	   In	   fact,	   since	   returning	   as	   prime	  minister,	   Abe	  has	   endeavored	   to	   further	  
distance	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy	  from	  the	  restrictions	  of	  Article	  9.
	   Tracing	  these	  shifts	  provides	  crucial	  insights	  into	   the	  processes	  through	  which	  
foreign	  policy	  emerges.	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy	  history	  demonstrates	  a	  consistent	  eﬀort	  
to	   strengthen	  state	   power	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	  regional	   powers	   and	  to	   reclaim	  or	  reaﬃrm	  
aspects	   of	   Japan’s	   national	   sovereignty.	   While	   neoclassical	   realism	   suggests	   such	  
characters	   are	  present	   for	  all	   states,	   understanding	   how	  the	  variables	   of	  power	  and	  
sovereignty	   are	   deﬁned	   requires	   a	   more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   domestic	   and	  
international	   norms.	   Constructivism	   reveals	   how	   ideational	   factors	   constrain	   and	  
inform	  the	  behavior	  of	  state	  elites,	  necessitating	  an	  analysis	  that	  distances	  itself	  from	  
the	   “black-­‐box”	   approach	   often	   forwarded	   by	   structuralist-­‐leaning	   theorists.	   Surely,	  
how	  power	  was	  conceptualized	  by	  Japanese	  imperialists	  during	  the	  1930s	  was	  radically	  
discordant	  with	  the	  mercantilist	  mindset	  of	  Japanese	  leaders	  during	  the	  1970s.	  
	   The	  core	  variables	  of	  statehood	  (power	  and	  sovereignty)	  and	  norms	  clarify	  part	  
of	   the	   process	   through	   which	   foreign	   policy	   emerges	   from	   the	   opaque	   shades	   of	  
history	   and	   state	   bureaucracy.	   Neither	   theory,	   even	   when	   combined,	   oﬀers	   a	  
comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  process	   through	  which	   foreign	  policy	   strategies	  
emerge.	   	  By	  introducing	   SIT,	   this	   thesis	  employs	  a	   new	  level	   of	   analysis	   that	   draws	  
upon	   the	   innate	   groupism	   that	   deﬁnes	   all	   aspects	   of	   social	   behavior.	   Japan’s	  
imperialist	  and	  militarist	  past,	  its	  postwar	  mercantilism,	  and	  its	  current	  move	  towards	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normalization	   materialized	   through	   the	   interconnectedness	   of	   history,	   perception,	  
norms,	  and	  external	  constraints.	  
	   This	   pattern	   of	   evaluating	   the	   external	   structure,	   considering	   the	   balance	  
between	  power	  and	  sovereignty,	  and	   identifying	  a	  referent	  group	  has	  been	  witnessed	  
through	   each	   historical	   period	   hereinbefore	   discussed.	   The	   arrival	   of	   the	   Western	  
powers	   in	   East	   Asia	   shifted	   regional	   power	   dynamics,	   forcing	   Japanese	   leaders	   to	  
evaluate	   the	   most	   eﬀective	   mechanisms	   for	   enhancing	   Japanese	   power	   and	  
sovereignty.	  Ultimately,	   Japan’s	   leaders	  settled	   on	   a	   strategy	   of	   social	  mobility,	   they	  
identiﬁed	   a	   relevant	   referent	   group	   in	   Britain,	   and	  modeled	   the	  new	   Japanese	  state	  
after	  the	  prevailing	  great	  powers	  of	  the	  day.	  Eventually	  the	  imperialist	  norms	  adopted	  
by	  Japanese	  leaders	  transformed	  into	  those	  of	  outright	  militarism,	  and	  Japan	  turned	  its	  
attention	   towards	   challenging	   the	   Western-­‐centric	   power	   hierarchy	   through	   social	  
competition.	  In	  the	  process,	  state	  elites	  identiﬁed	  the	  great	  powers	  of	  the	  day,	  namely	  
America	  and	  Britain,	  as	  the	  referent	  group	  they	  sought	  to	  displace.	  
	   Following	   the	   surrender	   of	   Imperial	   Japan,	   Japanese	   leaders	   faced	   a	   similar	  
choice	   in	  what	   direction	   to	   steer	  the	   Japanese	   state.	   In	   this	   instance,	   they	   chose	  to	  
rebuﬀ	   the	  external	   pressure	   to	   follow	   the	  American	  lead	   in	  containing	   communism.	  
Consequently,	   Japanese	  leaders	  opted	  for	  a	  strategy	  of	  social	  creativity,	  they	  elevated	  
their	  own	  state-­‐driven	  economic	  norms,	  and	  decided	  to	   self-­‐referentially	  deﬁne	  their	  
referent	   group.	   Currently,	   Japanese	   elites	   are	   actively	   sidestepping	   Article	   9	   in	   an	  
eﬀort	   to	   push	   normalization	   forward	   without	   forcing	   the	   issue	   of	   constitutional	  
reform.	  This	  approach	  enables	  a	  ﬂexible	  strategy	  of	  social	  mobility,	  allowing	  Japanese	  
leaders	   to	   support	   a	   great	   range	   of	   security	   initiatives,	   as	   is	   expected	   of	   America’s	  
junior	  alliance	  partners.	   In	  the	  context	  of	  SIT,	  these	  junior	  members	  serve	  as	  referent	  
groups	  for	  one	  another.	  	  By	  tracing	  these	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  conclusions	  over	  a	  
broad	  historical	  survey,	  this	  thesis	  oﬀers	  a	  clear	  and	  comprehensive	  picture	  of	  Japan’s	  
foreign	  policy	  evolution,	  as	  represented	  by	  Table	  8.1.












1633-­‐1804 Unipolar N/A • Traditionalists Self
Social	  Creativity.	  Policies	  of	  sakoku	  isolate	  Japan.	  





Social	  Creativity.	  Isolation	  maintained,	  but	  tenets	  
of	  sakoku	  challenged	  by	  arrival	  of	  Western	  powers.






Ambiguous.	  Western	  encroachment	  undermines	  
sakoku,	  domestic	  conﬂict	  over	  direction	  of	  Japan	  






Social	  Mobility.	  Westernization	  generally	  
accepted	  for	  short	  period	  before	  giving	  way	  to	  






Social	  Mobility.	  With	  modernization	  in	  full	  swing,	  
Japanese	  leaders	  shift	  focus	  from	  domestic	  to	  
international	  interests.








Social	  Mobility.	  Imperialist	  and	  internationalist	  
directions	  in	  FP	  explored.	  Considerable	  ambiguity	  
in	  dominant	  identity.	  Western	  powers	  not	  







Social	  Competition.	  Imperialist	  norms	  transform	  
in	  outright	  militarism	  that	  challenges	  the	  Western-­‐
centric	  hierarchical	  order.






Social	  Creativity.	  Article	  9	  utilized	  to	  oﬀ-­‐load	  
security	  costs	  onto	  America,	  aﬀording	  Japan	  








Social	  Creativity.	  Japan	  maintains	  its	  low	  
diplomatic	  proﬁle,	  but	  its	  growing	  economic	  
strength	  enhances	  its	  power	  and	  prestige.








N/A Ambiguous.	  Japan	  maintains	  its	  security	  
deference	  to	  America,	  but	  begins	  move	  away	  from	  














Social	  Mobility.	  LDP	  measures	  have	  greatly	  
eroded	  the	  eﬀectiveness	  of	  Article	  9.	  Negligible	  
resistance	  oﬀered	  by	  opposition	  parties.	  
Normalization	  becoming	  more	  widely	  




Table	  8.1:	  Tracing	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategies
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   It	   is	  only	  with	  this	  multileveled	  understanding	  of	  Japanese	  foreign	  policy,	  that	  
the	  contemporary	  constitutional	  debate	  facing	   Japanese	  leaders	  can	  be	  unpacked.	  By	  
retooling	  core	  international	  relations	  concepts	  within	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  SIT,	  this	  thesis	  
demonstrates	  a	  relatively	  consistent	   strategy	  of	   social	  mobility	  since	  the	  premiership	  
of	   Koizumi.	  Within	   the	  context	   of	  post-­‐9/11	   Japan,	   social	   mobility	   centers	   on	   Japan	  
utilizing	   a	   traditional	   military	   in	   a	   ‘normal’	   manner	   as	   expected	   from	   other	   great	  
powers,	  especially	  those	  allied	  with	  America.	  
	   This	  indirect	  approach	  to	  normalization	  forestalls	  the	  potential	  blowback	  from	  
outright	  revising	  Article	  9	  that	  may	  surface	  both	  domestically	  from	  paciﬁst	  segments	  
of	   the	  public,	   and	   from	   other	   regional	   powers,	   such	   as	  China	   or	   Korea,	   seeking	   to	  
hedge	   against	   Japanese	   inﬂuence.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   revision	   of	   the	   Japanese	  
constitution	   is	   oﬀ	   the	  table;	   for	  politicians	   like	  Abe	   it	   certainly	   is	  not.	   At	   the	  same	  
time,	   Abe	   and	   his	   supporters	   do	   not	   wish	   to	   undermine	   Japan’s	   security	   ties	   with	  
America,	  nor	  jeopardize	  the	  continuing	  expansion	  of	  JSDF	   responsibilities	  by	  pressing	  
too	   strongly	   for	   constitutional	   reform.	   When	   considering	   the	   wider	   landscape	   of	  
Japanese	  politics	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  Japan’s	  primary	  opposition	  party,	  the	  DPJ,	  has	  
done	  little	  to	   actively	  reverse	  the	  move	  toward	  normalization.	  Given	  that	   Japan’s	  two	  
major	   political	   parties	   are	   generally	   supportive	   of	   expanding	   Japan’s	   role	   in	  
international	  security,	  without	  a	  drastic	  reorientation	  of	  the	  political	  discourse	  within	  
Japan,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  this	  trend	  will	  be	  reversed.	  	  
As	  regional	  power	  dynamics	  continue	  to	  shift	   towards	  China,	  Japanese	  leaders	  
will	  be	  pressed	  to	  retain	  Japan’s	  regional	   power	  and	  address	  any	  perceived	  deﬁciency	  
in	  sovereignty	  that	  might	  inhibit	   eﬀorts	  to	  reinforce	  Japan’s	  regional	  position.	  Japan’s	  
strategy	  of	   social	   mobility	   must	   therefore	   be	   closely	  monitored.	  While	   the	   indirect	  
forms	   of	   normalization	   that	   are	  currently	  underway	   are	   likely	   to	   continue	   for	   some	  
time,	  these	  pursuits	  will	   continue	  to	  erode	  Article	  9.	  Ultimately,	  Japanese	  leaders	  are	  
on	  course	  to	  either	  diminish	  Article	  9	  to	  the	  level	  where	  it	  serves	  no	  practical	  purpose	  
within	   Japanese	   politics,	   or	   a	   full-­‐scale	   redrafting	   of	   Japanese	   constitution.	   Either	  
outcome	  will	   place	  tremendous	  security	  pressure	  upon	  the	  Asia-­‐Paciﬁc,	  a	  region	  that	  
is	  historically	  wary	  of	  Japanese	  assertiveness	  and	  already	  strained	  under	  the	  emerging	  
bipolarity	  of	  a	  potential	  Sino-­‐American	  rivalry.
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Future	  Research	  Pathways
The	  conclusions	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  not	  designed	  to	  stand	  alone	  as	  an	  exclusive	  monolith	  
of	   research.	   It	   is	  hoped	  that	   the	  framework	  and	  conclusions	  developed	   in	  this	  thesis	  
will	   help	   reﬁne	   current	   topics	   facing	   studies	   of	   Japan	   and	   the	   broader	   East	   Asian	  
region.	   Potential	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   pathways	   for	   future	   research	   must	  
therefore	  be	  considered.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  maintain	  focus	  on	  the	  stated	  research	  questions,	  this	  thesis	  focuses	  
primarily	  on	  state	  elites.	  As	  noted	   in	  Chapter	  2,	   there	   is	  a	  domestic	  contestation	  for	  
power	  between	  competing	  political	  groups	  (the	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy).	  It	  falls	  to	  
state	   elites	   to	   mediate	   this	   competition	   and	   simultaneously	   balance	   the	   external	  
pressures	  from	   the	  international	  power	  hierarchy.	  Future	  research	  can	  draw	  from	  the	  
developed	   framework	   to	   more	  closely	   examine	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   general	   public	   or	  
non-­‐state	   actors	   on	   state	   elites.	   Exploring	   this	   dynamic	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   in	  
reviewing	   eﬀorts	   towards	   constitutional	   revision,	   and	   the	   level	   of	   support	   for	   said	  
revisions	   among	   the	   Japanese	   public.	   Further	  exploration	  of	  status	   seeking	  behavior	  
and	  group	  dynamics	  with	   the	  Japanese	   polity	  would	  also	   clarify	  the	  role	  of	  the	  LDP	  
and	  DPJ	   in	  the	  political	  discourse.	  There	  is	  a	  considerable	  blurring	  of	  party	  lines	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  prevailing	  factional	  aﬃliation	  (habatsu),	  leading	  to	  ideological	  overlap	  among	  
the	  many	  of	   the	  politicians	  discussed.	   A	  more	  comprehensive	   understanding	   of	   the	  
current	  domestic	  identity	  hierarchy	  is	  needed.
	   SIT	   provides	   crucial	   insights	   into	   status	   seeking	   behavior.	   Future	   research	  
could	  utilize	   SIT	   to	  better	  understand	  how	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  norms	   transforms	  
the	   domestic	  competition	  between	  political	   groups.	   A	   possible	   avenue	   to	   explore	   is	  
how	  modernization	  norms	   aﬀect	   the	  domestic	  power	   of	   societal	   classes.	  During	   the	  
early	  Meiji	  period,	  many	  of	  the	  samurai	  elite	  that	  had	  held	  esteemed	  positions	  within	  
Tokugawa	   Japan	   were	   forced	   aside	   by	   the	   sweeping	   modernization	   eﬀorts.	   A	  
comparative	   survey	   of	   how	   ruling	   classes	   reacted	   to	   the	   domestic	   reorientation	   of	  
modernization	  in	  their	  respective	  states	  may	  yield	  fruitful	  results.
	   The	   framework	   of	   this	   thesis	   has	   been	   designed	   to	   trace	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	  
state’s	   foreign	   policy	   over	   a	   broad	   historical	   timeframe.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	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research,	   three	  case	  studies	   -­‐	   Meiji	   Japan,	   Imperial	   Japan,	  and	  postwar	   Japan	  -­‐	   were	  
examined.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   framework	   is	   easily	   transferable.	  A	   similar	   state-­‐centric	  
approach	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  regional	  powers	  to	  form	  a	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  
East	  Asian	   power	  dynamics.	  These	   factors	  are	  particularly	   salient	   when	   considering	  
Sino-­‐Japanese	  relations.	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Chinese	  hierarchical	  order	  coincided	  with	  
the	   rise	   of	   Japan,	   thereby	   shifting	   regional	   power	   dynamics.	   Japan’s	   economic	  
successes	   and	  military	   ties	   with	   America	   reinforced	   it	   position	   within	   the	   regional	  
power	  hierarchy.	   As	   China	   rises	   and	   Japan	   strives	   to	   retain	   its	   regional	   power	  and	  
prestige,	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  this	  thesis	  could	  drive	  research	  that	  clariﬁes	  the	  
historical,	   ideological,	   and	   hierarchical	   factors	   at	   play.	   This	   pathway	   would	   greatly	  
enhance	  the	  conclusions	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  and	  could	  specifically	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  
ongoing	  Senkaku	  Island	  dispute.
	   Japanese	  leaders	  have	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  reconceptualizing	  security	  along	  
the	   lines	   of	   “comprehensive”	   or	   “human”	   security.	   This	   paradigm	   privileges	   human	  
welfare	   above	   traditional	   notions	   of	   national	   security,	   and	   is	   representative	   of	   a	  
strategy	   of	   social	   creativity.	   The	   norms	   of	   comprehensive	   security	   have	   had	   some	  
impact	  on	  Japan’s	  policy	  making	  elite.	  Exploring	  whether	  these	  emerging	  norms	  have	  
the	   potential	   to	   challenge	   the	   current	   trend	   towards	   social	   mobility	   would	   yield	  
crucial	   insights	   into	   the	   future	   trajectory	   of	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy.	   This	   research	  
could	   also	   explore	   Japan’s	   use	   of	   multilateralism	   to	   bolster	   its	   position	   within	   the	  
regional	  hierarchy.
	   A	   similar	   historically	   rooted	   expansion	   of	   the	   groups	   competing	   with	   the	  
domestic	   identity	   hierarchy	   would	   enhance	   the	   oﬀered	   conclusions.	   For	   example,	  
literature	   on	   interwar	   Japan	   often	   focuses	   too	   narrowly	   on	   the	   emergence	   of	  
militarism;	   further	   discussion	   of	   the	   present	   liberal	   internationalist	   factors	   and	   the	  
military’s	   fear	   of	   democratic	   ideals	   would	   help	   clarify	   this	   transitional	   moment	   in	  
Japan’s	  history.	  A	  more	  thorough	  handling	  of	  the	  nationalist	  groups	  -­‐	  beginning	  with	  
the	   sonnō	   jōi	   movement,	   through	   the	  prevalent	   nationalism	   of	   the	  Paciﬁc	  War,	   and	  
ending	   with	   and	   analysis	   of	   contemporary	   nationalist	   groups	   (as	   noted	   the	   second	  
quadrant	   of	  Table	  7.7)	   -­‐	   could	  supplement	   this	  research.	  Clarifying	  how	  nationalism	  
has	   translated	   into	   policy	   may	   clarify	   why	   current	   nationalist	   movements	   often	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forward	  revisionist	   interpretations	  of	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War.	  Exploring	  oﬀshoots	  of	  Japanese	  
nationalism,	  such	  as	  Pan-­‐Asianism,	  may	  supplement	  this	  pathway.
Issues	  and	  Ambiguities
	  As	  with	  any	  research	  project,	   certain	  limitations	  must	   be	  noted.	  When	  considered	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  potential	  future	  pathways	  outlined	  above,	  some	  if	  not	  all	  of	  these	  
limitations	   would	   be	   addressed	   by	   future	   research	   projects	   that	   expand	   upon	   the	  
theoretical	  framework	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis.
	   The	  primary	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  trace	  foreign	  policy	  output.	  As	  such,	  much	  
of	  the	  oﬀered	  analysis	  examines	  state	  elites	  charged	  with	  crafting	   foreign	  policy.	  This	  
approach	  is	  consistent	  with	  neoclassical	  realism,	  which	  contests	  it	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  
state	   leaders	   that	   ﬁlters	   and	   interprets	   external	   pressures	   from	   the	   international	  
system.	  Similarly,	   constructivism	   holds	  that	  group	  leaders	  possess	  more	  control	  over	  
group	  identity	  and	  norms	  than	  other	  in-­‐group	  members.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  general	  public	  
and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  consequently	  underplayed	  to	  maintain	  analytical	  
focus	  on	  the	  research	  questions.	  
	   A	   similar	   analytical	   restriction	   has	   been	   applied	   to	   liberalism.	   Liberal	  
interpretations	   of	   interstate	   relations	   are	   rooted	   in	   twentieth	   century	   analyses	   of	  
economic	  integration	  and	  regionalism.	  Some	  interesting	  analysis	  could	  potentially	  be	  
drawn	   from	   examining	   Japan’s	   attempts	   to	   bolster	   its	  position	  within	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  
War	   power	   hierarchy	   though	   institutionalism.	   Nonetheless,	   some	   of	   the	   most	  
inﬂuential	   international	   organizations	  -­‐	  the	  UN,	  IMF,	  WTO,	  and	  World	  Bank	   -­‐	   often	  
support	  American	  global	  interests.	  When	  considering	  the	  most	  relevant	  factors	  to	  the	  
research	  questions,	  it	  proved	  more	  eﬀective	  to	  examine	  US-­‐Japanese	  bilateralism	  than	  
Japanese	  multilateralism.	  
	   The	  narrative	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  designed	  to	  trace	  the	  evolution	  of	  modern	  Japan’s	  
foreign	   policy.	   Resultantly,	   a	   greater	   focus	   is	   given	   to	   domestic	  factors	   in	   the	   early	  
chapters,	  where	  the	  competition	  of	  political	  groups	  determined	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  
emerging	   modern	   state.	   The	   norms	   of	   the	   dominant	   domestic	   group,	   namely	   pro-­‐
modernization,	  were	  disseminated	   across	   Japan	   following	   the	  Meiji	  Restoration,	  and	  
formed	   the	   basis	   of	   Japan’s	   foreign	   policy	   culture.	   This	   narrowing	   eﬀect	   is	  
fundamental	   to	   the	   narrative.	   The	   ongoing	   balance	   between	   protecting	   sovereignty	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and	  enhancing	   state	  power	   inherited	  from	   the	  Meiji	   period	  has	   consistently	  deﬁned	  
the	  domestic	  struggle	  between	   groups.	   Furthermore,	   this	  narrative	   supplements	   the	  
existing	  literature	  where	  the	  tracing	  of	  domestic	  competition	  between	  political	  groups	  
has	  centered	  on	  the	  years	  following	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War.	  
	   This	  thesis	  draws	  heavily	  from	  existing	  historical	  sources.	  Some	  criticism	  could	  
be	  raised	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  new	  primary	  source	  material	  hinders	  the	  presented	  analysis.	  
However,	   the	   historical	   sources	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   are	   frequently	   neglected	   by	  
international	   relations	   scholars	  whose	   preference	   for	   artiﬁcially	   truncating	   Japanese	  
history	  to	  the	  period	  following	  the	  Paciﬁc	  War	  is	  noted	  in	  the	  literature	  review.	  One	  of	  
the	  stated	  purposes	  of	   this	  research	  is	   to	   improve	  international	   relations	   research	  by	  
forwarding	  a	  multidisciplinary	  approach	  that	  draws	  upon	  underutilized	  resources.	  
Closing	  Thoughts
Japan	   is	   blessed	   with	  a	   rich	   cultural	   history	  and	   cursed	   with	  a	   complicated	   past.	   It	  
possesses	   a	   high	   level	   of	   economic,	   social,	   and	   military	   development	   with	   political	  
leaders	  dedicated	  to	  elevating	   Japan’s	  status	  within	  the	   international	  system.	  Yet	   it	  is	  
also	   a	   state	   with	   a	   paciﬁst	   constitution	   and	   a	   contentious	   regional	   position.	   The	  
conﬂuence	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  dynamics	  drive	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  all	  states.	  It	  is	  
the	   charge	   of	   researchers	   to	   determine	   through	   what	   metric	   the	   principles	   of	  
statehood	   and	   group	   dynamics	   are	   interpreted	   without	   reducing	   their	   analysis	   to	  
counterfactual	  or	  ahistorical	  claims.	  This	  imperative	  is	  all	  the	  more	  necessary	  for	  those	  
committed	   to	   researching	  the	   enigma	  that	   is	   Japan.	  This	   thesis	  has	   addressed	   these	  
gaps	  by	  presenting	  a	  historically	  nuanced	  conceptualization	  of	  modern	  Japan’s	  foreign	  
policy	  evolution.	  It	  is	  my	  sincere	  hope	  that	  this	  project	  will	  in	  some	  capacity	  provide	  
international	  relations	  scholars	  and	  East	  Asian	  experts	  a	  resource	  for	  expanding	  their	  
respective	  research.	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   of	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   title	   and	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   pages	   at	   the	  
beginning	   each	   chapter,	   citations	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   not	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   citation	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   these	   elements.	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   that	   quotations	   that	  
also	  appeared	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  the	  body	  of	  a	  chapter	  are	  not	  listed	  here.
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